A History of the Mahrattas v1.c28: Chapter XXI
A History of the Mahrattas v1.c28
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Chapter XXI
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A.D. 1760. (1754.)—THE revolution at the fallen court of Delhi, which took place in the year 1754, did but increase the troubles and confusion in the northern parts of India. The new vizier,¹ after evincing much hardihood during a mutiny of his troops, which he quelled by a merciless attack and plunder of all the body in which it broke out, having left Alumgeer the second, an Emperor he had raised to the throne, in the capital, departed with the Emperor's son, the Prince Ali Gohur, towards Mooltan and Lahore; provinces which he proposed to re-annex to the imperial throne. These vast tracts of territory were conquered, as has already been mentioned, by Ahmed Shah Abdallee; (1758.) and Meer Munnoo, who first defended them against him, afterwards accepted the government of them from the Abdallee king. Meer Munnoo died suddenly²; his son, though still a child, was confirmed in the government by Ahmed Shah, under the guardianship of the widow of Meer Munnoo. Great mismanagement ensued; universal poverty and misrule drew many to swell the numbers of a sect which had subsisted for a considerable period under the name of Seiks,³ and whose rapid increase tended to augment the confusion of the country. The son of Meer Munnoo died; and the widow, who, still as guardian, claimed the right of governing, after being confined for a time by one of her own officers, at last submitted to a compromise, and shared the authority with him. Under these circumstances, Meer Shahabodeen, the vizier, reasonably concluded that to obtain possession of the country would not be difficult; but he did not extend his views to the defence which it would be necessary to prepare against the coming of the Abdallee to recover them. It appears that a daughter of Meer Munnoo had been betrothed to Meer Shahabodeen. To aid his projects, he first gained the traitorous Adina Beg, who had been the first cause of the Abdallee invasion; and, in consultation with him, Meer Shahabodeen, on his arrival in her neighbourhood, sent to the widow of Meer Munnoo, applying for his affianced bride, a request from the vizier, which, on the part of the widow, was received with much satisfaction, and with which she readily complied. But Shahabodeen seized the government, conveyed the widow of Meer Munnoo to Delhi, and appointed Adina Beg to the charge of the provinces.
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¹ It may not be unnecessary to remind the reader that the person alluded to is Meer Shahabodeen, the son of Ghazee-ud-deen, and grandson of Nizam Ool Moolk. He is often mentioned in the English records, and in various publications, as Ghazee-ud-deen II. I have thought it best to retain his original name, especially as it ought to be Ghazee-ud-deen III.
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² [Mīr Mannu (Meer Munnoo) was accidentally killed by a fall from his horse. (Keene, Mughal Empire, p. 49.)]
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³ [The Sikhs (Seiks), or ‘disciples,’ were originally a pious sect of Hindus following the precepts of their first guru or prophet, Nānak (A.D. 1469–1539). Their transformation into a military order commenced under the sixth guru, Hargobind (1606–45), and was finally completed by their tenth guru, Govind Singh (1664–1708), who was
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Ahmed Shah Abdallee, enraged at these proceedings, crossed the Attock¹ with a large army, the provinces were, unresistingly, again occupied, and the king marched onwards to Delhi. Meer Shahabodeen humbled himself, and Ahmed Shah condescended to forgive him²; but Delhi was plundered, and its unhappy people again subjected to pillage, and its daughters to pollution. The city of Muttra shared a like fate, and Agra was only saved by the breaking out of a violent disease in the camp of the Afghans, which compelled their king to abandon his conquests and hasten beyond the influence of pestilence, to the more congenial climate
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¹ This was the fourth Abdallee invasion of Hindoostan, but Ahmed Shah was probably in the army of Nadir Shah, and if so, this was the fifth time he had crossed the Attock.
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² [Mīr Shāhbuddīn (Ghāzī-ud-dīn II) had by this date married Mīr Mannu's daughter and persuaded his mother-in-law, the widow of Mīr Mannu, to intercede for him with Ahmad Shāh Durrānī. (Keene, Mughal Empire, p. 50.)]
