Kena Upanishad 2.1

2.1

vedituṃ śakyam dāhyamiva dagdhum agnerdagdhuḥ na tvagneḥ svarūpameva| sarvasya hi vedituḥ svātmā brahneti sarvavedāntānāṃ suniścito'rthaḥ| iha ca tadeva pratipāditaṃ praśnaprativacanoktyā ’śrotrasya śrotram’ ityādyāyā| ’yadvācānabhyuditam’ iti ca viśeṣato'vadhāritam| brahmavitsampradāyaniśvayaśroktaḥ ’anyadeva tadviditādatho aviditādadhi’ iti| upanyastamupasaṃhariṣyati ca ’avijñātaṃ vijānatāṃ vijñātamavijānatām’ iti| tasmādyuktameva śiṣyasya suvedeti buddhiṃ nirākartum|
na hi veditā vediturvedituṃ śakyaḥ agnirdagdhuriva dagdhumagneḥ| na cānyo veditā brahmaṇo'sti yasya vedyamanyatsyāhrahma| "nānyadato'sti viśātṛ" (bṛ.u.3/8/11) ityanyo vijñātā pratiṣighyate|
tasmāt suṣṭhu vedāhaṃ brahmeti pratipattirmithyaiva tasmād yuktamevāhācāryo yadītyādi|
yadi manyase suvedeti daharamevāpi nūnam| tvaṃ vettha brahmaṇo rūpaṃ yadasya tvaṃ yadasya ca deveṣevatha nu mīmam̐syameva te manye viditam ||

Fearing that the disciple, to whom has been brought home the conviction, "You are the Self, which is opposed to the acceptable and the unacceptable, and which is Brahman", may jump to the conclusion, "I know myself well enough that I, indeed, am Brahman", the teacher, with a view to dispelling that notion of the disciple, says, "If you think" etc.

Objection: Is not such a firm conviction as, "I know well enough", desirable?

Answer: True, a firm conviction is desirable but not such a one as, "I know It well enough." That knowable thing alone that falls within the range of cognition can be known thoroughly, just as an inflammable substance becomes consumable to a fire that burns it, but not so the essence itself of the fire. The well-ascertained purport of all the Upaniṣads is that the personal Self of each knower is Brahman. Here, too, the same fact has been established in the form of an answer to questions, in the text beginning with, "That which is the Ear of the ear" etc. (I. 2); and the same has been specifically affirmed in the text, "That which is not uttered by speech" (I. 5). Besides, the positive conclusion of the (traditional) line of knowers of Brahman has been adduced in the text: "That is surely different from the known; and again, It is above the unknown" (I. 4). And the topic will be concluded thus: "It is unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know" (II. 3). Hence it is proper to dispel the disciple's notion: "I know well enough." For the knower cannot be known by the knower, just as fire cannot be consumed by the consuming fire; and there is no other knower different from Brahman to whom Brahman can become a separate knowable. A separate knower is denied by the Vedic text: "There is no other knower but this" (Bṛ. III. viii. 11). Therefore the conviction, "I know Brahman well enough", is certainly false. Hence the teacher has justifiably said, "If you think" etc.

Yadi, if perchance; manyase, you think; Su veda iti, "I know Brahman well enough." Although the entity may be inscrutable, yet some one who is possessed of real wisdom and who is free from defects, may at some time comprehend It, whereas some one else may not; hence the teacher says with hesitation, "If you think" etc. And it has been noticed that when it was declared, " 'The person that is perceived in the eye—this is the Self', so said he (Prajāpati). 'This is immortal, fearless--this is Brahman' " (Ch. VIII. vii. 4). Virocana, though he was a son of Prajāpati, and a scholar, and a king of the demons, still, owing to his natural defects, understood, contrary to what was taught, an opposite object, viz the body, to be the Self. Similarly, Indra, the king of the gods, who could not comprehend when instructed once, twice, and thrice, did, at the fourth stage, when his natural defects had been removed, realise the same Brahman that was spoken of at the very initial stage (Ch. VIII. vii-xii). In ordinary life also it is seen that, of the disciples hearing from the same teacher, some one understands accurately, some one inaccurately, some one contrarily, and some one nothing at all. What more need one speak with regard to (the knowledge of) the real nature of the Self which is beyond the senses? In this matter, indeed, all dialecticians, whether they believe in (the) existence or non-existence (of the Self), have got their misconceptions. Therefore though the statement, "Brahman has been realised", has been made with firm conviction, still the teacher's apprehensive remark, "If you think" etc., is quite appropriate in view of the unwarranted comprehensions. Tvam, you; vettha, know; nūnam, certainly; daharamfootnote{A different reading is dabham, having the same sense.} rūpam eva api, the very little form (i.e. expression); brahmaṇaḥ, of Brahman.

