Manava Dharmashastra 1.103

1.103

adhyetavyaṃ pravaktavyamityarhe kṛtyau na vidhau | dvitīyā'dhyāyātprabhṛti śāstraṃ pravartiṣyate| ayaṃ hyādhyāyo'rthavāda eva | nātra kaścidvidhirasti | tena yathā 'rājabhojanāḥ śālayaḥ' iti śālistutirna rājño'nyasyeti tadbhojananiṣedhaḥ, evamatrāpi nānyena kenaciditi nāyaṃ niṣedhaḥ, kevalaṃ śāstrastutiḥ-'sarvasmiñjagati śreṣṭho brāhmaṇaḥ, sarvaśāstrāṇāṃ śāstramidamatastādṛśasya viduṣo brāhmaṇasyādhyayanapravacanārha na sāmānyena śakyate adhyetuṃ pravaktuṃ vā' | ata evāha prayatnataiti | yāvanna mahānprayatna āsthito, yāvanna śāstrāntaraistarkavyākaraṇamīmāṃsādibhiḥ saṃskṛta ātmā, tāvadetatpravaktuṃ na śakyate | ata evādhyayanena śravaṇaṃ lakṣyate | tatra hi vidvattopayoginī na sampāṭhe | vidhau hyadhyayane vidvattā'dṛṣṭārthaiva syānna ca "vidhau śravaṇamadhyayanena lakṣyata" iti yuktaṃ vaktum | na vidheye lakṣaṇārthatā yuktā | arthavāde tu pramāṇāntarānusāreṇa guṇavādo na doṣāya | tasmāttraivarṇikārtha śāstram | etacca parastādviśeṣato vakṣyate |

This may he studied with care, and duly taught to pupils, by the learned Brāhmaṇa,—not by any one else.—(103)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):
Adhyetavyam-pravaktovyam’—‘can be studied and can be taught’—the verbal affix denotes capability, not injunction [ i.e. the meaning is that the institutes deserve to be studied and taught &c.]; for actual injunctions are going to begin only from the Second Discourse onward; and the present Discourse is purely descriptive, it contains no injunctions. Hence, just as the assertion, ‘Rice forms the food of Kings,’ is regarded as a mere praise of the Rice, and it is not taken us a prohibition of its eating by people other than Kings,—in the same manner, in the present passage the phrase ‘not by any one else’ is not a prohibition (of study by others), but only a praise of the institutes; the sense thus is as follows:—

‘The Brāhmaṇa is the highest being in the world,—these institutes are the best of all institutes,—hence these are capable of being studied and taught only by the said learned Brāhmaṇa,—and they cannot be either studied or taught by any ordinary man.’ It is in view of this that the author adds the term ‘with great care’; unless great care is taken, until the self has been duly equipped with the knowledge of other sciences,—such as Logic, Grammar and Exigetics,—these institutes cannot be taught. Thus it is that ‘study’ implies ‘hearing’ (from the lips of the Teacher) also; and the justification for this implication lies in the fact that the ‘learning’ (spoken of by the epithet ‘learned’) comes in useful only in the case of hearing from the teacher’s lips,—(which presupposes intelligent following of the oral lectures); it would not be necessary for the mere reading of the words. If the present verse were taken as an injunction of ‘study,’ the said ‘learning’ could he regarded only as serving some transcendental purpose. It would not he right to argue that—“in the injunction also hearing would be implied by the studying”; for it is not right to take what is enjoined as subserving the purposes of implications. In the case of Declamatory passages (Arthavāda) on the other hand, there is nothing incongruous in admitting of indirect implications on the basis of other sources of knowledge (while a direct Injunction by its very nature, cannot be diverted from its direct meaning, on any account whatsoever],

From all this it follows that all three castes are entitled to the study of the Institutes. This we shall explain in detail later on.—(103)