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the real founder of the Sikh military power, which was organized to oppose the Muhammadans. (O.H.I., pp. 453-5.) See also Cunningham, History of the Sikhs (1849 and 1853); Lepel Griffin, Ranjīt Singh, in Rulers of India Series, 1898; and Macauliffe, The Sikh Religion (6 vols., 1909).]
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of Cabul. He returned early in the year 1756. Prior to his quitting Delhi, he had sent his own son Timoor Shah as viceroy of the Punjab, including Mooltan and Lahore, and had appointed Nujeeb-ud-dowlah, a Rohilla chief of reputation, to the office of Meer Bukhshee, and to the rank of Umeer Ool Oomrah, at the Imperial court. Nujeeb-ud-dowlah, prior to the coming of the Abdallee, had attached himself to Meer Shahabodeen; and the latter, displeased at his being set up as his own rival and promoted without his concurrence, as soon as the Abdallee retired, stripped him of his honours, and conferred his rank and appointment on Ahmed Khan Bungush. The Emperor Alumgeer, with Nujeeb-ud-dowlah, was in possession of Delhi; and, as the one supported the other, Meer Shahabodeen determined to reduce them. For this purpose, on the advance of Rugonath Rao into Malwa, where he arrived in the end of 1756, Meer Shahabodeen entered on an alliance with Rugoba¹; and by his assistance soon recovered Delhi and the control of the Emperor's person. Nujeeb-ud-dowlah must have fallen a prisoner into his hands, but Mulhar Rao Holkar, who was more friendly to all the Rohillas than any of the other Mahratta chiefs, protected Nujeeb-ud-dowlah and aided his escape from the citadel to his own territory, situated about seventy miles to the north-east of Delhi.
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¹ Rugoba is the familiar name of Rugonath, and that by which the reader will frequently find this well-known personage mentioned.
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Rugonath Rao remained for a time encamped in the neighbourhood of the capital, when he was summoned to a great conquest, splendid indeed, but to it may be ascribed the immediate cause of the disastrous war which first checked the progress of the Mahrattas, and distinctly marks the date of their decline.
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Ahmed Shah Abdallee, before he appointed his son Timoor to the viceroyalty of the Punjab, gave him, as his minister and adviser, Jehan Khan, who apprised of the knowledge which Adina Beg Khan possessed of the resources of the country, applied to him, and for a time derived benefit from his management of some distant districts. Adina Beg was invited to Lahore, but suspicious of Jehan Khan's designs, he refused to go and withdrew to the mountains. He was therefore treated as a rebel, but he successfully opposed the troops sent against him, by raising the Seiks, who from devotees and mendicants now appeared as soldiers. He also invited the Mahrattas into the province, and Rugonath Rao, then at Delhi, embraced the proposal with alacrity, met and totally defeated the Abdallee governor of Sirhind, speedily overran the country, and entered Lahore as a conqueror in the month of May, 1758. He appointed Adina Beg Sur-soobehdar of Mooltan and Lahore,¹ and left Shabajee, a relation of Sindia’s, to support him with a body of Mahratta troops. Rugonath Rao then returned towards Poona; but his improvidence in this, as well as in most expeditions of his life, was very conspicuous; the magnitude of his conquests brought no revenue to the exchequer; and upwards of eighty lacks of rupees, over and above his receipts, were charged on the present occasion; a circumstance which, as has been alluded to, called forth the strictures of his cousin, and gave vent to those feelings of family jealousy, with which Sewdasheo Rao Bhow was beset.
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¹ It is said that Adina Beg Khan agreed to hold the provinces of the Mahrattas, paying an annual tribute of seventy-five lacks of rupees.
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Rugonath Rao, before he quitted Hindoostan, left Mulhar Rao Holkar and Duttajee Sindia in Malwa, whilst Junkajee, the son of Jyapa Sindia, remained near Delhi at the head of a body of troops, for the purpose of collecting tribute from the Rajpoot states and of supporting, if necessary, the troops in Lahore.²
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² Seyr Mutuakhereen, partly supported by Mahratta MSS.
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Ranoojee Sindia, so much distinguished under the great Bajee Rao, had three legitimate and two illegitimate sons; of the former were Jyapa, Duttajee, and Jooteba; of the latter, Tookajee and Mahadajee. The whole of the five sons survived their father, except Tookajee. Ranoojee Sindia died shortly after Shao; his sons Duttajee and Mahadajee were generally employed to command the troops with the Peishwa, whilst Jyapa was acting in Hindoostan.
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In consequence of a dispute between Ram Sing and Bejee Sing, the sons of Abhee Sing Raja of Joudpoor, regarding the division of their father’s territory after his death, the former (1759.) solicited aid from the Peishwa, who directed Jyapa to support Ram Sing and settle their affairs. Jyapa was at first successful against Bejee Sing, whom he besieged in Nagour, but the latter, following the infamous example of his father in regard to Peelajee Gaekwar, engaged two persons, who, under the promise of a Jagheer, repaired to Jyapa as accredited negotiators, and watching their opportunity assassinated him. Of the murderers one escaped, and Jyapa’s army retired, but Rugonath Rao afterwards accomplished the object of the expedition, took Ajimere, and established a tribute over the Joudpoor territory.¹
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¹ Mahratta MSS. and Tareekh-i-Dukhin, a Persian MS. in Mr. Erskine’s library, written by Boodh Sing, a native of Lahore, at the request of Major James Browne ; a valuable little manuscript. I have not been able to ascertain the date of Jyapa’s murder, nor does Sir John Malcolm’s report give it. [The exact date of Jayappa (Jyapa) or Jayajī Sindia’s murder is still undetermined. The fort and district of Ajmēr were made over to the Marāthās by Bijāi Singh (Bejee Singh) as mund kati, or ‘blood-money,’ for the murder of Jayappa. (I.G. (1907), v. 142.)]
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The most distinguished of the remaining sons of Ranoojee were Duttajee and Mahadajee, who first brought themselves into notice against Sulabut Jung and the French, in the war of 1751. Both of them were now left in Hindoostan, and not long after Rugonath Rao’s departure, Duttajee, incited by the restless Vizier Meer Shahabodeen, advanced with a large force to reduce the territory of the Rohillas. Operations were at first directed against Nujeeb-ud-dowlah only, who being unable to withstand such numbers, took post and entrenched himself on the bank of the Ganges, until relieved by Shujah-ud-dowlah, who, although he detested the Rohillas, as much as his father had done, was yet sensible that to unite against the Mahrattas was the only chance of safety to himself. Upon the advance of Shujah-ud-dowlah, Govind Punt Boondelay, the Soobehdar in charge of the Peishwa’s share of Bundelcund,² was directed by Duttajee to advance with his troops and lay waste the whole territory of the Rohillas, an order which he promptly obeyed, and committed great havoc both in the Dooab and east of the Ganges, where he drove the whole of the chiefs to seek shelter in the Kumaoon hills. Shujah-ud-dowlah advanced towards Govind Punt, and as soon as he came near, detached a part of his army, principally composed of Gosaeens, who attacked and routed Govind Punt with great slaughter, and drove his troops with much confusion across the river, in which many of them were drowned.
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² He derived his designations of Boondelay and the Jhansee-Wala from his situation.
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After this event, negotiations having been opened with Duttajee, he was induced to grant terms, not on account of the defeat of Govind Punt, but from having received intelligence that Ahmed Shah Abdallee was advancing in great force to recover the provinces of Mooltan and Lahore. Although the Rohillas anxiously looked to the arrival of the Abdallee, and were then in communication with Ahmed Shah,¹ they did not hesitate to give the strongest assurances of friendship to Duttajee, and confirmed their agreement on oath. Shujah-ud-dowlah joined in similar declarations, with more sincerity at the time, as he bore a personal and hereditary dislike to Ahmed Shah, which generally has much effect on the political conduct both of Hindoos and Mahomedans, and he dreaded the invasion of the Abdallee as much as the encroachments of the Mahrattas.
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¹ [Ahmad Shāh, as an Afghan, was in sympathy with the Rohillas; as a devout Musulmān, he resented Marāthā aggression on his co-religionists in Hindustan. ‘The cup of his fury was full; and he resolved to bring to a decisive issue his quarrel with the Hindu power which had thus crossed his track of conquest, ill-treated his allies, and made war on true believers.’ (Owen, Fall of the Moghul Empire, p. 239.)]
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Whilst these events were passing between the Mahrattas on the one part, and the Rohillas and Nabob of Oude on the other, Meer Shahabodeen, in consequence, it is said, of discovering a correspondence with Ahmed Shah Abdallee, put the Emperor, Alumgeer II., to death, together with his own relation, Intizam-ud-dowlah. He then raised to the imperial dignity a son of Kaum Bukhsh, the youngest son of Aurungzebe, by the title of Shah Jehan; whilst Ali Gohur, or Shah Alum, the son of the late nominal Emperor, after having some time before ineffectually applied for aid to Wittul Sewdeo, one of the Peishwa’s officers, and to Nujeeb-ud-dowlah, was used as an instrument by the crafty Shujah-ud-dowlah, and became the nominal head of a confederacy against Meer Jaffeir and the English in the well-known warfare of Bengal. Meer Shahabodeen, after having perpetrated those execrable deeds, in order to await the issue of the approaching contest between the Mahrattas and the Abdallee, sought protection with Sooruj Mull, Raja of the Jaths, who with mistaken generosity afforded him an asylum in one of his forts.²
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² [The public career of Ghāzī-ud-dīn here closes. For the next thirty years he lived in disguise and obscurity. In 1790 he was discovered by the British police at Surat, and was, by order of the Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis, permitted to depart with a small sum of money to Mecca. (Keene, Mughal Empire, pp. 55, 56.)]
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The Mahratta officer in Lahore was speedily put to flight, before Duttajee and Holkar could advance to his assistance. Ahmed Shah crossed the Jumna with the main body of his army, for the double purpose of favouring the junction of the Rohillas and of procuring forage and supplies with greater facility. At the same time his advanced division continued to march on, and Duttajee, fancying it was the main army, retired skirmishing. Holkar, who was in the rear of Duttajee at some distance, also retired. They had not thirty thousand men in both their armies, which appear to have been nearly equally divided. Holkar was negotiating with Sooruj Mull for his assistance, which the Jath promised, but refused to act in the field whilst the Mahrattas were so weak.
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In this manner they gradually fell back along the west bank of the Jumna; but their excesses had made the peasantry their enemies, and they were unusually deficient in regard to intelligence. Whilst the Abdallee vanguard occupied their attention in front, Ahmed Shah, assisted by the local knowledge and activity of Nujeeb-ud-dowlah, suddenly crossed the Jumna near Delhi, took the division of Duttajee Sindia in flank, completely surprised them, and scarcely one-third of their number escaped. Of that number were Mahadajee Sindia and his nephew Junkojee, the son of Jyapa; but Duttajee and Jooteba were killed.
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Holkar, on the news of this disaster, continued his retreat with great expedition until beyond Agra, where, stopping to take breath, he heard of a large convoy of supplies, escorted by the troops of Ahmed Khan Bungush and intended for the Abdallee camp. On this intelligence he crossed the Jumna, took or destroyed a great part of the convoy, and again retired until he reached Sekundra, east of the Jumna, but south of the Chumbul, where he fancied himself secure. A body of Afghans, however, detached from their main army, overtook him by a prodigious march, and routed his troops with great slaughter.¹
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¹ I have, after a comparison of the Persian and Mahratta authorities (perhaps on insufficient evidence), rejected the former, wherein it is stated that Holkar was in the Jeypoor country when Duttajee retreated, and that it was at the Sekundra, near Delhi, where he was surprised. The Tareekh-i-Dukhin by Boodh Sing follows the Persian manuscripts, and accounts for Holkar's venturing so near Delhi, by stating that the Afghans had gone to Nagour in pursuit of Junkojee. I should be glad, though a point of no great importance, to be able to present it to my readers with more confidence.
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Accounts of these reverses reached the Peishwa when encamped on the Manjera river, after the conclusion of the treaty by which so large a portion of the Deccan was ceded to him. Sewdasheo Rao, exulting in his late victory, requested permission to accompany Wiswas Rao, recover the lost reputation of the Mahrattas in Hindoostan, and drive the Afghans beyond the Attock; a proposal in which the Peishwa acquiesced. The natural violence of the Bhow's temper was increased by the family jealousy he had experienced, and the factious intrigues to which it gave rise. His pride was augmented by his extraordinary good fortune in the late campaign, and the spirit of military enthusiasm, so dangerous in a general without experience, took complete possession of his mind. Success had inspired him with a blind confidence, which salutary reverses in a humbler sphere would in all probability have amended; but it is unfortunate that such lessons cannot always reach individuals in high command, until the interests of their country, and the lives of thousands, may have been sacrificed to the effects of their arrogance and indiscretion.¹
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¹ [Kāsi Rājā Pandit, the leading original authority for the battle of Pānīpat, remarks that Sadāshivrāo Bhāu ‘began to exercise his authority in a new and offensive manner, and . . . in all public business he showed a capricious and self-conceited conduct. He totally excluded from his council Mulhar Rāo and all the other chiefs, who were experienced in the affairs of Hindustan . . . and carried on everything by his own opinion alone.’ Kāsi Rājā Pandit, who was an eye-witness of the battle and was much engaged in the negotiations preceding it, was in the employ of Shujā-ud-daula, Nawāb of Oudh. His narrative, translated from the Persian, is published in *Asiatic Researches*, vol. iii (1799). (O.H.I., p. 468; Owen, *Fall of the Moghul Empire*, pp. 239, 240.)]
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The Deccan army, prepared to accompany Sewdasheo Rao and his nephew, amounted to about twenty-thousand chosen horse; besides ten thousand men, artillery and disciplined infantry, under Ibrahim Khan Gardee, whose corps was doubled after the late service against Sulabut Jung and Nizam Ally. The equipment of this army was more splendid in appearance than any Mahratta force that ever took the field.² The camp equipage, which, in the former expensive campaign, had been brought back from Hindoostan by Rugonath Rao, was employed as part of the decoration. The lofty and spacious tents, lined with silks and broad cloths, were surmounted by large gilded ornaments, conspicuous at a great distance; immense parti-coloured walls of canvas enclosed each suite of tents, belonging to the principal officers; vast numbers of elephants, flags of all descriptions, the finest horses, magnificently caparisoned, and all those accompaniments of an Indian army, which give such an imposing effect to its appearance, seemed to be collected from every quarter in the Bhow’s camp. Cloth of gold was the dress of the officers, and all seemed to vie in that profuse and gorgeous display characteristic of wealth lightly acquired. It was in this instance an imitation of the more becoming and tasteful array of the magnificent Moghuls in the zenith of their glory.
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² Abajee Gonedeo, a highly respectable old Bramin, now employed in the judicial department at Satara, was then in a civil situation at Sungumnere: he was two days in the Bhow's camp when his army was encamped on the Paira, and gives a most lively description of it.
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The principal officers with the Bhow’s division were Bulwunt Rao Gunput Mendlee, Shumsher Buhadur, Naroo Shunkur (Raja Buhadur), Wittul Sewdeo (Vinchoorkur), Trimbuck Sewdasheo (Poorundhuree), with many of the chiefs, or connections of the old Mahratta families, who were now but secondary personages in the Deccan, owing to the power of the Peishwas and the consequent ascendancy of the Bramins.
