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Translation of Matharavritti (Māṭharavṛtti)

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Source: pramana-mt · Machine translation by Gemini 3.8 Flash (2026-10-06) of in.darsana.samkhya.samkhyakarika!mathara-vrtti · Machine output without human authorship: no copyright is claimed (CC0 1.0). The original text keeps its own…

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Text

1.2

The Sāṅkhyakārikā
accompanied by the commentary of Māṭhara

1.3

To the creator of all sciences, abiding in the sun, eternal,
I bow with supreme devotion, to the light associated with Kapila, the Lord. // 1

1.4

Homage to that Kapila, by whom, when the world was submerged in the ocean of ignorance,
out of compassion a boat consisting of Sāṅkhya was prepared here for crossing over. // 2

1.5

And bowing to him, I shall state the cause of that knowledge,
a compilation of concise texts for the benefit of all students. // 3

From the assault of the threefold suffering arises the desire to know the cause of its termination;
if [it is said that this desire is] superfluous because perceptible [means exist, we say:] no, because of their lack of certainty and finality. // SK 1

2.2

An introduction to this Āryā verse is undertaken:

2.3

The locus, the cause, the speaker, the hearer, the hearer's purpose,
and the statement of the connection and so forth—that is called the introduction.

2.4

Here indeed, the revered great sage—endowed with innate virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and lordship, an incarnation of the blessed ancient Spirit wishing to show grace to the world—was born to Devahūti, daughter of the Manu Svāyambhuva, as the son of the Prajāpati Kardama, named Kapila. Endowed with that comprehension which consists of the perception of the difference between the constituents and the spirit—like a supporting hand for one wishing to see the boundless shore, like an ambrosial gem for a world constantly bitten by the serpent of time, like a correct medicine for dispelling the hard-to-cure disease of existence, like a lamp for destroying the darkness of ignorance, like an axe for cutting down the tree of delusion that blocks the path to liberation—he saw this world sinking in blinding darkness. Seeing that, compassion arose in him: "Alas! This world, bound [to rebirth] from beginningless time, abides in blinding darkness by its very nature!"
Then this great ascetic, compassion having arisen in him, felt concern in his mind: "How can grace be extended to this wretched universe abiding in blinding darkness?" Reflecting thus, knowing a certain distinguished Brahmin of the Āsuri lineage, who had been performing sacrifices for a thousand years, to be an eligible student through the science of instruction on Brahman, he became unwearied and uttered these words: "O Āsuri, do you delight in the duty of a householder?" He said to him: "I delight [in it], sir." Addressed thus, the sage, concluding that "his discrimination and dispassion are slightly incomplete," departed; and returning again when a second thousand years was completed, he spoke in the very same way: "O Āsuri, do you delight in the duty of a householder?" He said to him: "I delight [in it], sir." Then that lord of great ascetics departed just as before, and approaching when a third thousand years was completed, he said: "O Āsuri, do you delight in the duty of a householder?" He said to him: "I do not delight [in it], sir." Then he was asked by the venerable one: "Why?" Āsuri said again: "From the assault of the threefold suffering." Then Kapila said: "My dear, if you are willing to lead the life of celibacy, then we will teach the remedy for this threefold suffering." He said: "Revered sir, certainly, I am able to follow the command of your reverence." Thus abandoning the duty of a householder, his sons, wife, and so forth, he renounced the world and became a pupil, indeed dear as life, to the venerable teacher Kapila, the ascetic.
In that regard, if someone should ask: "Whence did his desire to know arise, by which he went to the house of a teacher?" To that, this is the reply: The desire to know arose from the assault of the threefold suffering. Thinking: "Who is supreme here? What is the true nature [of reality]? What is the highest good? What should I do to achieve my purpose?", he went to the house of a teacher. For it is said:

2.5

"That is austerity, that is recitation, that is intellect, that is knowledge, and that is scholarship
from which there would never be a fall into the midst of the ocean of transmigration."

2.6

—because this is heard [in tradition].

2.7

Moreover:

2.8

"By what action did my birth occur here, and where must I go from this existence?"—
he in whom this inquiry does not arise on earth, how will he be inclined towards virtue?

2.9

Therefore, it is proper that this desire to know arose in him.

2.10

What, then, is that threefold suffering? He states it: internal, material, supernatural. There, the first is twofold: bodily and mental. There, bodily [suffering] is that which occurs with reference to the self, [namely] the body, such as fever and diarrhea, caused by an imbalance of the bodily humors: wind, bile, and phlegm. Mental [suffering] is twofold: caused by separation from what is dear and contact with what is not dear. This is described as internal suffering. Material [suffering], on the other hand, is that which occurs with reference to living beings, caused by humans, beasts, birds, reptiles, and immovable things. Supernatural [suffering], however, is that which occurs with reference to heaven, such as cold, heat, wind, and rain. Thus, in the Brahmin of Āsuri's lineage struck down by these three sufferings, a desire to know arose. Regarding what object? Concerning the cause of their removal: concerning that which is the cause that removes, that destroys, those three sufferings. He states that desire to know: 'Do these sufferings belong to the body, or is there some other spirit distinct from it to whom these three sufferings arise? Or is there even a means of countering them, or not? If there is, then we shall adopt precisely that. If not, then, like a bull [in] the first rainstorm of the monsoon, we must endure them with closed eyes. It is only one who is bitten by a scorpion or the like who seeks a snake-doctor to counter the venom, or not [if] able to endure the pain caused by the poison.' In this way, in Āsuri, overcome by unbearable suffering, a desire to know arose concerning the cause of its removal. And he, desiring to know the non-existence of the arisen suffering, approached for refuge the venerable master Kapila, who is skilled in countering it, [thinking:] 'He will tell me the means of countering suffering that I desire.'
Now, if the desire to know has arisen from sufferings alone, how can it serve as the cause for their non-existence? For a son born from a mother does not bring about her destruction. True. Here in the world, what is born from something is also seen to be the cause of its destruction. For instance, a crab or a mule, born from its mother, kills that very [mother]. Or, for instance, a certain venomous snake standing in an area full of dry grass, seeing a rival snake and becoming angry, the fire issuing from the breath of its mouth burned the grass and even that snake. By this reasoning, the desire to know, produced from sufferings alone, will bring about the non-existence of sufferings; thus the connection of the sense is coherent.
To this it is said: [“If it be said that] this is pointless because of visible [means]” — the particle “if” (cet) expresses a doubt. In this world there is indeed a remedy for all arisen sufferings; what is the point of approaching Kapila for that sake? This is the meaning. He shows that very visible cause: for internal bodily ailments, all diseases such as fever and diarrhea, there are indeed physicians, doctors knowing the eightfold Āyurveda, skilled in the treatment of the body, major surgery, minor surgery, poisons, madness, infertility, aging, and pediatric diseases. The remedy for internal mental torment is from union with pleasant things and avoiding from afar what is unpleasant. For material [suffering], its removal is accomplished by constructing villages, cities, and the like. For supernatural [suffering], by wind-shelters, coverings, veils, and the like. Therefore, because causes for their removal exist, what is the point of approaching Kapila? This is the meaning. And so there is a popular saying:

2.11

“If one can obtain honey on an arka plant, why should one go to a mountain? / When what is desired is achieved with ease, what wise person would exert effort?”

2.12

To this it is said: No. The word “no” is in negation of the statement of the prima facie view. The meaning is: it should not be said so. “Because of the absence of certainty and finality.” Certainly, inevitably, there is no remedy through the causes stated by you; because even when physicians administer well-prepared medicines and strive to the best of their ability, sometimes a creature dies, sometimes it lives. Even in a physician's home, because unavoidable death is seen of daughters-in-law, sons, wives, brothers, fathers, and so forth, this visible remedy is not certain for internal [suffering]. Furthermore, neither is it a final remedy; because even of those who have been made disease-free by medicine, fevers and the like are seen to arise again after a few days. Therefore, the visible remedy is not in any way final, [not] capable of removing internal suffering; just as spring and the other seasons, though gone, come again. And there are verses on this point:

2.13

“The burning sensation has arisen again, and trembling has occurred again; / hiccups trouble again, and the fever has returned again.”

2.14

And another:

2.15

“The eye-specialist has cataracts, the general physician has leprosy; / they ask the pediatrician: ‘How is it that your children have died?’”

2.16

Moreover, medicine does not exist through expertise in proper diagnosis of the bodily humors. For example:

2.17

“Whatever roots they may be, with whatever [liquid] one should grind them; / to whomever they should be given, whatever happens will happen.”

2.18

And another [point]: physicians, in order to devour the wealth of people who have come with needs, and to display their own competence, first aggravate even a slight disease; and from that, sometimes it becomes incurable even for them. And so [it is said]:

2.19

“O physician, O physician, homage to you, who have destroyed all men! / With his burden placed upon you, Death thrives in comfort.”

2.20

In this way, by a visible cause such as medicine, there is no remedy for bodily internal suffering with certainty, that is, inevitably, [or] with finality, that is, entirely. Likewise, even for mental [suffering], there is sometimes no cessation even from contact with pleasant sounds and the like. Likewise, material [suffering] also sometimes departs by means, and sometimes not. Likewise, supernatural [suffering] also sometimes departs, and sometimes not. Moreover, even the departure of suffering is useless because it arises again. But for this student, a cause for the departure of suffering that is certain and final is desired. Therefore, it is appropriate to approach a teacher for that sake. // 1

3.1

If so, then let there be, apart from perceived [means], the scriptural [cause] prescribed by the Veda, consisting of sacrifices and the like as means to heaven and so forth, because the threefold misery cannot exist on the summit of heaven. There, in tradition—the Veda—an invariable and final [cessation] is heard. Because students hear (śṛṇvanti) the Veda subsequently (paścāt) as spoken by the teacher (guruṇā), tradition (anuśrava) is the Veda. What originates therein is "scriptural" (ānuśravika). This scriptural [means], consisting of sacrifice and the like, is suitable as a cause for counteracting the threefold suffering. For it says thus: "He crosses over death, he crosses over grief, he crosses over evil, he crosses over the murder of a Brahmin, who sacrifices with the horse sacrifice." And the gods also say of this:

3.2

"We have drunk Soma, we have become immortal; we have reached the light, we have found the gods. / What now can the foe do to us, or what the malice of a mortal, O immortal?"

3.3

[thus the text].

