Kena Upanishad 1.1.2

Śrotrasya śrotram, the Ear of the ear. The śrotram is that by which one hears, the instrument for the hearing of sound, the organ of hearing which reveals the words. He about whom you put the question, "Who is the effulgent being who directs the eyes and the ears?"--is the Ear of the ear.

Objection: Is it not incongruous to answer, "He is the Ear of the ear", when the reply should have been "So-and-so, with such and such attributes, directs the ears etc."?

Answer: This is no fault, because His distinction can not be ascertained otherwise. If the director of the ears etc. can be known as possessed of His own activity, independently of the activities of the ears etc. just as it is in the case of the wielder of sickle etc., then this answer will be incongruous. But as a matter of fact, no director of ears etc., possessed of his own activity, is apprehended here like a mower possessed of a sickle etc. But He can be known, (as existing unmixed with the ear etc.), from the logical necessity that such activities as deliberation, volition, determination, of those very composite things, viz the ear etc., must be meant for some one's benefit. Just as in the case of a house, so also (in this case) there does exist some one, standing outside the conglomeration of ears etc., by whose necessity is impelled the group of ears etc. Thus from the fact that composite things exist for the need of some one else, a director of the ears etc. can be known (i.e. inferred).footnote{"Ears etc., are subsidiary to some one different from themselves, for they are composite things, like a house etc."—by this inference the master of the ears etc. can be known. If he, too, should be a part of the combination, then he will be insentient like the house etc. Then we shall have to imagine another master for him, and so also a third for this. Thus to avoid an infinite regress, a Consciousness that is not a part of the combination is apprehended"—A.G.} Hence the reply, "He is the Ear of the ear", is quite appropriate.

Objection: What, again, can there be the significance here of the expression, "The Ear of the ear" etc.? For just as a light has no need for another light, so in this context the ear can have no need for another ear.

Answer: There is no such fault. The significance here is this: The ear, to wit, is seen to be able to reveal its own object. This ability of the ear to reveal its own object is possible only when the eternal non-composite, all-pervading light of the Self is there, but not otherwise. Hence the expression, "Ear of the ear" etc., is justifiable. To the same effect there are other Vedic texts: "It is through the light of the Self that he sits" (Bṛ. IV. iii. 6), "Through His light all this shines" (Ka. II. ii. 15; Śv. VI. 14; Mu. II. ii. 10), "kindled by which light the sun shines" (Tai. B. III. xii. 9.7), etc. And in the Gītā, "(Know that light to be mine), which is in the sun and which illumines the whole universe" (XV. 12), and "(As the one sun illumines the whole universe), so does He who resides in the body, O descendant of Bharata, illumine the whole body" (XIII. 33). So also in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, "the permanent among all that is impermanent, the conscious among all that is conscious" (II. ii. 13). It is a commonly accepted belief that the ears etc. constitute the Self of all, and that these are conscious. This is being refuted here. There does exist something which is known to the intellect of the men of realisation, which dwells in the inmost recesses of all, which is changeless, undecaying, immortal, fearless, and unborn, and which is the Ear etc. of even the ear etc., i.e. the source of their capacity to act. Thus the answer and significance can be justified.

Similarly, manasaḥ, of the mind, of the internal organ; (He is) the manaḥ, Mind; because the internal organ is not able to perform its own functions—thinking, determination, etc.—unless the radiance of the light of consciousness is there. Therefore He is the Mind of the mind, too. Here the mind and the intellect are jointly mentioned by the word manaḥ (mind). Yad vāco ha vācam: the word yat, used in the sense of because, is connected with all such words as śrotra (ear) in this way: because He is the Ear of the ear, because He is the Mind of the mind, and so on. The objective case in vāco ha vācam is to be changed into the nominative in consonance with the expression prāṇasya prāṇaḥ (the Life of life).

Objection: In conformity with vāco ha vācam, why should not the conversion be into the objective case thus: prāṇasya prāṇam?

Answer: No, for it is reasonable to conform to the majority. So in consonance with the two words, (saḥ and prāṇaḥ), in saḥ u prāṇasya prāṇaḥ (where they are in the nominative case), the implication of the word vācam is vāk, for thus is the reasonable conformity with the majority maintained. Moreover, a thing asked about should properly be denoted in the first (nominative) case. He, of whom you ask, and who is the Life of prāṇa—of that particular function called life; by Him, indeed, is ensured the capacity of the vital force to discharge its functions of sustaining life, and this is because there can be no sustaining of life by anything that is not presided over by the Self, in accordance with the Vedic texts: "Who, indeed, will inhale, and who will exhale if this Bliss (Brahman) be not there in the supreme Space (within the heart)?" (Tai. II. vii. 1), "Who pushes the prāṇa upward and impels the apāna inwards" (Ka. II. ii. 3), etc. Here, too, it will be said, "That which man does not smell with prāṇa (the organ of smell), but that by which prāṇa is impelled, know that to be Brahman" (Ke. I. 9).

Objection: Is it not proper to understand prāṇa as the sense of smelling (and not life)footnote{The word prāṇa is used in different senses in different contexts. It may mean vital force, exhaling, sense of smell, etc,} in a context which deals with the senses—ears etc.?

Answer: This is true. But the text considers that by the mention of prāṇa (meaning the vital force), the sense of smell is referred to ipso facto. The meaning intended in the context is this: That for whose purpose occurs the activity of all the motor and sensory organs is Brahman.

So also He is the cakṣuṣaḥ cakṣuḥ, the Eye of the eye; the capacity to perceive colour that the eye, the organ of sight, possesses is merely by virtue of its being presided over by the consciousness of the Self. Hence He is the Eye of the eye. Since a questioner's desire is to know the thing he asks for, the expression, "having known" has to be supplied thus: "Having known Brahman, as the Ear etc. of the ear etc., as indicated before." This (addition) is also necessary, because the result is stated thus, "They become immortal" (Ke. II. 5), and because immortality is attained through realisation. From the fact that a man becomes free after getting realisation, it follows (that he becomes immortal) by giving up, (through the strength of knowledge), the group of organs beginning with the ear; that is to say, since by identifying the Self with the ear etc. a man becomes conditioned by these and takes birth, dies, and transmigrates, therefore having realised, as one's Self, the Brahman that is defined as the "Ear of the ear" etc., and atimucya, giving up self-identification with the ear etc. — (he becomes immortal). Those who give up self-identification with the ear etc. are the dhīrāḥ, intelligent, because the self-identification with the ear etc. cannot be given up unless one is endowed with uncommon intellect. Pretya, desisting; asmāt lokāt, from this world of empirical dealings involving ideas of "I and mine" with regard to sons, friends, wives, and relatives; i.e. having renounced all desires; (they) bhavanti, become; amṛtāḥ, immortal, immune from death. This is in accordance with the Vedic texts: "Not by work, not by progeny, not by wealth, but by renunciation some (rare ones) attained immortality" (Kaivalya Upaniṣad 1.2). "The self-existent Lord destroyed the outgoing senses hence one perceives the external things and not the Self within. A rare, discriminating man, longing for immortality, turned his eyes away and then saw the indwelling Self" (Ka. II. i. 1), "When all desires that cling to one's heart, fall off . . . then one attains Brahman here" (Ka. II. iii. 14), etc. Or renunciation of desires being implied in the expression atimucya (giving up) itself, pretya means separating from this body, dying.

To the worthy disciple who had asked thus, the teacher said, "Hear what you have asked for in the question, 'Who is that effulgent being who is the director of the mind and other organs towards their own objects, and how does he direct?'"

Kena, by what agent; being iṣitam, willed, directed; manaḥ, the mind; patati, goes, goes towards its own object—this is the construction. Since the root iṣ cannot be taken here to imply either repetition or going,footnote{"Since the intention here is not to make the mind an object of the concept of either repeated occurrence or going, and since the desire is for knowing some special director of the mind."—A.G.} it must be understood that the present form of the root is in its sense of desiring. The form in which the suffix it is used in the word iṣitam is a Vedic licence.footnote{The correct form should have been "eṣitam."—A.G.} Preṣitam is a form of the same root, with pra prefixed to it, in the sense of directing. If the word preṣitam alone were used (without iṣitam) there would arise such an inquiry about the particular kind of director and the direction as: "By what particular director? And how is the direction?" But the attribute iṣitam being there, both the questions are set at rest, because thereby is ascertained a special meaning, viz "directed (preṣitam) through whose mere will?"footnote{"By mere presence that involves no effort."—A.G.}

Objection: If this be the meaning intended, the purpose is served by the expression willed by alone, and the expression directed need not be used. Moreover, since it is reasonable that an additional word should imply an additional meaning, it is proper to understand some special sense such as: "By what is it directed—by will, act, or speech?"

Answer: This cannot be so because of the trend of the question. For the reasonable conclusion derived from the trend (of the question) is that the inquiry is made by a man who has become disgusted with the ephemeral works and their results, such as the assemblage of the body, senses, etc., and seeks to know something other than these, which is unchangeable and eternal. If it were not so, the question would be surely meaningless, since the directorship of the group of body etc. (over the mind) through will, word, and act is a familiar fact.

Objection: Even so, the sense of the word directed is not certainly brought out.

Answer: No, since the word directed can reasonably convey a special sense, viz that it is the question of a man in doubt. Both the adjectives iṣitam (willed) and preṣitam (directed), in the sentence willed by whom the directed mind goes, are justifiable as implying: "Does the directorship belong to the aggregate of body and senses, which is a well-known fact; or does the directorship through mere will, over the mind etc., belong to some independent entity is different from the aggregate?"

Objection: Is it not a well-known fact that the mind is free and goes independently to its own object? How can the question arise with regard to that matter?

The answer is this: If the mind were independent in engaging or disengaging itself, then nobody would have contemplated any evil. And yet the mind, though conscious of consequences, wills evil; and, though dissuaded, it does engage in deeds of intensely sorrowful result. Hence the question, keneṣitaṁ patati etc., is appropriate.

Kena, by whom; prāṇaḥ, the vital force; being yuktaḥ, engaged, directed; praiti, goes, towards its own activity? Prathamaḥ, first, should be an adjective of the vital force, for the activities of all the organs are preceded by it. Imāṁ vācam, this speech, consisting of words; as ordinary people vadanti, utter; kena iṣitām, by whom is it willed (during that utterance)? Similarly, kaḥ u devaḥ, which effulgent being; yunakti, engages, directs towards their respective objects; cakṣuḥ śrotram, the eyes and the ears?

To the worthy disciple who had asked thus, the teacher said, "Hear what you have asked for in the question, 'Who is that effulgent being who is the director of the mind and other organs towards their own objects, and how does he direct?'"

Objection: If this be the meaning intended, the purpose is served by the expression willed by alone, and the expression directed need not be used. Moreover, since it is reasonable that an additional word should imply an additional meaning, it is proper to understand some special sense such as: "By what is it directed—by will, act, or speech?"

Answer: This cannot be so because of the trend of the question. For the reasonable conclusion derived from the trend (of the question) is that the inquiry is made by a man who has become disgusted with the ephemeral works and their results, such as the assemblage of the body, senses, etc., and seeks to know something other than these, which is unchangeable and eternal. If it were not so, the question would be surely meaningless, since the directorship of the group of body etc. (over the mind) through will, word, and act is a familiar fact.

Objection: Even so, the sense of the word directed is not certainly brought out.

Answer: No, since the word directed can reasonably convey a special sense, viz that it is the question of a man in doubt. Both the adjectives iṣitam (willed) and preṣitam (directed), in the sentence willed by whom the directed mind goes, are justifiable as implying: "Does the directorship belong to the aggregate of body and senses, which is a well-known fact; or does the directorship through mere will, over the mind etc., belong to some independent entity is different from the aggregate?"

Objection: Is it not a well-known fact that the mind is free and goes independently to its own object? How can the question arise with regard to that matter?

The answer is this: If the mind were independent in engaging or disengaging itself, then nobody would have contemplated any evil. And yet the mind, though conscious of consequences, wills evil; and, though dissuaded, it does engage in deeds of intensely sorrowful result. Hence the question, keneṣitaṁ patati etc., is appropriate.

Kena, by whom; prāṇaḥ, the vital force; being yuktaḥ, engaged, directed; praiti, goes, towards its own activity? Prathamaḥ, first, should be an adjective of the vital force, for the activities of all the organs are preceded by it. Imāṁ vācam, this speech, consisting of words; as ordinary people vadanti, utter; kena iṣitām, by whom is it willed (during that utterance)? Similarly, kaḥ u devaḥ, which effulgent being; yunakti, engages, directs towards their respective objects; cakṣuḥ śrotram, the eyes and the ears?

Śrotrasya śrotram, the Ear of the ear. The śrotram is that by which one hears, the instrument for the hearing of sound, the organ of hearing which reveals the words. He about whom you put the question, "Who is the effulgent being who directs the eyes and the ears?"--is the Ear of the ear.

