India as Known to Panini: A Study of the Cultural Material in the Ashtadhyayi c10.s3.t1.131

c10.s3.t1.131

Pāṇini's view on the subject represents a synthesis. Kātyāyana and Patañjali state that Pāṇini regarded the *Uṇādi* formations as not derived from any root and suffix (*avyutpanna prātipadika*; *Prātipadika-vijñanāchcha Pāṇineḥ siddham*, VII.1.2.5; III.241, *Uṇādayo' vyutpannāni prātipadikāni*). Words of regular derivation from verbs and suffix form the subject of Pāṇini's *Kṛidanta* section. Others which do not admit of such regular analysis and derivation were considered by him to belong to the *Uṇādi* class. Pāṇini's attitude towards the *Uṇādi* suffixes is one of silent approval. In the *sūtra Uṇādayo bahulam* (III.3.1) he takes a passing notice of the *Uṇādi* suffixes, but he refrains from discussing in his usual manner the characteristic features and details of the *Uṇādi* system. It appears that the *Uṇādis* were the product of the Śākaṭāyana school. To ascribe them to Pāṇini would militate against the system for which he stands. *SOURCE OF MEANING*—Kātyāyana acquaints us with two views held about the factors which give to the words their proper meaning. He says that the application of a word to a particular object rests on the root-meaning underlying it, *e.g.* *gau* is so called because it moves, but all objects which move do not get the name *gau*. Yāska uses this argument as the *pūrvapaksha* view for rejecting the derivative theory (*Nirukta*, I.12). The other reason according to Kātyāyana is the application of a word to an object as seen in popular usage (*Darshanaṁ hetuḥ*, I.2.68; I.250). We have seen that Pāṇini recognises both these views when he says that *Saṁjñā* and *Yoga* both contribute to the meanings of words in their own way (II.1.53,55). *JĀTI AND VYAKTI*—This controversy centred round the question whether a word denotes a class (*Jāti*) or an individual (*Vyakti*). As indicated by Kātyāyana, Vājapyāyana held the view that a word denotes the class, whereas Vyāḍi took the other view that it stood for the individual (*Bhāshya*, I.242; I.244). Patañjali credits Pāṇini with the reconciling of the two opposite views; *e.g.* *sūtra* I.2.58 is based on the *ākṛiti* (class) view, and *sūtra* I.2.64 on the *dravya* (individual) view of meaning (*Bhāshya*, I.6).