Praudhamanorama p146

p146

If it is objected: even so, let it be for the sake of an original rule in the case of a semantically unconnected compound that is meaningless like "daśadāḍima" ('ten pomegranates') and the like? No, because the continuation of "arthavat" has already been stated. If it is asked: how then is there technical name [status] in an unconnected compound? understand that it is derived from the very authority establishing the entity. For by "asūryalalāṭayoḥ—" the affix khaś is ordained when the word asūrya is an upapada. And an upapada is a pada uttered nearby, and a pada ends in sup or tiṅ. He states the body of the restriction: "where in a combination..." and so on. "The prior part" is an elliptical indicator; it should be understood that the latter part is also not an affix. Otherwise, in cases like janmavān, the technical name would not apply, since the mention of taddhita would already have fulfilled its purpose in aupagava and the like. Why say: "the prior part is a pada"? So that the technical name prātipadika may apply to that which is qualified by bahuc. By this, in bahupaṭavaḥ, upon the elision of the first jas, and then with the accent of cit for the word bahupaṭu, when jas occurs again, the condition of having the acute accent on the penultimate syllable is accomplished. Alternatively, let the restriction pertain to a combination that has not entered the relation of base and affix. Nor can it be said that under the first alternative, in rājapuruṣau and the like, the technical name would apply to puruṣau and so forth; for this is prevented by the very requirement of being meaningful. For the meaning of the affix connects only with the qualified [whole], and not with the mere meaning of the subsequent member, by which puruṣau would be meaningful. He states the fruit of the restriction: "By this..." and so on. If it is objected: even so, in mūlakenopadaṃśam and the like, the technical name for the sentence is unavoidable, because when a kṛt is mentioned, that which is preceded by a gati or kāraka is also comprehended? Do not say so; because it is set aside by the restriction made by the mention of samāsa, on account of its being subsequent. And thus, the truth is that in the rule "kṛttaddhita—", the metarule concerning the mention of a kṛt does not present itself at all, because it would be purposeless. As for what some say: the mention of samāsa is not for the sake of a restriction, but is rather an original rule; for being meaningful is possessing signification (vṛtti), and signification is twofold—expressive power and secondary indication, and neither exists in a compound—on this, it must be said: In the established conclusion, because the unification of meanings is accepted, the claim that signification does not exist is completely refuted. Even in the Mīmāṃsaka view, secondary indication certainly exists. As they say: