Manava Dharmashastra 3.1.3

3.1.3

ata idamadhyayanamarthāvabodhaparyantamavaghāta iva taṇḍulaniṣpattiparyantaḥ | etāvāṃstu viśeṣaḥ | prakaraṇe'dhītatvādavaghāto jhaṭiti labdhādhikāravidhyantarasambandhaḥ | ayaṃ tvanārabhyādhītatvādavabodhaparyavasāyī sakalaphalakarmānuṣṭhānopayogitayā gamyamāno'dhikāraḥ | tathā vidhyarthanirvṛttireva phalaviśeṣo'bhipretaḥ | vidherhi puruṣārthatvaṃ vyutpannāvagamam , tatsānkṣādbhavatu vā paramparayā veti na viśeṣaḥ | gamyamānādhikāratvācca svatantra evāyaṃ vidhiḥ svātmānamanuṣṭhāpayati, yadyapi nityakāmaśrutiṣvarthāvabodha upayujyate | ye tvarthāvabodhadvāreṇa jyotiṣṭomādividhyekakāryatvamicchanti tatphalasyaiva ca prayatnaviśeṣādatiśayamāhusteṣāmācāryakaraṇavidhinā kimaparāddhaṃ, yena mahatā yatnena tadekakāryatā niṣidhyate | aprāmāṇyaṃ vedasya bhavatīti cedastu | na prayojanavaśena yuktisāmarthyāyāto'rtho hātuṃ śakyate | yuktistu yuktyantareṇa balīyasā bādhyate | "ācāryakaraṇavidhyekakāryatve tvasya vidhirūpataiva hīyate, svārthasyāvivakṣitatvāt" | tattulyaṃ jyotiṣṭomādyanupraveśe'pi | yadā tu svatantro'yaṃ vidhiḥ svārthānuṣṭhāpakastatsamānaskandhastadā svayamevetikartavyatayā yukto'nuṣṭhīyate | tatra ye vikalpātāḥ kalpā laghīyāṃso garīyāṃsaśca, teṣāṃ laghīyasā siddhe garīyasāmanuṣṭhānaṃ vidhyartha eva viśeṣamāvahati | yathā''dhāne 'ekā deyā tisro deyā' ityādi |

Some people have held the view that—“the injunction of Vedic Study serves, through the comprehension of meaning, the same purpose as the injunctions of the Jyotiṣṭoma and other acts, and that the additional effort (involved in Vedic Study and comprehension of meaning) serves to enhance the quality of the results brought about by those acts.” But what fault has the Injunction of ‘becoming a Teacher’ done for those people, that they should have made great efforts to deny the view that this latter also serves the same purpose as the Injunction of ‘Vedic Study?’ If it be urged that—“under this view, the Veda would become unauthoritative,”—our answer is that, that might be so; but when a certain fact is well established by reason and arguments, it is not abandoned or rejected for the sake of accomplishing any purpose. In fact, an argument is set aside only by another and a more cogent argument.

“But if the Injunction of Vedic Study were taken as serving the same purpose as that of ‘becoming a Teacher,’ then the former would lose its injunctive character; as in that case no significance would attach to what is expressed by its own words.”

The same thing happens also when the Injunction in question is made a part and parcel of the Injunction of the Jyotiṣṭoma, etc.

If, on the other hand, the Injunction of Vedic Study is regarded as independently by itself conducive to the carrying into effect of what it enjoins, then, standing upon an equal footing with all other Injunctions, it rightly comes to be acted up to by itself, as a necessary factor (of all performances).

The meaning of the statement is as follows:—The whole Injunction prescribes a sanctiticatory process, in which ‘Vedic Study’ forms the predominant factor, by reason of the sanctification being accomplished during that ‘study.’ And Injunctions of sanctifications do not stand in need of the direct mention of the result the seeker whereof would be entitled to their performance; in fact, through the object sanctified, they become part and parcel of another Injunction in connection with which a particular result has been mentioned. For example, we have the Injunction ‘the corns should be threshed and this ‘threshing’ becomes related to the transcendental results proceeding from the Darśa-pūrṇamāsa sacrifices,—not by itself, but—only through the removal of the chaff which goes to purify the corns of which is made the cake used at the Āgneya and other offerings making up the Darśa-Pūrnamāsa; and it is thus that the threshing comes to be recognised as something to be done. In the same manner, the Veda cannot be regarded as something to be sanctified or refined, except as subordinate to something else. As a matter of fact, we find that the comprehension of meaning actually follows after ‘Vedic Study from which it follows that this act of ‘study’ itself extends up to the comprehending of the meaning, just as the act of ‘threshing’ extends up to the accomplishment of the Rice. The only difference in the two cases is as follows:—By reason of its injunction occurring in the same context, the ‘threshing’ becomes quickly recognised as related to another Injunction mentioning a result; while the Injunction in question (of Vedic Study) does not occur in the context of any particular act, and is regarded as extending up to the comprehension of meaning; so that its connection with results is only implied by the fact of its being of use in the performance of all those acts that are enjoined as leading to various results. Thus the fact that an Injunction aims at some useful purpose of man is readily understood; and it makes no difference whether it does so directly or indirectly. And since its connection with a result is clearly implied, the Injunction in question gets itself carried out independently by itself, even though the comprehension of meaning is of use in connection with the injunctions of compulsory and voluntary acts.

Thus then, out of the several alternative options—some heavier than the rest—that have been set forth (in the verse), if the lighter alternative serves to accomplish the desired purpose, all that the undertaking of the heavier option can do is to add something to the quality of what has been prescribed by the Injunction. Just as is the case with the options of giving ‘one, three or twelve cows’ as a fee in connection with the Laying of Fire. Thus then, if the Injunction of Study has been carried into effect on its own accouut (and the Veda has been studied), we cannot escape from its twofold relation—viz.: (1) its leading to the performance of what it itself prescribes, and (2) its helping the performance of the Jyotiṣṭoma and other acts; it matters little whether such relation is directly stated, or implied, or assumed; for this latter fact would involve a diversity only in the means whereby the knowledge of the relation is obtained, and not any in the relation itself.