Nyāya Sūtras 93
Nyāyabhāṣya 93
- Language
- Sanskrit
93.3
pratyakṣam anumānam ekadeśagrahaṇād upalabdheḥ ||
Perception is [actually] inference, because apprehension [occurs] through the grasping of a single part.
93.4
yad idam indriyārthasannikarṣād utpadyate jñānaṃ vṛkṣa iti, etat kila pratyakṣam, tat khalv anumānam eva/ kasmāt? ekadeśagrahaṇād vṛkṣasyopalabdheḥ/ arvāgbhāgam ayaṃ gṛhītvā vṛkṣam upalabhate/ na caikadeśo vṛkṣaḥ/ tatra yathā dhūmaṃ gṛhītvā vahnim anuminoti tādṛg eva tad bhavati/
This cognition that arises from contact between a sense organ and an object, [namely] 'a tree', which is supposedly perception, is in fact solely inference. Why? Because the apprehension of the tree occurs through the grasping of a single part. Having grasped the near side, one apprehends the tree; and a single part is not the tree. There, just as one infers fire having grasped smoke, this is precisely of that nature.
93.5
kiṃ punar gṛhyamāṇād ekadeśād arthāntaram anumeyaṃ manyase? avayavasamūhapakṣe avayavāntarāṇi dravyāntarotpattipakṣe tāni cāvavavī ceti/ avayavasamūhapakṣe tāvad ekadeśagrahaṇād vṛkṣabuddher abhāvaḥ, nāgṛhyamāṇam ekadeśāntaraṃ vṛkṣo gṛhyamāṇaikadeśavad iti/
Now, what distinct object do you consider to be inferable from the grasped part? On the view of an aggregate of parts, other parts [are inferable]; on the view of the origination of a distinct substance, both those [other parts] and the whole [are inferable]. First, on the view of an aggregate of parts, there is no cognition of a tree from the grasping of a single part; an ungrasped other part is not the tree, just like the grasped part.
93.6
athaikadeśagrahaṇād ekadeśāntarānumāne samudāyapratisandhānāt tatra vṛkṣabuddhiḥ? na tarhi vṛkṣabuddhir anumānam evaṃ sati bhavitum arhatīti/
If [it is claimed that] because of the recollection of the aggregate when another part is inferred from the grasping of one part, the cognition of a tree [occurs] there—then the cognition of a tree cannot, in that case, be an inference.
93.7
dravyāntarotpattipakṣe nāvayavyanumeyaḥ, asyaikadeśasambaddhasyāgrahaṇāt grahaṇe cāviśeṣād anumeyatvābhāvaḥ/ tasmād vṛkṣabuddhir anumānaṃ na bhavati//31//
On the view of the origination of a distinct substance, the whole is not inferable: because it is connected with this [near] part, if it is not grasped [it cannot be inferred]; and if it is grasped, then owing to the absence of distinction, it cannot be inferable. Therefore, the cognition of a tree is not an inference.
Translations (1)
- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation
Commentaries (2)
- Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā — Vācaspati Miśra, Sanskrit
- Nyāyavārttika — Uddyotakara, Sanskrit
Linked texts (1)
- Nyāyasūtra — Akṣapāda Gautama, Sanskrit