Nyāya Sūtras 98

If it is said that the apprehension is like that of an army or a forest, [we say:] no, because atoms are beyond the senses.

[Opponent:] Just as with respect to the components of an army and the components of a forest, whose distinctness is not apprehended from a distance, the cognition 'This is one' arises, so too with respect to aggregated atoms, whose distinctness is not apprehended, the cognition 'This is one' arises. [Answer:] Just as in the case of the components of an army or a forest whose distinctness can be apprehended, the non-apprehension of their distinctness from afar is due to another cause,

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just as for [trees] whose universals can be apprehended, such as 'palāśa' or 'khadira', the universal is not apprehended from afar; just as for [objects] whose movement can be apprehended, movement is not apprehended from afar; and when a collection of objects is apprehended, the cognition 'one' arises figuratively because of the non-apprehension of distinctness; but in the case of atoms, whose distinctness is never apprehended, a figurative cognition of unity does not arise from a cause [such as distance] resulting in non-apprehension of distinctness, because atoms are beyond the senses.

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And this very point is being investigated: whether the cognition of unity has an aggregate of atoms as its object or not; the components of an army or a forest are themselves nothing but aggregates of atoms. And an example under investigation cannot properly be used [as evidence], because it is yet to be proved. If it is said, 'It is observed,' [we say:] no, because the object thereof is subject to investigation. As for what might be thought: 'This apprehension as one, through non-differentiation, due to the non-apprehension of the distinctness of the components of an army or a forest, is observed, and what is observed cannot be rejected'—that too is not so, because the object thereof is subject to investigation: this very object of sight is being investigated. This cognition which is observed as 'one' is investigated: does it have a distinct substance as its object, or an aggregate of atoms? In this matter, mere sight does not establish either alternative. And when atoms are manifold, the apprehension of them as one through non-differentiation due to the non-apprehension of distinctness is a cognition of that in what is not that, just like the cognition of a person in a post. What follows from that?

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Because a cognition of that in what is not that presupposes an archetype, the archetype is established. What is the archetype of the cognition of a person in a post? It is that cognition of a person in an [actual] person; when that exists, the cognition 'This is a person' arises in a post due to the apprehension of common features of a person. In the same way, when things are manifold, [the cognition] 'one' could arise due to the apprehension of common features [only] if the archetype exists. And [for you,] the archetype is not possible, because [on your view] of the non-apprehension of everything. Therefore, this cognition of non-difference, [namely,] 'one', has indeed a non-different [entity as its object].

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If it is said that the cognition of non-difference regarding the objects of other senses is the archetype, [we reply:] no, because, in the absence of a distinguishing reason, the examples remain unsettled: [that is, if you claim that] the cognition of unity regarding non-different [objects], such as sound and the like among the objects of the hearing and other senses, is the archetype for the cognition of unity regarding many [atoms]. And this being so, the citation of an example is not established, because of the absence of a distinguishing reason. Is the cognition of unity regarding aggregated atoms a cognition of that in what is not that, like the cognition of a person in a post, or, because the object really is such, is it a cognition of that in that, just as 'Sound is one' [arises] because of the oneness of sound? Without adopting a distinguishing reason, the two examples give rise to doubt. Since odor and the like are also merely aggregates like a jar, odor and the like are not an [independent] example.

In the same way, he should also be interrogated regarding cognitions of dimension, contact, motion, and specific universals, and the same absurdity applies to them.
The cognition of unity is a cognition of that [property] in that [object] because there is a differentiating reason, namely, co-referentiality with the cognition ‘large’—‘this is one and it is large’; these two cognitions have a single object and are co-referential. From this it is known that whatever is large is one. If it is claimed that the cognition of ‘large’ is the apprehension of an accumulation of atoms, then this cognition of ‘large’ with respect to atoms that are not large becomes a cognition of that [property] in what is not that. And what follows from this? Since a cognition of that [property] in what is not that depends on a prototype, the establishment of the prototype follows; and so there must be a cognition of ‘large’ precisely in what is large.

If it is claimed that the prototype is established from the judgment, ‘Sound is minute [or] large’—no, because that is the apprehension of faintness and loudness, owing to the non-ascertainment of spatial measure. As in the case of a substance, ‘a minute sound’ is the apprehension of what is faint and low, and ‘a loud sound’ is the apprehension of what is intense and sharp. Why? Because of the non-ascertainment of spatial measure. For one who judges ‘this is a large sound’ does not determine ‘it is of such-and-such size,’ as [one does in the case of] a jujube, a myrobalan, a bilva fruit, and so on.

Moreover, [the cognition] ‘these two are joined’ is the apprehension of contact residing in the same substratum as duality. If it is said that two aggregates are the substratum of contact, what is this aggregate? If it is said that an aggregate is one contact of many or many contacts of one, then there would be non-apprehension of contact residing in contact. In ‘these two things are joined,’ two joined contacts are not apprehended here.
If it is said that an aggregate is a collection of many, no, because there is the apprehension of what is co-referential with duality. When there is the apprehension ‘these two objects are joined,’ contact having an aggregate of many as its substratum is not apprehended. Nor is there any apprehension of two atoms. Therefore, two large substances serving as the substratum of duality are the locus of contact.

If it is said that proximity culminating in obstruction is contact, and not a distinct entity—no, because contact is the cause of a distinct entity. Contact is the cause of sound, color, and so on, and of motion. And without the production of a distinct quality in two substances, causality with respect to sound, color, and so on, and motion is not perceived; therefore, it is a distinct quality. And the object of a cognition is a distinct entity or its negation, as in ‘the teacher has earrings, the pupil does not have earrings.’ And if a distinct entity is not the object of the cognition of contact, then the negation of a distinct entity would be the object; in that case, the entity being negated must be stated: in ‘two substances are joined,’ whatever distinct entity seen elsewhere is negated here must be stated. Because it is apprehended as residing in two large [entities], it does not have atoms as its substratum.

A specific universal, which is indicated by the recurrence of a cognition, cannot be denied; or if it were denied, the consistency of cognitions would not be tenable. Since it does not manifest in what is not its locus, its locus must be stated. If it is said that an arrangement of atoms is its object, then its efficacy when reached or unreached must be stated: Is the specific universal residing in it apprehended when the arrangement of atoms is not reached [by the sense organ], or when it is reached? If it is apprehended when not reached, there would follow the apprehension even of an arrangement of atoms that is concealed; the specific universal residing in it would be apprehended even in a concealed arrangement of atoms. If it is apprehended when reached:

there would be non-manifestation when the middle and rear portions are not reached. If it is said that manifestation occurs in whatever part is reached, then only that much of the arrangement of atoms would be its locus; it would result that whatever extent is reached when the specific universal is apprehended is its locus. In that case, while a single aggregate is cognized, there would be a multiplicity of entities. And this being so, where this aggregate of atoms is cognized as ‘a tree,’ a plurality of trees would be cognized there, since whatever part of the aggregate of atoms tree-ness is apprehended in, that [part] would be a tree. Therefore, because an arrangement of aggregated atoms—which is a distinct entity—is the object of the manifestation of a specific universal, the composite whole is a distinct entity. //39