Vishnupurana 2.13.100

Having thus spoken, the Brahman was silent, and went on bearing the palankin; but the king leaped out of it, and hastened to prostrate himself at his feet; saying, "Have compassion on me, Brahman, and cast aside the palankin; and tell me who thou art, thus disguised under the appearance of a fool." The Brahman answered and said, "Hear me, Rája,. Who I am it is not possible to say: arrival at any place is for the sake of fruition; and enjoyment of pleasure, or endurance of pain, is the cause of the production of the body. A living being assumes a corporeal form to reap the results of virtue or vice. The universal cause of all living creatures is virtue or vice: why therefore inquire the cause (of my being the person I appear)." The king said, "Undoubtedly virtue and vice are the causes of all existent effects, and migration into several bodies is for the purpose of receiving their consequences; but with respect to what you have asserted, that it is not possible for you to tell me who you are, that is a matter which I am desirous to hear explained. How can it be impossible, Brahman, for any one to declare himself to be that which he is? There can be no detriment to one's-self from applying to it the word I." The Brahman said, "It is true that there is no wrong done to that which is one's-self by the application to it of the word I; but the term is characteristic of error, of conceiving that to be the self (or soul) which is not self or soul. The tongue articulates the word I, aided by the lips, the teeth, and the palate; and these are the origin of the expression, as they are the causes of the production of speech. If by these instruments speech is able to utter the word I, it is nevertheless improper to assert that speech itself is I. The body of a man, characterized by hands, feet, and the like, is made up of various parts; to which of these can I properly apply the denomination I? If another being is different specifically from me, most excellent monarch, then it may be said that this is I; that is the other: but when one only soul is dispersed in all bodies, it is then idle to say, Who are you? who am I? Thou art a king; this is a palankin; these are the bearers; these the running footmen; this is thy retinue: yet it is untrue that all these are said to be thine. The palankin on which thou sittest is made of timber derived from a tree. What then? is it denominated either timber or a tree? People do not say that the king is perched upon a tree, nor that he is seated upon a piece of wood, when you have mounted your palankin. The vehicle is an assemblage of pieces of timber, artificially joined together: judge, prince, for yourself in what the palankin differs really from the wood. Again; contemplate the sticks of the umbrella, in their separate state. Where then is the umbrella? Apply this reasoning to thee and to me. A man, a woman, a cow, a goat, a horse, an elephant, a bird, a tree, are names assigned to various bodies, which are the consequences of acts. Man is neither a god, nor a man, nor a brute, nor a tree; these are mere varieties of shape, the effects of acts. The thing which in the world is called a king, the servant of a king, or by any other appellation, is not a reality; it is the creature of our imaginations: for what is there in the world, that is subject to vicissitude, that does not in the course of time go by different names. Thou art called the monarch of the world; the son of thy father; the enemy of thy foes; the husband of thy wife; the father of thy children. What shall I denominate thee? How art thou situated? Art thou the head or the belly? or are they thine? Art thou the feet? or do they belong to thee? Thou art, oh king, distinct in thy nature from all thy members! Now then, rightly understanding the question, think who I am; and how it is possible for me, after the truth is ascertained (of the identity of all), to recognise any distinction, or to speak of my own individuality by the expression I.'

Having thus spoken, the Brahman was silent, and went on bearing the palankin; but the king leaped out of it, and hastened to prostrate himself at his feet; saying, "Have compassion on me, Brahman, and cast aside the palankin; and tell me who thou art, thus disguised under the appearance of a fool." The Brahman answered and said, "Hear me, Rája,. Who I am it is not possible to say: arrival at any place is for the sake of fruition; and enjoyment of pleasure, or endurance of pain, is the cause of the production of the body. A living being assumes a corporeal form to reap the results of virtue or vice. The universal cause of all living creatures is virtue or vice: why therefore inquire the cause (of my being the person I appear)." The king said, "Undoubtedly virtue and vice are the causes of all existent effects, and migration into several bodies is for the purpose of receiving their consequences; but with respect to what you have asserted, that it is not possible for you to tell me who you are, that is a matter which I am desirous to hear explained. How can it be impossible, Brahman, for any one to declare himself to be that which he is? There can be no detriment to one's-self from applying to it the word I." The Brahman said, "It is true that there is no wrong done to that which is one's-self by the application to it of the word I; but the term is characteristic of error, of conceiving that to be the self (or soul) which is not self or soul. The tongue articulates the word I, aided by the lips, the teeth, and the palate; and these are the origin of the expression, as they are the causes of the production of speech. If by these instruments speech is able to utter the word I, it is nevertheless improper to assert that speech itself is I. The body of a man, characterized by hands, feet, and the like, is made up of various parts; to which of these can I properly apply the denomination I? If another being is different specifically from me, most excellent monarch, then it may be said that this is I; that is the other: but when one only soul is dispersed in all bodies, it is then idle to say, Who are you? who am I? Thou art a king; this is a palankin; these are the bearers; these the running footmen; this is thy retinue: yet it is untrue that all these are said to be thine. The palankin on which thou sittest is made of timber derived from a tree. What then? is it denominated either timber or a tree? People do not say that the king is perched upon a tree, nor that he is seated upon a piece of wood, when you have mounted your palankin. The vehicle is an assemblage of pieces of timber, artificially joined together: judge, prince, for yourself in what the palankin differs really from the wood. Again; contemplate the sticks of the umbrella, in their separate state. Where then is the umbrella? Apply this reasoning to thee and to me. A man, a woman, a cow, a goat, a horse, an elephant, a bird, a tree, are names assigned to various bodies, which are the consequences of acts. Man is neither a god, nor a man, nor a brute, nor a tree; these are mere varieties of shape, the effects of acts. The thing which in the world is called a king, the servant of a king, or by any other appellation, is not a reality; it is the creature of our imaginations: for what is there in the world, that is subject to vicissitude, that does not in the course of time go by different names. Thou art called the monarch of the world; the son of thy father; the enemy of thy foes; the husband of thy wife; the father of thy children. What shall I denominate thee? How art thou situated? Art thou the head or the belly? or are they thine? Art thou the feet? or do they belong to thee? Thou art, oh king, distinct in thy nature from all thy members! Now then, rightly understanding the question, think who I am; and how it is possible for me, after the truth is ascertained (of the identity of all), to recognise any distinction, or to speak of my own individuality by the expression I.'