3.4

Here, in scripture, an invariable and final fruit is heard. In this regard, its explanation is: Once, it is said, Indra, having noticed the gods present, said this: "O gods! Is there any happiness other than godhood?" Then those gods said: "There is no other happiness. For this very reason, our abode is named nāka (heaven). Kam is a name for happiness; the negation of that is akam, unhappiness; that it is not (na akam), hence nāka. It is pure happiness. Two negatives convey the primary meaning." Then Indra said: "How so?" Then they said: "By this cause: we have drunk (apāma), meaning we drank; Soma, meaning Soma juice in the sacrifice; through that drinking, we have become (abhūma) immortal (amṛtāḥ), meaning deathless. Furthermore, we have reached (aganma), meaning attained; the light (jyotiḥ), heaven. Moreover, we have found (avidāma), meaning we know; the gods. We know: 'So many gods are in this heaven.' Kim ('what') is used in objection. Nūnam means certainly. Asmān means of us (asmākam), by change of case ending. Kṛṇavat means he will do. Arātiḥ means an enemy, death. Or what can dhṛtiḥ (malice), meaning old age, do to us? Amṛtamartyasya means of mortals who drink the immortal nectar. The change of number is by the rule 'Variously in the Veda'. In this manner, whoever else drinks Soma will also have an invariable (necessarily) and final (in every way) warding off of the threefold suffering. Therefore we say: what is the use of renunciation or of Sāṅkhya knowledge? We will perform what is spoken of in the Veda, and heaven will be the counteraction of suffering." Having heard this statement of the proponents of the Veda, the teacher of Sāṅkhya speaks the second verse to refute it and to establish his own doctrine:

3.5

The scriptural is like the perceived, for it is linked with impurity, decay, and excess. / Superior to that is [the path] opposed to it, arising from the discernment of the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower.

3.6

This scriptural [means] from the Veda—the Agnihotra and so forth—which is declared to be a cause for counteracting the threefold misery through being a means to heaven, is also an uncertain counteraction, just like the perceived. For instance: "A wife desiring a son should eat the middle rice-ball with the mantra: 'Fathers, place an embryo...'". Thus, in accordance with the Vedic statement, she eats many rice-balls, more than a hundred, and yet not even a single son is born. Likewise, in scripture there is: "May we see a hundred autumns, may we live a hundred autumns." But a prince dies while still in the womb, or just born, or as a child, or even as a youth. Furthermore, that scriptural cause is impure, because it involves violence to animals. It is linked with decay, because of falling back down [from heaven]. It is linked with excess, because even there one hears of the relationship of master and servant. And it is said:

3.7

"Six hundred animals, minus three animals, / are bound on the middle day of the horse sacrifice, according to the precept."

3.8

The slaughter of animals in the Agniṣṭoma, human sacrifice, the arrangement of the Gosava, the drinking of liquor in the Sautrāmaṇī, and the free chatter of the officiating priests with a widow—many other improper acts are also enjoined in the Kalpasūtra as duties to be performed. For one hears: "He should sacrifice a Brahmin to Brahman, a Kṣatriya to the nobility, a Vaiśya to the Maruts, a thief to penance, a slayer of heroes to hell," and so on. Moreover:

3.9

"Just as muddy water cannot be cleansed with mud, or [liquor-stained] with liquor, / so one cannot wipe away this killing of living beings through sacrifices."

3.10

"For hands smeared with blood are indeed not cleansed by blood alone."

3.11

Because of the Vedic passage: "Just as in this world human beings eat animals and thus consume them, so in yonder world animals eat human beings." Furthermore:

3.12

"If by cutting down trees, slaughtering animals, and making a mire of blood / one goes to heaven, by what does one go to hell?"

3.13

Thus, the Vedic means of counteracting the threefold suffering is accompanied in every way by impurity. Now, as to what was stated earlier: "We have drunk Soma, we have become immortal" [Ṛgveda 8.48.3]—to that, this is the reply: Even for drinkers of Soma such as Nṛga, Nahuṣa, Indra, and Yayāti, piercing, binding, and afflictions were manifold; and for others, there is a fall [from heaven] upon the exhaustion of the enjoyment of their karma. Sacrifices such as the one-day rites, which have a limited duration in days and are limited causes, are observed to produce an effect, such as heaven, that is likewise limited; for the effect conforms to the cause. From a limited lump of clay, only a limited pot can arise. In this way, because the fruit of scriptural means is limited, there is again decay. Moreover, it is accompanied by inequality. Just as suffering arises for a poor man on seeing a rich man, for an ugly man on seeing a handsome one, and for a fool on seeing a wise man, so too suffering arises for a heavenly resident possessing five Apsarases upon seeing one who possesses a hundred Apsarases, and for one possessing a single Apsaras upon seeing him. In this way, this [scriptural means] is just like the perceived means. Thus, on account of mutual inequality, suffering is unremitting even in heaven. Therefore: "The opposite of that is better" [Sāṅkhyakārikā 2]. The means that is the opposite of, dissimilar to, those two—the perceived and the scriptural means—being certain, absolute, pure, imperishable, yielding endless fruit, and unsurpassable because of isolation, is better, [that is,] superior. But how does this come about? He says: "from the knowledge of the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower" [Sāṅkhyakārikā 2]. From the knowledge, [that is,] the direct experience, of these three: the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower. For this [means] is certain because it necessarily grants its fruit; absolute because of the knowledge of nature; pure because of possessing restraints, observances, and so forth; and of imperishable fruit because, upon the dissolution of the body, there is no re-entry [into transmigration]. It yields unsurpassable fruit because of isolation and because nothing is higher—this is the completion of the sentence. Among them, the manifest is twenty-three-fold through the division of intellect, egoity, sense faculties, subtle elements, and gross elements. The unmanifest is primordial matter, the cause of the origination of the manifest; its establishment [rests on the principle] that an effect cannot lack a cause. The knower is the spirit, the cause of activity merely through the existence of its presence, like a magnet for iron; hence its establishment is that this is the cause of activity for insentient primordial matter. These are the twenty-five principles, designated as the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower, from the knowledge of which one is certainly and entirely freed from the threefold suffering.

4.1

Now, into how many kinds are these divided? To this, it is said: into four kinds. If it is asked: how? That is stated:

4.2

Root nature is not a modification; the seven beginning with the great [principle] are both natures and modifications;
but the sixteen-fold set is only a modification; the spirit is neither nature nor modification.

4.3

"Root nature" is primordial matter, because it is the root. "Root" means the source, the beginning of the seven that are both natures and modifications. It is nature (prakṛti) because it produces (prakaraṇa); it is nature because its property is generation. It is "not a modification"—an un-modification—because it is not originated from anything else. The meaning is that it is only a cause, not an effect, because it is unoriginated and an originator. But the seven beginning with the great [principle] are both natures and modifications: the great [principle], egoity, and the five subtle elements—these seven are natures by being the causes of other things, and themselves modifications by being effects. With respect to that, he explains the manifestation: from primordial matter arises the intellect, so it is a modification; and it produces egoity, so it is a nature. Egoity is originated from the great [principle], so it is a modification; it produces the subtle elements, so it is a nature. The subtle elements are originated from egoity, so all five are modifications; from them the five gross elements are born, so they are natures. Because they are originated and are originators, these seven are both natures and modifications. The subtle elements are those named sound, touch, form, taste, and smell. "The sixteen-fold set, however, is only a modification" because it is merely an effect; it has no nature-hood, because it is not a cause. He explains its manifestation: the eleven sense faculties originated from the modified egoity, and the five gross elements from the subtle elements—this sixteen-fold group is a modification originated from something else; the meaning is that nothing else is originated from it, because it is originated and is not an originator. But the spirit is not a nature, because it is not an originator, nor is it a modification, because it is not originated. The meaning is that it is neither cause nor effect. In this way, this fourfold division of nature and modification has been stated by virtue of the distinction: nature, nature-and-modification, modification, and neither nature nor modification.

5.1

In order to establish these objects of knowledge—the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower—he states the means of knowledge. For the establishment of everything is observed to proceed through the sequence of means of knowledge, object of knowledge, knower, and cognition.

5.2

Perception, inference, and authoritative testimony [are accepted],
since all means of knowledge are established [through them];
threefold means of knowledge is accepted, for the establishment of the object of knowledge is from the means of knowledge.

5.3

"The seen" is a synonym for perception. Knowledge that arises dependent upon an indriya, a sense faculty, is called "perception" or "the seen". For example, sound and the other five sense-objects are the means of valid cognition, "the seen", for the five [faculties] beginning with the ear. This is the first and principal among all means of valid cognition. An object that cannot be established by this seen [means of valid cognition] provides room for inference. And that [inference] consists of three factors or five factors; others say it consists of three members or five members. And that inference, free from the thirty-three fallacies, is deployed in the absence of perception. Having observed some mark, one measures after that mark: thus it is "inference" [measuring after]. For example, having observed the mark of smoke, as previously in a kitchen upon seeing fire, the existence of fire is established: thus it is an inference. For an object that cannot be established by perception and inference, there is authoritative testimony. For example: apsarases exist in heaven; there is the Nandana grove; there are distinct objects such as sound; there is residence in celestial chariots. Authoritative people are those devoid of passion, aversion, and the like, such as Brahmā and Sanatkumāra; authoritative revelation is the Veda; what is taught by these two, to be trusted as true, is authoritative testimony.
Now, are there not many other means of valid cognition, such as postulation, probability, non-existence, intuition, tradition, and comparison? How is the statement here that means of valid cognition are threefold consistent? To this it is replied: "Because all means of valid cognition are established [in them]". For all means of valid cognition are uncontradicted within these three means of valid cognition. Among them, when it is said, "Fat Devadatta does not eat by day," the meaning is that he eats at night; that postulation is just inference. When it is said, "a prastha", the understanding that there are four kuḍavas is probability; that too is just inference. And non-existence is of four kinds through the divisions of prior non-existence, mutual non-existence, destructional non-existence, and absolute non-existence; for instance, seeing the parching of the rice crop establishes that "the god has not rained", the non-existence of rain; that too is a variety of inference. Intuition is as follows:

5.4

"South of the Vindhya, but north of the Sahya,
On the earth extending to the sea, that region is delightful:"

5.5

When this is said, an intuition arises: "There are splendid qualities there". Intuition is the knowledge of those who understand; that too is just inference. Tradition is as follows: when it is said, "People say that a yakṣiṇī lives in this banyan tree", the knowledge that "she causes obstacles, gives wealth, and so forth" is also just inference. Comparison: "As is a cow, so is a wild ox"; this too is just inference. Furthermore, the knowledge of a thirsty person by his cupped hands, of a hungry person from his bringing together the five fingers, of a weak person from the observation of broad eyes and the like, from the observation of mud on the forefinger—all this is just inference. Therefore, since any other [means of valid cognition] is included within these three alone, it is correctly stated that means of valid cognition are threefold. "Accepted" means intended: this is the meaning. What is to be established by that means of valid cognition? He says: "For the establishment of the object of valid cognition is from the means of valid cognition". Because every object of valid cognition is cognized by a means of valid cognition, just as sandalwood and the like [are measured] by a balance, ghee and the like by a karṣa, or rice and the like by a prastha. The means of valid cognition are perception, inference, and revelation; the objects of valid cognition are the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower; the knower is the self. There, the manifest comprises the twenty-three [principles]; the unmanifest is primordial matter; the knower is the field-knower. Thus, among these, some are cognized by perception, others by inference, and the rest by both authoritative testimony and inference. Therefore, it has been rightly stated by the venerable teacher: "For the establishment of the object of valid cognition is from the means of valid cognition". //

6.1

There, the distinct definition of the threefold means of valid cognition is set forth:

6.2

The seen is the determination of each respective object; inference is stated to be threefold;
It is preceded by a mark and a mark-bearer; but authoritative testimony is authoritative revelation. //

6.3

The determination towards each respective object on the part of the five sense faculties—the eye and the rest—in respect to the five [kinds of objects] such as form, that is perception, whose nature is apprehension, designated as 'the seen'. Inference is of three kinds. Others say it has three proofs, [that is,] three members, or five members. It is 'declared', [meaning] stated. 'Thesis, reason, example'—this is the three-membered [inference]. A thesis is the statement of the proposition, as for instance: 'This place possesses fire.' A thesis is the presentation of the entity to be proved. The others are the nine pseudo-theses, beginning with that contradicted by perception. The reason has three forms. The threefold condition, furthermore, is: presence in the subject, presence in the similar instances, and absence from the counter-instances. An example here is: 'Because it possesses smoke.' The others are the fourteen pseudo-reasons, beginning with the unproved, the inconclusive, and the contradictory. The example is of two kinds, through similarity and through dissimilarity; as for instance, 'the kitchen'. The others are the ten pseudo-examples. In this way, the three-membered inference is free from the thirty-three fallacies. Others say it has five members. He states that: 'The members, furthermore, are the proposition, the reason, the example, the application, and the conclusion.' Thus, demonstrating to another an object ascertained for oneself by means of a five-membered statement is inference for the sake of another. And that is of three kinds: possessing an antecedent, possessing a consequent, and seen through commonality. There, from seeing a particular rise of clouds, one considers that rain will occur; because 'this was seen previously', it is 'possessing an antecedent'. Or, from the sight of a river's flooding, the apprehension that 'the god has rained above'. 'Possessing a consequent', as for instance: having tasted a drop of seawater, the saltiness of the rest is inferred—thus it is 'possessing a consequent'. 'Seen through commonality': from seeing a mango tree in bloom, [inferring] that mango trees are in bloom elsewhere. Or again, as when someone says, 'there is brightness outside,' and another says regarding that, 'the moon must have risen'—such is the connection of meaning. 'Preceded by a mark and that which has the mark': through a mark, [such as] through the sight of a triple staff and the like, even one who is unseen and possesses the mark is established: 'Surely there is a renunciant here, whose triple staff this is.' 'Authoritative revelation is authoritative testimony': this is the third instrument of knowledge. The 'authoritative' are the teachers, Brahmā and others; 'revelation' is the Veda; both of these together are authoritative testimony. 'Authority' is direct attainment of an object, perception of things as they are; one who proceeds through that is 'authoritative'—one who has directly realized virtue, who grasps the revealed meaning through an accurate attainment; what is spoken by him is authoritative testimony. There too, there are three functions of words: conventional, metaphorical, and qualitative. In that regard, the threefold nature of metaphor—exclusive metaphor, inclusive metaphor, and exclusive-inclusive metaphor, etc.—is extensively elaborated in treatises on epistemology. Here, only the view of the blessed Kapila that is under discussion is set forth:

6.4

"Authoritative tradition is indeed authoritative speech; they consider someone authoritative because of the destruction of flaws. / One whose flaws have dwindled would not speak an untruthful sentence, because of the absence of a motive.

6.5

He who is devoted to his own duty, free from passion and aversion, / and constantly honored by those who know that—such a person is to be known as authoritative."

6.6

Thus, such is this threefold instrument of knowledge. //

7.1

Now, of that which is termed the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower, which is established by which among the three kinds of instruments of knowledge, perception and the rest? In response, it is said:

7.2

Cognition of supersensible things, however, is from inference seen through commonality; / and what is beyond perception, unproved even by that, is to be established from authoritative tradition. //

7.3

Here, primordial matter and spirit are supersensible; their establishment is from inference seen through commonality. Because, seeing the mark [consisting of] the intellect and the rest, which possesses the three constituents and is an effect, primordial matter, which is its cause and also possesses the three constituents, is established to exist even though unseen. For the existent cannot arise from the non-existent, nor can an effect be unlike its cause. The manifest, however, is established by perception alone; therefore no effort is made for its sake. Because primordial matter, even though insentient, proceeds into the activity of production, therefore there must necessarily exist spirit, like a magnet which is the cause of the power of movement in iron; thus the knower is established. //