Objection: Is it not incongruous to answer, "He is the Ear of the ear", when the reply should have been "So-and-so, with such and such attributes, directs the ears etc."?

Answer: This is no fault, because His distinction can not be ascertained otherwise. If the director of the ears etc. can be known as possessed of His own activity, independently of the activities of the ears etc. just as it is in the case of the wielder of sickle etc., then this answer will be incongruous. But as a matter of fact, no director of ears etc., possessed of his own activity, is apprehended here like a mower possessed of a sickle etc. But He can be known, (as existing unmixed with the ear etc.), from the logical necessity that such activities as deliberation, volition, determination, of those very composite things, viz the ear etc., must be meant for some one's benefit. Just as in the case of a house, so also (in this case) there does exist some one, standing outside the conglomeration of ears etc., by whose necessity is impelled the group of ears etc. Thus from the fact that composite things exist for the need of some one else, a director of the ears etc. can be known (i.e. inferred).footnote{"Ears etc., are subsidiary to some one different from themselves, for they are composite things, like a house etc."—by this inference the master of the ears etc. can be known. If he, too, should be a part of the combination, then he will be insentient like the house etc. Then we shall have to imagine another master for him, and so also a third for this. Thus to avoid an infinite regress, a Consciousness that is not a part of the combination is apprehended"—A.G.} Hence the reply, "He is the Ear of the ear", is quite appropriate.

Objection: What, again, can there be the significance here of the expression, "The Ear of the ear" etc.? For just as a light has no need for another light, so in this context the ear can have no need for another ear.

Answer: There is no such fault. The significance here is this: The ear, to wit, is seen to be able to reveal its own object. This ability of the ear to reveal its own object is possible only when the eternal non-composite, all-pervading light of the Self is there, but not otherwise. Hence the expression, "Ear of the ear" etc., is justifiable. To the same effect there are other Vedic texts: "It is through the light of the Self that he sits" (Bṛ. IV. iii. 6), "Through His light all this shines" (Ka. II. ii. 15; Śv. VI. 14; Mu. II. ii. 10), "kindled by which light the sun shines" (Tai. B. III. xii. 9.7), etc. And in the Gītā, "(Know that light to be mine), which is in the sun and which illumines the whole universe" (XV. 12), and "(As the one sun illumines the whole universe), so does He who resides in the body, O descendant of Bharata, illumine the whole body" (XIII. 33). So also in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, "the permanent among all that is impermanent, the conscious among all that is conscious" (II. ii. 13). It is a commonly accepted belief that the ears etc. constitute the Self of all, and that these are conscious. This is being refuted here. There does exist something which is known to the intellect of the men of realisation, which dwells in the inmost recesses of all, which is changeless, undecaying, immortal, fearless, and unborn, and which is the Ear etc. of even the ear etc., i.e. the source of their capacity to act. Thus the answer and significance can be justified.

Similarly, manasaḥ, of the mind, of the internal organ; (He is) the manaḥ, Mind; because the internal organ is not able to perform its own functions—thinking, determination, etc.—unless the radiance of the light of consciousness is there. Therefore He is the Mind of the mind, too. Here the mind and the intellect are jointly mentioned by the word manaḥ (mind). Yad vāco ha vācam: the word yat, used in the sense of because, is connected with all such words as śrotra (ear) in this way: because He is the Ear of the ear, because He is the Mind of the mind, and so on. The objective case in vāco ha vācam is to be changed into the nominative in consonance with the expression prāṇasya prāṇaḥ (the Life of life).

Objection: In conformity with vāco ha vācam, why should not the conversion be into the objective case thus: prāṇasya prāṇam?

Answer: No, for it is reasonable to conform to the majority. So in consonance with the two words, (saḥ and prāṇaḥ), in saḥ u prāṇasya prāṇaḥ (where they are in the nominative case), the implication of the word vācam is vāk, for thus is the reasonable conformity with the majority maintained. Moreover, a thing asked about should properly be denoted in the first (nominative) case. He, of whom you ask, and who is the Life of prāṇa—of that particular function called life; by Him, indeed, is ensured the capacity of the vital force to discharge its functions of sustaining life, and this is because there can be no sustaining of life by anything that is not presided over by the Self, in accordance with the Vedic texts: "Who, indeed, will inhale, and who will exhale if this Bliss (Brahman) be not there in the supreme Space (within the heart)?" (Tai. II. vii. 1), "Who pushes the prāṇa upward and impels the apāna inwards" (Ka. II. ii. 3), etc. Here, too, it will be said, "That which man does not smell with prāṇa (the organ of smell), but that by which prāṇa is impelled, know that to be Brahman" (Ke. I. 9).

Objection: Is it not proper to understand prāṇa as the sense of smelling (and not life)footnote{The word prāṇa is used in different senses in different contexts. It may mean vital force, exhaling, sense of smell, etc,} in a context which deals with the senses—ears etc.?

Answer: This is true. But the text considers that by the mention of prāṇa (meaning the vital force), the sense of smell is referred to ipso facto. The meaning intended in the context is this: That for whose purpose occurs the activity of all the motor and sensory organs is Brahman.

So also He is the cakṣuṣaḥ cakṣuḥ, the Eye of the eye; the capacity to perceive colour that the eye, the organ of sight, possesses is merely by virtue of its being presided over by the consciousness of the Self. Hence He is the Eye of the eye. Since a questioner's desire is to know the thing he asks for, the expression, "having known" has to be supplied thus: "Having known Brahman, as the Ear etc. of the ear etc., as indicated before." This (addition) is also necessary, because the result is stated thus, "They become immortal" (Ke. II. 5), and because immortality is attained through realisation. From the fact that a man becomes free after getting realisation, it follows (that he becomes immortal) by giving up, (through the strength of knowledge), the group of organs beginning with the ear; that is to say, since by identifying the Self with the ear etc. a man becomes conditioned by these and takes birth, dies, and transmigrates, therefore having realised, as one's Self, the Brahman that is defined as the "Ear of the ear" etc., and atimucya, giving up self-identification with the ear etc. — (he becomes immortal). Those who give up self-identification with the ear etc. are the dhīrāḥ, intelligent, because the self-identification with the ear etc. cannot be given up unless one is endowed with uncommon intellect. Pretya, desisting; asmāt lokāt, from this world of empirical dealings involving ideas of "I and mine" with regard to sons, friends, wives, and relatives; i.e. having renounced all desires; (they) bhavanti, become; amṛtāḥ, immortal, immune from death. This is in accordance with the Vedic texts: "Not by work, not by progeny, not by wealth, but by renunciation some (rare ones) attained immortality" (Kaivalya Upaniṣad 1.2). "The self-existent Lord destroyed the outgoing senses hence one perceives the external things and not the Self within. A rare, discriminating man, longing for immortality, turned his eyes away and then saw the indwelling Self" (Ka. II. i. 1), "When all desires that cling to one's heart, fall off . . . then one attains Brahman here" (Ka. II. iii. 14), etc. Or renunciation of desires being implied in the expression atimucya (giving up) itself, pretya means separating from this body, dying.

Śrotrasya śrotram, the Ear of the ear. The śrotram is that by which one hears, the instrument for the hearing of sound, the organ of hearing which reveals the words. He about whom you put the question, "Who is the effulgent being who directs the eyes and the ears?"--is the Ear of the ear.

Kena, by what agent; being iṣitam, willed, directed; manaḥ, the mind; patati, goes, goes towards its own object—this is the construction. Since the root iṣ cannot be taken here to imply either repetition or going,footnote{"Since the intention here is not to make the mind an object of the concept of either repeated occurrence or going, and since the desire is for knowing some special director of the mind."—A.G.} it must be understood that the present form of the root is in its sense of desiring. The form in which the suffix it is used in the word iṣitam is a Vedic licence.footnote{The correct form should have been "eṣitam."—A.G.} Preṣitam is a form of the same root, with pra prefixed to it, in the sense of directing. If the word preṣitam alone were used (without iṣitam) there would arise such an inquiry about the particular kind of director and the direction as: "By what particular director? And how is the direction?" But the attribute iṣitam being there, both the questions are set at rest, because thereby is ascertained a special meaning, viz "directed (preṣitam) through whose mere will?"footnote{"By mere presence that involves no effort."—A.G.}

Objection: If this be the meaning intended, the purpose is served by the expression willed by alone, and the expression directed need not be used. Moreover, since it is reasonable that an additional word should imply an additional meaning, it is proper to understand some special sense such as: "By what is it directed—by will, act, or speech?"

Answer: This cannot be so because of the trend of the question. For the reasonable conclusion derived from the trend (of the question) is that the inquiry is made by a man who has become disgusted with the ephemeral works and their results, such as the assemblage of the body, senses, etc., and seeks to know something other than these, which is unchangeable and eternal. If it were not so, the question would be surely meaningless, since the directorship of the group of body etc. (over the mind) through will, word, and act is a familiar fact.

Objection: Even so, the sense of the word directed is not certainly brought out.

Answer: No, since the word directed can reasonably convey a special sense, viz that it is the question of a man in doubt. Both the adjectives iṣitam (willed) and preṣitam (directed), in the sentence willed by whom the directed mind goes, are justifiable as implying: "Does the directorship belong to the aggregate of body and senses, which is a well-known fact; or does the directorship through mere will, over the mind etc., belong to some independent entity is different from the aggregate?"

Objection: Is it not a well-known fact that the mind is free and goes independently to its own object? How can the question arise with regard to that matter?

The answer is this: If the mind were independent in engaging or disengaging itself, then nobody would have contemplated any evil. And yet the mind, though conscious of consequences, wills evil; and, though dissuaded, it does engage in deeds of intensely sorrowful result. Hence the question, keneṣitaṁ patati etc., is appropriate.

Kena, by whom; prāṇaḥ, the vital force; being yuktaḥ, engaged, directed; praiti, goes, towards its own activity? Prathamaḥ, first, should be an adjective of the vital force, for the activities of all the organs are preceded by it. Imāṁ vācam, this speech, consisting of words; as ordinary people vadanti, utter; kena iṣitām, by whom is it willed (during that utterance)? Similarly, kaḥ u devaḥ, which effulgent being; yunakti, engages, directs towards their respective objects; cakṣuḥ śrotram, the eyes and the ears?

To the worthy disciple who had asked thus, the teacher said, "Hear what you have asked for in the question, 'Who is that effulgent being who is the director of the mind and other organs towards their own objects, and how does he direct?'"

Objection: If this be the meaning intended, the purpose is served by the expression willed by alone, and the expression directed need not be used. Moreover, since it is reasonable that an additional word should imply an additional meaning, it is proper to understand some special sense such as: "By what is it directed—by will, act, or speech?"

Answer: This cannot be so because of the trend of the question. For the reasonable conclusion derived from the trend (of the question) is that the inquiry is made by a man who has become disgusted with the ephemeral works and their results, such as the assemblage of the body, senses, etc., and seeks to know something other than these, which is unchangeable and eternal. If it were not so, the question would be surely meaningless, since the directorship of the group of body etc. (over the mind) through will, word, and act is a familiar fact.

Objection: Even so, the sense of the word directed is not certainly brought out.

Answer: No, since the word directed can reasonably convey a special sense, viz that it is the question of a man in doubt. Both the adjectives iṣitam (willed) and preṣitam (directed), in the sentence willed by whom the directed mind goes, are justifiable as implying: "Does the directorship belong to the aggregate of body and senses, which is a well-known fact; or does the directorship through mere will, over the mind etc., belong to some independent entity is different from the aggregate?"

Objection: Is it not a well-known fact that the mind is free and goes independently to its own object? How can the question arise with regard to that matter?

The answer is this: If the mind were independent in engaging or disengaging itself, then nobody would have contemplated any evil. And yet the mind, though conscious of consequences, wills evil; and, though dissuaded, it does engage in deeds of intensely sorrowful result. Hence the question, keneṣitaṁ patati etc., is appropriate.

Kena, by whom; prāṇaḥ, the vital force; being yuktaḥ, engaged, directed; praiti, goes, towards its own activity? Prathamaḥ, first, should be an adjective of the vital force, for the activities of all the organs are preceded by it. Imāṁ vācam, this speech, consisting of words; as ordinary people vadanti, utter; kena iṣitām, by whom is it willed (during that utterance)? Similarly, kaḥ u devaḥ, which effulgent being; yunakti, engages, directs towards their respective objects; cakṣuḥ śrotram, the eyes and the ears?

Śrotrasya śrotram, the Ear of the ear. The śrotram is that by which one hears, the instrument for the hearing of sound, the organ of hearing which reveals the words. He about whom you put the question, "Who is the effulgent being who directs the eyes and the ears?"--is the Ear of the ear.

Objection: Is it not incongruous to answer, "He is the Ear of the ear", when the reply should have been "So-and-so, with such and such attributes, directs the ears etc."?

