A History of the Mahrattas v1.c22: Chapter XV
A History of the Mahrattas v1.c22
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- v1.c22.82 — 4 parts
Chapter XV
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A.D. 1734.—I HAVE thus endeavoured to show the steps by which the Mahrattas spread themselves in Guzerat and established a footing in Malwa; their domestic policy, their affairs in regard to Berar and the Concan, now claim our attention: before we return to their operations in Malwa, or enter on the more important proceedings, which the present chapter will record.
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During the Peishwa’s absence, Kanhojee Bhonslay, the Sena Sahib Soobeh, had been accused of disobedience and confined at Satara; and Rughoojee, the son of Kanhojee’s cousin Bembajee, had been appointed to the situation of Sena Sahib Soobeh in his stead. Rughoojee had served with a small party of horse, both under his relation Kanhojee and with one of the petty Mahomedan ¹ princes in Gondwaneh; his station was too humble to bring him into general notice, but he had, in a confined sphere, distinguished himself by superior intelligence, activity, and spirit. The particulars of the intrigue by which Kanhojee Bhonslay was deprived of his title and Jagheer are not known, but from the selection of Rughoojee as his successor, agreeably to the choice of the Raja, it is probable that Bajee Rao had no share in it. Rughoojee had accompanied Shao in his excursions, and from being a very bold and expert hunter had ingratiated himself with the Raja and obtained a great ascendancy over him. Shao married him to the sister of one of his own wives, of the Sirkay family, which, except their having the same surname, and that they may possibly ² have been originally relations and rivals for the hereditary right of Patell of their village, is the only connection which can be traced between the families of Satara and Nagpoor.¹
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¹ They were originally Hindoo Polygars, and converted by Aurungzebe.
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² There is a tradition of their having been rivals in an hereditary dispute, which may have been invented to prejudice the Rajas of
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¹ [The family of the Bhoslēs, to which Sivājī belonged, took its name, in all probability, from the village or pargana of Bhose. The Bhoslēs of Nāgpur were originally Pātels of the village of Deor, in Sātāra District, but derived their name from Bhose. Beyond the fact that both families belonged originally to the Kunbī agricultural tribe and were settled in the same tract, there seems to have been no close connexion between them. Russell (Nāgpur Gazetteer, 33, 96) speaks of the name Bhoslē being ‘derived from the village Bhosāvat, near Bhosa fort in Bombay.’ The village or pargana of Bhose seems to offer the most probable origin of the name. See note, pp. 71, 72, ante.]
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On receiving the Sunnuds for Berar, Rughoojee gave a bond to maintain a body of five thousand horse for the service of the state; to pay an annual sum of nine lacks of rupees; and, exclusive of Ghas-dana, a tribute which the Sena Sahib Soobeh since the time of Raja Ram had been allowed to reserve, the half only of all other tribute, prize property, and contributions, was to be accounted for to the head of the government. He also bound himself to raise ten thousand horse when required, and to accompany the Peishwa, or to proceed to any quarter where he might be ordered.
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This arrangement was effected during the absence of Sreeput Rao Pritee Needhee, who had been sent into the Concan by the Raja. The Pritee Needhee, being the friend of Kanhojee Bhonslay, endeavoured to obtain some mitigation of his sentence and proposed that Akola and Balapoor in Berar Payeen Ghaut should be restored on condition of his maintaining two hundred horse; but it does not appear that this arrangement was carried into effect. Kanhojee was an officer of great enterprise; he had made some partial conquests in Gondwaneh, and headed one incursion into Kuttack. He died at Satara, after having lived there many years a prisoner at large.
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Whether Nizam Ool Moolk had made any preparations in consequence of these dissensions is uncertain; but Chimnajee Appa conceived, or affected to believe, that he meditated an attack. He, therefore, pitched his camp about forty miles east of Satara, leaving Peelajee Jadow with an inconsiderable body of
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Satara against the Bhonslays of Nagpoor, and prevent their desire to adopt any member of that powerful family. It is a point of honour to maintain the hereditary difference.
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horse; being the only troops at Satara, in the immediate interest of the Peishwa.
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When Bajee Rao advanced into Malwa, it was his design to engage the Raja’s mind with petty affairs in the Concan. Divisions of authority, contending factions, and the turbulent disposition of some of its inhabitants, afforded ample field, within the small tract from Goa to Bombay, for engaging and fatiguing attention; but as these authorities had also a large share in the transactions of the Bombay government during the last century, they demand, as a record of our own history, particular enumeration. Sawunt, the principal Deshmookh of Waree, occupied his hereditary territory in that quarter, but having suffered from Kanhojee Angria’s attacks, prior to the late peace between the Rajas of Satara and Kolapoor, he bore an enmity to Angria’s family ever after.
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Kanhojee Angria’s death happened about the end of the year 1728.¹ During his life, all attempts at reducing his power proved fruitless. The Bombay government, incensed at his piracies and contumelious conduct, joined with the Portuguese in an expedition against Kolabah. The land forces furnished by that nation, and three English ships of the line under Commodore Matthews² co-operated, but the attempt failed, owing to the cowardice of the Portuguese. This expedition took place in 1722, and two years afterwards the Dutch, with seven ships, two bomb vessels and a body of troops, made an attempt on Viziadroog, at that time better known by its Moghul name of Gheriah; but this attack also failed. Angria seized many English vessels, and about a year before his death took the *Darby*, a ship richly laden belonging to the East India Company. The crews of his vessels, like all Mahrattas when successful, became very daring, and his forts on the coast were considered impregnable.¹
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¹ Mahratta MSS. I am not certain of this date, as I have not observed it in the English Records.
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² [Matthews left Spithead in February 1721, and arrived in Bombay in September of the same year. The expedition was dispatched by the King’s order at the request of the East India Company which was alarmed by constant reports of piracies committed by Angria and European buccaneers. Downing (Comp. History of the Indian Wars, 1737), who accompanied the expedition as a midshipman, gives an amusing account of the behaviour of the Viceroy of Goa and the Portuguese General of the North on the occasion of the attack on Alibāg (Kolāba), and of the Commodore’s anger at their pusillanimity. (B.C.G., ii. 87–9.)]
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¹ Orme. Bruce's Annals, partly confirmed by Mahratta MSS.
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Kanhojee Angria left two legitimate and three illegitimate sons. The two former succeeded to his possessions; the elder, named Sukkajee,² remained at Kolabah, and the younger, Sumbhajee, resided at Severndroog. The elder died a short time after his father, and Sumbhajee, keeping with him the eldest of his half-brothers, appointed the other two to the charge of Kolabah. The eldest of these, Yessajee, had charge of the interior management, whilst Mannajee commanded the naval and military establishment. The latter, some time after, having quarrelled with his family, sought protection and assistance from the Portuguese; and having obtained the aid of some troops, he escaladed Kolabah and carried it sword in hand. He cruelly put out the eyes of his brother Yessajee, and confined him, for which Sumbhajee, as soon as the Portuguese retired, attacked him. Mannajee, however, having obtained aid from Bajee Rao, compelled Sumbhajee to raise the siege, and in consequence of the assistance afforded, ceded the forts of Kootla and Rajmachee to the Peishwa.³
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² [Sakojī Angria made friendly advances to the Bombay Council, and on June 21, 1733, sent envoys to Bombay with proposals for a definite peace. His early death put an end to the negotiations. (B.C.G., ii. 98.)]
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³ Mahratta MSS.
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The Seedee, who at this time was chief of Jinjeera, had held that situation for several years, with the old Moghul title of Yakoot Khan. The districts which had been placed under the Seedee's charge by Aurungzebe, including Mhar, Raigurh, Dabul, and Anjenweel, had been defended against every effort of the Mahrattas, and frequently, in consequence of their inroads, the Seedee levied contributions from Shao's districts. As force was not likely to prevail, the Pritee Needhee, Jewajee Khunde Rao Chitnees, and others of the Raja's ministers, formed schemes for ruining the Seedee by intrigue. A person named Yacoob Khan, well known in those times as one of the most daring pirates on the coast, and distinguished by his familiar appellation of Shaikjee, possessed the entire confidence of the Seedee. This man was a descendant of the Koolee Rajas of the Concan, and hereditary Patell of Goagurh. In one of the incursions of the Seedees he was, when a child, taken prisoner and bred a Mussulman. At a very early period he distinguished himself, and on getting command of a ship became as celebrated for his strategy as his bravery. The Pritee Needhee gained this Shaik Yacoob and entered into a secret treaty with him, by which he was to receive the command of the fleet, the whole of the Seedee’s possessions, with the exception of some forts, several villages in Enam, and the Surgounda¹ or two per cent. of the whole revenue of the lower Concan, from the river Penn to the boundary of the Kolapoor territory. His brother was to be appointed second in command at Raigurh, and one lack of rupees was to be distributed as a largess amongst the troops and crews of the vessels, in case of success in effecting a revolution.²
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¹ The same as Nargounda, only here confined to two, instead of three per cent. ² Original papers in possession of the Chitnees at Satara. ³ Original letters from Shao to Chimnajee, and from the Peishwa’s Mootaliq, procured from the Dawursee Swamee. Many interesting letters from the Bajee Rao and Chimnajee were lent to me by the descendants of the disciples of the Dawursee Swamee. The Swamee was a much venerated person in the country, and was the Mahapooroosh of Bajee Rao and his brother, and seems to have possessed their entire confidence. The Peishwa’s letters to the Swamee, and to his brother, detail the actions of his life, in a familiar manner, without disguise, and are quite invaluable. I was permitted to translate, but not to copy them. The originals continue in possession of the Swamee’s disciples at Dawursee, a village within a few miles of Satara. ⁴ This part of the letter is a postscript in his own handwriting.
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To aid this scheme, a force was sent into the Concan in 1733, under the Pritee Needhee, his Mootaliq Yemmajee Sewdeo, and Oodajee Chowan; the intrigues, for reasons which are not explained, were unsuccessful, but a war ensued, the effects of which fell principally upon the helpless peasantry. Little impression could be made on the Seedee’s garrisons; the Pritee Needhee after many months was finally worsted, and when encamped at Chiploon, the fort of Goelkot, although strongly garrisoned, was disgracefully surprised and taken. Chimnajee Appa incurred the Raja’s displeasure for not sending assistance to Sreeput Rao after repeated orders,³ and Shao at last told him, ‘if you do not I must go myself.’⁴ Peelajee Jadow was at length dispatched, but none of the other officers at Satara would undertake to support the Pritee Needhee, except on condition of receiving the conquered districts in Jagheer; he was, therefore, compelled to return to Satara with great loss of reputation. About this time the chief at Jinjeera died, leaving several sons, the eldest of whom, Seedee Abdoollah, was murdered by his brothers, supported by other conspirators, with the view of usurping the government in prejudice to Seedee Rehman, one of the brothers not in Jinjeera at the time of the murder, and who bore no part in the conspiracy.
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A.D. 1735.—Yacoob Khan immediately embraced the cause of Seedee Rehman and called on Shao for support, but nothing could be done until the return of Bajee Rao, who after leaving Holkar and Sindia with a large body of cavalry in Malwa, returned to the Deccan, and on crossing the Godavery, intimated to the Raja that he should march straight to Dhunda Rajepoor. All the disposable infantry were directed to join the Peishwa, and Peelajee Jadow was sent off reinforced with a body of the Pagah horse, to support Mulhar Rao Holkar in Malwa.
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Seedee Rehman and Yacoob Khan joined Bajee Rao, who commenced operations by attacking some of the forts. Futih Sing Bhonslay and the Pritee Needhee proceeded to co-operate; but the only assistance which they rendered was the recovery of Sivajee’s capital, Raigurh, the Killidar of which had been previously corrupted by Shaik Yacoob. The Peishwa reduced the forts of Tala and Gossala; but his further progress was interrupted by the advance of Seedee Rehman, one of the brothers, at the head of a body of troops from Jinjeera. They attacked the Peishwa vigorously, but could not prevail over the numerous forces of the Mahrattas. Seedee Rehman was killed, and his troops were pursued to Dhunda Rajepoor. Batteries were erected against Jinjeera, whilst Mannajee Angria assailed it from the sea.
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The operation of cannonading Jinjeera had been repeated from the time of Sumbhajee, every year the Mahrattas were in possession of Dhunda Rajepoor. Bajee Rao perceived the impracticability of reducing it, at least for many months; and as he foresaw many bad consequences from remaining in the Concan, he listened to overtures made by the besieged, entered into a treaty, by which they recognized the pretensions of Seedee Rehman, gave up half the revenues of eleven Mahals¹ to him, and ceded the forts of Raigurh, Tala, Gossala, Oochitgurh and Beerwaree to the Mahrattas.
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¹ Smaller divisions of a district.
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Upon this successful termination of hostilities, Bajee Rao with additional power and influence returned to Satara, and was appointed Soobehdar of the late acquisitions.¹
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¹ Mahratta MSS., and original letters. In parts where I have only Mahratta authority, I am seldom quite certain of my dates, as many of the original letters have only the date of the week and of the moon.
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After Bajee Rao’s return to the Deccan, the troops of Mulhar Rao Holkar made incursions beyond Agra. Khan Dowran, the vizier of Mohummud Shah, attempted to check the progress of the Mahrattas rather by the pen than the sword; forgetting that all negotiations with a predatory state, without previously punishing its aggressions, only tend to excite further depredation] He laid plans for obtaining the aid of Nizam Ool Moolk without appearing to solicit it; a conduct little less inconsistent than that of the fickle Emperor, who now earnestly courted him; but the Nizam was nursing his resources, and the period had not yet arrived when he could perceive that his presence at Delhi would be hailed as that of the saviour of the empire.
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Khan Dowran’s attempts were feeble, but his preparations were always splendid; all Delhi was in bustle when his expeditions set out; but they commenced in bombast and ended in ridicule. His brother, Muzuffir Khan, moved forth to drive the plunderers and robbers across the Nerbuddah. Holkar sent a few of his light troops to molest his march during the day and to throw rockets into his camp during the night; but he never allowed himself to be interrupted in the collection of contributions, in which he was employed for the purpose of endeavouring to satisfy the importunate demands of his master the Peishwa, whose pecuniary distress had become very great. Muzuffir Khan advanced as far as Seronje, whence he returned, and was received at Delhi as if he had performed signal services, acquiring fame among his friends by the contempt of his enemies. The province of Malwa and the country south of the Chumbul, although some of the forts remained in possession of the imperial officers, were completely overrun, and the Rohillas, as well as the Mahrattas, took possession of several places.² Kantajee Kuddum Bhanday, who the year before had been constrained by the power of Dummajee Gaekwar to quit Guzerat, persuaded Holkar to make an incursion into that province, where they appeared unexpectedly; levied contributions as far as the Bunass; plundered several towns to the north of Ahmedabad, amongst which were Eder and Pulhanpoor,¹ and departed as suddenly as they had come.
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² Seyr Mutuakhereen, and Mahratta letters.
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¹ Meerat Ahmudee. [Pālanpur (Pulhanpoor) is a very ancient town, now the capital of the Pālanpur Agency.]
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Abhee Sing was shortly after removed from the government of Guzerat, and Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah, Momin Khan, was appointed to officiate, but the deputy of Abhee Sing would not evacuate the city of Ahmedabad, and Momin Khan was at last obliged to court an alliance with Dummajee, in order to expel him.
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A.D. 1736.—Bajee Rao, owing to the vast army he had kept up, both to secure his conquests and to overcome his rivals, had become greatly involved in debts. His troops were in arrears, the Soucars (or Bankers), to whom he already owed a personal debt of many lacks of rupees, refused to make any further advances, and he complained bitterly of the constant mutinies and clamours in his camp, which occasioned him much vexation and distress.² He levied the Chouth and Surdeshmookhee in Malwa, and applied through Raja Jey Sing for their formal cession in that province; and likewise for a confirmation of the deeds granted by Sur Boolund Khan for Guzerat. The Tooranee Moghuls, who formed a considerable party in the ministry, were decidedly against a compromise so disgraceful; Khan Dowran and the Emperor, by whom it had been already tacitly yielded, were disposed by the advice of Jey Sing to acknowledge the title in due form; but, in the course of the negotiation which ensued between the imperial minister and the Peishwa, both parties went beyond their original intentions, and hastened the advancing reconciliation between Mohummud Shah and Nizam Ool Moolk.
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² Among Hindoos, an attitude of worship or adoration is to place the forehead at the threshold of a temple or at the feet of the idol, and is used in humble supplication to a superior. The following extract of a letter, from Bajee Rao to his Mahapooroosh, must of course be understood figuratively: but it shows the embarrassments under which he laboured:—‘I have fallen into that hell of being beset by creditors, and to pacify Soucars and Sillidars, I am falling at their feet, till I have rubbed the skin from my forehead.’ Part of this distress originated in the high rates of pay which he was obliged to give, in order to outbid Nizam Ool Moolk and secure the best of the Deccan soldiery.
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The Emperor, in the first instance, agreed to relinquish, in the form of an assignment, thirteen lacks of rupees of the revenue of the districts south of the Chumbul for the ensuing season, payable by three instalments at stated periods; and to grant an authority to the Peishwa to levy a tribute from the Rajpoot states, from Boondee and Kotah on the west to Budawur on the east, fixing the annual amount at ten lacks and sixty thousand rupees. The latter concession Khan Dowran probably expected, was more likely to create enmity than to establish friendship between the Mahrattas and the Rajpoots. This minister imagined himself superior to a Mahratta Bramin in political artifice, and continued to negotiate, when he should have had no thought but to chastise. The Raja Jey Sing was the medium through whom Khan Dowran sent an envoy of his own, named Yadgar Khan, to treat with Bajee Rao. The Sunnuds for the Chouth and Surdeshmookhee were secretly prepared, and given to the agent with instructions to reserve them; but Dhondoo Punt Poorundhuree, the Peishwa’s wukeel, residing with Khan Dowran, discovered this preliminary admission and apprised Bajee Rao of the circumstance. Mahrattas in every negotiation invariably begin by requiring much more than they expect. If they find their proposal acceded to they rise in their pretensions, and very often, from a tone of the most obsequious complaisance, assume an overbearing insolence of manner and a style of pointed threat and menace, which, to those who have only seen them submissive, is scarcely conceivable.
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Bajee Rao’s demands now exceeded all bounds; at different stages during the discussions he required the whole provinces of Malwa in Jagheer; the Rohillas, who had established themselves, to be dispossessed; the forts of Mandoo, Dhar, and Raiseen; the Jagheer and Foujdaree of the whole tract south of the Chumbul; fifty lacks of rupees from the royal treasury, or an equivalent assignment on Bengal; Allahabad, Benares, Gya, and Muttra in Jagheer, and an hereditary right as Surdeshpandya of the six Soobehs of the Deccan.¹
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¹ Original papers, and Poona records.
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All these concessions were evaded by the Emperor, excepting the last; to that he acceded, on Bajee Rao’s agreeing to pay a fee of six lacks of rupees. This grant was precisely similar to that of the Surdeshmookhee, but coinciding with the proportion of the emoluments of Deshmookh and Deshpandya : those of the Surdeshmookhee being ten, the Surdeshpandeegheeree was five per cent. This grant, however, fell upon the Deccan ; it was a stroke levelled at Nizam Ool Moolk by Khan Dowran, and had the immediate effect of rousing the Nizam’s jealousy, whilst encouragement from the Moghul faction and pressing invitations from Mohummud Shah to repair to Delhi and save the empire at length induced Nizam Ool Moolk to think of turning the scale against his predatory allies. In the meantime negotiations produced no cessation of activity on the part of Bajee Rao, and his demands were so exorbitant that it was determined, after protracted consultations, to assemble a vast army, by the mere display of which it seemed as if they expected to annihilate the Mahrattas. The plains in the neighbourhood of the capital were accordingly covered with tents, and the preparations were as splendid as the operations proved feeble. The Peishwa, on hearing that Khan Dowran and Kummur-ud-deen Khan, each at the head of a great army, had advanced towards Muttra, deposited his heavy baggage with his ally Juggut Raj in Bundelcund, and advanced to a position on the banks of the Jumna, forty miles south of Agra. He had attacked the Raja of Budawur for refusing to settle his claims, and levied contributions in every direction. Mulhar Rao Holkar, Peelajee Jadow, and Wittoojee Bolay committed great depredations in the Dooab, until driven across the Jumna by Sadut Khan, who marched from Oude and unexpectedly assailed the Mahrattas. He wrote an exaggerated account of his success to court, stating that he had wounded Mulhar Rao Holkar, killed Wittoojee Bolay, and driven the whole Mahratta army across the Chumbul; that two thousand were killed, and two thousand were drowned in the Jumna. On Sadut Khan’s arrival at Agra, Bajee Rao quitted his ground on the banks of the Jumna and moved to a more open country in a north-east direction, his former position being confined by the Chumbul on his left flank, and his camp intersected by deep ravines; very unfavourable to his mode of fighting.¹
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¹ The Seyr Mutuakhereen gives the Moghul account of this campaign, the only one to which the author of that work had access. I have not omitted due consideration of both sides of the narrative.
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Sadut Khan’s account of his success, as written by himself to the Emperor, was communicated to Bajee Rao by his wukeel, who remained with Khan Dowran until the latter, accompanied by Mohummud Khan Bungush, joined Sadut Khan at Agra, when, by the advice of the latter, the wukeel was dismissed. Nothing was talked of in Delhi but the hero Sadut Khan, who had driven the Mahrattas back to the Deccan. ‘I was resolved,’ says Bajee Rao, ‘to tell the Emperor truth, to prove that I was still in Hindoostan, and to show him flames and Mahrattas at the gates of his capital.’
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Six days before Khan Dowran joined Sadut Khan, Bajee Rao, foreseeing that they would unite, was on his march to Delhi. Quitting the great road and skirting the hills of Mehwat, where they formed the boundary of the territory of Chooramun Jath, and keeping fourteen miles to the left of Oorlass,¹ where Kummur-ud-deen Khan was encamped, he advanced at the rate of forty miles daily, and pitched his camp close to the suburbs. Some elephants and camels coming out of the city were seized, and a party of Hindoos when going to a temple for the performance of a religious ceremony were stripped,² but the Peishwa prudently abandoned his first intention of plundering and burning; as he conceived the booty might retard his retreat, and that burning the suburbs would but show a disrespect and contempt which would impede his negotiations with the Emperor and Khan Dowran, both of whom he well knew were disposed to grant a large share of his demands. He therefore next day wrote two letters, one to the Emperor, and the other to Raja Bukht Mull. Their purport is not mentioned, but the Emperor requested that a wukeel might be sent, which Bajee Rao refused, unless a guard came out for his protection. He, however, returned a polite message, stating ‘that as he apprehended mischief to the city, from the contiguity of his troops, he was about to retire to the Jheel Tank.’ This moderation encouraged a party of eight thousand men from the city, under Muzuffir Khan, Meer Hoossein Khan Kokah, Raja Sew Sing, and other nobles of the court, to venture forth and attack the Mahrattas. Bajee Rao dispatched Suttojee Jadow with a few skirmishers to reconnoitre them;
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¹ This is probably the Hindoo name for the place, as I cannot find it in any of our maps.
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² This fact Bajee Rao mentions to his brother, without reserve or comment.
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and upon Suttojee’s sending notice that they were coming out to attack him, Mulharjee Holkar, followed by Ranoojee Sindia, immediately wheeled about, fell upon them, killed and wounded upwards of six hundred, drove them back into the city, and took two thousand of their horses and one elephant. Raja Sew Sing was amongst the slain, and Meer Hoossein Khan Kokah was mortally wounded.
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The Mahrattas lost very few men, and had only one officer¹ wounded. This action was soon over, and Bajee Rao was about to refresh his men when the army of Kummur-ud-deen Khan came in sight. Bajee Rao had a skirmish with him, but as night was approaching, and as he perceived that the enemy was supported by troops from the city as well as by Khan Dowran and Sadut Khan, who were close at hand, he determined to retreat, and before morning moved eight miles to the westward of the late field of battle. In the skirmish with Kummur-ud-deen Khan the Peishwa lost thirty men. Khan Dowran and Sadut Khan effected a junction with Kummur-ud-deen Khan on the following morning; and Bajee Rao retreated towards Gwalior, by the route of Rewaree and Mundawar, both of which he plundered, and was neither interrupted nor pursued. It was Bajee Rao’s intention to cross the Jumna and plunder the Dooab before the rains; but being apprehensive that Nizam Ool Moolk might interrupt him before he could collect the revenue in Malwa, he ordered his brother to watch the Nizam’s preparations²: and, ‘if he attempt,’ says the Peishwa’s letter, ‘to cross the Rewa (Nerbuddah), fall instantly on his rear and put heel ropes upon him.’³
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¹ Indrajee Kuddum, belonging to Ranoojee Sindia’s party. I mention his name merely to show the minuteness of the Peishwa’s report.
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² A private letter, or rather journal, in the handwriting of Bajee Rao, to his brother Chimnajee Appa. Without various corroborative testimonies, as to the facts, it bears that internal evidence of truth which commands confidence.
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³ Such of my readers as may have seen a horse break from his pickets, and attempt to gallop off with his heel ropes, will understand the Peishwa’s injunctions in their full force.
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No opportunity presented itself of crossing the Jumna, and as his presence became requisite in the Deccan, Bajee Rao, upon a promise of obtaining the government of Malwa and thirteen lacks of rupees, again sent his wukeel to Khan Dowran, and set out on his return to Satara, where he paid his respects to the Raja, and immediately proceeded into the Concan.
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A.D. 1737.—The Portuguese, who had assisted in taking Kolabah, not having received some districts promised to them in the neighbourhood of Rewadunda, now appeared, as the allies of Sumbhajee Angria against Mannajee, in another attack upon Kolabah. The Peishwa was sent to repel this attempt, in which he succeeded, took Mannajee under his protection, on condition of his paying the yearly sum of seven thousand rupees, and presenting annually to the Raja foreign articles from Europe or China,¹ to the value of three thousand rupees more. The war with the Portuguese led to the invasion of Salsette. Visajee Punt Leiley, a Carcoon in the service of the Peishwa, corrupted some natives in the Portuguese service.² The Mahrattas first possessed themselves of a small fort³ on the opposite side of the river from Bassein, on the night of the 6th April, put the commandant with his garrison to the sword, and occupied the river so as to prevent all succour from Bassein to the other forts on the island; numbers of their troops crossed on the seventh, and the fortifications of Tannah being then unfinished, and a whole curtain wanting, the Portuguese governor of Salsette, Don Lewis Botelho, who was there, without attempting to defend it himself, called a council of war and decided on retiring to Caranja, leaving Captain John de Souza Pereira to defend the fort, and Captain John de Souza Ferraz to command the garrison of Bandora opposite to Mahim. Pereira behaved with spirit, and gallantly repulsed two assaults, in the last of which he was severely wounded; but the officer who succeeded him, having been seized with a panic when there was no enemy in sight, shamefully took to flight. The English at Bombay, interested in the defence of Bandora, sent both men and ammunition to that post; but on other occasions declared their neutrality.⁴ The Peishwa, to secure these conquests and to maintain the war against the Portuguese, entertained some Arabs and a very large body of infantry, principally Mawulees and Hetkurees. But news from Delhi obliged him to withdraw a part of his forces from the Concan.
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¹ Mahratta MSS. One manuscript states that some of his forts were also to be placed under Havildars and Carcoons, to be appointed by the Raja.
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² Mahratta MSS.
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³ Probably Gorabundur.
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⁴ Letter from Don Conde de Sandomel, viceroy of Goa, to the king of Portugal, 25th of January, 1738. [The English sent fifty men with some ammunition to aid in the defence of Bāndra, but withdrew them when the Marāthā general declared his intention of attacking the town. (B.C.G., ii, 107-8.) In April 1737, immediately after
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The Emperor, having at last prevailed on Nizam Ool Moolk to repair to court, the government of Malwa and Guzerat were restored to him, but in the name of his eldest son Ghazee-ud-deen; the conditions were that he should drive the Mahrattas from those provinces, and every inducement that could flatter his ambition or stimulate his avarice was held out to prevail upon him to undertake this service in person.
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The fullest powers were granted by the Emperor for assembling all the tributary Rajas under his standard, whose forces, added to his own troops, enabled him to take the field with thirty-four thousand men, under his personal command, and a train of artillery accounted the best in India. Abool Munsoor Khan Sufdur Jung,¹ nephew of Sadut Khan, and the Raja of Kotah covered his rear. The Nizam began operations with abundant caution, crossed over into the Dooab, and kept the Jumna on his right flank, recrossed the river at Kalpee, obliged the Rajas of Bundelcund to join him, and advanced into Malwa.
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¹ Afterwards Nabob of Oude, and the father of the well-known Shujah-ud-Dowlah.
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Bajee Rao assembled all the troops he could collect, and by the time he reached the Nerbuddah, found himself at the head of an army, estimated at eighty thousand men.² Neither Yeswunt Rao Dhabaray, nor any of the Senaputtee’s officers, joined him; and Rughoojee Bhonslay evaded the order, under pretence that he apprehended an invasion of Berar.
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² Letter from Chimnajee Appa, who says he crossed the Nerbuddah, ‘by the route of Kurgouna, near Poonashah, at the head of eighty thousand men.’
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Thāna fell into the hands of the Marāthās, the Bombay Council, which was doubtful what policy to adopt, decided to send ‘Rāmji Parbhu, a person of capacity and experience,’ to discover Chimnāji Appa’s intentions. In 1738, in reply to an appeal for help from the Portuguese, the Governor of Bombay wrote: ‘I dare not hazard to increase our charges by a rash and abrupt declaration of war against these people (Marāthās), not only without the orders of my superiors, but without a force to support and carry it through with dignity and reputation.’ The Council, however, lent some money to the Portuguese ‘at the hazard of our own private fortunes, in case of the same being disavowed by our employers.’]
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A.D. 1738.—When Bajee Rao crossed the Nerbuddah, Nizam Ool Moolk was at Seronje. The two armies met near Bhopaul in the month of January; when the Nizam, instead of advancing at once on his adversary, took up a strong position in the neighbourhood of the fort of Bhopaul, with a tank in his rear and a rivulet in his front.¹ This extreme caution may be said to have decided the fate of the war; the Mahrattas, who had approached under some alarm, no sooner fancied themselves superior than they in fact became so. They insulted the Nizam in his lines; and when a part of his army chose their own position for battle, the Mahrattas attacked them with vigour. The action was principally maintained, on the part of Nizam Ool Moolk, by the Rajpoots under the son of Raja Jey Sing, supported by the troops from Bundelcund and the neighbouring Rajas; all of whom, except the Raja of Boondee, had united with Nizam Ool Moolk. The Rajpoots lost about five hundred men and seven hundred horses; the Mahrattas' loss was principally from the fire of the artillery, and estimated, by the Peishwa himself, at one hundred killed and three hundred wounded. Ranoojee Sindia, Peelajee Jadow, and Syajee Goozur were the officers who led the Mahratta troops into action. The Peishwa, during the engagement, was within two rockets' flight of the Nizam, anxiously watching an opportunity, in hopes that he would quit the strong ground on which he stood, when it was Bajee Rao's intention to have made an effort to cut him off; but in this he was disappointed. No decisive advantage was gained by the Mahrattas during the attack; but the Nizam recalled his troops and allowed himself to be hemmed in on all sides; provisions and forage soon became exceedingly scarce; a detachment from the army under Sufdur Jung and the Raja of Kotah, was intercepted and defeated, with the loss of fifteen hundred men, by Mulhar Rao Holkar and Yeswunt Rao Powar. Sufdur Jung retreated, and the Mahrattas exulting straitened the army at Bhopaul, cut off their supplies, and kept them on the alert day and night. Dispirited by privation, and harassed by tiresome watching, many of the troops, especially the Rajpoots, would have deserted, but Bajee Rao would admit of no overtures; he now had an opportunity of showing his superiority to all India, and well knew, that as long as the blockade could be secured, the greater the numbers the greater their straits. It seemed unaccountable to Bajee Rao how Nizam Ool Moolk should have thus put himself into his power. ‘The Nabob,’ says the Peishwa in a letter to his brother, ‘is both an old man and a man of experience, how he has got himself into this difficulty I cannot comprehend; it will ruin him in the opinion of all at Delhi.’
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¹ Original letter, in the handwriting of Bajee Rao.
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Preparations were made both in Hindoostan and in the Deccan to effect his relief. Khan Dowran perhaps saw the distress of his rival with secret pleasure; and the Emperor’s command, not to advance until he should march in person, was an intimation to Bajee Rao that he had nothing to apprehend from the northward. The Nizam’s principal hopes of succour were from the Deccan; troops were assembled both at Hyderabad and Aurungabad by his second son, Nasir Jung, whom he had left as his deputy; and messengers were secretly dispatched from the camp at Bhopaul to hasten their march.
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Bajee Rao, on the other hand, exerted himself with the utmost earnestness to prevent their approach; he wrote, beseeched, and threatened Rughoojee Bhonslay, without effect; he entreated the Raja to compel the Senaputtee, then at Sonegurh near Surat, to join him; and Shao, to that end, wrote a peremptory mandate with his own hand. Chimnajee Appa took post on the Taptee, and the intended relief for the Nizam assembled at Phoolmurry,¹ north of Aurungabad. The Peishwa urged his brother in the strongest manner to collect every man he could: ‘bring up Futih Sing Bhonslay, Sumbhoo Sing Jadow, and the Sur Lushkur, from the southward; if Dhabaray, Gaekwar, and Bhanday are not on their march to join me, let them take post with you on the Taptee; let every Mahratta join, and one grand and united effort may make us masters of the Deccan.’
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¹ This is the common Mahratta appellation; Phooloomree is its proper name.
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The Nizam made an attempt to move, but owing to the encumbrance of heavy baggage and stores, he was compelled to return; his troops, in retiring to their former ground, were driven under the walls, or crowded within the fortifications of Bhopaul. Bajee Rao, from the want of artillery, could not effect a breach, but he poured in such a shower of rockets, and so galled the Moghuls with matchlocks, that Nizam Ool Moolk determined on making a last effort to extricate himself. He deposited his baggage in Bhopaul and Islamgurh, and began his retreat under cover of a powerful artillery and a number of swivels mounted on camels. The Mahrattas charged the guns, but failed in taking them. The retreat, however, was only at the rate of three miles a day. The Mahrattas acted vigorously, but began to be discouraged by the execution from the guns¹; at last, the Nizam, on the twenty-fourth day from the commencement of the attack, about the 11th February, was compelled to sign a convention at Dooraee Suraee, near Seronje, promising in his own handwriting to grant to Bajee Rao the whole of Malwa and the complete sovereignty of the territory between the Nerbuddah and the Chumbul; to obtain a confirmation of it from the Emperor, and to use every endeavour to procure the payment of a subsidy of fifty lacks of rupees to defray the Peishwa’s expenses.² ‘I tried hard,’ says Bajee Rao, ‘to get something from the Nabob himself, but this I scarcely expected, I recollected his unwillingness to part with money when I entered on an agreement to assist him’; alluding to their compact six years before.
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¹ Chimnajee had been with the Peishwa in the first campaign against Nizam Ool Moolk, and had suffered from the Nizam’s guns. Bajee Rao, as some apology for allowing him to move at all, significantly observes, ‘Appa, you know what kind of an artillery he has.’
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² The Nizam was surrounded from the 3d to the 26th Ramzan. On the latter day the agreement was concluded. A copy of this paper was sent to Sir John Malcolm, when he was writing his report on Malwa, and I mention the date particularly, because I observe, that owing to a mistake in attaching the name of Ballajee, instead of that of his father, to the paper, he has been led into an error in regard to it.
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The Peishwa remained for a time levying contributions south of the Chumbul; and carrying on negotiations at court, where the threatening invasion of Nadir Shah, at that time besieging Candahar, although mentioned by Mahomedan writers as an apology for the Nizam’s failure against the Mahrattas, had as yet excited little alarm at court, and the inhabitants of Delhi, like all enervated and selfish people, were as careless of danger at a distance as terrified and helpless on its approach.
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In the meantime the war in the Concan was maintained against the Portuguese; to keep them in check, a body of horse had been sent down towards Goa, under Wenkut Rao Narrain Ghorepuray; and Khundoojee Mankur, in the northern Concan, laid siege to the fort of Asseeree near Tarrapoor; but Don Antonio Cardim Frois, an officer of reputation, had superseded the late governor of Bassein and Salsette, and exerted himself with some success in the recovery of their possessions. Colonel Pedro de Mello, with about five hundred Europeans and four thousand Portuguese, natives of India, attacked Khundoojee Mankur, stormed and destroyed the batteries at Asseeree, and was preparing to make a great effort for the recovery of Tannah. The Governor of Bombay apprised the Mahrattas of the intended expedition, and advised them to make peace with the Portuguese; at the same time the English sold them both powder and shot¹; but Khundoojee Mankur was reinforced and Mulhar Rao Holkar was sent with all speed to Tannah, where he arrived in time to repulse an attack on the fort, led by Don Antonio Frois in person, who bravely fell in the attempt.
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¹ Mahratta MSS. The commandant of Bassein had good proof of this, for the Mahratta shot, which the year before were all hammered, were now thrown of cast-iron and bore the English stamp.
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Although Bombay was then insignificant, it afterwards became a great English settlement, and the subtle part which its chief² acted on that occasion, leaves room to regret that political animosity and the spirit of commercial rivalry should have tended to a conduct which certainly in some degree detracts from our national reputation. Like everything of the kind it was exaggerated by the exasperated feelings of the other party, and although it must be admitted that the Portuguese had great reason to complain, their assertion that the English assisted the Mahrattas in the defence of Tannah, and that an English gunner pointed the cannon which killed their commander,¹ appears from all contemporary authority to be totally unfounded. We are also bound in justice to add, in regard to such part of the conduct of the English as deserves censure, that it was principally to be ascribed to the treatment they had experienced from the Portuguese. Bombay, with its dependencies, was ceded by the crown of Portugal to Charles II, in 1661, as the dowry of his queen. In the year following, when the English appeared and demanded possession, the Portuguese refused to give up Salsette, which they, contrary to what had always been understood, declared was not a dependency of Bombay. The English at first declined receiving any part of the cession, and the troops they had brought, five hundred in number, were landed on the island of Aujeedeva. But three hundred and eighty-one of them having fallen a sacrifice to the climate of that unhealthy spot, Ensign Humphray Cooke, who became the surviving commander, was glad to accept of Bombay on any terms. When the Portuguese, therefore, were dispossessed of Salsette by the Mahrattas, it was natural for the English, in a public point of view,² to regard their misfortunes without regret, especially as it afforded a better chance of one day obtaining or conquering from the Mahrattas what they could not recover as their just rights from the Portuguese.³
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² I do not know whether it was Mr. John Horne, or Mr. Stephen Law. Mr. Law succeeded Mr. Horne some time during the first part of the year 1739. Mr. Law, in a letter to the Court of Directors, 4th September, 1739, is anxious to exculpate the government, and declares the complaints of the Portuguese gross misrepresentations, which so far exonerates the home authorities from suspicion of conniving at such acts of their servants; but what reason could the Mahrattas have for misrepresentation? [Stephen Law succeeded John Horne as President of the Bombay Council on April 7, 1739. The charge against the Bombay Government of assisting the Marāthās is contained in a letter from John Pereira Pinto, Commandant of Bassein, to the Bombay Council, before whom it was laid for information by the President, John Horne, on January 1, 1739. Apparently, therefore, it was Horne, and not Law, who was in office at the time the alleged assistance was given. The Bombay Council recorded that the letter from the Portuguese Commandant was ‘couched in very opprobrious and disrespectful language, which is ordered to be entered after this consultation for the notice of our honourable masters.’ (Forrest’s Selections (Marāthā Series), i. 24, 26.) The Portuguese attempt to recover Thāna took place towards the close of 1738, i.e. during the governorship of Horne which lasted from September 22, 1734 to April 7, 1739. (B.G., xiv.; B.C.G., ii.)]
