The Law Code of Yājñavalkya 3.5: atha prāyaścittaprakaraṇam

In the verse, "Tell us in full the duties of the social classes, the stages of life, and the rest" (YDh 1.1), having expounded five types of duties among the sixfold duties promised to be set forth, now wishing to begin the remaining class of occasional duty denoted by the term expiation, he first states the ripening of actions, which takes the form of commendatory exposition, in order to generate interest in it and to show the specific qualified persons.

Having reached the frightful, dread hells born of major sins, / perpetrators of major sins, due to the exhaustion of their deeds, are reborn here [in this world].

The designation 'major sins' (mahāpātaka) for the set of five beginning with the murder of a Brahmin will be stated in [the verse beginning] 'A murderer of a Brahmin, a drinker of liquor…' (YDh 3.227). Those who are connected with them are perpetrators of major sins. Having reached the dread hells, such as Tāmisra, which are produced by major sins, corresponding to the wicked deeds they themselves generated, frightful because they produce exceedingly acute pain, and dread, being the abode solely of the experience of suffering; then, after the exhaustion of their deeds—that is, after the cessation of the experience of the suffering of hell generated by those deeds—they are, by virtue of the remainder of their deeds, repeatedly and emphatically born again here in mundane existence (saṃsāra) into non-human wombs full of suffering, such as those of dogs and jackals. The mention of 'perpetrators of major sins' is an indicative mark (upalakṣaṇa) for others as well, such as perpetrators of minor sins, because their attainment of non-human and other wombs will also be stated. || 3.206

Having spoken of the entrance into mundane existence for perpetrators of major sins, he speaks in order to state the particulars thereof:

The killer of a Brahmin enters the womb of a deer, a dog, a hog, or a camel; / a drinker of liquor [enters the womb] of a donkey, a Pulkasa, or a Veṇa: of this there is no doubt.

The stealer of gold attains the condition of a worm, an insect, or a moth; / and the violator of the Guru's bed gradually [attains] the condition of grasses, shrubs, and creepers.

'Deer' means antelopes and the like; 'dog, hog, and camel' are well known. The killer of a Brahmin enters their womb through the residue of his deed. A 'donkey' is an ass; a 'Pulkasa' is one born of a Nishada father upon a Shudra woman in the reverse order of castes; a 'Veṇa' is one born of a Vaidehaka upon an Ambaṣṭha woman; a drinker of liquor attains their womb. 'Worms' (kṛmi) are those born of meat, feces, cow dung, and the like, without relying on intercourse between members of the same species; somewhat larger than them, devoid of wings and bones, are 'insects' (kīṭa) such as ants; 'moths' (pataṅga) are locusts. A stealer of a Brahmin's gold attains their womb. 'Grass' is kāśa-grass and the like; 'shrubs and creepers' have been mentioned before; the violator of the Guru's bed gradually attains their species. And this applies to an act done unintentionally. But when done intentionally, they transmigrate into other wombs as well, full of suffering, as Manu has stated:

'The killer of a Brahmin enters the womb of dogs, hogs, donkeys, camels, / cattle, sheep, horses, deer, birds, / and of Caṇḍālas and Pukkasas.'

A Brahmin wine-drinker would enter the wombs of worms, insects, winged moths, filth-eating birds, / and ferocious creatures.

And the Brahmin thief [enters] thousands of times [the wombs] of spiders, snakes, lizards, water-dwelling animals, / and ferocious Piśācas.

"Lūtā" is a spider. "Saraṭha" is a chameleon or lizard.

And the violator of the Guru's bed [enters] hundreds of times [the state] of grasses, shrubs, creepers, and carnivorous, fanged beasts, / and of those who perform cruel deeds. / Thus. (MDh 12.55–58) 3.207–8.

Furthermore:

A killer of a Brahmin becomes consumptive; a wine-drinker, black-toothed; / a thief of gold, bad-nailed; and the violator of the Guru's bed, diseased in skin.

Whoever associates with any of these is born with his characteristics.