Objection: Are there many forms of Brahman, great and small, because of which it is said, "very little form" etc.?

Answer: Quite so. Many, indeed, are the aspects of Brahman created by conditions of name and form, but not naturally. From its own standpoint, forms, together with words, are denied thus: "That which is without sound, touch, form, and destruction; likewise tasteless, everlasting, and odourless" (Ka. I. iii. 15; Nṛ. 9; Muk. II. 72).

Objection: Is it not a fact that the very attribute by which a thing is determined is its own nature? Therefore that very distinctive feature by which Brahman is defined must be Its nature. Hence it is argued that since consciousness cannot be an attribute of any one of (the elements) earth etc., nor can it be of all of them in their transformation (as body), and as it is not an attribute of either of (the senses such as) the ear etc., or of the internal organ (mind), therefore it is a feature of Brahman; and thus is Brahman defined by consciousness. Thus it has been said, "Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman" (Bṛ. III. ix. 28.7) "Pure intelligence only" (Bṛ. II. iv. 12), "Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, Infinite" (Tai. II. i. 1), "Brahman is consciousness" (Ai. V. 3) —thus, too, is the feature of Brahman determined in the Vedic texts.

Answer: Truly this is so. But even so, that aspect is indicated, not from the intrinsic point of view, but merely with reference to the limiting adjuncts--mind, body, and senses; and this is because of Its correspondence with those things, in accordance as the body etc. undergo expansion, contraction, disruption, etc., or are destroyed. But in reality, the conclusion will be: "unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know" (Ke. II. 3).

The expression, yat asya, should be construed with the expression, brahmaṇaḥ rūpam (the aspect of Brahman), that preceded it, (meaning thereby: that form of Brahman which). Not only do you know little of the expression of that Brahman that is conditioned by the human personality, but the expression of Brahman as conditioned by divine adjuncts, which you deveṣu vettha, know among the gods, that too, as known to you, is very little indeed. This is how I think. Whether the expression be in the human personality or whether it be among the gods, it does not become freed from insignificance, since it is conditioned by adjuncts. The purport is that the Brahman, that is free from all distinctions, that is one without a second, and that known as Bhūmā (great) and eternal, cannot be known as a fully comprehended object. Since this is so, atha nu, therefore; manye, I think; te, for you; even now, Brahman is mīmāṁsyam eva, certainly to be deliberated on. The disciple having been told so by the teacher, sat in solitude with his mind concentrated, discussed the traditional teaching, as imparted by the teacher, together with its purport, ascertained it by a process of reasoning, made it a matter of personal experience, approached the teacher, and said, "Manye, (now) I think; (Brahman) is viditam, known."

(Teacher): "How (is Brahman known to you)?" (Disciple): "Listen!" —

Answer: Truly this is so. But even so, that aspect is indicated, not from the intrinsic point of view, but merely with reference to the limiting adjuncts--mind, body, and senses; and this is because of Its correspondence with those things, in accordance as the body etc. undergo expansion, contraction, disruption, etc., or are destroyed. But in reality, the conclusion will be: "unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know" (Ke. II. 3).

The expression, yat asya, should be construed with the expression, brahmaṇaḥ rūpam (the aspect of Brahman), that preceded it, (meaning thereby: that form of Brahman which). Not only do you know little of the expression of that Brahman that is conditioned by the human personality, but the expression of Brahman as conditioned by divine adjuncts, which you deveṣu vettha, know among the gods, that too, as known to you, is very little indeed. This is how I think. Whether the expression be in the human personality or whether it be among the gods, it does not become freed from insignificance, since it is conditioned by adjuncts. The purport is that the Brahman, that is free from all distinctions, that is one without a second, and that known as Bhūmā (great) and eternal, cannot be known as a fully comprehended object. Since this is so, atha nu, therefore; manye, I think; te, for you; even now, Brahman is mīmāṁsyam eva, certainly to be deliberated on. The disciple having been told so by the teacher, sat in solitude with his mind concentrated, discussed the traditional teaching, as imparted by the teacher, together with its purport, ascertained it by a process of reasoning, made it a matter of personal experience, approached the teacher, and said, "Manye, (now) I think; (Brahman) is viditam, known."

2.1.p1

yadi kadācid manyase muvedeti suṣṭhu vedāhaṃ brahmeti| kadācidyathāśrutaṃ durvijñeyamapi kṣīṇadoṣaḥ sumedhāḥ kaścit pratipadyate kaścinneti sāśaṅkamāha yadityādi| ddaṣṭaṃ ca "ya eṣo'kṣiṇi puruṣo ddaśyata eṣa ātmeti hovācaitadamṛtamabhayametahrahma" (chā.u.8/7/4) ityukte prājāpatyaḥ paṇḍito'pyasurarāḍ virocanaḥ svabhāvadoṣavaśādanupadyamānamapi viparītamarthaṃ śarīramātmeti pratipannaḥ| tathendro devarāṭ sakṛddvistriruktaṃ cāpratipadyamānaḥ svabhāvadoṣakṣayamapekṣya caturthe paryāye prathamoktameva brahma pratipannavān| loke'pi ekasmād guroḥ śṛṇvatāṃ kaścidyathāvatpratipadyate kaścidayathābat kaścidviparītaṃ kaścinna pratipadyate| kimu vaktavyamatīndriyamātmatacvam? atra hi vipratipannāḥ sadasadvādinastārkikāḥ sarve| tasmādviditaṃ brahmeti suniścitoktamapi viṣamapratipattitvād yadi manyase ityādi sāśaṅkaṃ vacanaṃ yuktameva ācāryasya| daharam alpamevāpi nūnaṃ tvaṃ vettha jāniṣe brahmaṇo rūpam|

Fearing that the disciple, to whom has been brought home the conviction, "You are the Self, which is opposed to the acceptable and the unacceptable, and which is Brahman", may jump to the conclusion, "I know myself well enough that I, indeed, am Brahman", the teacher, with a view to dispelling that notion of the disciple, says, "If you think" etc.

Objection: Is not such a firm conviction as, "I know well enough", desirable?

Answer: True, a firm conviction is desirable but not such a one as, "I know It well enough." That knowable thing alone that falls within the range of cognition can be known thoroughly, just as an inflammable substance becomes consumable to a fire that burns it, but not so the essence itself of the fire. The well-ascertained purport of all the Upaniṣads is that the personal Self of each knower is Brahman. Here, too, the same fact has been established in the form of an answer to questions, in the text beginning with, "That which is the Ear of the ear" etc. (I. 2); and the same has been specifically affirmed in the text, "That which is not uttered by speech" (I. 5). Besides, the positive conclusion of the (traditional) line of knowers of Brahman has been adduced in the text: "That is surely different from the known; and again, It is above the unknown" (I. 4). And the topic will be concluded thus: "It is unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know" (II. 3). Hence it is proper to dispel the disciple's notion: "I know well enough." For the knower cannot be known by the knower, just as fire cannot be consumed by the consuming fire; and there is no other knower different from Brahman to whom Brahman can become a separate knowable. A separate knower is denied by the Vedic text: "There is no other knower but this" (Bṛ. III. viii. 11). Therefore the conviction, "I know Brahman well enough", is certainly false. Hence the teacher has justifiably said, "If you think" etc.

Yadi, if perchance; manyase, you think; Su veda iti, "I know Brahman well enough." Although the entity may be inscrutable, yet some one who is possessed of real wisdom and who is free from defects, may at some time comprehend It, whereas some one else may not; hence the teacher says with hesitation, "If you think" etc. And it has been noticed that when it was declared, " 'The person that is perceived in the eye—this is the Self', so said he (Prajāpati). 'This is immortal, fearless--this is Brahman' " (Ch. VIII. vii. 4). Virocana, though he was a son of Prajāpati, and a scholar, and a king of the demons, still, owing to his natural defects, understood, contrary to what was taught, an opposite object, viz the body, to be the Self. Similarly, Indra, the king of the gods, who could not comprehend when instructed once, twice, and thrice, did, at the fourth stage, when his natural defects had been removed, realise the same Brahman that was spoken of at the very initial stage (Ch. VIII. vii-xii). In ordinary life also it is seen that, of the disciples hearing from the same teacher, some one understands accurately, some one inaccurately, some one contrarily, and some one nothing at all. What more need one speak with regard to (the knowledge of) the real nature of the Self which is beyond the senses? In this matter, indeed, all dialecticians, whether they believe in (the) existence or non-existence (of the Self), have got their misconceptions. Therefore though the statement, "Brahman has been realised", has been made with firm conviction, still the teacher's apprehensive remark, "If you think" etc., is quite appropriate in view of the unwarranted comprehensions. Tvam, you; vettha, know; nūnam, certainly; daharamfootnote{A different reading is dabham, having the same sense.} rūpam eva api, the very little form (i.e. expression); brahmaṇaḥ, of Brahman.

Objection: Are there many forms of Brahman, great and small, because of which it is said, "very little form" etc.?

Answer: Quite so. Many, indeed, are the aspects of Brahman created by conditions of name and form, but not naturally. From its own standpoint, forms, together with words, are denied thus: "That which is without sound, touch, form, and destruction; likewise tasteless, everlasting, and odourless" (Ka. I. iii. 15; Nṛ. 9; Muk. II. 72).

Objection: Is it not a fact that the very attribute by which a thing is determined is its own nature? Therefore that very distinctive feature by which Brahman is defined must be Its nature. Hence it is argued that since consciousness cannot be an attribute of any one of (the elements) earth etc., nor can it be of all of them in their transformation (as body), and as it is not an attribute of either of (the senses such as) the ear etc., or of the internal organ (mind), therefore it is a feature of Brahman; and thus is Brahman defined by consciousness. Thus it has been said, "Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman" (Bṛ. III. ix. 28.7) "Pure intelligence only" (Bṛ. II. iv. 12), "Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, Infinite" (Tai. II. i. 1), "Brahman is consciousness" (Ai. V. 3) —thus, too, is the feature of Brahman determined in the Vedic texts.

Answer: Truly this is so. But even so, that aspect is indicated, not from the intrinsic point of view, but merely with reference to the limiting adjuncts--mind, body, and senses; and this is because of Its correspondence with those things, in accordance as the body etc. undergo expansion, contraction, disruption, etc., or are destroyed. But in reality, the conclusion will be: "unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know" (Ke. II. 3).

The expression, yat asya, should be construed with the expression, brahmaṇaḥ rūpam (the aspect of Brahman), that preceded it, (meaning thereby: that form of Brahman which). Not only do you know little of the expression of that Brahman that is conditioned by the human personality, but the expression of Brahman as conditioned by divine adjuncts, which you deveṣu vettha, know among the gods, that too, as known to you, is very little indeed. This is how I think. Whether the expression be in the human personality or whether it be among the gods, it does not become freed from insignificance, since it is conditioned by adjuncts. The purport is that the Brahman, that is free from all distinctions, that is one without a second, and that known as Bhūmā (great) and eternal, cannot be known as a fully comprehended object. Since this is so, atha nu, therefore; manye, I think; te, for you; even now, Brahman is mīmāṁsyam eva, certainly to be deliberated on. The disciple having been told so by the teacher, sat in solitude with his mind concentrated, discussed the traditional teaching, as imparted by the teacher, together with its purport, ascertained it by a process of reasoning, made it a matter of personal experience, approached the teacher, and said, "Manye, (now) I think; (Brahman) is viditam, known."

(Teacher): "How (is Brahman known to you)?" (Disciple): "Listen!" —

Yadi, if perchance; manyase, you think; Su veda iti, "I know Brahman well enough." Although the entity may be inscrutable, yet some one who is possessed of real wisdom and who is free from defects, may at some time comprehend It, whereas some one else may not; hence the teacher says with hesitation, "If you think" etc. And it has been noticed that when it was declared, " 'The person that is perceived in the eye—this is the Self', so said he (Prajāpati). 'This is immortal, fearless--this is Brahman' " (Ch. VIII. vii. 4). Virocana, though he was a son of Prajāpati, and a scholar, and a king of the demons, still, owing to his natural defects, understood, contrary to what was taught, an opposite object, viz the body, to be the Self. Similarly, Indra, the king of the gods, who could not comprehend when instructed once, twice, and thrice, did, at the fourth stage, when his natural defects had been removed, realise the same Brahman that was spoken of at the very initial stage (Ch. VIII. vii-xii). In ordinary life also it is seen that, of the disciples hearing from the same teacher, some one understands accurately, some one inaccurately, some one contrarily, and some one nothing at all. What more need one speak with regard to (the knowledge of) the real nature of the Self which is beyond the senses? In this matter, indeed, all dialecticians, whether they believe in (the) existence or non-existence (of the Self), have got their misconceptions. Therefore though the statement, "Brahman has been realised", has been made with firm conviction, still the teacher's apprehensive remark, "If you think" etc., is quite appropriate in view of the unwarranted comprehensions. Tvam, you; vettha, know; nūnam, certainly; daharamfootnote{A different reading is dabham, having the same sense.} rūpam eva api, the very little form (i.e. expression); brahmaṇaḥ, of Brahman.

2.1.p2

kimanekāni brahmaṇo rūpāṇi mahāntyarbhakāṇi ca, yenāha daharamevetyādi?

Fearing that the disciple, to whom has been brought home the conviction, "You are the Self, which is opposed to the acceptable and the unacceptable, and which is Brahman", may jump to the conclusion, "I know myself well enough that I, indeed, am Brahman", the teacher, with a view to dispelling that notion of the disciple, says, "If you think" etc.

Objection: Is not such a firm conviction as, "I know well enough", desirable?

Answer: True, a firm conviction is desirable but not such a one as, "I know It well enough." That knowable thing alone that falls within the range of cognition can be known thoroughly, just as an inflammable substance becomes consumable to a fire that burns it, but not so the essence itself of the fire. The well-ascertained purport of all the Upaniṣads is that the personal Self of each knower is Brahman. Here, too, the same fact has been established in the form of an answer to questions, in the text beginning with, "That which is the Ear of the ear" etc. (I. 2); and the same has been specifically affirmed in the text, "That which is not uttered by speech" (I. 5). Besides, the positive conclusion of the (traditional) line of knowers of Brahman has been adduced in the text: "That is surely different from the known; and again, It is above the unknown" (I. 4). And the topic will be concluded thus: "It is unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know" (II. 3). Hence it is proper to dispel the disciple's notion: "I know well enough." For the knower cannot be known by the knower, just as fire cannot be consumed by the consuming fire; and there is no other knower different from Brahman to whom Brahman can become a separate knowable. A separate knower is denied by the Vedic text: "There is no other knower but this" (Bṛ. III. viii. 11). Therefore the conviction, "I know Brahman well enough", is certainly false. Hence the teacher has justifiably said, "If you think" etc.

Yadi, if perchance; manyase, you think; Su veda iti, "I know Brahman well enough." Although the entity may be inscrutable, yet some one who is possessed of real wisdom and who is free from defects, may at some time comprehend It, whereas some one else may not; hence the teacher says with hesitation, "If you think" etc. And it has been noticed that when it was declared, " 'The person that is perceived in the eye—this is the Self', so said he (Prajāpati). 'This is immortal, fearless--this is Brahman' " (Ch. VIII. vii. 4). Virocana, though he was a son of Prajāpati, and a scholar, and a king of the demons, still, owing to his natural defects, understood, contrary to what was taught, an opposite object, viz the body, to be the Self. Similarly, Indra, the king of the gods, who could not comprehend when instructed once, twice, and thrice, did, at the fourth stage, when his natural defects had been removed, realise the same Brahman that was spoken of at the very initial stage (Ch. VIII. vii-xii). In ordinary life also it is seen that, of the disciples hearing from the same teacher, some one understands accurately, some one inaccurately, some one contrarily, and some one nothing at all. What more need one speak with regard to (the knowledge of) the real nature of the Self which is beyond the senses? In this matter, indeed, all dialecticians, whether they believe in (the) existence or non-existence (of the Self), have got their misconceptions. Therefore though the statement, "Brahman has been realised", has been made with firm conviction, still the teacher's apprehensive remark, "If you think" etc., is quite appropriate in view of the unwarranted comprehensions. Tvam, you; vettha, know; nūnam, certainly; daharamfootnote{A different reading is dabham, having the same sense.} rūpam eva api, the very little form (i.e. expression); brahmaṇaḥ, of Brahman.

Objection: Are there many forms of Brahman, great and small, because of which it is said, "very little form" etc.?

Answer: Quite so. Many, indeed, are the aspects of Brahman created by conditions of name and form, but not naturally. From its own standpoint, forms, together with words, are denied thus: "That which is without sound, touch, form, and destruction; likewise tasteless, everlasting, and odourless" (Ka. I. iii. 15; Nṛ. 9; Muk. II. 72).

Objection: Is it not a fact that the very attribute by which a thing is determined is its own nature? Therefore that very distinctive feature by which Brahman is defined must be Its nature. Hence it is argued that since consciousness cannot be an attribute of any one of (the elements) earth etc., nor can it be of all of them in their transformation (as body), and as it is not an attribute of either of (the senses such as) the ear etc., or of the internal organ (mind), therefore it is a feature of Brahman; and thus is Brahman defined by consciousness. Thus it has been said, "Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman" (Bṛ. III. ix. 28.7) "Pure intelligence only" (Bṛ. II. iv. 12), "Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, Infinite" (Tai. II. i. 1), "Brahman is consciousness" (Ai. V. 3) —thus, too, is the feature of Brahman determined in the Vedic texts.

Answer: Truly this is so. But even so, that aspect is indicated, not from the intrinsic point of view, but merely with reference to the limiting adjuncts--mind, body, and senses; and this is because of Its correspondence with those things, in accordance as the body etc. undergo expansion, contraction, disruption, etc., or are destroyed. But in reality, the conclusion will be: "unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know" (Ke. II. 3).

The expression, yat asya, should be construed with the expression, brahmaṇaḥ rūpam (the aspect of Brahman), that preceded it, (meaning thereby: that form of Brahman which). Not only do you know little of the expression of that Brahman that is conditioned by the human personality, but the expression of Brahman as conditioned by divine adjuncts, which you deveṣu vettha, know among the gods, that too, as known to you, is very little indeed. This is how I think. Whether the expression be in the human personality or whether it be among the gods, it does not become freed from insignificance, since it is conditioned by adjuncts. The purport is that the Brahman, that is free from all distinctions, that is one without a second, and that known as Bhūmā (great) and eternal, cannot be known as a fully comprehended object. Since this is so, atha nu, therefore; manye, I think; te, for you; even now, Brahman is mīmāṁsyam eva, certainly to be deliberated on. The disciple having been told so by the teacher, sat in solitude with his mind concentrated, discussed the traditional teaching, as imparted by the teacher, together with its purport, ascertained it by a process of reasoning, made it a matter of personal experience, approached the teacher, and said, "Manye, (now) I think; (Brahman) is viditam, known."

(Teacher): "How (is Brahman known to you)?" (Disciple): "Listen!" —

Objection: Are there many forms of Brahman, great and small, because of which it is said, "very little form" etc.?

2.1.p3

bāḍham;anekāni hi nāmarūpopādhikṛtāni brahmaṇo rūpāṇi, na svataḥ| svatastu "aśabdamasparśamarūpamavyayaṃ tathārasaṃ nityamagandhavacca yat" (ka.u.1/3/15, nṛsiṃhottara, 1, muktika.2/72) iti śabdādibhiḥ saha rūpāṇi pratiṣidhyante|

Fearing that the disciple, to whom has been brought home the conviction, "You are the Self, which is opposed to the acceptable and the unacceptable, and which is Brahman", may jump to the conclusion, "I know myself well enough that I, indeed, am Brahman", the teacher, with a view to dispelling that notion of the disciple, says, "If you think" etc.

Objection: Is not such a firm conviction as, "I know well enough", desirable?

Answer: True, a firm conviction is desirable but not such a one as, "I know It well enough." That knowable thing alone that falls within the range of cognition can be known thoroughly, just as an inflammable substance becomes consumable to a fire that burns it, but not so the essence itself of the fire. The well-ascertained purport of all the Upaniṣads is that the personal Self of each knower is Brahman. Here, too, the same fact has been established in the form of an answer to questions, in the text beginning with, "That which is the Ear of the ear" etc. (I. 2); and the same has been specifically affirmed in the text, "That which is not uttered by speech" (I. 5). Besides, the positive conclusion of the (traditional) line of knowers of Brahman has been adduced in the text: "That is surely different from the known; and again, It is above the unknown" (I. 4). And the topic will be concluded thus: "It is unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know" (II. 3). Hence it is proper to dispel the disciple's notion: "I know well enough." For the knower cannot be known by the knower, just as fire cannot be consumed by the consuming fire; and there is no other knower different from Brahman to whom Brahman can become a separate knowable. A separate knower is denied by the Vedic text: "There is no other knower but this" (Bṛ. III. viii. 11). Therefore the conviction, "I know Brahman well enough", is certainly false. Hence the teacher has justifiably said, "If you think" etc.

Yadi, if perchance; manyase, you think; Su veda iti, "I know Brahman well enough." Although the entity may be inscrutable, yet some one who is possessed of real wisdom and who is free from defects, may at some time comprehend It, whereas some one else may not; hence the teacher says with hesitation, "If you think" etc. And it has been noticed that when it was declared, " 'The person that is perceived in the eye—this is the Self', so said he (Prajāpati). 'This is immortal, fearless--this is Brahman' " (Ch. VIII. vii. 4). Virocana, though he was a son of Prajāpati, and a scholar, and a king of the demons, still, owing to his natural defects, understood, contrary to what was taught, an opposite object, viz the body, to be the Self. Similarly, Indra, the king of the gods, who could not comprehend when instructed once, twice, and thrice, did, at the fourth stage, when his natural defects had been removed, realise the same Brahman that was spoken of at the very initial stage (Ch. VIII. vii-xii). In ordinary life also it is seen that, of the disciples hearing from the same teacher, some one understands accurately, some one inaccurately, some one contrarily, and some one nothing at all. What more need one speak with regard to (the knowledge of) the real nature of the Self which is beyond the senses? In this matter, indeed, all dialecticians, whether they believe in (the) existence or non-existence (of the Self), have got their misconceptions. Therefore though the statement, "Brahman has been realised", has been made with firm conviction, still the teacher's apprehensive remark, "If you think" etc., is quite appropriate in view of the unwarranted comprehensions. Tvam, you; vettha, know; nūnam, certainly; daharamfootnote{A different reading is dabham, having the same sense.} rūpam eva api, the very little form (i.e. expression); brahmaṇaḥ, of Brahman.

Objection: Are there many forms of Brahman, great and small, because of which it is said, "very little form" etc.?

Answer: Quite so. Many, indeed, are the aspects of Brahman created by conditions of name and form, but not naturally. From its own standpoint, forms, together with words, are denied thus: "That which is without sound, touch, form, and destruction; likewise tasteless, everlasting, and odourless" (Ka. I. iii. 15; Nṛ. 9; Muk. II. 72).

Objection: Is it not a fact that the very attribute by which a thing is determined is its own nature? Therefore that very distinctive feature by which Brahman is defined must be Its nature. Hence it is argued that since consciousness cannot be an attribute of any one of (the elements) earth etc., nor can it be of all of them in their transformation (as body), and as it is not an attribute of either of (the senses such as) the ear etc., or of the internal organ (mind), therefore it is a feature of Brahman; and thus is Brahman defined by consciousness. Thus it has been said, "Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman" (Bṛ. III. ix. 28.7) "Pure intelligence only" (Bṛ. II. iv. 12), "Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, Infinite" (Tai. II. i. 1), "Brahman is consciousness" (Ai. V. 3) —thus, too, is the feature of Brahman determined in the Vedic texts.

