Siddhitraya p45

p45

nanu dehamevātmānaṃ pratyakṣataḥ pratidyāmahe . ahaṃ jānāmīti jñātā hyātmā ahamiti cakāsti . dehaścāhaṅkāragocaraḥ, sthūlo%haṃ kṛśo%hamiti darśanāt . dehasya hi sthaulyādiyogaḥ . atastatsamānādhikaraṇatayā%yamahaṅkāraḥ śarīrālambana ityavaśyāśrayaṇīyam . itarathā sakalalaukikaparīkṣakavyavahāroparodhaśca . na cāyaṃ lākṣaṇiko vyavahāraḥ, mukhyavṛttibhūmeḥ pṛthagasiddhatvāt . na cānekāvayavayogiśarīrālambanatve jñātravabhāsasya tadīyarūpāvayavādyavabhāsenānvayinā bhavitavyam, yena tadanvayābhāvāt jānāmīti pratyayaḥ śarīrātiriktamavagamayet . bāhyendriyapratyakṣa eva tathā niyamadarśanāt . svānta syā%%ntaraguṇādhāratāvabhāsa eva sāmarthyaniyamāt . anavadhṛtāvayavaviśeṣasyāpyanekāvayavayogino mahimaguṇaśālinaḥ tryaṇukasya prathamapratyakṣābhyupagamāt . vāyośca tvagindriyeṇa sparśādhiṣṭhānamātratayopalambhadarśanācca . dehavyatiriktātmagocaratve%pi yathā tadīyaguṇāntarāgrahaṇam, tathehāpi . yathā tatra bāhyapratyakṣagocara eva saṅkyāparimāṇādigrahaṇaniyamaḥ .
evaṃ ca pratyekaṃ paramāṇuṣu caitanyānupalabdheḥ, tadabhyupagame caikaśarīra evānekasahasracetanāpātāt, akāraṇaguṇapūrvakasya kāryadravyavartino viśeṣaguṇasyāsambhavānna śarīraviśeṣaguṇaścetanyam, ayāvaccharīrabhāvitvāccetyādayo%numānabedāḥ pratyakṣabādhitaviṣayatayā na parākramituṃ kṣamante . viśeṣaguṇatve ca

Now [an objection]: We apprehend through perception that the body alone is the self. For the self, as the knower, shines forth as "I" in "I know." And the body is the object of the ego-sense, because it is observed: "I am stout," "I am thin." For the connection with stoutness and so on belongs to the body. Therefore, by virtue of having the same locus with that [stoutness], this ego-sense necessarily has the body as its basis—this must be admitted. Otherwise, there would be a disruption of all ordinary and critical usage. Nor is this a figurative usage, because a ground for primary application distinct [from the body] is not established. Nor, if the illumination of the knower has the body—possessing many parts—as its basis, must it be accompanied by the illumination of its color, parts, and so forth, such that, in the absence of that accompaniment, the cognition "I know" would make known something over and above the body. For such a invariable rule is observed only in external sensory perception; because the inner organ's capacity is necessarily restricted solely to illuminating the status of being a locus of internal qualities; because a triad of atoms, though endowed with the quality of magnitude and possessing many parts whose particular components are unascertained, is accepted to be apprehended in initial perception; and because air is observed to be apprehended by the tactile sense merely as the substratum of touch. Just as there is no grasping of its other qualities even if it were an object [of perception] as a self distinct from the body, so it is here too. Just as there the invariant rule of grasping number, dimension, and so forth applies only to what is an object of external perception.
And thus, inference-varieties such as: consciousness is not a specific quality of the body because consciousness is not observed in individual atoms, and if that were admitted, many thousands of conscious beings would result in a single body; because a specific quality present in an effect-substance without being preceded by qualities of the cause is impossible; and because it does not endure as long as the body endures—these [inferences] are incapable of prevailing, as their subject matter is sublated by perception. And if it were a specific quality…