Thus, after experiencing terrible suffering in Raurava and other hells and in the wombs of dogs, pigs, donkeys, and the like, they wander next, through the remnant of their sin, into abundant human bodies, endowed from the very moment of birth with marks such as consumption. A killer of a Brahmin becomes consumptive, suffering from pulmonary consumption (rājayakṣman). A drinker of forbidden wine naturally has black teeth. A stealer of a Brahmin's gold incurs the condition of having ugly nails. One who goes to the Guru's wife incurs a diseased skin, that is, leprosy. Among these, the killer of a Brahmin and the rest, whichever outcaste a man associates with, he is born endowed with that person's characteristic mark. 3.209.

Furthermore:

A thief of food becomes afflicted with indigestion; a stealer of words, mute.

One who adulterates grain has a redundant limb; a slanderer has a putrid nose; / a stealer of oil becomes a cockroach (tailapāyin); but an informer has a foul-smelling mouth.

A stealer of food becomes diseased, that is, suffering from indigestion of food. A stealer of words—one who studies without permission and a stealer of books—becomes mute, impaired in the organ of speech. One who adulterates grain has an extra limb, such as six fingers. A slanderer is one whose habit is to proclaim the existing faults of others; he has a putrid nose, that is, a foul-smelling nose. A stealer of oil becomes a cockroach (tailapāyin), a kind of insect. An informer, one who proclaims non-existent faults, is born with a foul-smelling mouth. And this should be understood to occur upon attaining a human body subsequent to attaining the animal state;

for Manu's tradition states: / 'Having forcibly stolen another's property, whatever it may be, a man / inevitably enters the animal state, as well as by eating an unoffered oblation.' / (MDh 12.68)

Thus. 3.210–3.211.

Furthermore:

Having seized another's woman and having stolen a Brahmin's property, / one becomes a Brahmarākṣasa in a waterless wilderness.

He who abducts another's wife and steals a Brahmin's property other than gold is born in a waterless wilderness as a Brahmarākṣasa, a specific kind of spirit. 3.212.

Furthermore:

A stealer of another's jewels would be born in a low caste; / by stealing leafy vegetables, [one becomes] a peacock; by stealing fine fragrances, a musk-shrew.

A stealer of another's jewels and the like is born in a low caste, among the goldsmith class, [or] among bird species. And similarly Manu:

'A man, having stolen out of greed gems, pearls, corals, / and various jewels, is born among goldsmiths.' / Thus. (MDh 12.69)

By stealing vegetables consisting of leaves, one becomes a peacock. By stealing pleasant perfumes, one is born as a musk-shrew (chucchundarī), a mouse-like creature called 'rājaduhitā'. 3.213.

Furthermore:

A stealer of grain becomes a mouse; of a vehicle, a camel; of fruit, a monkey; / of water, a diving duck; of milk, a crow; of household furnishings, a potter wasp;

of honey, a gadfly; of meat, a vulture; of a cow, an iguana lizard; of fire, a heron; / of clothing, one with leukoderma; of juice, a dog; while a stealer of salt becomes a cricket.

A stealer of grain becomes a mouse (ākhu); having stolen a vehicle, a camel; of fruit, a monkey; of water, a diving duck (plava), a bird called 'śakaṭavila'; of milk (payas, kṣīra), a crow (kāka, dhvāṅkṣa); having stolen household utensils such as a pestle, a potter wasp (gṛhakārin), a kind of insect called 'caṭaka'; having stolen honey, an insect called 'daṃśa'; of flesh (pala, māṃsa), having stolen that, a bird called a vulture (gṛdhra); having stolen a cow, a creature called an iguana lizard (godhā); having stolen fire, a bird called a heron (baka); having stolen clothing, one afflicted with leukoderma (śvitrin); having stolen sugarcane juice or the like, a dog; a stealer of salt becomes a loud-sounding insect called a cricket (cīrī). 3.214–3.215.

