Brahmasutrabhashya (Sharirakamimamsabhashya) 1.813.3

1.813.3

adhikāraṇatātparyamāha-
iheti /
samarthanaprayojanamāha-
bandhamokṣeti /
asamarthane bandhamokṣādhikārābhāvamāha-
na hyasatīti /
adhastanatantroktena paunaruktyaṃ codayati-
nanviti /
pariharati-
uktaṃ bhāṣyakṛteti /
nasūtrakāreṇa tatroktaṃ yena punaruktaṃ bhavedapi tu bhāṣyakṛtetyatratyasyaivārthasyāpakarṣaḥ pramāṇalakṣaṇopayogitayā tatra kṛta iti /
yata iha sūtrakṛdvakṣyatyata eva bhagavatopavarṣeṇoddhāro 'pakarṣasya kṛtaḥ /
vicārasyāsya pūrvottaratantraśeṣatvamāha-
iha ceti /
pūrvādhikaraṇasaṃgatimāha-
apiceti /
nanvātmāstitvopapattaya evātrocyantāṃ kiṃ tadākṣepeṇetyata āha-ākṣepapūrvikā hīti /
ākṣepamāha-
atraike dehamātrātmadarśina iti /
yadyapi samastavyasteṣu pṛthivyaptejovāyuṣu na caitanyaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tathāpi kāyākārapariṇateṣu bhaviṣyati /
nahi kiṇvādayaḥ samastavyastā na madanā dṛṣṭā iti madirākārapariṇatā na madayanti /
ahamiti cānubhave deha eva gaurādyakāraḥ prathate /
na tu tadatiriktaḥ tadadhiṣṭhānaḥ kuṇḍa eva dadhīti /
ata evāhaṃ sthūlo gacchāmītyādisāmānādhikaraṇyopapattirahamaḥ sthūlādibhiḥ /
na jātu dadhisamānādhikaraṇāni madhurādīni kuṇḍasyaikādhikaraṇyamanubhavanti sitaṃ madhuraṃ kuṇḍamiti /
na cāpratyakṣamātmatattvamanumānādibhiḥ śakyamunnetum /
na khalvapratyakṣaṃ pramāṇamasti /
uktaṃ hi-'deśakālādirūpāṇāṃ bhedādbhinnāsu śaktiṣu /
bhavānāmanumānena prasiddhiratidurlabhā'iti /
yadā ca upalabdhisādhyanāntarīyakabhāvasya liṅgasyeyaṃ gatistadā kaiva kathā dṛṣṭavyabhicārasya śabdasyārthāpatteścātyantaparokṣārthagocarāyā upamānasya ca sarvaikadeśasādṛśyavikalpitasya /
sarvasārūpye tattvāt /
ekadeśasārūpye cātiprasaṅgātsarvasya sarveṇopamānāt /
sautrastu heturbhāṣyakṛtā

He states the purport of the section: 'Here...'
He states the purpose of establishing [it]: 'Bondage and liberation...'
He states the absence of qualification for bondage and liberation if it is not established: 'For if it does not exist...'
He raises an objection regarding redundancy with what was stated in the lower system: 'Now, is it not...?'
He resolves [it]: 'It was stated by the author of the commentary...'
It was not stated there by the author of the aphorisms such that it would be redundant; rather, it was by the author of the commentary, in that an anticipation of the matter belonging precisely here was made there because of its utility for the definition of the means of valid cognition.
Because the author of the aphorisms will state it here, precisely for that reason the anticipation was removed by the venerable Upavarṣa.
He states that this investigation is supplementary to both the prior and later systems: 'And here...'
He states the connection with the previous section: 'Moreover...'
Now, an objection may be raised: let the proofs for the existence of the Self alone be stated here; what need is there for an objection against it? To this he says: 'For preceded by an objection...'
He states the objection: 'Here, some who see the Self as merely the body...'
Even though consciousness is not observed in earth, water, fire, and air collectively or individually, nevertheless it will come to be in them when transformed into the form of a body.
For it is not the case that because yeast and other [ingredients] are not seen to be intoxicating collectively or individually, they do not intoxicate when transformed into the form of liquor.
And in the experience 'I', only the body appears with the attributes of fair complexion and the like,
and not anything distinct from it, having it as its locus, as curd in a bowl.
Precisely for this reason, the co-reference of the 'I' with 'fat' and the like is justified: 'I am fat, I go', etc.
Never do sweet and other qualities, which are co-referent with curd, experience a single locus with the bowl as 'a white, sweet bowl.'
Nor can the reality of the Self, being imperceptible, be inferred by inference and other means.
For there is indeed no non-perceptual means of valid cognition.
For it has been said: 'Because potencies vary according to the variations of space, time, and other conditions, / establishing existents through inference is exceedingly difficult.'
And when this is the fate of an inferential sign whose invariable concomitance is to be established by observation, what need be said of verbal testimony, which is seen to be fallible, of presumption, which has completely imperceptible things as its domain, and of comparison, which is rendered questionable whether it is similarity in all respects or in part?
For if there were similarity in all respects, it would be the very same thing;
and if there were similarity in a partial respect, there would be overextension, because everything would be comparable with everything.
As for the reason stated in the sūtra, the author of the commentary...