The Cambridge History of India, Vol. IV: The Mughul Period v4.c20.313

v4.c20.313

Two other grave defects appeared, as early as in 1595, at the first siege of Ahmadnagar. The first was the jealousy which afterwards became so prominent a characteristic of the imperial officers that a commander would sometimes deliberately refrain from bringing to a successful conclusion a battle already more than half won or a siege which had reduced the garrison of a fortress to extremities if he perceived that another would share the credit of his success. The second was the habit of treacherous correspondence with the enemy. The constant internecine wars between the five independent Muhammadan kingdoms of the Deccan had been conducted on a most pernicious system. A campaign was regarded by the commanders on either side as an occasion for the display of diplomatic as well as of military skill, and as an opportunity for enriching themselves. This spirit appears to have infected the imperial army in the Deccan and during Aurangzīb’s quarter of a century of warfare in that region only one fortress was taken by storm. Conflicts in the field, as well as the attack and defence of fortified places, were decided by negotiations and money payments as often as by force of arms.