Verses on Sāṃkhya 10.1

10.1

tiṣṭhatu tāvad etat | anyat pṛcchāmaḥ --- kim etan mahadādi prāg utpatteḥ pradhāne sat jāyate, utāsat sambhavati | atrācāryāṇāṃ vipratipattir ataḥ saṃśayaḥ | atra vaiśeṣikā vipratipannā asataḥ sad bhavatīti manyante | mṛtpiṇḍe hi prāg utpatter ghaṭo nāstīti vyavasitāste | asti nāstīti varākā jīvakāḥ | naivāsti na ca nāsti | eṣa bauddhānāṃ pakṣaḥ | evam anyonyavirodhavādiṣu darśiṣu ko nāma niścayaḥ | tad ucyate | tatra tāvat sadasadvādino jīvakāḥ svavacanavirodhenaiva nirastāḥ | yadi sat tadāsan na bhavati | utāsat tadā sadbhāvo na | yataḥ sadasator ekatra virodhāt | atra dṛṣṭānto yathā devadatto mṛto jīvati cetivat | bauddhānāṃ tu nāsti na ca nāstīti pakṣaparigrahābhāvāt taiḥ saha sañjalpa eva na yujyate | vaiśeṣikāṇāṃ tu asataḥ sad bhavatīti matapratiṣedhāya ucyate ---

Let that stand for now. We ask another [question]: Does this [effect] beginning with the intellect arise as existent in primordial matter prior to origination, or does it come about as nonexistent? On this point there is disagreement among teachers, hence there is doubt. Here the Vaiśeṣikas, holding a divergent view, consider that the existent arises from the nonexistent. For they are resolved that a pot does not exist in a lump of clay prior to origination. The wretched Ājīvikas say: 'it exists and does not exist.' 'It neither exists nor does not exist': this is the position of the Buddhists. With theorists thus speaking in mutual contradiction, what indeed is the certainty? Regarding that, it is said: First, the Ājīvikas, who assert existence and nonexistence, are refuted by the very contradiction in their own statement. If it is existent, then it is not nonexistent; or if it is nonexistent, then existence is not [possible]; because there is contradiction between the existent and nonexistent in one place. The example here is: just as 'Devadatta is dead and lives.' As for the Buddhists, since there is an absence of adopting a thesis in '[it] does not exist and does not not-exist,' debate with them is not even proper. But in order to refute the view of the Vaiśeṣikas that the existent arises from the nonexistent, it is said: