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Matharavritti 5

English (machine translation) 5

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English

5.1

In order to establish these objects of knowledge—the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower—he states the means of knowledge. For the establishment of everything is observed to proceed through the sequence of means of knowledge, object of knowledge, knower, and cognition.

5.2

Perception, inference, and authoritative testimony [are accepted],
since all means of knowledge are established [through them];
threefold means of knowledge is accepted, for the establishment of the object of knowledge is from the means of knowledge.

5.3

"The seen" is a synonym for perception. Knowledge that arises dependent upon an indriya, a sense faculty, is called "perception" or "the seen". For example, sound and the other five sense-objects are the means of valid cognition, "the seen", for the five [faculties] beginning with the ear. This is the first and principal among all means of valid cognition. An object that cannot be established by this seen [means of valid cognition] provides room for inference. And that [inference] consists of three factors or five factors; others say it consists of three members or five members. And that inference, free from the thirty-three fallacies, is deployed in the absence of perception. Having observed some mark, one measures after that mark: thus it is "inference" [measuring after]. For example, having observed the mark of smoke, as previously in a kitchen upon seeing fire, the existence of fire is established: thus it is an inference. For an object that cannot be established by perception and inference, there is authoritative testimony. For example: apsarases exist in heaven; there is the Nandana grove; there are distinct objects such as sound; there is residence in celestial chariots. Authoritative people are those devoid of passion, aversion, and the like, such as Brahmā and Sanatkumāra; authoritative revelation is the Veda; what is taught by these two, to be trusted as true, is authoritative testimony.
Now, are there not many other means of valid cognition, such as postulation, probability, non-existence, intuition, tradition, and comparison? How is the statement here that means of valid cognition are threefold consistent? To this it is replied: "Because all means of valid cognition are established [in them]". For all means of valid cognition are uncontradicted within these three means of valid cognition. Among them, when it is said, "Fat Devadatta does not eat by day," the meaning is that he eats at night; that postulation is just inference. When it is said, "a prastha", the understanding that there are four kuḍavas is probability; that too is just inference. And non-existence is of four kinds through the divisions of prior non-existence, mutual non-existence, destructional non-existence, and absolute non-existence; for instance, seeing the parching of the rice crop establishes that "the god has not rained", the non-existence of rain; that too is a variety of inference. Intuition is as follows:

5.4

"South of the Vindhya, but north of the Sahya,
On the earth extending to the sea, that region is delightful:"

5.5

When this is said, an intuition arises: "There are splendid qualities there". Intuition is the knowledge of those who understand; that too is just inference. Tradition is as follows: when it is said, "People say that a yakṣiṇī lives in this banyan tree", the knowledge that "she causes obstacles, gives wealth, and so forth" is also just inference. Comparison: "As is a cow, so is a wild ox"; this too is just inference. Furthermore, the knowledge of a thirsty person by his cupped hands, of a hungry person from his bringing together the five fingers, of a weak person from the observation of broad eyes and the like, from the observation of mud on the forefinger—all this is just inference. Therefore, since any other [means of valid cognition] is included within these three alone, it is correctly stated that means of valid cognition are threefold. "Accepted" means intended: this is the meaning. What is to be established by that means of valid cognition? He says: "For the establishment of the object of valid cognition is from the means of valid cognition". Because every object of valid cognition is cognized by a means of valid cognition, just as sandalwood and the like [are measured] by a balance, ghee and the like by a karṣa, or rice and the like by a prastha. The means of valid cognition are perception, inference, and revelation; the objects of valid cognition are the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower; the knower is the self. There, the manifest comprises the twenty-three [principles]; the unmanifest is primordial matter; the knower is the field-knower. Thus, among these, some are cognized by perception, others by inference, and the rest by both authoritative testimony and inference. Therefore, it has been rightly stated by the venerable teacher: "For the establishment of the object of valid cognition is from the means of valid cognition". //