Having thus spoken of a few cases by way of illustration, because it is impossible to speak of every single item by the method of endless individual inquiry, he speaks [the next verse] in order to show the retribution of deeds by means of a unifying principle:

'This has been spoken by me only by way of illustration in the matter of theft; / for according to the types of goods, so indeed are the species of living beings.'

Of whatever nature are the types of property being stolen, just of such nature are the species of living beings into which thieves turn in the act of theft. For example, a stealer of bell-metal becomes a swan. Or else, of whatever result a stolen object is the instrument, the thief is deprived of that instrument, as a horse-thief incurs lameness. A specific detail has been shown in some cases by Śaṅkha:

'A Brahmin-killer becomes a leper; a stealer of metal vessels, afflicted with ringworm; a reviler of gods and Brahmins, bald; a poisoner and an arsonist, mad; an attacker of a Guru, epileptic; a cow-slayer, blind; one who has abandoned his lawful wife and indulged elsewhere becomes a specific creature that strikes by sound; a guest who eats at a funeral feast for an illegitimate son (kuṇḍāśin) becomes a consumer of vulvas; a stealer of property of gods and Brahmins, jaundiced; a stealer of a deposit, one-eyed; one who lives off the prostitution of women, a eunuch; an abandoner of his wife taken in virginity, unfortunate; one who eats sweets alone, afflicted with abdominal wind-tumors; an eater of forbidden food, afflicted with scrofula; one who has intercourse with a Brahmin woman, impotent; one of cruel deeds, a dwarf; a stealer of clothes, a moth; a stealer of a bed, a Jain monk (kṣapaṇaka); a stealer of conches and oyster-shells, a Kapālin; a stealer of a lamp, an owl; a betrayer of friends, consumptive; and one who reviles his mother and father, a cripple.' / Thus.

Gautama also states a particular distinction in some cases:

A liar becomes a stutterer, his speech constantly faltering; an abandoner of his wife gets dropsy; a false witness gets elephantiasis and withered shanks and feet; an obstructor of a marriage gets a cleft lip; one who raises a weapon in threat loses a hand; a matricide becomes blind; one who has sex with his daughter-in-law gets scrotal hernia; one who defecates or urinates at a crossroads suffers from strangury; a defiler of a maiden becomes a eunuch; an envious person becomes a mosquito; one who argues with his father gets epilepsy; one who misappropriates a deposit becomes childless; one who steals jewels becomes utterly destitute; a seller of learning becomes a man-deer; a seller of the Veda becomes a leopard; one who sacrifices for many becomes a water-fowl; one who sacrifices for those unfit to sacrifice becomes a boar; one who eats uninvited becomes a crow; one who eats sweets alone becomes a monkey; one who eats from anywhere becomes a cat; from burning shrub and forest one becomes a firefly; a teacher of children gets foul breath; one who eats stale food becomes a worm; one who takes what is not given becomes an ox; an envious person becomes a bee; an extinguisher of the sacred fire gets macular leprosy; a teacher of a Shudra becomes an outcaste; a cow-thief becomes a snake; a thief of oil gets consumption; a thief of grain gets indigestion; a thief of knowledge becomes mute; on having sex with a Caṇḍāla or Pulkasa woman one becomes a python; on having sex with a female ascetic, a desert goblin; on having sex with a Shudra woman, a long worm; one who has sex with a woman of his own class becomes impoverished; a thief of water becomes a fish; a thief of milk becomes a crane; a usurer loses a limb; a seller of forbidden goods becomes a vulture; one who has sex with a queen becomes a eunuch; a reviler of the king becomes a donkey; one who has sex with a cow becomes a frog; on studying during an unseasonable time, a jackal; a stealer of another's wealth becomes another's servant; upon killing fish, one dwells in the womb; these are those who do not ascend to higher births. / Thus [it is taught].

Women also, on these same grounds, experience female status within these very species previously mentioned. As Manu said:

"Women also, by stealing in this manner, incur guilt; / they attain the state of being wives to these very creatures." / Thus.