Answer: Truly this is so. But even so, that aspect is indicated, not from the intrinsic point of view, but merely with reference to the limiting adjuncts--mind, body, and senses; and this is because of Its correspondence with those things, in accordance as the body etc. undergo expansion, contraction, disruption, etc., or are destroyed. But in reality, the conclusion will be: "unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know" (Ke. II. 3).

The expression, yat asya, should be construed with the expression, brahmaṇaḥ rūpam (the aspect of Brahman), that preceded it, (meaning thereby: that form of Brahman which). Not only do you know little of the expression of that Brahman that is conditioned by the human personality, but the expression of Brahman as conditioned by divine adjuncts, which you deveṣu vettha, know among the gods, that too, as known to you, is very little indeed. This is how I think. Whether the expression be in the human personality or whether it be among the gods, it does not become freed from insignificance, since it is conditioned by adjuncts. The purport is that the Brahman, that is free from all distinctions, that is one without a second, and that known as Bhūmā (great) and eternal, cannot be known as a fully comprehended object. Since this is so, atha nu, therefore; manye, I think; te, for you; even now, Brahman is mīmāṁsyam eva, certainly to be deliberated on. The disciple having been told so by the teacher, sat in solitude with his mind concentrated, discussed the traditional teaching, as imparted by the teacher, together with its purport, ascertained it by a process of reasoning, made it a matter of personal experience, approached the teacher, and said, "Manye, (now) I think; (Brahman) is viditam, known."

(Teacher): "How (is Brahman known to you)?" (Disciple): "Listen!" —

Answer: Quite so. Many, indeed, are the aspects of Brahman created by conditions of name and form, but not naturally. From its own standpoint, forms, together with words, are denied thus: "That which is without sound, touch, form, and destruction; likewise tasteless, everlasting, and odourless" (Ka. I. iii. 15; Nṛ. 9; Muk. II. 72).

2.1.p4

nanu yenaiva dharmeṇa yadrūpyate tadeva tasya svarūpamiti brahmaṇo'pi yena viśeṣeṇa nirūpaṇaṃ tadeva tasya svarūpaṃ syāt| ata ucyate--caitanyaṃ pṛthivyādīnāmanyatamasya sarveṣāṃ vipariṇatānāṃ vā dharmo na bhavatīti brahmaṇo rūpamiti brahma rūpyate caitanyena| tathā coktam "vijñānamānandaṃ brahma" (bṛ.u.3/9/28) "vijñānadhana eva" (bṛ.u.2/4/12) "satyaṃ jñānamanantaṃ brahma" (tai.u.2/1/1) "prajñānaṃ

Fearing that the disciple, to whom has been brought home the conviction, "You are the Self, which is opposed to the acceptable and the unacceptable, and which is Brahman", may jump to the conclusion, "I know myself well enough that I, indeed, am Brahman", the teacher, with a view to dispelling that notion of the disciple, says, "If you think" etc.

Objection: Is not such a firm conviction as, "I know well enough", desirable?

Answer: True, a firm conviction is desirable but not such a one as, "I know It well enough." That knowable thing alone that falls within the range of cognition can be known thoroughly, just as an inflammable substance becomes consumable to a fire that burns it, but not so the essence itself of the fire. The well-ascertained purport of all the Upaniṣads is that the personal Self of each knower is Brahman. Here, too, the same fact has been established in the form of an answer to questions, in the text beginning with, "That which is the Ear of the ear" etc. (I. 2); and the same has been specifically affirmed in the text, "That which is not uttered by speech" (I. 5). Besides, the positive conclusion of the (traditional) line of knowers of Brahman has been adduced in the text: "That is surely different from the known; and again, It is above the unknown" (I. 4). And the topic will be concluded thus: "It is unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know" (II. 3). Hence it is proper to dispel the disciple's notion: "I know well enough." For the knower cannot be known by the knower, just as fire cannot be consumed by the consuming fire; and there is no other knower different from Brahman to whom Brahman can become a separate knowable. A separate knower is denied by the Vedic text: "There is no other knower but this" (Bṛ. III. viii. 11). Therefore the conviction, "I know Brahman well enough", is certainly false. Hence the teacher has justifiably said, "If you think" etc.

Yadi, if perchance; manyase, you think; Su veda iti, "I know Brahman well enough." Although the entity may be inscrutable, yet some one who is possessed of real wisdom and who is free from defects, may at some time comprehend It, whereas some one else may not; hence the teacher says with hesitation, "If you think" etc. And it has been noticed that when it was declared, " 'The person that is perceived in the eye—this is the Self', so said he (Prajāpati). 'This is immortal, fearless--this is Brahman' " (Ch. VIII. vii. 4). Virocana, though he was a son of Prajāpati, and a scholar, and a king of the demons, still, owing to his natural defects, understood, contrary to what was taught, an opposite object, viz the body, to be the Self. Similarly, Indra, the king of the gods, who could not comprehend when instructed once, twice, and thrice, did, at the fourth stage, when his natural defects had been removed, realise the same Brahman that was spoken of at the very initial stage (Ch. VIII. vii-xii). In ordinary life also it is seen that, of the disciples hearing from the same teacher, some one understands accurately, some one inaccurately, some one contrarily, and some one nothing at all. What more need one speak with regard to (the knowledge of) the real nature of the Self which is beyond the senses? In this matter, indeed, all dialecticians, whether they believe in (the) existence or non-existence (of the Self), have got their misconceptions. Therefore though the statement, "Brahman has been realised", has been made with firm conviction, still the teacher's apprehensive remark, "If you think" etc., is quite appropriate in view of the unwarranted comprehensions. Tvam, you; vettha, know; nūnam, certainly; daharamfootnote{A different reading is dabham, having the same sense.} rūpam eva api, the very little form (i.e. expression); brahmaṇaḥ, of Brahman.

Objection: Are there many forms of Brahman, great and small, because of which it is said, "very little form" etc.?

Answer: Quite so. Many, indeed, are the aspects of Brahman created by conditions of name and form, but not naturally. From its own standpoint, forms, together with words, are denied thus: "That which is without sound, touch, form, and destruction; likewise tasteless, everlasting, and odourless" (Ka. I. iii. 15; Nṛ. 9; Muk. II. 72).

Objection: Is it not a fact that the very attribute by which a thing is determined is its own nature? Therefore that very distinctive feature by which Brahman is defined must be Its nature. Hence it is argued that since consciousness cannot be an attribute of any one of (the elements) earth etc., nor can it be of all of them in their transformation (as body), and as it is not an attribute of either of (the senses such as) the ear etc., or of the internal organ (mind), therefore it is a feature of Brahman; and thus is Brahman defined by consciousness. Thus it has been said, "Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman" (Bṛ. III. ix. 28.7) "Pure intelligence only" (Bṛ. II. iv. 12), "Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, Infinite" (Tai. II. i. 1), "Brahman is consciousness" (Ai. V. 3) —thus, too, is the feature of Brahman determined in the Vedic texts.

Answer: Truly this is so. But even so, that aspect is indicated, not from the intrinsic point of view, but merely with reference to the limiting adjuncts--mind, body, and senses; and this is because of Its correspondence with those things, in accordance as the body etc. undergo expansion, contraction, disruption, etc., or are destroyed. But in reality, the conclusion will be: "unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know" (Ke. II. 3).

The expression, yat asya, should be construed with the expression, brahmaṇaḥ rūpam (the aspect of Brahman), that preceded it, (meaning thereby: that form of Brahman which). Not only do you know little of the expression of that Brahman that is conditioned by the human personality, but the expression of Brahman as conditioned by divine adjuncts, which you deveṣu vettha, know among the gods, that too, as known to you, is very little indeed. This is how I think. Whether the expression be in the human personality or whether it be among the gods, it does not become freed from insignificance, since it is conditioned by adjuncts. The purport is that the Brahman, that is free from all distinctions, that is one without a second, and that known as Bhūmā (great) and eternal, cannot be known as a fully comprehended object. Since this is so, atha nu, therefore; manye, I think; te, for you; even now, Brahman is mīmāṁsyam eva, certainly to be deliberated on. The disciple having been told so by the teacher, sat in solitude with his mind concentrated, discussed the traditional teaching, as imparted by the teacher, together with its purport, ascertained it by a process of reasoning, made it a matter of personal experience, approached the teacher, and said, "Manye, (now) I think; (Brahman) is viditam, known."

(Teacher): "How (is Brahman known to you)?" (Disciple): "Listen!" —

Objection: Is it not a fact that the very attribute by which a thing is determined is its own nature? Therefore that very distinctive feature by which Brahman is defined must be Its nature. Hence it is argued that since consciousness cannot be an attribute of any one of (the elements) earth etc., nor can it be of all of them in their transformation (as body), and as it is not an attribute of either of (the senses such as) the ear etc., or of the internal organ (mind), therefore it is a feature of Brahman; and thus is Brahman defined by consciousness. Thus it has been said, "Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman" (Bṛ. III. ix. 28.7) "Pure intelligence only" (Bṛ. II. iv. 12), "Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, Infinite" (Tai. II. i. 1), "Brahman is consciousness" (Ai. V. 3) —thus, too, is the feature of Brahman determined in the Vedic texts.