Manava Dharmashastra 2.4.2

2.4.2

yathā 'steno hiraṇyasya surāṃ pibaṃśce' tyādeḥ pañcāgnividhiśeṣataivametāvattaiva nopapadyate yāvaddhiraṇyasteyādeḥ pratiṣedho nāvagamitaḥ | ya etāṃ vidyāmadhīte sa hiraṇyasteyādyapyācaraṃstaiśca saṃvasanna patati, anyathā tu patatītyavagatiraviruddhā | "atha vidhyuddeśo vidheḥ pratipādako, nārthavāda iti kenaiṣā paribhāṣā kṛtā | 'ete patanti catvāra' ityatrāpyākhyātaśravaṇamasti | 'liṅādayo na santīti' cet 'pratitiṣṭhantīti' rātriṣvapi naiva liṅaśrutirasti | atha 'tatrādhikārākāṅkṣāyāmekavākyatāyāṃ satyāṃ pañcamalakārikalpanayā vidhyavasāyaḥ', evamatrāpi bhaviṣyati | bahavaśca dravyadevatāvidhayo'rthavādāvagamyāḥ santi | tatra yasya vidheḥ śeṣā arthavādāstadvidhinaiva dravyadevatāderapekṣitatvādviśeṣasamarpaṇamātre vyāpārāntargataviśeṣāvagatirarthavādādhīnā na doṣāya | iha tu tadasambaddhasya vidhyantarasyeṣyamāṇatvādvākyabhedāpattirataśca na prakṛtiśeṣatā | tadabhāve ca tanmūlā pratiṣedhāvagatirna syādataśca 'aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhāti' 'tejo vai ghṛtami'tyanena vaiṣamyamityāhuḥ |" tadasat | satyapyarthāntaratve tadekavākyatāmūlatvādasyāvagaternāsti vākyabhedābhidhodyāpattiḥ | mantrāḥ prayogaprakāśatvena rūpādevāvagatāstasya prayogasyānyato'siddheḥ prakāśakatvanirvahaṇāya prakāśyaṃ kalpayanti | na cā'satohatpatyadhikārayoḥ prakāśanamaṣṭakāyāḥ sambhavatītyutpatyadhikāraviniyogaprayogabodhakā mantrāḥ | evaṃ māntravarṇikāśca vidhayo'pyupagamyante | yathā''ghāre devatāvidhiḥ |

(A) First, as regards Arthavādas, these are not meant to be construed apart from the injunctive passages; it is only if they were so construed that they would fail to help in the knowledge of dharma. As a matter of fact, we find that if the Arthavāda is taken apart by itself, it remains syntactically defective; and this leads us to conclude that they subserve the purposes of the corresponding injunctive passages; being so subservient to these latter, they come to be construed along with them; and hence they have got to be explained in such a manner as to make them fit in with the corresponding injunction. Thus the mention of Prajāpati having cut his fat cannot be taken by itself; it has to be taken as supplementing an injunction; in view of the fact however that the Arthavādas do not denote a substance, a sacrificial accessory, or any such thing as generally forms the direct object of injunction, they are construed differently, as eulogising what is directly enjoined, and thus come to be recognised as supplementing the injunction. This praise of the enjoined thing is also expressed by the Arthavāda; for instance, the sense of the passage in question is this—‘it is so necessary to perform animal-sacrifices that, at a time when no animals were available, and there was no other remedy, Prajāpati constituted himself into the animal and cut out his own fat.’ That such is the construction to be put upon the Arthavāda is shown by the fact that whenever we have Arthavādas, they always accompany injunctive passages. Thus even though the sense of the injunction is comprehended even without the accompanying Arthavāda,—e.g., in the case of the injunction ‘one should offer the Kapiñjala birds to Vasanta,’ we comprehend the injunction from the sentence itself,—yet the Arthavādas are not absolutely useless; for when the Arthavāda is there, it is not right to deduce the injunction from the injunctive sentence only. The Veda is not the work of any author; we cannot argue (from the analogy of human speeches) that ‘since in one case the injunction has no Arthavāda to help it, it need not have it in another case also’;—the Arthavādas are there, we have to construe them; and what we have shown above is the only right way in which the particular Arthavāda can be construed. Nor is there anything very extraordinary in this; in ordinary practice also, we find eulogistic words accompanying injunctions; for instance, at the time that the master is paying -wages to his servants, some servant says affectionately (in regard to another)—‘This Devadatta is a good servant, he is always present, knows the occasions of service and is always careful about it.’ Thus we find that Arthavādas also serve the purpose of enjoining, through the eulogising of what is enjoined by the injunction. In fact, in certain cases, details of what is enforced by the injunction are got at from the Arthavāda only; for instance, when the injunction says, ‘wet pebbles are to be put in,’ this injunction stands in need of some wetting substance, such as butter oil, etc.; so that when it is followed by the Arthavāda ‘Butter is glory,’ this praise of Butter leads us to conclude that Butter is the welting substance to be used. Similarly the Arthavāda ‘those who have recourse to these Rātris become respected’serves to point out the qualifying conditions for the performers of the Rātri-satra sacrifice. From all this it is clear that Arthavādas also are ‘the root of Dharma.’

(B) Next as regards Mantras, some of them are directly injunctive; e.g., the Mantra ‘Vasantāya kapiñjalān ālabhate’ (‘offers the Kapiñjala birds to Vasanta’);—in connection with the Āghāra-offering, the deity to whom the offering is to be made is pointed out by the mantra ‘Ita Indra urdhvo’ dhvaraḥ, etc.’ In this case the Deity is not mentioned in the passage that enjoins the offering, nor is it mentioned in any other purely injunctive passage; the particular mantra to be used however is directly enjoined as being the one that begins with ‘Ita Indra’; hence it is from the words of this mantra that we learn the name of the requisite Deity. There are thousand, of such instances where the Deity is indicated by the words of the mantra. Then, there are certain mantras that are only descriptive of what is being done; and these also serve the purpose of making known Dharma by reminding (the persons engaged in the act, of what is to be done); and thus these also become ‘root of Dharma’ by indicating what should be done.