Moreover, this statement of marks such as consumption is meant to arouse dread in a killer of a Brahmin or the like who is already inclined toward penance; it is not meant to prescribe a twelve-year vow or the like for those bearing marks such as consumption, nor is it meant to stop social intercourse [with them]. For penance is for the destruction of sin. And there is no purpose in destroying, by means of penance, the unseen karmic force (apūrva) whose fruit has already begun [to manifest]. For an arrow shot from a bow does not depend on the further existence of the archer or his activity to hit the mark. Nor should the destruction of the unseen force be sought for the sake of destroying the fruit that has already begun from it; for the destruction of the wheel, potter’s cloth, and the like, which serve as instrumental causes, does not bring about the destruction of the water-jar or other products already produced by them. Nor can innate bad nails and the like be reversed. Furthermore, for one who has experienced the series of sufferings produced by hells, animal wombs, and the like, a deformity such as bad nails is the final fruit; and as soon as it is produced, it causes the destruction of its own causal unseen force, just as the fire generated by churning destroys the firestick. Therefore, the observance of a vow is not for the destruction of sin, nor is it for social intercourse. For cultured people do not avoid association with those who have bad nails and the like. Since social eligibility is also established through the destruction of sin by exhaustion of past karma, there is no need for the observance of a vow. As for what was said by Vasiṣṭha—"One with bad nails and one with black teeth should perform a kṛcchra penance of twelve nights" (VaDh 20.6)—that is to be understood as merely an occasional [duty] like the Kṣāmavatī rite, not for the destruction of sin or for the sake of establishing social eligibility. || 3.216

Furthermore:

"Having obtained the fruit according to their deeds and animal birth, by the turn of time, / they are born bereft of auspicious marks, impoverished, the lowest among men.

"According to their deeds," without overstepping the bad deeds committed by themselves, having obtained a commensurate fruit such as hell and animal birth, and when the karma is exhausted in due course of time, they are born with defective marks, impoverished, and the lowest among men. || 3.217

Furthermore:

"Then, having become free of stain, they are born in a great family, enjoying pleasures, / endowed with learning, and possessed of wealth and grain.

Then, after the birth as a human with ill marks, having become free of stain, their sin exhausted through the experience of hell and the like, by the remainder of their good deeds from a prior life, they are born in a great family, endowed with pleasures, and endowed with learning, wealth, and grain. || 3.218

Thus, having explained the retribution of deeds in order to incite [people] toward penances, he now speaks to determine the qualified person for these very [penances]:

"From non-performance of what is enjoined, and from indulgence in what is censured, / and from lack of restraint of the senses, a man incurs a fall.

"Therefore, here a penance must be performed by him for purification; / thus his inner self and the world are propitiated."

By "what is enjoined" is meant both that which is obligatory, such as the twilight worship and the Agnihotra, which is regular, and that which is enjoined as occasional, such as bathing upon touching an impure thing; from not performing that, from performing what is censured, that is, forbidden, such as drinking wine, and from lack of restraint of the senses, a man incurs, that is, meets with, a fall; that is to say, he incurs transgression.

Objection: In the rule "one should not attach oneself to all sensory objects out of desire," attachment of the senses is also forbidden; since it is already covered by the mention of "what is censured," what is the purpose of mentioning separately "and from lack of restraint of the senses"?

To this it is said: The prohibition of indulgence of the senses does not have the nature of an absolute negation, because it is recited in the context of the observances of the Snātaka, and there, by virtue of the governing rule of the word 'vow' (vrata) in 'he shall maintain these vows' and because a negative particle is heard, a mental resolution (saṃkalpa) that turns one away from indulgence of the senses is enjoined. And because that [resolution] has a positive nature (bhāvarūpa), it is mentioned separately. [Objection:] From what, then, is it determined that one incurs sin (pratyavāya) from the non-performance of what is enjoined? First, the injunction (codanā) for the Agnihotra and other [rites], whose nature is to urge a person to act, does not imply that non-performance is the cause of sin. For it terminates merely in the comprehension that the performance of the object is an aim of human life (puruṣārtha), and since activity is accounted for by that alone, it does not further declare that non-performance is the cause of sin, because its capacity is exhausted and there is no inconsistency. Moreover, if another matter were assumed merely to clear away an inconsistency in order to account for activity, then, even though abstention from a prohibited act is established as an aim of human life solely by being the avoidance of sin produced by that prohibited act, one would assume yet another fruit; and this is not acceptable to anyone.

[Objection:] Well, just as in the case of prohibited acts their being an aim of human life consists merely in the avoidance of sin as understood from explanatory statements (arthavāda), why should there not likewise be, even in the case of enjoined acts, the nature of avoiding sin produced by non-performance as understood from explanatory statements?

[Reply:] Not so; for such explanatory statements do not exist everywhere in the case of the Agnihotra and the like. Nor is it sound to say that this very Smṛti rule—'Through the non-performance of what is enjoined… a man incurs a fall'—stands in the place of a supplementary statement (vākyaśeṣa). For an explanatory statement in another sentence cannot apply to a task established by a different sentence. Or, even granting that somehow an explanatory statement forms a single syntactical sentence with it, nonetheless, the non-performance of what is enjoined, having the nature of an absence (abhāva), is incapable of producing another positive effect.

[Objection:] But according to the statement of Āyurveda, 'In fever and in dysentery, fasting is the supreme medicine,' fasting, which has the nature of an absence of eating, is understood to produce the alleviation of fever; let it be so here as well.

[Reply:] Not so; because here too the alleviation of fever does not arise from fasting.

From what, then? It must be understood that it arises from the equilibrium of the bodily humors (dhātusāmya) produced by the cooking of the digestive fire in the stomach when there is an absence of food, which is an impediment to the destruction of fever. Therefore, it must be explained: what is the meaning of this Smṛti, 'Through the non-performance of what is enjoined, a man incurs a fall'?

It is replied: It refers to the sin (pratyavāya) consisting in the failure to achieve eligibility (adhikāra) regarding the Agnihotra and other rites; thus there is no defect.

[Objection:] But then,

'A Brahmin who has fallen from his own duty becomes a corpse-eating Ulkāmukha ghost, / and a Kshatriya a Kaṭapūtana who feeds on foul things and carcasses. / A Vaishya who has fallen from his own duty becomes a pus-eating Maitrākṣajyotika ghost, / and a Shudra becomes a moth-eating ghost.' (MDh 12.71–72)

How can these statements of Manu, which are concerned with the sin of not performing what is enjoined, be consistent?

It is replied: Just as there is suffering for one who eats vomit or one whose mouth is burned by a fiery brand, so too for a person who does not perform what is enjoined there is the non-achievement of the aims of human life; thus the censure of non-performance is for the sake of encouraging performance, and so there is no contradiction. Alternatively, it must be understood that the state of being an Ulkāmukha ghost who eats vomit and the like is produced by passion, indolence, and the like, which are opposed to the performance of enjoined acts and are implied by the performance of prohibited deeds in a previous life; therefore, in no case is an absence (abhāva) a cause.

[Objection:] Well, in the case of one seen by an unchaste woman, a monkey, or a donkey, one bitten by a dog, or one falsely accused, since not even one of the causes such as non-performance of what is enjoined is present, how can there be the state of incurring sin, and in the absence of that, how can there be the prescription of a penance?

In reply, it is said: From the very prescription of expiation for the destruction of sin, an unseen result consisting of sin born of indulgence in prohibited acts and the like committed in another birth is presupposed; hence, it is postulated that curses and the like, which are to be dispelled by expiation occasioned by them, were incurred by him [in that previous life]. For it is not possible that an effect in the form of sin could arise without reference to human effort. Nor does sin arise in another person through the effort belonging to a promiscuous woman and the like, because of the rule that merit and demerit inhere exclusively in the agent. Therefore, the enumeration of the three occasions for expiation is entirely reasonable. And Manu says likewise:

"A man incurs the need for expiation by not performing an enjoined action, by practicing what is censured, and by clinging to the objects of the senses."

The mention of 'a man' is meant to include the qualification for expiation even for those born in inverse order of caste hierarchy, since violation of universal duties such as non-violence is possible for them as well. Since a person incurs sin in this way through the performance of prohibited acts and the like, therefore expiation must be performed by that person who has engaged in prohibited acts and the like, for the sake of purification in this world and the next. And this word 'expiation' has conventional usage with reference to a specific occasional rite aimed at the destruction of sin. When expiation is performed in this manner, his inner self becomes tranquil through purification, and society is inclined to interact with him. By speaking thus, this has been demonstrated: this qualification for expiation is occasional; and in that regard, even the destruction of sin mentioned in explanatory passages is accepted as something to be accomplished, according to the principle of the Jāteṣṭi sacrifice. Nor should one suspect an optional qualification driven by desire simply because it is performed by one desiring to avoid evil, since:

"Therefore, expiation must always be performed for purification; / for those who have not expiated their sins are born endowed with censured bodily marks."

For its obligatory nature is understood from the hearing of a fault in the case of non-performance. || 3.219 || 3.220

He states the fault in the non-performance of expiation:

Men who do not perform expiation, who remain devoted to sins, / and who feel no repentance, go to distressing, terrible hells.

Men who are addicted to sins born of the transgression of the teachings of scripture, who feel no repentance—that is, who are free from anxiety in the form of 'I have committed an evil deed'—and do not perform expiation, reach intolerable hells. || 3.221

Explaining the nature of the hells, he says:

Tāmisra, Lohaśaṅku, Mahāniraya, Śālmalī, / Raurava, Kuḍmala, Pūtimṛttika, Kālasūtra,

Saṃghāta, Lohitoda, Saviṣa, Saṃprapātana, / Mahānaraka, Kākola, Saṃjīvana, Mahāpatha,

Avīci, Andhatāmisra, and Kumbhīpāka likewise, / Asipatravana, and Tāpana as the twenty-first;

Endowed with dreadful [demerits] arising from mortal sins and from secondary sins, / the lowest of men, having not performed expiation, go [to these].

Endowed with terrifying sins produced by mortal sins and secondary sins, the lowest of men who have not performed expiation reach the twenty-one hells beginning with Tāmisra and ending with Tāpana, whose sub-varieties are indicated by their literal names. || 3.222-225

It has been said that expiation is for the destruction of incurred sin. Regarding that, he states a specific rule:

Through expiations, sin that has been committed unknowingly departs; / but [if committed] intentionally, [a person] becomes fit for social interaction in this world only through scriptural injunction.

Through expiations whose characteristics will be explained, that sin which has been committed unknowingly departs, goes away; not that which is committed intentionally. Rather, in that case, by virtue of the scriptural statements enjoining expiation, he becomes fit for social interaction in this world. And here, since the passage begins with 'through expiations, sin that has been committed unknowingly departs', although one should have said 'knowingly' as its counterpart, the fact that he said 'intentionally' is in order to demonstrate the equivalence of knowledge and intention. For so it is said:

"That which is enjoined for those without intention becomes double when done with intention."

Similarly, "in the case of an action done unintentionally, the expiation is half"; likewise:

"If a Shudra has been approached somehow by a barbarian out of ignorance, / he should perform three kṛcchra penances; but if done knowingly, it becomes double."

Since an equivalent expiation is observed for knowledge and desire by these and other passages, their result is strictly equivalent. Furthermore, independent action is governed by knowledge of the object and desire for it, since action is impossible in the absence of either of them; hence it is stated as 'intentionally'. Even when it is stated as 'knowingly or unknowingly', desire is implied due to invariable concomitance. Nor should one argue that there is no invariable concomitance because, in the case of one being compelled by force by thieves and the like, desire is absent even though there is knowledge of the object; for in that case, because the existing knowledge is not the cause of the action, it is treated as non-existent. As for one who falls into mud due to error even when wishing to fall on dry ground, there too, because of the absence of actual knowledge, there is simply an absence of desire concerning that object. In this way, there is strictly an invariable connection between ignorance and absence of desire as well.