Answer: This is no fault, because His distinction can not be ascertained otherwise. If the director of the ears etc. can be known as possessed of His own activity, independently of the activities of the ears etc. just as it is in the case of the wielder of sickle etc., then this answer will be incongruous. But as a matter of fact, no director of ears etc., possessed of his own activity, is apprehended here like a mower possessed of a sickle etc. But He can be known, (as existing unmixed with the ear etc.), from the logical necessity that such activities as deliberation, volition, determination, of those very composite things, viz the ear etc., must be meant for some one's benefit. Just as in the case of a house, so also (in this case) there does exist some one, standing outside the conglomeration of ears etc., by whose necessity is impelled the group of ears etc. Thus from the fact that composite things exist for the need of some one else, a director of the ears etc. can be known (i.e. inferred).footnote{"Ears etc., are subsidiary to some one different from themselves, for they are composite things, like a house etc."—by this inference the master of the ears etc. can be known. If he, too, should be a part of the combination, then he will be insentient like the house etc. Then we shall have to imagine another master for him, and so also a third for this. Thus to avoid an infinite regress, a Consciousness that is not a part of the combination is apprehended"—A.G.} Hence the reply, "He is the Ear of the ear", is quite appropriate.

Objection: What, again, can there be the significance here of the expression, "The Ear of the ear" etc.? For just as a light has no need for another light, so in this context the ear can have no need for another ear.

Answer: There is no such fault. The significance here is this: The ear, to wit, is seen to be able to reveal its own object. This ability of the ear to reveal its own object is possible only when the eternal non-composite, all-pervading light of the Self is there, but not otherwise. Hence the expression, "Ear of the ear" etc., is justifiable. To the same effect there are other Vedic texts: "It is through the light of the Self that he sits" (Bṛ. IV. iii. 6), "Through His light all this shines" (Ka. II. ii. 15; Śv. VI. 14; Mu. II. ii. 10), "kindled by which light the sun shines" (Tai. B. III. xii. 9.7), etc. And in the Gītā, "(Know that light to be mine), which is in the sun and which illumines the whole universe" (XV. 12), and "(As the one sun illumines the whole universe), so does He who resides in the body, O descendant of Bharata, illumine the whole body" (XIII. 33). So also in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, "the permanent among all that is impermanent, the conscious among all that is conscious" (II. ii. 13). It is a commonly accepted belief that the ears etc. constitute the Self of all, and that these are conscious. This is being refuted here. There does exist something which is known to the intellect of the men of realisation, which dwells in the inmost recesses of all, which is changeless, undecaying, immortal, fearless, and unborn, and which is the Ear etc. of even the ear etc., i.e. the source of their capacity to act. Thus the answer and significance can be justified.

Similarly, manasaḥ, of the mind, of the internal organ; (He is) the manaḥ, Mind; because the internal organ is not able to perform its own functions—thinking, determination, etc.—unless the radiance of the light of consciousness is there. Therefore He is the Mind of the mind, too. Here the mind and the intellect are jointly mentioned by the word manaḥ (mind). Yad vāco ha vācam: the word yat, used in the sense of because, is connected with all such words as śrotra (ear) in this way: because He is the Ear of the ear, because He is the Mind of the mind, and so on. The objective case in vāco ha vācam is to be changed into the nominative in consonance with the expression prāṇasya prāṇaḥ (the Life of life).

Objection: In conformity with vāco ha vācam, why should not the conversion be into the objective case thus: prāṇasya prāṇam?

Answer: No, for it is reasonable to conform to the majority. So in consonance with the two words, (saḥ and prāṇaḥ), in saḥ u prāṇasya prāṇaḥ (where they are in the nominative case), the implication of the word vācam is vāk, for thus is the reasonable conformity with the majority maintained. Moreover, a thing asked about should properly be denoted in the first (nominative) case. He, of whom you ask, and who is the Life of prāṇa—of that particular function called life; by Him, indeed, is ensured the capacity of the vital force to discharge its functions of sustaining life, and this is because there can be no sustaining of life by anything that is not presided over by the Self, in accordance with the Vedic texts: "Who, indeed, will inhale, and who will exhale if this Bliss (Brahman) be not there in the supreme Space (within the heart)?" (Tai. II. vii. 1), "Who pushes the prāṇa upward and impels the apāna inwards" (Ka. II. ii. 3), etc. Here, too, it will be said, "That which man does not smell with prāṇa (the organ of smell), but that by which prāṇa is impelled, know that to be Brahman" (Ke. I. 9).

Objection: Is it not proper to understand prāṇa as the sense of smelling (and not life)footnote{The word prāṇa is used in different senses in different contexts. It may mean vital force, exhaling, sense of smell, etc,} in a context which deals with the senses—ears etc.?

Answer: This is true. But the text considers that by the mention of prāṇa (meaning the vital force), the sense of smell is referred to ipso facto. The meaning intended in the context is this: That for whose purpose occurs the activity of all the motor and sensory organs is Brahman.

So also He is the cakṣuṣaḥ cakṣuḥ, the Eye of the eye; the capacity to perceive colour that the eye, the organ of sight, possesses is merely by virtue of its being presided over by the consciousness of the Self. Hence He is the Eye of the eye. Since a questioner's desire is to know the thing he asks for, the expression, "having known" has to be supplied thus: "Having known Brahman, as the Ear etc. of the ear etc., as indicated before." This (addition) is also necessary, because the result is stated thus, "They become immortal" (Ke. II. 5), and because immortality is attained through realisation. From the fact that a man becomes free after getting realisation, it follows (that he becomes immortal) by giving up, (through the strength of knowledge), the group of organs beginning with the ear; that is to say, since by identifying the Self with the ear etc. a man becomes conditioned by these and takes birth, dies, and transmigrates, therefore having realised, as one's Self, the Brahman that is defined as the "Ear of the ear" etc., and atimucya, giving up self-identification with the ear etc. — (he becomes immortal). Those who give up self-identification with the ear etc. are the dhīrāḥ, intelligent, because the self-identification with the ear etc. cannot be given up unless one is endowed with uncommon intellect. Pretya, desisting; asmāt lokāt, from this world of empirical dealings involving ideas of "I and mine" with regard to sons, friends, wives, and relatives; i.e. having renounced all desires; (they) bhavanti, become; amṛtāḥ, immortal, immune from death. This is in accordance with the Vedic texts: "Not by work, not by progeny, not by wealth, but by renunciation some (rare ones) attained immortality" (Kaivalya Upaniṣad 1.2). "The self-existent Lord destroyed the outgoing senses hence one perceives the external things and not the Self within. A rare, discriminating man, longing for immortality, turned his eyes away and then saw the indwelling Self" (Ka. II. i. 1), "When all desires that cling to one's heart, fall off . . . then one attains Brahman here" (Ka. II. iii. 14), etc. Or renunciation of desires being implied in the expression atimucya (giving up) itself, pretya means separating from this body, dying.

Objection: Is it not incongruous to answer, "He is the Ear of the ear", when the reply should have been "So-and-so, with such and such attributes, directs the ears etc."?

Kena, by what agent; being iṣitam, willed, directed; manaḥ, the mind; patati, goes, goes towards its own object—this is the construction. Since the root iṣ cannot be taken here to imply either repetition or going,footnote{"Since the intention here is not to make the mind an object of the concept of either repeated occurrence or going, and since the desire is for knowing some special director of the mind."—A.G.} it must be understood that the present form of the root is in its sense of desiring. The form in which the suffix it is used in the word iṣitam is a Vedic licence.footnote{The correct form should have been "eṣitam."—A.G.} Preṣitam is a form of the same root, with pra prefixed to it, in the sense of directing. If the word preṣitam alone were used (without iṣitam) there would arise such an inquiry about the particular kind of director and the direction as: "By what particular director? And how is the direction?" But the attribute iṣitam being there, both the questions are set at rest, because thereby is ascertained a special meaning, viz "directed (preṣitam) through whose mere will?"footnote{"By mere presence that involves no effort."—A.G.}

Objection: If this be the meaning intended, the purpose is served by the expression willed by alone, and the expression directed need not be used. Moreover, since it is reasonable that an additional word should imply an additional meaning, it is proper to understand some special sense such as: "By what is it directed—by will, act, or speech?"

Answer: This cannot be so because of the trend of the question. For the reasonable conclusion derived from the trend (of the question) is that the inquiry is made by a man who has become disgusted with the ephemeral works and their results, such as the assemblage of the body, senses, etc., and seeks to know something other than these, which is unchangeable and eternal. If it were not so, the question would be surely meaningless, since the directorship of the group of body etc. (over the mind) through will, word, and act is a familiar fact.

Objection: Even so, the sense of the word directed is not certainly brought out.

Answer: No, since the word directed can reasonably convey a special sense, viz that it is the question of a man in doubt. Both the adjectives iṣitam (willed) and preṣitam (directed), in the sentence willed by whom the directed mind goes, are justifiable as implying: "Does the directorship belong to the aggregate of body and senses, which is a well-known fact; or does the directorship through mere will, over the mind etc., belong to some independent entity is different from the aggregate?"

Objection: Is it not a well-known fact that the mind is free and goes independently to its own object? How can the question arise with regard to that matter?

The answer is this: If the mind were independent in engaging or disengaging itself, then nobody would have contemplated any evil. And yet the mind, though conscious of consequences, wills evil; and, though dissuaded, it does engage in deeds of intensely sorrowful result. Hence the question, keneṣitaṁ patati etc., is appropriate.

Kena, by whom; prāṇaḥ, the vital force; being yuktaḥ, engaged, directed; praiti, goes, towards its own activity? Prathamaḥ, first, should be an adjective of the vital force, for the activities of all the organs are preceded by it. Imāṁ vācam, this speech, consisting of words; as ordinary people vadanti, utter; kena iṣitām, by whom is it willed (during that utterance)? Similarly, kaḥ u devaḥ, which effulgent being; yunakti, engages, directs towards their respective objects; cakṣuḥ śrotram, the eyes and the ears?

To the worthy disciple who had asked thus, the teacher said, "Hear what you have asked for in the question, 'Who is that effulgent being who is the director of the mind and other organs towards their own objects, and how does he direct?'"

Objection: If this be the meaning intended, the purpose is served by the expression willed by alone, and the expression directed need not be used. Moreover, since it is reasonable that an additional word should imply an additional meaning, it is proper to understand some special sense such as: "By what is it directed—by will, act, or speech?"

Answer: This cannot be so because of the trend of the question. For the reasonable conclusion derived from the trend (of the question) is that the inquiry is made by a man who has become disgusted with the ephemeral works and their results, such as the assemblage of the body, senses, etc., and seeks to know something other than these, which is unchangeable and eternal. If it were not so, the question would be surely meaningless, since the directorship of the group of body etc. (over the mind) through will, word, and act is a familiar fact.

Objection: Even so, the sense of the word directed is not certainly brought out.

Answer: No, since the word directed can reasonably convey a special sense, viz that it is the question of a man in doubt. Both the adjectives iṣitam (willed) and preṣitam (directed), in the sentence willed by whom the directed mind goes, are justifiable as implying: "Does the directorship belong to the aggregate of body and senses, which is a well-known fact; or does the directorship through mere will, over the mind etc., belong to some independent entity is different from the aggregate?"

Objection: Is it not a well-known fact that the mind is free and goes independently to its own object? How can the question arise with regard to that matter?

The answer is this: If the mind were independent in engaging or disengaging itself, then nobody would have contemplated any evil. And yet the mind, though conscious of consequences, wills evil; and, though dissuaded, it does engage in deeds of intensely sorrowful result. Hence the question, keneṣitaṁ patati etc., is appropriate.

Kena, by whom; prāṇaḥ, the vital force; being yuktaḥ, engaged, directed; praiti, goes, towards its own activity? Prathamaḥ, first, should be an adjective of the vital force, for the activities of all the organs are preceded by it. Imāṁ vācam, this speech, consisting of words; as ordinary people vadanti, utter; kena iṣitām, by whom is it willed (during that utterance)? Similarly, kaḥ u devaḥ, which effulgent being; yunakti, engages, directs towards their respective objects; cakṣuḥ śrotram, the eyes and the ears?

Śrotrasya śrotram, the Ear of the ear. The śrotram is that by which one hears, the instrument for the hearing of sound, the organ of hearing which reveals the words. He about whom you put the question, "Who is the effulgent being who directs the eyes and the ears?"--is the Ear of the ear.

Objection: Is it not incongruous to answer, "He is the Ear of the ear", when the reply should have been "So-and-so, with such and such attributes, directs the ears etc."?

Answer: This is no fault, because His distinction can not be ascertained otherwise. If the director of the ears etc. can be known as possessed of His own activity, independently of the activities of the ears etc. just as it is in the case of the wielder of sickle etc., then this answer will be incongruous. But as a matter of fact, no director of ears etc., possessed of his own activity, is apprehended here like a mower possessed of a sickle etc. But He can be known, (as existing unmixed with the ear etc.), from the logical necessity that such activities as deliberation, volition, determination, of those very composite things, viz the ear etc., must be meant for some one's benefit. Just as in the case of a house, so also (in this case) there does exist some one, standing outside the conglomeration of ears etc., by whose necessity is impelled the group of ears etc. Thus from the fact that composite things exist for the need of some one else, a director of the ears etc. can be known (i.e. inferred).footnote{"Ears etc., are subsidiary to some one different from themselves, for they are composite things, like a house etc."—by this inference the master of the ears etc. can be known. If he, too, should be a part of the combination, then he will be insentient like the house etc. Then we shall have to imagine another master for him, and so also a third for this. Thus to avoid an infinite regress, a Consciousness that is not a part of the combination is apprehended"—A.G.} Hence the reply, "He is the Ear of the ear", is quite appropriate.

Objection: What, again, can there be the significance here of the expression, "The Ear of the ear" etc.? For just as a light has no need for another light, so in this context the ear can have no need for another ear.

Answer: There is no such fault. The significance here is this: The ear, to wit, is seen to be able to reveal its own object. This ability of the ear to reveal its own object is possible only when the eternal non-composite, all-pervading light of the Self is there, but not otherwise. Hence the expression, "Ear of the ear" etc., is justifiable. To the same effect there are other Vedic texts: "It is through the light of the Self that he sits" (Bṛ. IV. iii. 6), "Through His light all this shines" (Ka. II. ii. 15; Śv. VI. 14; Mu. II. ii. 10), "kindled by which light the sun shines" (Tai. B. III. xii. 9.7), etc. And in the Gītā, "(Know that light to be mine), which is in the sun and which illumines the whole universe" (XV. 12), and "(As the one sun illumines the whole universe), so does He who resides in the body, O descendant of Bharata, illumine the whole body" (XIII. 33). So also in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, "the permanent among all that is impermanent, the conscious among all that is conscious" (II. ii. 13). It is a commonly accepted belief that the ears etc. constitute the Self of all, and that these are conscious. This is being refuted here. There does exist something which is known to the intellect of the men of realisation, which dwells in the inmost recesses of all, which is changeless, undecaying, immortal, fearless, and unborn, and which is the Ear etc. of even the ear etc., i.e. the source of their capacity to act. Thus the answer and significance can be justified.

Similarly, manasaḥ, of the mind, of the internal organ; (He is) the manaḥ, Mind; because the internal organ is not able to perform its own functions—thinking, determination, etc.—unless the radiance of the light of consciousness is there. Therefore He is the Mind of the mind, too. Here the mind and the intellect are jointly mentioned by the word manaḥ (mind). Yad vāco ha vācam: the word yat, used in the sense of because, is connected with all such words as śrotra (ear) in this way: because He is the Ear of the ear, because He is the Mind of the mind, and so on. The objective case in vāco ha vācam is to be changed into the nominative in consonance with the expression prāṇasya prāṇaḥ (the Life of life).

Objection: In conformity with vāco ha vācam, why should not the conversion be into the objective case thus: prāṇasya prāṇam?

Answer: No, for it is reasonable to conform to the majority. So in consonance with the two words, (saḥ and prāṇaḥ), in saḥ u prāṇasya prāṇaḥ (where they are in the nominative case), the implication of the word vācam is vāk, for thus is the reasonable conformity with the majority maintained. Moreover, a thing asked about should properly be denoted in the first (nominative) case. He, of whom you ask, and who is the Life of prāṇa—of that particular function called life; by Him, indeed, is ensured the capacity of the vital force to discharge its functions of sustaining life, and this is because there can be no sustaining of life by anything that is not presided over by the Self, in accordance with the Vedic texts: "Who, indeed, will inhale, and who will exhale if this Bliss (Brahman) be not there in the supreme Space (within the heart)?" (Tai. II. vii. 1), "Who pushes the prāṇa upward and impels the apāna inwards" (Ka. II. ii. 3), etc. Here, too, it will be said, "That which man does not smell with prāṇa (the organ of smell), but that by which prāṇa is impelled, know that to be Brahman" (Ke. I. 9).

Objection: Is it not proper to understand prāṇa as the sense of smelling (and not life)footnote{The word prāṇa is used in different senses in different contexts. It may mean vital force, exhaling, sense of smell, etc,} in a context which deals with the senses—ears etc.?

Answer: This is true. But the text considers that by the mention of prāṇa (meaning the vital force), the sense of smell is referred to ipso facto. The meaning intended in the context is this: That for whose purpose occurs the activity of all the motor and sensory organs is Brahman.

So also He is the cakṣuṣaḥ cakṣuḥ, the Eye of the eye; the capacity to perceive colour that the eye, the organ of sight, possesses is merely by virtue of its being presided over by the consciousness of the Self. Hence He is the Eye of the eye. Since a questioner's desire is to know the thing he asks for, the expression, "having known" has to be supplied thus: "Having known Brahman, as the Ear etc. of the ear etc., as indicated before." This (addition) is also necessary, because the result is stated thus, "They become immortal" (Ke. II. 5), and because immortality is attained through realisation. From the fact that a man becomes free after getting realisation, it follows (that he becomes immortal) by giving up, (through the strength of knowledge), the group of organs beginning with the ear; that is to say, since by identifying the Self with the ear etc. a man becomes conditioned by these and takes birth, dies, and transmigrates, therefore having realised, as one's Self, the Brahman that is defined as the "Ear of the ear" etc., and atimucya, giving up self-identification with the ear etc. — (he becomes immortal). Those who give up self-identification with the ear etc. are the dhīrāḥ, intelligent, because the self-identification with the ear etc. cannot be given up unless one is endowed with uncommon intellect. Pretya, desisting; asmāt lokāt, from this world of empirical dealings involving ideas of "I and mine" with regard to sons, friends, wives, and relatives; i.e. having renounced all desires; (they) bhavanti, become; amṛtāḥ, immortal, immune from death. This is in accordance with the Vedic texts: "Not by work, not by progeny, not by wealth, but by renunciation some (rare ones) attained immortality" (Kaivalya Upaniṣad 1.2). "The self-existent Lord destroyed the outgoing senses hence one perceives the external things and not the Self within. A rare, discriminating man, longing for immortality, turned his eyes away and then saw the indwelling Self" (Ka. II. i. 1), "When all desires that cling to one's heart, fall off . . . then one attains Brahman here" (Ka. II. iii. 14), etc. Or renunciation of desires being implied in the expression atimucya (giving up) itself, pretya means separating from this body, dying.