8.1

An objection: Is it not the accepted view that whatever object is not apprehended by perception does not exist in any way, like a second head on someone other than Īśvara, a third arm, or the horn of a hare? Likewise, primordial matter and spirit are not apprehended, therefore they too do not exist. To dispel this doubt, he says:

8.2

From excessive distance, from extreme proximity, from injury to a sense faculty, from instability of the mind, / from subtlety, from an obstruction, from being overpowered, and from intermixture with similar things. //

8.3

In this world, non-perception occurs in eight ways even of existent things. For it is shown: Just as Devadatta, Viṣṇumitra, and Yajñadatta, though existent, are not perceived from excessive distance when they have gone to another region—does that mean they do not exist? Or just as the eye does not perceive collyrium due to excessive proximity—does that mean it does not exist? Just as a deaf person and a blind person do not perceive sound and form—does that mean the two do not exist? One whose mind is unsteady does not see even a passing king—does that mean he did not pass? Smoke, heat, water-droplets, mist, and atoms are not perceived—does that mean they are nonexistent? What is obstructed by a wall is not perceived—does that mean it does not exist? Because planets, asterisms, stars, and the like are overwhelmed by the radiance of the sun and so forth, is it possible to imagine their nonexistence? If [an object] is not perceived when cast into a pile of similar things—into a heap of mung beans, water lilies, myrobalans, pearls, pigeons, and so on—as 'this is it'—does that mean it does not exist? Thus non-perception has been declared to be eightfold even of existent things. Now, of nonexistent things, it is fourfold. On that, it is said: by the division into prior nonexistence, destructional nonexistence, mutual nonexistence, and absolute nonexistence. Among these, prior nonexistence is: in a lump of clay, a pot is not perceived prior to origination. Destructional nonexistence is: just as a pot, destroyed by the blow of a mallet, is not perceived. Mutual nonexistence is: just as horseness [is not perceived] in a cow, or cowness in a horse. Absolute nonexistence is: just as a second head of a mortal, a third arm, or hare's horns and the like. Thus this non-perception is twelvefold: eightfold of the existent and fourfold of the nonexistent. In this way, primordial matter and spirit are also not perceived although they are existent.

9.1

Then, among these, due to which cause are these two not perceived? Regarding that, it is said:

9.2

Its non-perception is due to subtlety, not due to nonexistence; its perception is from the effect. / And that effect, beginning with the intellect, is both dissimilar to and similar to nature.

9.3

The non-perception—the lack of apprehension—of that primordial matter is due to the cause of subtlety, not due to nonexistence. Primordial matter is subtle because it lacks the characteristics of sound and so forth, like atoms and the like. It is not, on the other hand, in this way: that primordial matter does not exist and therefore is not perceived. Rather, primordial matter exists, but is not perceived due to subtlety, like atoms and the like. 'Then how is it perceived?' On this, he says: 'its perception is from the effect.' Having seen the effect, the cause is to be inferred, like a banyan seed. Just as the cause, a banyan seed, is inferred on seeing the effect, the banyan tree, so the cause, primordial matter, which is certainly existent, is inferred from the existent effect beginning with the intellect. For the origination of the existent does not come from the nonexistent. 'Beginning with the intellect' means the group of twenty-three: the intellect, egoity, the five subtle elements, the eleven sense faculties, and the five gross elements. Having seen this effect, beginning with the intellect, possessing the three constituents, it is inferred: 'Primordial matter, the cause possessing the three constituents whose effect possessing the three constituents this is, also exists.' What is more? 'And that effect is both dissimilar to and similar to nature.' The meaning is: dissimilar to and similar to primordial matter. There are reasons whereby this [effect] is dissimilar to and similar to primordial matter. Just as in the world, a son may be similar and dissimilar to his father: if in appearance, then not in qualities; when in qualities, then not in appearance. And we shall state those reasons later on.

10.1

Let that stand for now. We ask another [question]: Does this [effect] beginning with the intellect arise as existent in primordial matter prior to origination, or does it come about as nonexistent? On this point there is disagreement among teachers, hence there is doubt. Here the Vaiśeṣikas, holding a divergent view, consider that the existent arises from the nonexistent. For they are resolved that a pot does not exist in a lump of clay prior to origination. The wretched Ājīvikas say: 'it exists and does not exist.' 'It neither exists nor does not exist': this is the position of the Buddhists. With theorists thus speaking in mutual contradiction, what indeed is the certainty? Regarding that, it is said: First, the Ājīvikas, who assert existence and nonexistence, are refuted by the very contradiction in their own statement. If it is existent, then it is not nonexistent; or if it is nonexistent, then existence is not [possible]; because there is contradiction between the existent and nonexistent in one place. The example here is: just as 'Devadatta is dead and lives.' As for the Buddhists, since there is an absence of adopting a thesis in '[it] does not exist and does not not-exist,' debate with them is not even proper. But in order to refute the view of the Vaiśeṣikas that the existent arises from the nonexistent, it is said:

10.2

Because what is nonexistent cannot be produced, because of the grasping of a material cause, because not everything is possible, / because the capable produces what is possible, and because of the nature of the cause, the effect is existent.

