Verses on Sāṃkhya 10

Let that stand for now. We ask another [question]: Does this [effect] beginning with the intellect arise as existent in primordial matter prior to origination, or does it come about as nonexistent? On this point there is disagreement among teachers, hence there is doubt. Here the Vaiśeṣikas, holding a divergent view, consider that the existent arises from the nonexistent. For they are resolved that a pot does not exist in a lump of clay prior to origination. The wretched Ājīvikas say: 'it exists and does not exist.' 'It neither exists nor does not exist': this is the position of the Buddhists. With theorists thus speaking in mutual contradiction, what indeed is the certainty? Regarding that, it is said: First, the Ājīvikas, who assert existence and nonexistence, are refuted by the very contradiction in their own statement. If it is existent, then it is not nonexistent; or if it is nonexistent, then existence is not [possible]; because there is contradiction between the existent and nonexistent in one place. The example here is: just as 'Devadatta is dead and lives.' As for the Buddhists, since there is an absence of adopting a thesis in '[it] does not exist and does not not-exist,' debate with them is not even proper. But in order to refute the view of the Vaiśeṣikas that the existent arises from the nonexistent, it is said:

Because what is nonexistent cannot be produced, because of the grasping of a material cause, because not everything is possible, / because the capable produces what is possible, and because of the nature of the cause, the effect is existent.

In this world, only what is existent comes to be existent; there is no bringing about of what is non-existent. If there were, then there would be oil from sand, a protective cloak from turtle hair, the arching of the eyebrows of a barren woman's daughter, a hare's horn, and a sky-flower. But there is not; therefore it is inferred that the intellect and the rest do exist in primordial matter even prior to arising. "Because of taking an appropriate material cause": in this world, whoever has need of something takes that which serves as its material cause; he takes the causal condition for it. As, for instance, one who needs curds takes milk. And if the effect were non-existent, then one who needs curds would also take water; but he does not take [it]. Therefore the effect, beginning with the intellect, exists in primordial matter. Moreover, "because of the absence of the arising of everything [from everything]": in this world, that alone arises from that in which it is found, as oil from sesame seeds, ghee from curds. If the effect were non-existent, then everything would arise from everything; and consequently silver, gold, gems, pearls, corals, and the like would be produced from grass, dust, sand, and so forth. But they are not produced. Therefore we observe, also because of the absence of the arising of everything [from everything], that the effect beginning with the intellect is existent in primordial matter, and only what is existent comes to be existent. And for this reason also it exists: "because an able agent produces what is possible": in this world, an able craftsman endowed with the instrument and other causes, the material, the time, and the means undertakes only a possible task from what is possible, not an impossible one from what is impossible. As, for instance, an able potter endowed with an appropriate lump of clay and with an appropriate stick, wheel, cord, water, strips, and basin is seen undertaking jars, shallow bowls, water-vessels, and the like; but not a large water-jar and such, because that is impossible with just that much of a lump. If, on the other hand, there were no restriction regarding instruments, what is impossible would be undertaken even from what is impossible. Therefore the effect must be existent, not non-existent. Moreover, "and because of being identical in nature with the cause": the effect must be existent. In this world, whatever is the defining characteristic of the cause, that must be the defining characteristic of the effect. As grain of kodrava comes from kodrava, rice from rice. And if the effect were non-existent, then rice might also be produced from kodrava; but it is not produced. Therefore, also because of being identical in nature with the cause, we observe that the effect beginning with the intellect exists in primordial matter. Thus by these five reasons it is established that the effect is existent. Beginning with the scripture: "In the beginning, gentle one, this was Being alone, one only without a second; regarding this some say: In the beginning this was non-being alone," up to: "Indeed, in the beginning, gentle one, this was Being alone."