Answer: This is no fault, because His distinction can not be ascertained otherwise. If the director of the ears etc. can be known as possessed of His own activity, independently of the activities of the ears etc. just as it is in the case of the wielder of sickle etc., then this answer will be incongruous. But as a matter of fact, no director of ears etc., possessed of his own activity, is apprehended here like a mower possessed of a sickle etc. But He can be known, (as existing unmixed with the ear etc.), from the logical necessity that such activities as deliberation, volition, determination, of those very composite things, viz the ear etc., must be meant for some one's benefit. Just as in the case of a house, so also (in this case) there does exist some one, standing outside the conglomeration of ears etc., by whose necessity is impelled the group of ears etc. Thus from the fact that composite things exist for the need of some one else, a director of the ears etc. can be known (i.e. inferred).footnote{"Ears etc., are subsidiary to some one different from themselves, for they are composite things, like a house etc."—by this inference the master of the ears etc. can be known. If he, too, should be a part of the combination, then he will be insentient like the house etc. Then we shall have to imagine another master for him, and so also a third for this. Thus to avoid an infinite regress, a Consciousness that is not a part of the combination is apprehended"—A.G.} Hence the reply, "He is the Ear of the ear", is quite appropriate.

Kena, by what agent; being iṣitam, willed, directed; manaḥ, the mind; patati, goes, goes towards its own object—this is the construction. Since the root iṣ cannot be taken here to imply either repetition or going,footnote{"Since the intention here is not to make the mind an object of the concept of either repeated occurrence or going, and since the desire is for knowing some special director of the mind."—A.G.} it must be understood that the present form of the root is in its sense of desiring. The form in which the suffix it is used in the word iṣitam is a Vedic licence.footnote{The correct form should have been "eṣitam."—A.G.} Preṣitam is a form of the same root, with pra prefixed to it, in the sense of directing. If the word preṣitam alone were used (without iṣitam) there would arise such an inquiry about the particular kind of director and the direction as: "By what particular director? And how is the direction?" But the attribute iṣitam being there, both the questions are set at rest, because thereby is ascertained a special meaning, viz "directed (preṣitam) through whose mere will?"footnote{"By mere presence that involves no effort."—A.G.}

Objection: If this be the meaning intended, the purpose is served by the expression willed by alone, and the expression directed need not be used. Moreover, since it is reasonable that an additional word should imply an additional meaning, it is proper to understand some special sense such as: "By what is it directed—by will, act, or speech?"

Answer: This cannot be so because of the trend of the question. For the reasonable conclusion derived from the trend (of the question) is that the inquiry is made by a man who has become disgusted with the ephemeral works and their results, such as the assemblage of the body, senses, etc., and seeks to know something other than these, which is unchangeable and eternal. If it were not so, the question would be surely meaningless, since the directorship of the group of body etc. (over the mind) through will, word, and act is a familiar fact.

Objection: Even so, the sense of the word directed is not certainly brought out.

Answer: No, since the word directed can reasonably convey a special sense, viz that it is the question of a man in doubt. Both the adjectives iṣitam (willed) and preṣitam (directed), in the sentence willed by whom the directed mind goes, are justifiable as implying: "Does the directorship belong to the aggregate of body and senses, which is a well-known fact; or does the directorship through mere will, over the mind etc., belong to some independent entity is different from the aggregate?"

Objection: Is it not a well-known fact that the mind is free and goes independently to its own object? How can the question arise with regard to that matter?

The answer is this: If the mind were independent in engaging or disengaging itself, then nobody would have contemplated any evil. And yet the mind, though conscious of consequences, wills evil; and, though dissuaded, it does engage in deeds of intensely sorrowful result. Hence the question, keneṣitaṁ patati etc., is appropriate.

Kena, by whom; prāṇaḥ, the vital force; being yuktaḥ, engaged, directed; praiti, goes, towards its own activity? Prathamaḥ, first, should be an adjective of the vital force, for the activities of all the organs are preceded by it. Imāṁ vācam, this speech, consisting of words; as ordinary people vadanti, utter; kena iṣitām, by whom is it willed (during that utterance)? Similarly, kaḥ u devaḥ, which effulgent being; yunakti, engages, directs towards their respective objects; cakṣuḥ śrotram, the eyes and the ears?

To the worthy disciple who had asked thus, the teacher said, "Hear what you have asked for in the question, 'Who is that effulgent being who is the director of the mind and other organs towards their own objects, and how does he direct?'"

Objection: If this be the meaning intended, the purpose is served by the expression willed by alone, and the expression directed need not be used. Moreover, since it is reasonable that an additional word should imply an additional meaning, it is proper to understand some special sense such as: "By what is it directed—by will, act, or speech?"

Answer: This cannot be so because of the trend of the question. For the reasonable conclusion derived from the trend (of the question) is that the inquiry is made by a man who has become disgusted with the ephemeral works and their results, such as the assemblage of the body, senses, etc., and seeks to know something other than these, which is unchangeable and eternal. If it were not so, the question would be surely meaningless, since the directorship of the group of body etc. (over the mind) through will, word, and act is a familiar fact.

Objection: Even so, the sense of the word directed is not certainly brought out.

Answer: No, since the word directed can reasonably convey a special sense, viz that it is the question of a man in doubt. Both the adjectives iṣitam (willed) and preṣitam (directed), in the sentence willed by whom the directed mind goes, are justifiable as implying: "Does the directorship belong to the aggregate of body and senses, which is a well-known fact; or does the directorship through mere will, over the mind etc., belong to some independent entity is different from the aggregate?"

Objection: Is it not a well-known fact that the mind is free and goes independently to its own object? How can the question arise with regard to that matter?

The answer is this: If the mind were independent in engaging or disengaging itself, then nobody would have contemplated any evil. And yet the mind, though conscious of consequences, wills evil; and, though dissuaded, it does engage in deeds of intensely sorrowful result. Hence the question, keneṣitaṁ patati etc., is appropriate.

Kena, by whom; prāṇaḥ, the vital force; being yuktaḥ, engaged, directed; praiti, goes, towards its own activity? Prathamaḥ, first, should be an adjective of the vital force, for the activities of all the organs are preceded by it. Imāṁ vācam, this speech, consisting of words; as ordinary people vadanti, utter; kena iṣitām, by whom is it willed (during that utterance)? Similarly, kaḥ u devaḥ, which effulgent being; yunakti, engages, directs towards their respective objects; cakṣuḥ śrotram, the eyes and the ears?