Manava Dharmashastra 2.29.4

2.29.4

yato na vibhaktervacanamevaikaṃ prayojane, karmādyarthāntarābhidhānenāpyarthavattvāt | iha tvavivakṣāyāmānarthakyameva prāpnoti puṃspadasya | yathā tatraiva grahaprātipadikāthartho vivakṣyate vākyānthevasyaparihārāya | athocyeta “na pratyayārthamātrasyāvivakṣā | kṛtsno'pi padārtha uddiśyamānaviśeṣaṇaṃ na vivakṣyate | yathā 'yasyobhayaṃ haviḥ,' iti satyapyubhayapadaśravaṇe dadhipayasoranyatarāvṛttāvapi tadeva prāyaścittam | na vivakṣita ubhayaśabdaḥ” | atra kecitparihāramāhuḥ | naitattena samānam | na hi havirarthaḥ pañcaśarāvaḥ | havirvināśe hi naimittiko'dhikāraḥ | iha tu māṇavakārthā eva saṃskārāḥ | eṣa tvaprayojako viśeṣaḥ | vākyabhedabhayādviśeṣaṇavivakṣā neṣyate | tādarthye'pi vākyabhedo naivāpaiti | tasmādayaṃ parihāraḥ | etadevotpattivākyaṃ jātakarmaṇo vaidikaiḥ karmabhirityetadupakramam | tatra pumāneva saṃskāryatayā nirdiṣṭaḥ | tadvivakṣāyāṃ vākyānthevasyaṃ, yathā tatraiva haviḥpadaṃ vivakṣyate | “yadyevaṃ śūdrasyāpi prāptiḥ, jātiviśeṣānirdeśāt” | na prāpsyati, mantrasādhyatvāt | athavā dvijanmanāmiti vākyaśeṣako bhaviṣyati | na ca tadānīṃ vidheyārthaviṣayatvena nirdiṣṭo yena tata eva saṃskāryāvagatau puṃsa ityetadubhayapadvavadavivakṣitamāśaṅkyeta | strīṇāṃ tvaprāpte'pi vidhānamupapadyate | klībasyāpi dvāradarśanam | vātaretā yaḥ klība ubhayavyañjano'pravṛttandriyo vā | bahuprakāravyāvṛttikaraṃ jātakarmādisaṃskārakāle'paricchedyatvācchakyapratīkāratvācca |' na ca yo na niyato dharmaḥ so'dhikāraṃ vyāvartayati, yathā'dravyatvaṃ, na hyadravyatvaṃ niyataṃ jātivat |

The following argument might be urged—“It is not only what is signified by the case-ending that may be non-significant; as a matter of fact, the denotation of the entire word, if it qualifies the subject, is regarded as non-significant. For instance, in the case of the text which lays down an expiatory rite in the case of one for whom ‘both offering materials have been spoilt.’—though we have the word ‘both,’ yet the expiatory rite is performed even on the spoiling of even one of the two materials, milk and curd; and no significance is attached to the denotation of the entire word ‘both’ (which qualifies the subject.)”

To this objection some people offer the following answer:—The present case is not analogous to the case just cited. In the latter, the ‘Pañcaśarāva rite’ (which is the expiatory rite referred to) is not done for the sake of the offering-material; all that is meant is that the spoiling of the materials provides the occasion for the performance of the rite;—while in the case in question, the sacraments are done for the sake of the Boy.

This difference (between the two cases) however is of no consequence at all. Because as a matter of fact, it is only with a view to avoid a syntactical split that significance is not attached to qualifications; and even though the Rite were for the sake of the material, that would not prevent the said syntactical split.

Hence the real answer to the objection is as follows:—The passage beginning with ‘vaidikaiḥ karmabhiḥ, etc.,’ (Verse 26) is what constitutes the original injunction of the ‘Jātakarma’ sacrament; and throughout this passage it is the male that is indicated as the person to be ‘consecrated.’ So that if no significance were attached to this male-character, the whole passage would become meaningless. It is this same consideration which leads us (in the case of the passage cited by the objection) to attach due significance to the denotation of the word ‘offering-material’ (even though none is attached to its qualification ‘both’).

“Well, then the sacraments would be performed for the Śūdra also; as the passage does not specify any particular caste.”

Certainly there is no possibility of the sacraments for Śūdras, because sacraments are performed to the accompaniment of Mantras. Or, we may take the term ‘of the twice-born persons,’ occurring in a supplementary passage, as providing the necessary restriction. Nor does the term ‘of the twice-born persons’ in the said passage pertain (as a qualification) only to what is therein enjoined; so that it cannot be urged that, “in as much as the necessity of their consecration has been mentioned in that passage, no significance can attach to the term ‘male’ in the present passage; just as none is attached to the term ‘both’ in the passage referred to above.”

As for the fact of a later text (Verse 66) speaking of the Rites for females being ‘without mantras,’ this could be taken as an independent injunction; without necessarily depending upon the fact of the ‘sacrament with mantras’ being possible for women also (under the present verse; of which the later verse has been regarded as an exception, by the objector above).

Our answer to the above is as follows:—The word ‘male’ does not denote the ‘human’ genus in general, in the way that the word ‘man’ does; and it is only if it did have that denotation that there might he some ground for not attaching any significance to the gender expressed by the particular case-ending. What the word ‘male’ denotes in all cases is a particular gender in the form of masculinity, as pertaining to all things, moving and unmoving, corporeal and incorporeal. In the present case the gender is denoted by the basic noun (‘pumān’ in ‘puruṣaḥ’) itself; and it is only in connection with what is denoted by the case-ending, that the question of significance or non-significance can arise; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the denotation of number (or gender) is not the only function of the case-ending,—it may have its use simply in the denoting of any one of several such factors as the ‘accusative character’ and so forth [so that if no significance is attached to any one of these several factors, it does not matter]. In the present case however (where the gender is denoted by the basic noun itself), if no significance were attached to the gender, then the word ‘pumān’ would become absolutely meaningless. As in the very instance cited above, full significance is actually attached to the denotation of the basic noun ‘Cup’; and this is done simply because the sentence would, otherwise, become absolutely meaningless.

As for the ‘marriage of sexless persons’;—‘sexless’ persons are of various kinds—e.g., (a) those whose semen is ‘airy,’ (Impotent), (b) those who have the signs of both sexes (Hermaphrodite), and (c) those whose organs are inactive. All these people cannot be excluded from all the ‘sacraments’; because, in the first place their impotence, etc., cannot be detected at the time (during infancy) when the ‘Jātakarma’ and the other (earlier) sacraments are performed; and secondly (even when detected) the said impotence, etc., may be such as might be cured, and certainly a characteristic that is not of a permanent character can never serve as a disqualification. For instance, absence of wealth; this is not a permanent characteristic, like the caste of a person; for the man who has no wealth comes to acquire wealth; having remained poor for a long time, a man becomes very rich in a single day. It is on the killing of such a (confirmed and permanent) eunuch that one becomes purified (of the sin) by the giving of a load of dry grass; and the reason for this lies in the fact that he has had no ‘sacraments,’ he has not been ‘initiated,’ and his life is of no use to any person.