Manava Dharmashastra 1.1.2

1.1.2

yattu—“uktamapi na niścīyate, pauruṣeyebhyo vākyebhyo'rthaniścayābhāvāt | evamevāyaṃ puruṣo vedeti pratyayo na tvevamartha iti”—nātra vivadāmahe niścayo'sti nāstīti, granthagauravaprasaṃgāt | arthasaṃśaye'pi pravṛttisiddhau niyataviṣayasaṃśayotpattirnāntareṇa prayojanavacanam | anukte hi kimidaṃ dharmaśāstramarthaśāstraṃ kākadantaparīkṣādilakṣaṇarūpaṃ vetyapi saṃśayaḥ syāt | abhihite tu prayojane'yaṃ tāvadevamāha naḥ śreyasaḥ panthānaṃ darśayāmīti na ca me pravṛttasya kācitkṣatirasti | bhavatu, paryālocayāmīti pravṛttisiddhiḥ | yā tu svādhyāyādhyayane pravṛttiḥ sā''cāryaprayuktasya, na svādhikārapratipattyā | nahi tadānīṃ bālatvātsvādhikāraṃ pratipattumutsahate | paraprayuktyaiva ca pravṛttisiddhiḥ | nādhikārapratipādanenāpi cābodhyate | atastatra pravṛttasya prayojanamarthāvabodho'taśca pravṛttiḥ | iha tu “yo'nadhītya dvijo vedamanyatra kurute śramamiti” gṛhītavedasyādhyayanādhikāraḥ | tadānīṃ cābhyutpannabuddhitvātprayojanamanvicchati | bhagavataḥ punaḥ pāṇineratisaṃkṣiptāni sūtrāṇi | naivārthāntarābhidhānaparatvāśaṅkā | tatra ākumāraṃ ca yaśaḥ pāṇineḥ prakhyātamiti suprasiddhaprayojanatvādanupanyāsaḥ | ayaṃ tu vitato grantho'nekārthavādabahulaḥ sarvapuruṣārthopayogī | tatra sukhāvabodhārthe prayojanābhidhāne na kiṃcitparihīṇam |

As regards the argument that—“even when the purpose has been stated there can be no certainty about it, for the simple reason that we do not derive conviction from the words of human beings,—in whose oase the idea that we have is that this man knows the matter as he says, and not that the fact is really as he asserts,”—our answer is that we do not quarrel over the question as to whether the words of human

beings do, or do not, bring about conviction; because discussion over this question would swell the size of our work. But as a matter of fact, even though it is possible for a man to have recourse to a certain course of action, even when he is in doubt as to the exact purpose served by it,—yet until there is some statement as to the purpose served by a particular action, even doubts could not arise in regard to it. In fact, if some statement had not been made in regard to the purpose to be served by the present Treatise, the doubt that would arise in men’s minds would be (not as to whether or not it was going to serve any useful purpose, but) as to whether it is a treatise on Law or on Economics, or an aimless attempt in the nature of an examination of such subjects as the ‘Crow’s teeth’ and the like. On the other hand, when the aim of the work has been stated, the idea arising in our minds is—‘the author of this work asserts that he is going to show us the path leading to our welfare,—there is no harm done by our undertaking the study of the work,—well, let us look into it’; and forthwith we take up the work.

Next as regards the case (cited by the opponent) of pupils taking up Vedic study (without being told of the exact purpose to be accomplished thereby),—the fact of the matter is that the action of the pupil is due to his being urged to it by his Teacher, and not to his recognition of the fact that if behoves him to take up the study (for the accomplishment of any purpose of his own); in fact being quite a child at the time (of beginning Vedic study), it is not possible for him to have any idea as to his being entitled to the study (by virtue of his having an aim that could be served only by that study); and his activity, therefore, is brought about entirely by the direction of another person (his Teacher); who does not bewilder him by pointing out to him that he is entitled to take up the study; and when once the boy has taken up Vedic study (entirely under advice of his Teacher), the motive for further study is provided by the desire to know the meaning of the Vedic texts studied; and thus the study continues to be carried on. [This is the case with the study of the Veda.] As regards the study of the present Treatise (on Law), only such persons are entitled to it as have already studied the Veda, as is clearly indicated by the text—‘the twice-born person who, without having studied the Vedas, devotes his energies to other subjects [becomes a Shudra]’ (Manu, 2.168); and by that time the pupil has his intelligence aroused, and consequently seeks to know wbat purpose is to be served by any further action that he is going to undertake.

As regards the revered Pāṇini, his aphorisms are extremely brief; so that there is no possibility of their having any other meaning (or serving any other purpose) than the one directly expressed by them; and further, the fame of Pāṇini is well known to even the smallest boy; so that the purpose served by his work is too well known to need reiteration. The present treatise (of Manu) on the other hand is on an extensive scale, abounding in several (commendatory and condemnatory) ‘Descriptions,’ and it helps in the accomplishment of all human ends; so that if its aim is stated in easily intelligible words, there is no harm done.