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¹ Records of the Portuguese government at Goa.
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² Individuals of the Portuguese nation who fled to Bombay experienced the utmost kindness and commiseration from the inhabitants. The governor gave them money for subsistence, and refitted some of their ships at the public expense.
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³ [In a letter to Sir G. Oxinden of September 26, 1662, Gerald Aungier writes: ‘The place (Bombay) does not answer our King’s expectations by four-fifths of what was represented to him. For by the draught which was delivered to His Majesty, Bombay, Salsette and Thāna were included all in one island, and all under the same and royalty of Bombay; but Captain Browne and myself, having sailed round this island, do find it far otherwise, being in extent scarcely
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Feb. 1665.
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After the rains the body of horse under Wenkut Rao Narrain Ghorepuray, the Peishwa’s brother-in-law, returned to the neighbourhood of Goa, whilst Chimnajee Appa was sent down with Sindia and Holkar into the Concan, attended by a very large army, a number of guns, and a vast body of infantry. Ranoojee Sindia, detached from the main army, took Kuttulwaree and Dannoo early in January, and before the month of February Seergaom was surrendered, and Kelwa and Tarrapoor were carried by storm. At the last-mentioned place the defence and assault were desperate: there were four mines constructed by the Mahrattas, two of which succeeded and effected large breaches in a bastion and curtain; the different leaders vied with each other in the attack, Bajee Bew Rao, Ramchundur Hurry, Yeswunt Rao Powar, and Tookajee Powar (the last an officer of Angria’s), rushed forward with their respective colours; but the Portuguese gallantly opposed them, and for a time success was doubtful. At length Ranoojee Bhonslay having crossed the ditch at a place where there was no breach, applied scaling ladders to the wall and entered sword in hand; ‘but the garrison,’ says Chimnajee Appa in his account of the attack, ‘still fought with the bravery of Europeans, and defended themselves till completely overpowered. The few that remained alive, amongst whom was their commander, Don Francis de Alarcao, demanded and received quarter.¹
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¹ Letter from Chimnajee Appa to the Dawursee Swamee. Official report from Don Martin Silveira De Menezes, from Bassein, 18th February 1739.
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Whilst the war was thus vigorously prosecuted against the Portuguese, and Ranoojee Bhonslay of Oomrautee, the uncle of Rughoojee, the Sena Sahib Soobeh, had, as related, distinguished himself at Tarrapoor, his nephew had seized the opportunity of extending his possessions to the eastward; he had plundered Kuttack, and during the period when the Nizam was surrounded at Bhopaul, Rughoojee made an incursion to the northward, as far as Allahabad, defeated and slew the Soobehdar, Shujah Khan, and returned loaded with booty. These expeditions,
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one-fifth part of the other two islands; and this is all the Portugals intend to surrender to us.’ Antonio de Mello de Castro, Viceroy of Goa, did his best to delay the cession of Bombay. (B.C.G., ii. 48–51.) For details of Humphrey Cooke’s governorship and ultimate fate see B.C.G., ii. 51–6.]
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undertaken without regular sanction, were highly resented by Bajee Rao. He marched from Poona for the purpose of punishing his misconduct, and sent forward Awjee Kowray to plunder in Berar. But that unfortunate officer¹ was attacked and defeated by Rughoojee in the end of February. Bajee Rao was preparing to avenge his loss, when news reached him of the arrival of Nadir Shah, the defeat of the Moghuls, the death of Khan Dowran, the capture of Sadut Khan; and finally, that the victorious Persian was dictating the terms of ransom at the gates of Delhi. These accounts exceedingly alarmed Bajee Rao, but the subsequent intelligence which he received at Nusseerabad informed him of the imprisonment of the Emperor, the plunder of Delhi, the dreadful massacre of many of its inhabitants,² and seemed for a time to overwhelm him. ‘Our domestic quarrel with Rughoojee Bhonslay is now insignificant,’ says the Peishwa, ‘the war with the Portuguese is as nought; there is now but one enemy in Hindoostan.’ He appears to have conceived that Nadir Shah would establish himself as Emperor, but he was not dismayed when he heard reports that a hundred thousand Persians were advancing to the southward.
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‘Hindoos and Mussulmans,’ says Bajee Rao, ‘the whole power of the Deccan must assemble, and I shall spread our Mahrattas from the Nerbuddah to the Chumbul.’ He called on Nasir Jung to arm against the common foe, and Chimnajee Appa was ordered to desist from the Concan warfare, and join him with all speed. Before Chimnajee received this command a detachment from his army under Khundoojee Mankur had reduced the forts of Versovah and Darawee; he was in possession of the whole of Salsette,³ and had begun the siege of Bassein. It was invested by an advanced force under Shunkrajee Narrain, on the 17th of February. The commandant represented with humility that he was willing to pay the Mahratta tribute, and that the Portuguese asked no more than the terms granted to the Seedee of Jinjeera. But he was mistaken in supposing that such a tone would avert the attack of a victorious Bramin. Chimnajee was unwilling to relinquish the capture of an important fortress which would secure his conquests, and without which the Portuguese had a key which opened a passage to the recovery, not only of what they had lost, but to the whole Concan from the Ghauts to the sea, and from Damaun to Bombay; therefore, although the mandate from his brother was urgent, he determined to secure Bassein. Aware of the risk to which he exposed himself by the chance of discomfiture, during the whole of March and April he pressed the siege by every possible exertion.
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