10.3

In this world, only what is existent comes to be existent; there is no bringing about of what is non-existent. If there were, then there would be oil from sand, a protective cloak from turtle hair, the arching of the eyebrows of a barren woman's daughter, a hare's horn, and a sky-flower. But there is not; therefore it is inferred that the intellect and the rest do exist in primordial matter even prior to arising. "Because of taking an appropriate material cause": in this world, whoever has need of something takes that which serves as its material cause; he takes the causal condition for it. As, for instance, one who needs curds takes milk. And if the effect were non-existent, then one who needs curds would also take water; but he does not take [it]. Therefore the effect, beginning with the intellect, exists in primordial matter. Moreover, "because of the absence of the arising of everything [from everything]": in this world, that alone arises from that in which it is found, as oil from sesame seeds, ghee from curds. If the effect were non-existent, then everything would arise from everything; and consequently silver, gold, gems, pearls, corals, and the like would be produced from grass, dust, sand, and so forth. But they are not produced. Therefore we observe, also because of the absence of the arising of everything [from everything], that the effect beginning with the intellect is existent in primordial matter, and only what is existent comes to be existent. And for this reason also it exists: "because an able agent produces what is possible": in this world, an able craftsman endowed with the instrument and other causes, the material, the time, and the means undertakes only a possible task from what is possible, not an impossible one from what is impossible. As, for instance, an able potter endowed with an appropriate lump of clay and with an appropriate stick, wheel, cord, water, strips, and basin is seen undertaking jars, shallow bowls, water-vessels, and the like; but not a large water-jar and such, because that is impossible with just that much of a lump. If, on the other hand, there were no restriction regarding instruments, what is impossible would be undertaken even from what is impossible. Therefore the effect must be existent, not non-existent. Moreover, "and because of being identical in nature with the cause": the effect must be existent. In this world, whatever is the defining characteristic of the cause, that must be the defining characteristic of the effect. As grain of kodrava comes from kodrava, rice from rice. And if the effect were non-existent, then rice might also be produced from kodrava; but it is not produced. Therefore, also because of being identical in nature with the cause, we observe that the effect beginning with the intellect exists in primordial matter. Thus by these five reasons it is established that the effect is existent. Beginning with the scripture: "In the beginning, gentle one, this was Being alone, one only without a second; regarding this some say: In the beginning this was non-being alone," up to: "Indeed, in the beginning, gentle one, this was Being alone."

11.1

In this regard, as to what was stated in the previous verse: "dissimilar to nature and similar," in order to demonstrate their similarity and dissimilarity, this [verse] is undertaken:

11.2

The manifest is caused, non-eternal, non-pervading, active, manifold, supported, an indicator, / having parts, and dependent; the unmanifest is the reverse. //

11.3

"Caused": that which has an originating cause is caused. "Cause" (hetu), "designation" (apadeśa), "condition" (nimitta), "nature" (prakṛti), "cause" (kāraṇa) are identical in meaning; these are synonyms for primordial matter. Therefore, through primordial matter as their cause, these twenty-three [entities] ending with the gross elements, which serve as an indicator, have a cause. For so it is: the principle of intellect is caused by primordial matter as its cause; egoity is caused by it; the eleven faculties and the subtle elements are caused by this [egoity]; and the gross elements by these; thus all of this is mutually caused. Furthermore, cause is twofold: producing and indicative. There, the producing cause is fourfold, characterized by primordial matter, intellect, egoity, and subtle elements. The indicative cause is fivefold according to the divisions of error, incapacity, contentment, attainment, and favor. Endowed with both kinds of causes, this is established as being caused. Moreover: "non-eternal": it goes to dissolution. Because it has an arising, therefore it is non-eternal. "That which is without a cause is eternal" is the definition of eternal. Being the reverse of that, this is non-eternal. As, for instance, a jar produced from a lump of clay is seen to be non-eternal. Likewise the intellect and the rest are produced from primordial matter, therefore they are non-eternal, and they dissolve into it alone. For so it is: at the time of dissolution, intellect dissolves into primordial matter, egoity into it, the faculties and subtle elements into it, and the gross elements into them. Therefore it is non-eternal. Moreover: "non-pervading": not all-pervasive. The meaning is that it is not as primordial matter and spirit are all-pervasive. For this exists only in the place in which it is situated. Moreover: "active": because at the time of transmigration, the effect consisting of the intellect and the rest transmigrates resting upon the subtle body, therefore it is active. Moreover: "manifold": of many kinds, twenty-three in type. And another [characteristic]: "supported": that which arises from something is supported by it. The intellect is supported by primordial matter, and egoity by it, and the faculties and subtle elements by it, and the gross elements are supported by them. Thus it is supported. It is "an indicator" (liṅgam) because it goes to dissolution (layaṃ gacchati). "Having parts": parts (avayava) are that which weave together (avayanti), like the hands, feet, and so on of a body. The manifest is endowed with parts such as sound, touch, taste, form, and smell. Moreover: "dependent": relying on another. Just as while the father is alive a son is not independent, so is the manifest. Intellect is dependent on primordial matter, egoity is dependent on intellect, the faculties and subtle elements are dependent on egoity, and the gross elements are dependent on the subtle elements. Thus it is dependent. The manifest has been described. The unmanifest is characterized by the reverse of this: uncaused, because it is unproduced; eternal, because it has no cause; pervading, because it is all-pervasive; primordial matter abides pervading like the spirit as far as a blade of grass from Brahmā; inactive, because it embraces everything; one, because it is the cause of all; unsupported, because it is the sovereign source; not an indicator, because it has no origin; partless, because it is incorporeal; independent, because it is the cause of the arising of all. //

12.1

Thus by this verse the dissimilarity between the manifest and the unmanifest has been stated. The similarity is now stated:

12.2

Possessing three constituents, non-discriminating, an object, common, non-conscious, productive of effects— / such is the manifest, and likewise primordial matter; the spirit is the opposite of them, and yet similar [in certain respects]. // 11

12.3

Possessing three constituents is the manifest, beginning with the intellect. Primordial matter also possesses three constituents, because an effect conforms to its cause; just as black thread is the cause and the cloth, which is the effect, is also black alone. Through the effect having three constituents, its cause also comes to have three constituents: thus primordial matter is established. Moreover, the manifest is non-discriminating: one cannot discriminate, saying, "These are the constituents; this is the manifest." Likewise, with regard to primordial matter too, one cannot separate it, saying, "This is primordial matter; these are the constituents." Moreover, the manifest, beginning with the intellect, is an object; it is to be experienced by the spirit in the form of pleasure, suffering, and delusion, for he is its experiencer. Likewise, primordial matter too is to be experienced by all spirits, the knowers of the field. The manifest is common; it belongs to all spirits, like a courtesan. Primordial matter is likewise. The manifest is non-conscious; it does not cognize pleasure, suffering, and delusion. Primordial matter is likewise. The manifest is productive of effects: from the intellect arises egoity, thence the sense faculties and the subtle elements, and from them the gross elements are born. In this manner, primordial matter also produces the intellect. This describes the similarity between the manifest and the unmanifest. Now, regarding what is stated: "the spirit is the opposite of them, and yet similar [in certain respects]"—he explains that. He is the opposite of those two, the manifest and the unmanifest. The similarity between the two was stated as: "Possessing three constituents, non-discriminating, an object, common, non-conscious, productive of effects." From that he is opposite, having contrary properties: devoid of the constituents, discriminating, not an object, not common, conscious, and not productive of effects. Having stated the dissimilarity, he states the similarity: "and yet similar, the spirit."

12.4

"Possessing a cause, non-eternal, non-pervasive, active, multiple, supported, indicative, / with parts, dependent is the manifest; the opposite is the unmanifest."

12.5

(Sāṅkhyakārikā 10)—thus it was stated.

12.6

Just as primordial matter is dissimilar to the manifest, in that same way the spirit shares the properties of primordial matter. For indeed, he is causeless, eternal, pervasive, inactive, single, unsupported, non-indicative, without parts, and independent. // 11

13.1

There, it has been stated that the manifest and the unmanifest possess three constituents, and the spirit is devoid of the constituents. Of what nature are the constituents? To this, it is said:

13.2

Having the nature of pleasure, displeasure, and dejection; with the purposes of illumination, activity, and restraint; / functioning to overpower, support, generate, and consort with one another are the constituents. // 12

13.3

Here, this is the compound: pleasure, displeasure, and dejection are the self, the intrinsic nature, of which constituents—they are "having the nature of pleasure, displeasure, and dejection." Their characteristic definition is stated. Among them, sattva has the nature of pleasure. The word "self" refers to intrinsic nature. Why? Because its characteristic is pleasure. For whichever person obtains pleasure anywhere, there uprightness, gentleness, truth, purity, modesty, intellect, forbearance, compassion, knowledge, and so on are to be recognized as sattva. Rajas has the nature of displeasure. Why? Because its characteristic is suffering. For whichever person at any time obtains displeasure anywhere, there hatred, hostility, envy, censure, obstinacy, longing, deceit, deception, bondage, slaying, mutilation, and so on are to be recognized as rajas. Tamas has the nature of dejection. Why? Because its characteristic is delusion. For whichever person at any time obtains delusion anywhere, there ignorance, intoxication, indolence, fear, misery, incapacity, atheism, dejection, sleep, and so on are to be recognized as tamas. Moreover: "with the purposes of illumination, activity, and restraint"—illumination, activity, and restraint are their purposes, hence so described. There, illumination belongs to sattva, activity belongs to rajas, and restraint, withdrawal, belongs to tamas. Moreover: "functioning to overpower, support, generate, and consort with one another are the constituents." Here too is the compound: overpowering one another, supporting one another, generating one another, consorting with one another, and whose mutual functionings exist—such are they described. The word "and" should be understood in the sense of conjunction. Pleasure and the others have already been stated earlier. "Overpowering one another": from the overpowering of rajas and tamas, the tranquil functioning of sattva, beginning with virtue, arises; from the overpowering of sattva and tamas, the violent functioning of rajas, beginning with non-virtue, arises; from the overpowering of sattva and rajas, the stupefied functioning of tamas, beginning with ignorance, arises. Moreover: the constituents support one another. For sattva illuminates by relying upon activity and restraint; rajas activates by relying upon illumination and restraint; tamas restrains by relying upon illumination and activity. They are to be understood like the mutual bracing of a tripod. Moreover: the constituents generate one another. They produce one another. Sometimes sattva generates rajas and tamas; sometimes tamas generates sattva and rajas. Just as a lump of clay, supervised by a potter equipped with his implements, produces a pot, in that manner they generate. That they awaken one another is accepted: just as Devadatta and Yajñadatta awaken each other, so the constituents abiding in the intellect—sattva, rajas, and tamas—awaken one another. Thus the constituents generate one another. Moreover: the constituents consort with one another, because they have the property of non-separation. For thus they say:

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