Objection: The statement 'sin departs through expiations' is not correct, because action is destroyed only through its result.

This is not so. Just as the arising of sin is cognizable only through scripture, so too is its destruction; hence no other means of knowledge applies here. For this very reason, Gautama has presented this matter in the form of a prima facie view and a rejoinder: "They debate whether one should perform an expiation or not. They say one should not, for action is not destroyed. Others say one should, for it is known [from scripture]: 'Having sacrificed with the Punaḥstoma, they return to the repeated soma-pressing'; 'Having sacrificed with the Vrātyastoma, one crosses over all evil; one who sacrifices with the horse sacrifice crosses over the killing of an embryo.'" The phrase 'they return to the repeated soma-pressing' means he becomes qualified for rites of the twice-born such as the Jyotiṣṭoma, which are accomplished by soma-pressing. And this is not mere commendatory eulogy. For when an qualification is desired as an attribute of the agent, it is logical to postulate the result stated in the explanatory passage itself, according to the principle of the Rātrisatra sacrifice. Therefore, it is correct to say: 'through expiations, sin departs'.

Objection: Since there is no expiation for an intentional act, how can there be fitness for social interaction? And the absence of that [expiation] is established from the statement of Vasiṣṭha: "Expiation is for an offense committed without premeditation."

"This purification is prescribed for having killed a twice-born unintentionally; / but when a Brahmin is intentionally slain, no expiation is ordained."

And [this objection is raised because] it is known from this statement of Manu.

This is not so.

"Whatever man should intentionally commit a major sin in any way, / no expiation for him is seen other than falling from a precipice or into fire,"

and likewise:

"Whatever is ordained for unintentional [acts] shall be doubled for intentional ones,"

since expiation is observed even for what is intentionally committed. As for the statement of Vasiṣṭha, however, its meaning too is:

"Expiation brings purification for an unintentionally committed offense,"

and not that there is no expiation for what is intentionally done. And as for Manu's statement, "This purification is prescribed…" and so on, that too refers only to the performance of vows such as the twelve-year vow referred to by the pronoun "this". By the phrase "no expiation is ordained for intentionally slaying a Brahmin," there is a prohibition of that [specific vow], not of expiation in general, since expiations ending in death and the like are taught.

[Objection:] If there is expiation even for what is intentionally done, then why shouldn't there also be destruction of the sin, since there is no difference? And if there is no destruction of the sin, then how can fitness for social intercourse even arise?

[Response:] It is said in reply: Even though expiation is equally present in both cases, a distinction in result is known from the authoritative texts. When done unknowingly, destruction of the sin occurs in all cases. But where fitness for social intercourse is prohibited in major sins and the like mentioned by Gautama: "The slayer of a Brahmin, a drinker of liquor, one who violates the teacher's bed, one who enters a womb related to mother or father, a thief, an atheist, one who constantly engages in censured actions, one who abandons an outcaste and one who abandons one not an outcaste, are outcastes; and so are those who associate with sinners"—in such a degrading action, when done intentionally, only fitness for social intercourse [is achieved], not the destruction of the sin. Nor is fitness for social intercourse illogical in the absence of the destruction of the sin. For sin has two powers: producing hell and obstructing social intercourse. There, even when the other power is not destroyed, the destruction of the power that obstructs social intercourse is not illogical; therefore, even though the sin does not depart, fitness for social intercourse is not illogical. As for the statement of Manu:

"The wise consider expiation to be for a sin committed unintentionally; / some, however, say it is also for what is intentionally done, based on Vedic evidence."

That too is intended to establish expiation for intentional acts, not to expound the destruction of sin. However, for a non-degrading [offense], even when done intentionally, the destruction of the sin does indeed occur through expiation: