Kena Upanishad 4: caturtha khaṇḍaḥ

4.1

caturtha khaṇaḍa
1.4.1
sā brahmeti hovāca brahmaṇo vā etadvijaye mahiyadhvamiti tato haiva vidāñcakāra brahmeti ||

Sā, She; uvāca ha, said, "Brahma iti, It was Brahman; Brahmaṇaḥ vai vijaye, in the victory of God, indeed. The devils were conquered only by God, and you were mere instruments there. In the victory that was really His, you mahīyadhvam, became elated, you attained glory." The word etat, in this way, is used adverbially (to modify the verb). "But yours is this vaingloriousness: 'Asmākam eva ayam vijayaḥ, asmākam eva ayam mahimā—ours is this victory, ours is this glory,' (Ke. III. 2). Tataḥ ha eva, from that, from Umā's words alone, to be sure; Indra, vidāñcakāra, learned; Brahma iti, that It was Brahman. The emphatic limitation implied in tataḥ ha eva, from that alone to be sure, implies that (he came to learn) not independently.

Sā, She; uvāca ha, said, "Brahma iti, It was Brahman; Brahmaṇaḥ vai vijaye, in the victory of God, indeed. The devils were conquered only by God, and you were mere instruments there. In the victory that was really His, you mahīyadhvam, became elated, you attained glory." The word etat, in this way, is used adverbially (to modify the verb). "But yours is this vaingloriousness: 'Asmākam eva ayam vijayaḥ, asmākam eva ayam mahimā—ours is this victory, ours is this glory,' (Ke. III. 2). Tataḥ ha eva, from that, from Umā's words alone, to be sure; Indra, vidāñcakāra, learned; Brahma iti, that It was Brahman. The emphatic limitation implied in tataḥ ha eva, from that alone to be sure, implies that (he came to learn) not independently.

4.1-2

sā brahmeti hovāca ha kila brahmaṇo vai īśvarasyaiva vijayeīśvareṇaiva jitā asurāḥ; yūyaṃ tatra nimittamātram, tasyaiva vijaye--yūyaṃ mahiyadhvaṃ mahimānaṃ prāpnutha| etaditi kriyāviśeṣaṇārtham| mithyābhimānastu yuṣmākam--asmākamevāyaṃ vijayo'smākamevāyaṃ mahimeti| tataḥ masmādumāvākyād ha eva vidāñcakāra brahmeti indraḥ, avadhāraṇāt tato haiva iti, na svātantryeṇa ||

Sā, She; uvāca ha, said, "Brahma iti, It was Brahman; Brahmaṇaḥ vai vijaye, in the victory of God, indeed. The devils were conquered only by God, and you were mere instruments there. In the victory that was really His, you mahīyadhvam, became elated, you attained glory." The word etat, in this way, is used adverbially (to modify the verb). "But yours is this vaingloriousness: 'Asmākam eva ayam vijayaḥ, asmākam eva ayam mahimā—ours is this victory, ours is this glory,' (Ke. III. 2). Tataḥ ha eva, from that, from Umā's words alone, to be sure; Indra, vidāñcakāra, learned; Brahma iti, that It was Brahman. The emphatic limitation implied in tataḥ ha eva, from that alone to be sure, implies that (he came to learn) not independently.

4.1-2.p1

yasmādagnivāṭivandrā ete devā brahmaṇaḥ saṃvādadarśanādinā sāmipyamupagatāḥ-

touched It most proximately, and they knew It first as Brahman.

Since these gods—Fire, Air, and Indra—approached Brahman through conversation, visualisation, etc., tasmāt, therefore, ete devāḥ, these gods; atitarām iva, surpassed greatly, through their own excellence, i.e. good luck comprising power, quality, etc; anyān devān, the other gods. The word iva is meaningless or is used for the sake of emphasis. Yat agniḥ vāyuḥ indraḥ, (the gods) viz Fire, Air, and Indra. Hi, since; te they, those gods; nediṣṭham pasparśuḥ, most proximately, intimately, touched; enat, this Brahman; through the process of conversation etc., as described earlier. Hi, because, because of the further reason that; te, they; being prathamaḥ (should be prathamāḥ) first, being prominent; enat, this Brahman; vidāṁcakāra, (shoudl be vidāṁcakruḥ), knew, knew It to be Brahman.

Since these gods—Fire, Air, and Indra—approached Brahman through conversation, visualisation, etc., tasmāt, therefore, ete devāḥ, these gods; atitarām iva, surpassed greatly, through their own excellence, i.e. good luck comprising power, quality, etc; anyān devān, the other gods. The word iva is meaningless or is used for the sake of emphasis. Yat agniḥ vāyuḥ indraḥ, (the gods) viz Fire, Air, and Indra. Hi, since; te they, those gods; nediṣṭham pasparśuḥ, most proximately, intimately, touched; enat, this Brahman; through the process of conversation etc., as described earlier. Hi, because, because of the further reason that; te, they; being prathamaḥ (should be prathamāḥ) first, being prominent; enat, this Brahman; vidāṁcakāra, (shoudl be vidāṁcakruḥ), knew, knew It to be Brahman.

4.2

1.4.2
tasmādvā ete devā atitarāmivānyāndevānyadagnirvāyurindraste hyenannediṣṭha paspṛśuste hyenatprathamo vidāñcakāra brahmeti ||

touched It most proximately, and they knew It first as Brahman.

Since these gods—Fire, Air, and Indra—approached Brahman through conversation, visualisation, etc., tasmāt, therefore, ete devāḥ, these gods; atitarām iva, surpassed greatly, through their own excellence, i.e. good luck comprising power, quality, etc; anyān devān, the other gods. The word iva is meaningless or is used for the sake of emphasis. Yat agniḥ vāyuḥ indraḥ, (the gods) viz Fire, Air, and Indra. Hi, since; te they, those gods; nediṣṭham pasparśuḥ, most proximately, intimately, touched; enat, this Brahman; through the process of conversation etc., as described earlier. Hi, because, because of the further reason that; te, they; being prathamaḥ (should be prathamāḥ) first, being prominent; enat, this Brahman; vidāṁcakāra, (shoudl be vidāṁcakruḥ), knew, knew It to be Brahman.

4.2.p1

tasmāt svairguṇaiḥ atitarāmiva śaktiguṇādimahābhāgyaiḥ anyān devān atitarām atiśerata iva ete devāḥ| iva śabdo'narthako'vadhāraṇārtho vā| yad agniḥ vāyuḥ indraḥ te hi devā yasmād

touched It most proximately, and they knew It first as Brahman.

Since these gods—Fire, Air, and Indra—approached Brahman through conversation, visualisation, etc., tasmāt, therefore, ete devāḥ, these gods; atitarām iva, surpassed greatly, through their own excellence, i.e. good luck comprising power, quality, etc; anyān devān, the other gods. The word iva is meaningless or is used for the sake of emphasis. Yat agniḥ vāyuḥ indraḥ, (the gods) viz Fire, Air, and Indra. Hi, since; te they, those gods; nediṣṭham pasparśuḥ, most proximately, intimately, touched; enat, this Brahman; through the process of conversation etc., as described earlier. Hi, because, because of the further reason that; te, they; being prathamaḥ (should be prathamāḥ) first, being prominent; enat, this Brahman; vidāṁcakāra, (shoudl be vidāṁcakruḥ), knew, knew It to be Brahman.

4.2-2

enad brahma nediṣṭham antikatamaṃ priyatamaṃ pasparśuḥ spṛṣṭavanto yathoktairbrahmaṇaḥ saṃvādādiprakāraiḥ, te hi yasmācca hetoḥ enad brahma prathamaḥ prathamāḥ pradhānāḥ santa ityetat, vidāñcakāra vidāñcakurityetahrahmeti ||

touched It most proximately, and they knew It first as Brahman.

Since these gods—Fire, Air, and Indra—approached Brahman through conversation, visualisation, etc., tasmāt, therefore, ete devāḥ, these gods; atitarām iva, surpassed greatly, through their own excellence, i.e. good luck comprising power, quality, etc; anyān devān, the other gods. The word iva is meaningless or is used for the sake of emphasis. Yat agniḥ vāyuḥ indraḥ, (the gods) viz Fire, Air, and Indra. Hi, since; te they, those gods; nediṣṭham pasparśuḥ, most proximately, intimately, touched; enat, this Brahman; through the process of conversation etc., as described earlier. Hi, because, because of the further reason that; te, they; being prathamaḥ (should be prathamāḥ) first, being prominent; enat, this Brahman; vidāṁcakāra, (shoudl be vidāṁcakruḥ), knew, knew It to be Brahman.

4.2-2.p1

yasmādagnivāyū api indravākyādeva vidāñcakratuḥ, indreṇa hi umāvākyātprathamaṃ śrutaṃ brahmeti--

Since even Fire and Air knew from the words of Indra alone, and since Indra heard first from Umā's words that It was Brahman, tasmāt vai indraḥ atitarām iva, therefore Indra did excel (the other deities). Hi saḥ enat nediṣṭham pasparśa, inasmuch as he touched It most proximately, because saḥ hi enat prathamaḥ vidāṁcakāra Brahma iti—this sentence has been already explained.

Since even Fire and Air knew from the words of Indra alone, and since Indra heard first from Umā's words that It was Brahman, tasmāt vai indraḥ atitarām iva, therefore Indra did excel (the other deities). Hi saḥ enat nediṣṭham pasparśa, inasmuch as he touched It most proximately, because saḥ hi enat prathamaḥ vidāṁcakāra Brahma iti—this sentence has been already explained.

4.3

1.4.3
tasmādvā indro'titarāmivānyāndevānsa hyenannediṣṭhaṃ pasparśa sa hyenatprathamo vidāñcakāra brahmeti ||

4.3-2

tasmādvai indraḥ atitarāmiva atiśerata iva anyān devān| sa hyenannediṣṭhaṃ pasparśa yasmāt sa hyenatprathamo vidāñcakāra brahmetyuktārthaṃ vākyam ||

Since even Fire and Air knew from the words of Indra alone, and since Indra heard first from Umā's words that It was Brahman, tasmāt vai indraḥ atitarām iva, therefore Indra did excel (the other deities). Hi saḥ enat nediṣṭham pasparśa, inasmuch as he touched It most proximately, because saḥ hi enat prathamaḥ vidāṁcakāra Brahma iti—this sentence has been already explained.

4.4

1.4.4
tasyaiṣa ādeśo yadetadvidyuto vyadyutadā 3 itinnyamīmiṣadā 3 ityadhidaivatama ||

Tasya of the Brahman under discussion, eṣaḥ ādeśaḥ, this is the instruction through analogy. That analogy through which the instruction about the incomparable Brahman is imparted is called ādeśaḥ. What is that? Yat etat, that fact, which is well known among people as the flash of lightning. Since vidyutaḥ vyadyutat, cannot mean that Brahman (vyadyutat) flashed (by borrowing Its light) (vidyutaḥ) from lightning,footnote{"The meaning, 'It flashed from lightning', is inadmissible, for Brahman being self-effulgent, Its effulgence cannot be dependent on others. The meaning, 'It performed the flashing of lightning,' is unacceptable, since the flash that belongs to something cannot be produced by another."—A.G.} therefore the meaning has to be assumed to be "the flash of lightning". Ā, like, is used in the sense of comparison. The meaning is: "It is like the flash of lightning"; and (this meaning is acceptable) since it is seen in a different Vedic text, "comparable to a single flash of lightning" (Bṛ. II. iii. 6); for Brahman disappeared after revealing Itself but once to the gods like lightning. Or the word tejaḥ (brilliance) has to be supplied after the word vidyutaḥ (of lightning). Vyadyutat (in this case) means flashed; (and) ā means as it were. The purport is: It was, as though, the brilliance of lightning flashed but once. The word iti is meant to call back to memory the word ādeśa; (so the meaning is): This is the ādeśa, the analogy. The word it is used for joining together. (So the sense is): Here is another analogy for It. What is that one? Nyamīmiṣat, winked, as the eye did the act of winking. The causative form (in nyamīmiṣat) is used in the same sense as the root itself. The ā is used here, too, in the sense of comparison. The meaning is: And it was like the opening and shutting of the eye with regard to its object. Iti adhidaivatam, this is by way of showing analogies of Brahman in a divine context.

4.4.p1

tasya prakṛtasya brahmaṇa eṣa ādeśa upamopadeśaḥ| nirupamasya brahmaṇo yenopamānenopadeśaḥ so'yamādeśa ityucyate| kiṃ tat ? yadetat prasiddhaṃ loke vidyuto vyadyutad vidyotanaṃ kṛtavadityetadanupapannamiti vidyuto vidyotanamiti kalpyate| ā 3 ityupamārthaḥ| vidyuto vidyotanamivetyarthaḥ, "yathā sakṛdvidyutam" iti śrutyantare ca darśanād vidyudiva hi sakṛdātmānaṃ darśayitvā tirobhūtaṃ brahma devebhyaḥ|

Tasya of the Brahman under discussion, eṣaḥ ādeśaḥ, this is the instruction through analogy. That analogy through which the instruction about the incomparable Brahman is imparted is called ādeśaḥ. What is that? Yat etat, that fact, which is well known among people as the flash of lightning. Since vidyutaḥ vyadyutat, cannot mean that Brahman (vyadyutat) flashed (by borrowing Its light) (vidyutaḥ) from lightning,footnote{"The meaning, 'It flashed from lightning', is inadmissible, for Brahman being self-effulgent, Its effulgence cannot be dependent on others. The meaning, 'It performed the flashing of lightning,' is unacceptable, since the flash that belongs to something cannot be produced by another."—A.G.} therefore the meaning has to be assumed to be "the flash of lightning". Ā, like, is used in the sense of comparison. The meaning is: "It is like the flash of lightning"; and (this meaning is acceptable) since it is seen in a different Vedic text, "comparable to a single flash of lightning" (Bṛ. II. iii. 6); for Brahman disappeared after revealing Itself but once to the gods like lightning. Or the word tejaḥ (brilliance) has to be supplied after the word vidyutaḥ (of lightning). Vyadyutat (in this case) means flashed; (and) ā means as it were. The purport is: It was, as though, the brilliance of lightning flashed but once. The word iti is meant to call back to memory the word ādeśa; (so the meaning is): This is the ādeśa, the analogy. The word it is used for joining together. (So the sense is): Here is another analogy for It. What is that one? Nyamīmiṣat, winked, as the eye did the act of winking. The causative form (in nyamīmiṣat) is used in the same sense as the root itself. The ā is used here, too, in the sense of comparison. The meaning is: And it was like the opening and shutting of the eye with regard to its object. Iti adhidaivatam, this is by way of showing analogies of Brahman in a divine context.

4.4.p2

athavā vidyutaḥ ’tejaḥ’ ityadhyāhāryam| vyadyutad vidyotitavat ā 3 iva vidyutastejaḥ

Tasya of the Brahman under discussion, eṣaḥ ādeśaḥ, this is the instruction through analogy. That analogy through which the instruction about the incomparable Brahman is imparted is called ādeśaḥ. What is that? Yat etat, that fact, which is well known among people as the flash of lightning. Since vidyutaḥ vyadyutat, cannot mean that Brahman (vyadyutat) flashed (by borrowing Its light) (vidyutaḥ) from lightning,footnote{"The meaning, 'It flashed from lightning', is inadmissible, for Brahman being self-effulgent, Its effulgence cannot be dependent on others. The meaning, 'It performed the flashing of lightning,' is unacceptable, since the flash that belongs to something cannot be produced by another."—A.G.} therefore the meaning has to be assumed to be "the flash of lightning". Ā, like, is used in the sense of comparison. The meaning is: "It is like the flash of lightning"; and (this meaning is acceptable) since it is seen in a different Vedic text, "comparable to a single flash of lightning" (Bṛ. II. iii. 6); for Brahman disappeared after revealing Itself but once to the gods like lightning. Or the word tejaḥ (brilliance) has to be supplied after the word vidyutaḥ (of lightning). Vyadyutat (in this case) means flashed; (and) ā means as it were. The purport is: It was, as though, the brilliance of lightning flashed but once. The word iti is meant to call back to memory the word ādeśa; (so the meaning is): This is the ādeśa, the analogy. The word it is used for joining together. (So the sense is): Here is another analogy for It. What is that one? Nyamīmiṣat, winked, as the eye did the act of winking. The causative form (in nyamīmiṣat) is used in the same sense as the root itself. The ā is used here, too, in the sense of comparison. The meaning is: And it was like the opening and shutting of the eye with regard to its object. Iti adhidaivatam, this is by way of showing analogies of Brahman in a divine context.

4.4-2

sakṛdvidyotitavadivetyabhiprāyaḥ| itiśabda ādeśapratinirdeśārthaḥ--ityayamādeśa iti| icchabdaḥ samuccayārthaḥ|
ayaṃ cāparastasyādeśaḥ| ko'sau ? nyamīmiṣad yathā cakṣuḥ nyamīmiṣad nimeṣaṃ kṛtavat| svārthe ṇic| upamārtha eva ākāraḥ| cakṣuṣo viṣayaṃ prati prakāśatirobhāva iva cetyarthaḥ| iti adhidaivataṃ devatāviṣayaṃ brahmaṇa-upamānadarśanam ||

Tasya of the Brahman under discussion, eṣaḥ ādeśaḥ, this is the instruction through analogy. That analogy through which the instruction about the incomparable Brahman is imparted is called ādeśaḥ. What is that? Yat etat, that fact, which is well known among people as the flash of lightning. Since vidyutaḥ vyadyutat, cannot mean that Brahman (vyadyutat) flashed (by borrowing Its light) (vidyutaḥ) from lightning,footnote{"The meaning, 'It flashed from lightning', is inadmissible, for Brahman being self-effulgent, Its effulgence cannot be dependent on others. The meaning, 'It performed the flashing of lightning,' is unacceptable, since the flash that belongs to something cannot be produced by another."—A.G.} therefore the meaning has to be assumed to be "the flash of lightning". Ā, like, is used in the sense of comparison. The meaning is: "It is like the flash of lightning"; and (this meaning is acceptable) since it is seen in a different Vedic text, "comparable to a single flash of lightning" (Bṛ. II. iii. 6); for Brahman disappeared after revealing Itself but once to the gods like lightning. Or the word tejaḥ (brilliance) has to be supplied after the word vidyutaḥ (of lightning). Vyadyutat (in this case) means flashed; (and) ā means as it were. The purport is: It was, as though, the brilliance of lightning flashed but once. The word iti is meant to call back to memory the word ādeśa; (so the meaning is): This is the ādeśa, the analogy. The word it is used for joining together. (So the sense is): Here is another analogy for It. What is that one? Nyamīmiṣat, winked, as the eye did the act of winking. The causative form (in nyamīmiṣat) is used in the same sense as the root itself. The ā is used here, too, in the sense of comparison. The meaning is: And it was like the opening and shutting of the eye with regard to its object. Iti adhidaivatam, this is by way of showing analogies of Brahman in a divine context.

4.5

1.4.5
athādhyātmaṃ yadetadgacchatīva ca mano'nena caitadupasmaratyabhīkṣṇam̐ saṅkalpaḥ ||

Atha, after this; is being told the analogical instruction adhyātmam, in the context of the soul, with regard to the indwelling Self. Yat etat, that which is a known fact, viz that etat, to this Brahman; gacchati iva ca manaḥ, as though the mind goes, as though the mind enters into Brahman, encompasses It as an object. And the fact that anena, by that mind; the spiritual aspirant; abhīkṣṇam, repeatedly, upasmarati, remembers intimately; etat, this Brahman; and the saṅkalpaḥ, thought of the mind with regard to Brahman. Since Brahman has got the mind as Its limiting adjunct, It seems to be revealed by such states of the mind as thought, memory, etc., by which It seems to be objectified. Therefore, this is an instruction about Brahman, through analogy, in the context of the soul. In the divine context, Brahman has the attribute of revealing Itself quickly like lightning and winking;footnote{"The winking of the eye is rapid—this is well known; similar is Brahman's power of acting quickly. Its attribute in the divine context is the power to act quickly with regard to creation etc., since there is an absence of obstruction and effort. ... The light of lightning covers the whole world at once, similarly Brahman is surpassingly bright by nature, It accomplishes creation etc. of everything quickly, and It is possessed of supreme glory."—A.G.} and in the context of the soul, It has the attribute of manifesting Itself simultaneously with the states of the mind.footnote{"One should meditate thus: 'Towards this Brahman, that is of the nature of light, my mind proceeds and there it rests.' The instruction in this form is the instruction in the context of the individual soul. The indwelling Brahman becomes revealed to one who meditates thus: 'The thoughts in my mind constantly revolve round Brahman.'"—A.G.} This is the instruction about Brahman through analogy. The need for this teaching about Brahman through analogy is that It becomes easily comprehensible to people of dull intellect when instruction is thus imparted. For the unconditioned Brahman, as such, cannot be comprehended by people of dull intellect.

4.5-2

atha anantaram adhyātmaṃ pratyagātmaviṣaya ādeśa ucyate| yadetad gacchatīva ca manaḥ| etadbrahma ḍhaukata iva viṣayīkarotīva| yacca anena manasā etad brahma upasmarati samīpataḥ smarati sādhakaḥ abhīkṣṇaṃ bhuśam| sekalpaśca manaso brahmaviṣayaḥ| manaupādhikatvāddhi manasaḥ saṃkalpasmṛtyādipratyayairabhivyajyate brahma, viṣayīkriyamāṇamiva| ataḥ sa eṣa brahmaṇo'dhyātmamādeśaḥ|
vidyunnimeṣaṇavadadhidaivataṃ drutaprakāśanadharmi, adhyātmaṃ ca manaḥpratyayasamakālābhivyaktidharmi--ityeṣa ādeśaḥ| evamādiśyamānaṃ hi brahma mandabuddhigamyaṃ bhavatīti brahmaṇa ādeśopadeśaḥ| na hi nirupādhikameva brahma mandabuddhibhirākalayituṃ śakyam ||

Atha, after this; is being told the analogical instruction adhyātmam, in the context of the soul, with regard to the indwelling Self. Yat etat, that which is a known fact, viz that etat, to this Brahman; gacchati iva ca manaḥ, as though the mind goes, as though the mind enters into Brahman, encompasses It as an object. And the fact that anena, by that mind; the spiritual aspirant; abhīkṣṇam, repeatedly, upasmarati, remembers intimately; etat, this Brahman; and the saṅkalpaḥ, thought of the mind with regard to Brahman. Since Brahman has got the mind as Its limiting adjunct, It seems to be revealed by such states of the mind as thought, memory, etc., by which It seems to be objectified. Therefore, this is an instruction about Brahman, through analogy, in the context of the soul. In the divine context, Brahman has the attribute of revealing Itself quickly like lightning and winking;footnote{"The winking of the eye is rapid—this is well known; similar is Brahman's power of acting quickly. Its attribute in the divine context is the power to act quickly with regard to creation etc., since there is an absence of obstruction and effort. ... The light of lightning covers the whole world at once, similarly Brahman is surpassingly bright by nature, It accomplishes creation etc. of everything quickly, and It is possessed of supreme glory."—A.G.} and in the context of the soul, It has the attribute of manifesting Itself simultaneously with the states of the mind.footnote{"One should meditate thus: 'Towards this Brahman, that is of the nature of light, my mind proceeds and there it rests.' The instruction in this form is the instruction in the context of the individual soul. The indwelling Brahman becomes revealed to one who meditates thus: 'The thoughts in my mind constantly revolve round Brahman.'"—A.G.} This is the instruction about Brahman through analogy. The need for this teaching about Brahman through analogy is that It becomes easily comprehensible to people of dull intellect when instruction is thus imparted. For the unconditioned Brahman, as such, cannot be comprehended by people of dull intellect.

4.6

kiṃ ca--
1.4.6
taddha tadvanaṃ nāma tadvanamityupāsitavyaṃ sa ya etadevaṃ vedābhi hainam̐ sarvāṇi bhūtāni saṃvāñchanti ||

Tat, that Brahman; is ha, certainly; tadvanam nāma: tadvanam is derived from the words tasya, his, and vanam, adorable; It is adorable to all creatures, since It is their in-dwelling Self. Therefore Brahman is tadvanam nāma, well known as the one to be adored by all beings. Since it is tadvana, therefore tadvanam iti, through this name, tadvana, which is indicative of Its quality; It is upāsitavyam, to be meditated on. The text states the results of meditation through this name; saḥ yaḥ, anyone that; veda meditates on; etat, the aforesaid Brahman; evam, thus, as possessed of the qualities mentioned above; sarvāṇi bhūtāni, all beings; ha, certainly; enam, to him, this meditator; abhisaṁvāñchanti, pray, as (they do) to Brahman.

4.6-2

tad brahma ha kila tadvanaṃ nāma tasya vanaṃ tadvanaṃ tasya praṇijātasya pratyagātmabhūtatvādvanaṃ vananīyaṃ saṃbhajanīyam| ataḥ tadvanaṃ nāma, prakhyātaṃ brahma tadvanamiti yataḥ, tasmāt tadvanamiti anenaiva guṇābhidhānena upāsitavyaṃ cintanīyam|
anena nāmnopāsanasya phalamāha| sa yaḥ kaścid etad yathoktaṃ brahma evaṃ yathoktaguṇaṃ veda upāste abhi ha enam upāsakaṃ sarvāṇi bhūtāni abhi saṃvāñchanti ha prārthayanta eva yathā brahma ||

Tat, that Brahman; is ha, certainly; tadvanam nāma: tadvanam is derived from the words tasya, his, and vanam, adorable; It is adorable to all creatures, since It is their in-dwelling Self. Therefore Brahman is tadvanam nāma, well known as the one to be adored by all beings. Since it is tadvana, therefore tadvanam iti, through this name, tadvana, which is indicative of Its quality; It is upāsitavyam, to be meditated on. The text states the results of meditation through this name; saḥ yaḥ, anyone that; veda meditates on; etat, the aforesaid Brahman; evam, thus, as possessed of the qualities mentioned above; sarvāṇi bhūtāni, all beings; ha, certainly; enam, to him, this meditator; abhisaṁvāñchanti, pray, as (they do) to Brahman.

4.7

evamanuśiṣṭaḥ śiṣya ācāryamuvāca--
1.4.7
upaniṣadaṃ bho brūhītyuktā ta upaniṣad brāhmī vāva ta upaniṣadamabrūmeti ||

After being instructed thus, the disciple said to the teacher, "Bhoḥ, sir; brūhi, speak of; upaniṣadam, the secret thing, that is to be thought about." iti. To the student who had spoken thus, the teacher said, te, to you; upaniṣat, the secret knowledge; uktā, has been spoken of. "What is that, again?"—to such a question he answers, "Te, to you; upaniṣadam vāva abrūma iti, I have spoken the very secret; brāhmīm, relating to Brahman, to the supreme Self—since the knowledge already imparted relates to the supreme Self." For the sake of (distinguishing) what follows, the teacher delimits (his teaching) thus: "The Upaniṣad that I have told you consists of nothing but what has already been presented as the Upaniṣad of the supreme Self."

Objection: What motive could have prompted the disciple, who had heard the Upaniṣad about the supreme Self to put this question: "Sir, speak of the Upaniṣad"? If, now, the question related to what had been already heard, then it is useless, inasmuch as it involved a repetition like the grinding over again of what had already been ground. If, again, the earlier Upaniṣad was incomplete, then it was not proper to conclude it by mentioning its result thus: "Having turned away from this world, the intelligent ones become immortal" (Ke. II. 5). Hence the question is improper even if it relates to some unexplained portion of the Upaniṣad already presented, inasmuch as no remainder was left over. What then is the intention of the question?

Answer: We say that this is the intention (of the disciple): "Does the secret teaching already imparted need any accessory, or does it not need any? If it does, tell me of the secret teaching with regard to that needed accessory. Or if it does not, then like Pippalāda make the clenching assertion: 'There is nothing beyond this' (Pr. VI. 7)." Thus this clencher of the teacher, "I have told you the Upaniṣad" is justified.

Objection: May it not be urged that this is not a concluding remark, inasmuch as the teacher has something more to add in the statement: "Concentration, cessation from sense-objects, rites, etc. are its legs" etc. (Ke. IV. 8).

Answer: It is true that a fresh matter is introduced by the teacher; but this is not done either by way of bringing in something as an attributive constituent (śeṣa) of the Upaniṣad or as an accessory (sahakārī) to it,footnote{"By the word śeṣa is implied an attributive part contributing to the production of the effect (of the main rite). By the word sahakārī is implied something that need not necessarily be a constituent, but can be combined (with the principal rite)."—A.G. Both have a bearing on the result.} but rather as a means for the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman, because tapas (concentration) etc., occurring as they do in the same passage along with the Vedas and their supplementaries, are given an equal status with the latter, and because neither the Vedas nor the science of pronunciation and euphony (śikṣā) etc., which are their supplementaries, can directly by either attributive constituents of the knowledge of Brahman or its helpful accessories.

Objection: Should not even things that occur in the same passage be put to separate uses according to their appropriateness? Just as the mantras, occurring at the end of a sacrifice, in the form of a hymn meant for the invocation of (many) deities, are applied with respect to the (individual) deities concerned, similarly it can be imagined that concentration, self-control, rites, truth, etc., will either be attributive constituents of the knowledge of Brahman or be helpful accessories (in accordance with their respective appropriateness).footnote{“At the end of all sacrifices, the deities are invoked with the hymn beginning with:} As for the Vedas and their subsidiaries, they are means for either knowledge or rites by virtue of their respective meanings (ideas). In this way this division becomes appropriate when significance of words, relation (of things denoted), and reason are taken into consideration. Suppose we advance such an argument?

Answer: No, because this is illogical. This division does not certainly accord with facts, because it is not reasonable that the knowledge of Brahman, which repels all ideas of distinction of deeds, doers, and results, should have dependence on any attributive constituent, or any relation with any helpful accessory, and because the knowledge of Brahman and its result, freedom, are concerned only with the Self which is unassociated with any object. “He who wants emancipation should for ever give up all works together with their instruments, because it is known only by the man of renunciation. The state of the supreme Reality that is the same as the indwelling Self is attained by the man of renunciation.” Therefore knowledge cannot reasonably have work either as an accessory or as a complement. Therefore the division (of concentration etc.) on the analogy of the invocation through hymn, occurring at the

end of a sacrifice, is quite inappropriate. Hence it is proper to say that the question and the answer are meant for fixing a limit thus: "The secret teaching that has been imparted extends thus far only; it is adequate for the attainment of knowledge without depending on anything else."

After being instructed thus, the disciple said to the teacher, "Bhoḥ, sir; brūhi, speak of; upaniṣadam, the secret thing, that is to be thought about." iti. To the student who had spoken thus, the teacher said, te, to you; upaniṣat, the secret knowledge; uktā, has been spoken of. "What is that, again?"—to such a question he answers, "Te, to you; upaniṣadam vāva abrūma iti, I have spoken the very secret; brāhmīm, relating to Brahman, to the supreme Self—since the knowledge already imparted relates to the supreme Self." For the sake of (distinguishing) what follows, the teacher delimits (his teaching) thus: "The Upaniṣad that I have told you consists of nothing but what has already been presented as the Upaniṣad of the supreme Self."

4.7.p1

upaniṣadaṃ rahasyaṃ yaccintyaṃ bho bhagavan brūhi iti|

After being instructed thus, the disciple said to the teacher, "Bhoḥ, sir; brūhi, speak of; upaniṣadam, the secret thing, that is to be thought about." iti. To the student who had spoken thus, the teacher said, te, to you; upaniṣat, the secret knowledge; uktā, has been spoken of. "What is that, again?"—to such a question he answers, "Te, to you; upaniṣadam vāva abrūma iti, I have spoken the very secret; brāhmīm, relating to Brahman, to the supreme Self—since the knowledge already imparted relates to the supreme Self." For the sake of (distinguishing) what follows, the teacher delimits (his teaching) thus: "The Upaniṣad that I have told you consists of nothing but what has already been presented as the Upaniṣad of the supreme Self."

Objection: What motive could have prompted the disciple, who had heard the Upaniṣad about the supreme Self to put this question: "Sir, speak of the Upaniṣad"? If, now, the question related to what had been already heard, then it is useless, inasmuch as it involved a repetition like the grinding over again of what had already been ground. If, again, the earlier Upaniṣad was incomplete, then it was not proper to conclude it by mentioning its result thus: "Having turned away from this world, the intelligent ones become immortal" (Ke. II. 5). Hence the question is improper even if it relates to some unexplained portion of the Upaniṣad already presented, inasmuch as no remainder was left over. What then is the intention of the question?

Answer: We say that this is the intention (of the disciple): "Does the secret teaching already imparted need any accessory, or does it not need any? If it does, tell me of the secret teaching with regard to that needed accessory. Or if it does not, then like Pippalāda make the clenching assertion: 'There is nothing beyond this' (Pr. VI. 7)." Thus this clencher of the teacher, "I have told you the Upaniṣad" is justified.

Objection: May it not be urged that this is not a concluding remark, inasmuch as the teacher has something more to add in the statement: "Concentration, cessation from sense-objects, rites, etc. are its legs" etc. (Ke. IV. 8).

Answer: It is true that a fresh matter is introduced by the teacher; but this is not done either by way of bringing in something as an attributive constituent (śeṣa) of the Upaniṣad or as an accessory (sahakārī) to it,footnote{"By the word śeṣa is implied an attributive part contributing to the production of the effect (of the main rite). By the word sahakārī is implied something that need not necessarily be a constituent, but can be combined (with the principal rite)."—A.G. Both have a bearing on the result.} but rather as a means for the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman, because tapas (concentration) etc., occurring as they do in the same passage along with the Vedas and their supplementaries, are given an equal status with the latter, and because neither the Vedas nor the science of pronunciation and euphony (śikṣā) etc., which are their supplementaries, can directly by either attributive constituents of the knowledge of Brahman or its helpful accessories.

Objection: Should not even things that occur in the same passage be put to separate uses according to their appropriateness? Just as the mantras, occurring at the end of a sacrifice, in the form of a hymn meant for the invocation of (many) deities, are applied with respect to the (individual) deities concerned, similarly it can be imagined that concentration, self-control, rites, truth, etc., will either be attributive constituents of the knowledge of Brahman or be helpful accessories (in accordance with their respective appropriateness).footnote{“At the end of all sacrifices, the deities are invoked with the hymn beginning with:} As for the Vedas and their subsidiaries, they are means for either knowledge or rites by virtue of their respective meanings (ideas). In this way this division becomes appropriate when significance of words, relation (of things denoted), and reason are taken into consideration. Suppose we advance such an argument?

Answer: No, because this is illogical. This division does not certainly accord with facts, because it is not reasonable that the knowledge of Brahman, which repels all ideas of distinction of deeds, doers, and results, should have dependence on any attributive constituent, or any relation with any helpful accessory, and because the knowledge of Brahman and its result, freedom, are concerned only with the Self which is unassociated with any object. “He who wants emancipation should for ever give up all works together with their instruments, because it is known only by the man of renunciation. The state of the supreme Reality that is the same as the indwelling Self is attained by the man of renunciation.” Therefore knowledge cannot reasonably have work either as an accessory or as a complement. Therefore the division (of concentration etc.) on the analogy of the invocation through hymn, occurring at the

end of a sacrifice, is quite inappropriate. Hence it is proper to say that the question and the answer are meant for fixing a limit thus: "The secret teaching that has been imparted extends thus far only; it is adequate for the attainment of knowledge without depending on anything else."

4.7.p2

evamuktavati śiṣye āhācāryaḥ uktā ābhihitā te tava upaniṣat| kā punaḥ setyāha--brāhmīṃ brāhmaṇaḥ paramātmana iyaṃ brāhmīṃ tām, paramātmaviṣayatvādatītavijñānasya, vāva eva te upaniṣadamabrūmeti uktāmeva paramātmaviṣayāmupaniṣadamabrūmetyavadhārayatyuttarārtham|

After being instructed thus, the disciple said to the teacher, "Bhoḥ, sir; brūhi, speak of; upaniṣadam, the secret thing, that is to be thought about." iti. To the student who had spoken thus, the teacher said, te, to you; upaniṣat, the secret knowledge; uktā, has been spoken of. "What is that, again?"—to such a question he answers, "Te, to you; upaniṣadam vāva abrūma iti, I have spoken the very secret; brāhmīm, relating to Brahman, to the supreme Self—since the knowledge already imparted relates to the supreme Self." For the sake of (distinguishing) what follows, the teacher delimits (his teaching) thus: "The Upaniṣad that I have told you consists of nothing but what has already been presented as the Upaniṣad of the supreme Self."

Objection: What motive could have prompted the disciple, who had heard the Upaniṣad about the supreme Self to put this question: "Sir, speak of the Upaniṣad"? If, now, the question related to what had been already heard, then it is useless, inasmuch as it involved a repetition like the grinding over again of what had already been ground. If, again, the earlier Upaniṣad was incomplete, then it was not proper to conclude it by mentioning its result thus: "Having turned away from this world, the intelligent ones become immortal" (Ke. II. 5). Hence the question is improper even if it relates to some unexplained portion of the Upaniṣad already presented, inasmuch as no remainder was left over. What then is the intention of the question?

Answer: We say that this is the intention (of the disciple): "Does the secret teaching already imparted need any accessory, or does it not need any? If it does, tell me of the secret teaching with regard to that needed accessory. Or if it does not, then like Pippalāda make the clenching assertion: 'There is nothing beyond this' (Pr. VI. 7)." Thus this clencher of the teacher, "I have told you the Upaniṣad" is justified.

Objection: May it not be urged that this is not a concluding remark, inasmuch as the teacher has something more to add in the statement: "Concentration, cessation from sense-objects, rites, etc. are its legs" etc. (Ke. IV. 8).

Answer: It is true that a fresh matter is introduced by the teacher; but this is not done either by way of bringing in something as an attributive constituent (śeṣa) of the Upaniṣad or as an accessory (sahakārī) to it,footnote{"By the word śeṣa is implied an attributive part contributing to the production of the effect (of the main rite). By the word sahakārī is implied something that need not necessarily be a constituent, but can be combined (with the principal rite)."—A.G. Both have a bearing on the result.} but rather as a means for the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman, because tapas (concentration) etc., occurring as they do in the same passage along with the Vedas and their supplementaries, are given an equal status with the latter, and because neither the Vedas nor the science of pronunciation and euphony (śikṣā) etc., which are their supplementaries, can directly by either attributive constituents of the knowledge of Brahman or its helpful accessories.

Objection: Should not even things that occur in the same passage be put to separate uses according to their appropriateness? Just as the mantras, occurring at the end of a sacrifice, in the form of a hymn meant for the invocation of (many) deities, are applied with respect to the (individual) deities concerned, similarly it can be imagined that concentration, self-control, rites, truth, etc., will either be attributive constituents of the knowledge of Brahman or be helpful accessories (in accordance with their respective appropriateness).footnote{“At the end of all sacrifices, the deities are invoked with the hymn beginning with:} As for the Vedas and their subsidiaries, they are means for either knowledge or rites by virtue of their respective meanings (ideas). In this way this division becomes appropriate when significance of words, relation (of things denoted), and reason are taken into consideration. Suppose we advance such an argument?

Answer: No, because this is illogical. This division does not certainly accord with facts, because it is not reasonable that the knowledge of Brahman, which repels all ideas of distinction of deeds, doers, and results, should have dependence on any attributive constituent, or any relation with any helpful accessory, and because the knowledge of Brahman and its result, freedom, are concerned only with the Self which is unassociated with any object. “He who wants emancipation should for ever give up all works together with their instruments, because it is known only by the man of renunciation. The state of the supreme Reality that is the same as the indwelling Self is attained by the man of renunciation.” Therefore knowledge cannot reasonably have work either as an accessory or as a complement. Therefore the division (of concentration etc.) on the analogy of the invocation through hymn, occurring at the

end of a sacrifice, is quite inappropriate. Hence it is proper to say that the question and the answer are meant for fixing a limit thus: "The secret teaching that has been imparted extends thus far only; it is adequate for the attainment of knowledge without depending on anything else."

4.7.p3

paramātmaviṣayāmupaniṣadaṃ śrutavataḥ upaniṣadaṃ bho brūhīti pṛcchataḥ śiṣyasya ko'bhiprāyaḥ ? yadi tadavacchutasyārthasya praśnaḥ kṛtaḥ, tataḥ piṣṭapeṣaṇavatpunarukto'narthakaḥ praśnaḥ syāt| atha sāvaśeṣoktopaniṣatsyāt, tatastasyāḥ phalavacanenopasaṃhāro na yuktaḥ "pretyāsmāllokādamṛtā bhavanti" (ke.u.2/5) iti| tasmāduktopaniṣaccheṣaviṣayo'pi praśne'nupapanna eva, anavaśeṣitatvāt| kastarhyabhiprāyaḥ praṣṭurityucyate--

After being instructed thus, the disciple said to the teacher, "Bhoḥ, sir; brūhi, speak of; upaniṣadam, the secret thing, that is to be thought about." iti. To the student who had spoken thus, the teacher said, te, to you; upaniṣat, the secret knowledge; uktā, has been spoken of. "What is that, again?"—to such a question he answers, "Te, to you; upaniṣadam vāva abrūma iti, I have spoken the very secret; brāhmīm, relating to Brahman, to the supreme Self—since the knowledge already imparted relates to the supreme Self." For the sake of (distinguishing) what follows, the teacher delimits (his teaching) thus: "The Upaniṣad that I have told you consists of nothing but what has already been presented as the Upaniṣad of the supreme Self."

Objection: What motive could have prompted the disciple, who had heard the Upaniṣad about the supreme Self to put this question: "Sir, speak of the Upaniṣad"? If, now, the question related to what had been already heard, then it is useless, inasmuch as it involved a repetition like the grinding over again of what had already been ground. If, again, the earlier Upaniṣad was incomplete, then it was not proper to conclude it by mentioning its result thus: "Having turned away from this world, the intelligent ones become immortal" (Ke. II. 5). Hence the question is improper even if it relates to some unexplained portion of the Upaniṣad already presented, inasmuch as no remainder was left over. What then is the intention of the question?

Answer: We say that this is the intention (of the disciple): "Does the secret teaching already imparted need any accessory, or does it not need any? If it does, tell me of the secret teaching with regard to that needed accessory. Or if it does not, then like Pippalāda make the clenching assertion: 'There is nothing beyond this' (Pr. VI. 7)." Thus this clencher of the teacher, "I have told you the Upaniṣad" is justified.

Objection: May it not be urged that this is not a concluding remark, inasmuch as the teacher has something more to add in the statement: "Concentration, cessation from sense-objects, rites, etc. are its legs" etc. (Ke. IV. 8).

Answer: It is true that a fresh matter is introduced by the teacher; but this is not done either by way of bringing in something as an attributive constituent (śeṣa) of the Upaniṣad or as an accessory (sahakārī) to it,footnote{"By the word śeṣa is implied an attributive part contributing to the production of the effect (of the main rite). By the word sahakārī is implied something that need not necessarily be a constituent, but can be combined (with the principal rite)."—A.G. Both have a bearing on the result.} but rather as a means for the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman, because tapas (concentration) etc., occurring as they do in the same passage along with the Vedas and their supplementaries, are given an equal status with the latter, and because neither the Vedas nor the science of pronunciation and euphony (śikṣā) etc., which are their supplementaries, can directly by either attributive constituents of the knowledge of Brahman or its helpful accessories.

Objection: Should not even things that occur in the same passage be put to separate uses according to their appropriateness? Just as the mantras, occurring at the end of a sacrifice, in the form of a hymn meant for the invocation of (many) deities, are applied with respect to the (individual) deities concerned, similarly it can be imagined that concentration, self-control, rites, truth, etc., will either be attributive constituents of the knowledge of Brahman or be helpful accessories (in accordance with their respective appropriateness).footnote{“At the end of all sacrifices, the deities are invoked with the hymn beginning with:} As for the Vedas and their subsidiaries, they are means for either knowledge or rites by virtue of their respective meanings (ideas). In this way this division becomes appropriate when significance of words, relation (of things denoted), and reason are taken into consideration. Suppose we advance such an argument?

Answer: No, because this is illogical. This division does not certainly accord with facts, because it is not reasonable that the knowledge of Brahman, which repels all ideas of distinction of deeds, doers, and results, should have dependence on any attributive constituent, or any relation with any helpful accessory, and because the knowledge of Brahman and its result, freedom, are concerned only with the Self which is unassociated with any object. “He who wants emancipation should for ever give up all works together with their instruments, because it is known only by the man of renunciation. The state of the supreme Reality that is the same as the indwelling Self is attained by the man of renunciation.” Therefore knowledge cannot reasonably have work either as an accessory or as a complement. Therefore the division (of concentration etc.) on the analogy of the invocation through hymn, occurring at the

end of a sacrifice, is quite inappropriate. Hence it is proper to say that the question and the answer are meant for fixing a limit thus: "The secret teaching that has been imparted extends thus far only; it is adequate for the attainment of knowledge without depending on anything else."

Objection: What motive could have prompted the disciple, who had heard the Upaniṣad about the supreme Self to put this question: "Sir, speak of the Upaniṣad"? If, now, the question related to what had been already heard, then it is useless, inasmuch as it involved a repetition like the grinding over again of what had already been ground. If, again, the earlier Upaniṣad was incomplete, then it was not proper to conclude it by mentioning its result thus: "Having turned away from this world, the intelligent ones become immortal" (Ke. II. 5). Hence the question is improper even if it relates to some unexplained portion of the Upaniṣad already presented, inasmuch as no remainder was left over. What then is the intention of the question?

4.7.p4

kiṃ pūrvoktopaniṣaccheṣatayā tatsahakārisādhanāntarāpekṣā, atha nirapekṣaiva| sāpekṣā cedapekṣitaviṣayāmupaniṣadaṃ brūhi| atha nirapekṣā cedavadhāraya pippalādavannātaḥ paramastītyevamabhiprāyaḥ| etadupapannamācāryasyāvadhāraṇavacanam ’uktā ta upaniṣat’ iti|

After being instructed thus, the disciple said to the teacher, "Bhoḥ, sir; brūhi, speak of; upaniṣadam, the secret thing, that is to be thought about." iti. To the student who had spoken thus, the teacher said, te, to you; upaniṣat, the secret knowledge; uktā, has been spoken of. "What is that, again?"—to such a question he answers, "Te, to you; upaniṣadam vāva abrūma iti, I have spoken the very secret; brāhmīm, relating to Brahman, to the supreme Self—since the knowledge already imparted relates to the supreme Self." For the sake of (distinguishing) what follows, the teacher delimits (his teaching) thus: "The Upaniṣad that I have told you consists of nothing but what has already been presented as the Upaniṣad of the supreme Self."

Objection: What motive could have prompted the disciple, who had heard the Upaniṣad about the supreme Self to put this question: "Sir, speak of the Upaniṣad"? If, now, the question related to what had been already heard, then it is useless, inasmuch as it involved a repetition like the grinding over again of what had already been ground. If, again, the earlier Upaniṣad was incomplete, then it was not proper to conclude it by mentioning its result thus: "Having turned away from this world, the intelligent ones become immortal" (Ke. II. 5). Hence the question is improper even if it relates to some unexplained portion of the Upaniṣad already presented, inasmuch as no remainder was left over. What then is the intention of the question?

Answer: We say that this is the intention (of the disciple): "Does the secret teaching already imparted need any accessory, or does it not need any? If it does, tell me of the secret teaching with regard to that needed accessory. Or if it does not, then like Pippalāda make the clenching assertion: 'There is nothing beyond this' (Pr. VI. 7)." Thus this clencher of the teacher, "I have told you the Upaniṣad" is justified.

Objection: May it not be urged that this is not a concluding remark, inasmuch as the teacher has something more to add in the statement: "Concentration, cessation from sense-objects, rites, etc. are its legs" etc. (Ke. IV. 8).

Answer: It is true that a fresh matter is introduced by the teacher; but this is not done either by way of bringing in something as an attributive constituent (śeṣa) of the Upaniṣad or as an accessory (sahakārī) to it,footnote{"By the word śeṣa is implied an attributive part contributing to the production of the effect (of the main rite). By the word sahakārī is implied something that need not necessarily be a constituent, but can be combined (with the principal rite)."—A.G. Both have a bearing on the result.} but rather as a means for the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman, because tapas (concentration) etc., occurring as they do in the same passage along with the Vedas and their supplementaries, are given an equal status with the latter, and because neither the Vedas nor the science of pronunciation and euphony (śikṣā) etc., which are their supplementaries, can directly by either attributive constituents of the knowledge of Brahman or its helpful accessories.

Objection: Should not even things that occur in the same passage be put to separate uses according to their appropriateness? Just as the mantras, occurring at the end of a sacrifice, in the form of a hymn meant for the invocation of (many) deities, are applied with respect to the (individual) deities concerned, similarly it can be imagined that concentration, self-control, rites, truth, etc., will either be attributive constituents of the knowledge of Brahman or be helpful accessories (in accordance with their respective appropriateness).footnote{“At the end of all sacrifices, the deities are invoked with the hymn beginning with:} As for the Vedas and their subsidiaries, they are means for either knowledge or rites by virtue of their respective meanings (ideas). In this way this division becomes appropriate when significance of words, relation (of things denoted), and reason are taken into consideration. Suppose we advance such an argument?

Answer: No, because this is illogical. This division does not certainly accord with facts, because it is not reasonable that the knowledge of Brahman, which repels all ideas of distinction of deeds, doers, and results, should have dependence on any attributive constituent, or any relation with any helpful accessory, and because the knowledge of Brahman and its result, freedom, are concerned only with the Self which is unassociated with any object. “He who wants emancipation should for ever give up all works together with their instruments, because it is known only by the man of renunciation. The state of the supreme Reality that is the same as the indwelling Self is attained by the man of renunciation.” Therefore knowledge cannot reasonably have work either as an accessory or as a complement. Therefore the division (of concentration etc.) on the analogy of the invocation through hymn, occurring at the

end of a sacrifice, is quite inappropriate. Hence it is proper to say that the question and the answer are meant for fixing a limit thus: "The secret teaching that has been imparted extends thus far only; it is adequate for the attainment of knowledge without depending on anything else."

Answer: We say that this is the intention (of the disciple): "Does the secret teaching already imparted need any accessory, or does it not need any? If it does, tell me of the secret teaching with regard to that needed accessory. Or if it does not, then like Pippalāda make the clenching assertion: 'There is nothing beyond this' (Pr. VI. 7)." Thus this clencher of the teacher, "I have told you the Upaniṣad" is justified.