The Cambridge History of India, Vol. IV: The Mughul Period v4.c20.117

v4.c20.117

But all this long self-preparation and splendid vitality in one sense proved his undoing, as they naturally begot in him a self-confidence and distrust of others which urged him to order and supervise every minute detail of administration and warfare personally. This excessive interference of the head of the state kept “the men on the spot” in far-off districts in perpetual tutelage; their sense of responsibility was destroyed, initiative and rapid adaptability to a changing environment could not be developed in them, and they tended to sink into lifeless puppets. No surer means than this could have been devised for causing administrative degeneration in an extensive and diversified empire like India. Aurangzib in his latter years, like Napoleon I after the climax of Tilsit, could bear no contradiction, and his ministers became mere clerks passively registering his edicts.