Praudhamanorama 12_264

12_264

On this point, this must be stated: the claim that "the ākam must belong to that ām which would have suṭ following it" is already refuted, because what is removed by ākam has no connection with suṭ. If it is said that "suṭ comes after ākam," then it would merely serve as an indicator for that [ākam]. If it is argued that it serves as an indicator for the original element through an indirect relation mediated by the substitute—alas, then in forms like yuṣmākam, suṭ would be heard! If it is argued that it is not heard on the strength of the explicit enunciation "sāmaḥ," that is not so, because the enunciation has fulfilled its purpose by excluding secondary usage, and thus possesses no such special force. Moreover, as to the objection raised regarding its being enjoined by subordination when embarking on an aggregate dvandva, the assertion of that [objection] is also untenable. All that remains is the claim that, because simultaneity is intended to be expressed, [the substitute] cannot apply to the bare ām. Even that is not so; for in the derivational stage, the simultaneity of ām (which is already present) and suṭ (which is conceived of as occurring at a subsequent time) is accepted solely through being grasped by a single cognition—just as in the expression "he is the seer of past and future things." If it is objected that there, both are connected with a single act of seeing, then here too both are connected with a single substitute, so the case is identical. And similarly, in the source text under the rule "irayoḥ," it is established that in forms such as dadhre, when irec replaces the jha of dhāñ, the ā is elided, and the r-substitute is applied, and then—since that [r-substitute] has fulfilled its purpose in kṛ, sṛ, bhṛ, and so forth—when iṭ has been applied, the r-substitute is made again even to an element produced by grammatical operation, on the strength of the dual enunciation "irayoḥ." The form irayoḥ is a single remainder, whereas sāmaḥ is a dvandva compound; but the intention to express simultaneity is identical in both.
In truth, however, in the rule "sāma ākam," even the bare ām is enunciated by way of a single utterance serving multiple purposes. To that [bare ām], ākam applies; and since [the resulting form] has the nature of ām by transfer of properties from the original element, and possesses suṭ, the rule "sāmaḥ" [subsequently] applies. But in a secondary sense, [the derivational process] concludes with the very first application. For this very reason, identity of result with the view of elision of the remainder and ti-elision is also accomplished. In every way, one should not insist on defending the forms atitvayām and atimayām imagined by some scholars; for forms such as atitvākama and atimākam were explicitly cited by none other than the Bhāṣyakāra. This is the general direction.