Praudhamanorama p151

p151

As for another view put forward by an older commentator, namely that single remainder applies to items that already possess case endings—that is incorrect; because even though the departing items would disappear along with their case endings, there would be the undesirable consequence that the singular case ending would be heard after the remaining one.
Now, if it is said: when there is expression of multiple substrates simultaneously (yugapadadhikaraṇavacanatā), the single remainder is of forms ending in dual and plural endings; dvandva is also like this; for, in an integration that does not abandon its own meaning (ajahatsvārthā vṛtti), each [word] denotes multiple meanings on account of mutual co-utterance; and thus, since only dual and plural endings enter into the non-empirical analytical sentence of derivation (alaukika prakriyāvākya) of dvandva and single remainder, the position that single remainder applies to items ending in case endings is entirely unhindered. This too is incorrect, because that is impossible in an integration that abandons its own meaning (jahatsvārthā vṛtti). Even in the other position, it is impossible to discard the singular ending that was initially applied. Otherwise, the undesirable consequence of the loss of the genitive tatpuruṣa and the like would follow; for there too, because of the transfer of the prior member into the meaning of the subsequent member, a genitive ending and the like would be impossible. And so says the Mahābhāṣya: "This expression of multiple substrates simultaneously is both troublesome and difficult to establish."
As for what they also explained—namely, that in the view of the individual (vyaktipakṣa), when the usage of each individual word would apply to as many individuals as there are, the rule is so that there may be the usage of only one; but in the view of the generic form (ākṛtipakṣa), since multiple individuals inseparable from the generic form are obtained by just one [word], [the rule] is useless—that is incorrect. Even in the view of the individual, in [such sentences as] "One should not kill a brāhmaṇa," multiple [individuals] can easily be stated by a single word "brāhmaṇa" through a single utterance serving multiple purposes (tantra). Otherwise, even in the view of the universal (jātipakṣa), without the rule, [the matter] could not be settled in view of different meanings in cases like "vāsena samyakkṣamayośca tasmin" and so forth. Therefore, even though in both the view of the universal and the view of the individual [the matter] could be settled by usage through tantra, since there is no determining principle that [meaning] must be conveyed only through tantra everywhere, an occasional dvandva would be unavoidable without the rule; for, since the usage of multiple words is observed in "this is a pot, this is a pot," a dvandva such as "ghaṭaghaṭau" would be arrived at by logical reasoning just like that. Nor should it be said that even so, a dvandva such as "ghaṭakalaśau" would result; because of the vārttika "virūpāṇāmapi samānārthānām" (even of dissimilar forms having the same meaning); and because, by relying on the word 'rūpa' denoting meaning through the etymology "it is formed, i.e., made known" (rūpyate = bodhyate), the meaning of the vārttika is also embraced by the rule itself. Therefore, it should be understood that the rule is necessary in both positions in order to prevent an occasional undesirable [compound] such as "ghaṭaghaṭau" or "ghaṭakalaśau".
This being so, keeping in mind the sheer uselessness of the rule, when they explained here: "single remainder is not enjoined by this [rule]," and so forth; and when, having rejected the view that [a single case ending is introduced] after the aggregate when there is a single case ending, they said again: "when 'rāma rāma au' is situated; this is conceived as a non-empirical analytical sentence of derivation (alaukika prakriyāvākya), not an empirical one; and in a non-empirical one, operations like case endings and single substitutes do not apply, because explanation is given only of words already in use," and so forth—all that is contrary to the context and contrary to logical reasoning. For it is precisely to explain words already in use that the non-empirical [sentence] is postulated. And every grammatical operation applies only in non-empirical [stages], not in the fully formed word (pariniṣṭhita); because without the application of [rules such as] "prathamayoḥ pūrvasavarṇaḥ" (6.1.102), the fully formed shape cannot be attained, and because its application to a fully formed word is difficult to establish. Let this stand for now.