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A large army remained with Ballajee Rao; but orders were dispatched to all the Mahratta commanders to join the standard of Sewdasheo Rao Bhow as he advanced towards the Moghul capital. Accordingly, before he crossed the Chumbul, Mulhar Rao Holkar, Junkojee Sindia, Dummajee Gaekwar, Jeswunt Rao Powar, Appajee Rao Atowlay, Antajee Mankesir, Govind Punt Boondelay, and many others of less note, had joined with their troops. Most of the Rajpoot chieftains sent parties of their horse, vast numbers of Pindharees, and irregulars of all descriptions, flocked to the increasing host; it seemed the national cause with all Hindoos; and Sooruj Mull, through the agency of Holkar, was induced to meet the army with thirty thousand men.¹
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¹ [According to Owen (Fall of the Moghul Empire, pp. 254, 255), Ibrāhīm Khān Gardī’s corps comprised ‘2,000 horse and 9,000 sepoys with firelocks, disciplined after the European manner, together with 40 pieces of cannon. Except some five or six thousand inferior infantry, equipped in native fashion, the rest of the army consisted of cavalry, 58,000 in number, under various leaders, who each supplied his own contingent. Thus Holkar contributed 5,000; Sindia 10,000; Amājī Gaikwār, 8,000; Jaswant Rāo Powār, 2,000; &c. The whole train of artillery included 200 cannon, the bulk of these being heavy “guns of position.” The Bhāu had also in his service two Pindārī
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The experienced Jath, however, soon perceived that the unwieldy assemblage under the Bhow, clogged with a cumbersome artillery and suiting their movements to those of an attendant body of infantry, were ill adapted to the purpose of the war. He proposed, therefore, that the families and all the heavy equipments should be placed either in Gwalior or Jhansee, or under the protection of some of his own forts, whilst the Mahratta horse and his own could cut off the supplies; and, by constant skirmishing, oblige the Mahomedan princes to withdraw, and compel the Abdallee to retreat. Holkar coincided in this opinion, but Sewdasheo Rao had an aversion to Holkar, the enemy of Ramchundur Shenwee, and from the connection between Holkar and the Jaths he imbibed a prejudice against Sooruj Mull. Common report had spread accounts of wonders performed by Europeans; Sewdasheo Rao himself had witnessed the effects of French discipline and artillery; he had gained great advantages by the employment of Ibrahim Khan, and he haughtily contemned the only advice which might have ensured success.¹ The army proceeded to Delhi, and attempted the citadel at once. A party of the Mahrattas clambered up one of the towers and got inside, whilst the main body was assaulting the gateway and the besieged busy in defending it; but the Mahrattas, who had made good their entrance, without ever thinking of opening the gate to keep possession of the place, began to plunder, for some time without interruption, but being at last discovered, the whole body, as helpless as an unarmed mob, were driven out by about twelve men.² The assault was therefore deferred, batteries were opened, and in a short time the fort capitulated.³ The Bhow, on this success, proposed placing Wiswas Rao on the throne and making Shujah-ud-dowlah his Vizier.⁴
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¹ Mahratta MSS., Asiatic Researches, vol. iii, Seyr Mutuakhereen.
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² Seyr Mutuakhereen.
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³ Seyr Mutuakhereen, Mahratta MSS., and Asiatic Researches.
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⁴ Mulhar Rao Holkar, in his account of the campaign, asserts that the Bhow placed Wiswas Rao on the throne: the account in the Asiatic Researches, said to be on the authority of Shujah-ud-dowlah, mentions that such an arrangement was intended; but it seems to be an exaggeration on the part of Holkar.
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As the Jumna was already unfordable, Sewdasheo Bhow leaders with 15,000 of their irregular and vagabond cavalry.' (See the author's estimate on p. 521, infra.) Elphinstone puts the total number of men within the Marāthā lines at 300,000; but a proportion of these must have been non-combatants and followers.]
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cantoned his army at Delhi, where his innumerable followers consumed everything in the neighbourhood; all articles of provision and supply became scarce, but the first difficulty that appeared to the Bhow was the want of treasure. In this respect, however, he was more provident than in others, he brought two krores of rupees with him from the Deccan, and Holkar, Sindia, Govind Punt Boondelay and the Rajpoots furnished three more; but the prospect of want of funds induced Sewdasheo Rao to seize the gold and silver ornaments of the imperial audience chamber, and to destroy the throne; from all which he only procured the sum of seventeen lacks of rupees.
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Against this procedure both Holkar and Sooruj Mull remonstrated in the strongest manner, as they considered it both impolitic and indecorous, but Sewdasheo Rao treated their opinion with scorn, on which Sooruj Mull with his whole force quitted the army in disgust, and the Rajpoots, at the suggestion of some of their friends in the Mahomedan camp, withdrew from the confederacy.¹
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¹ Mahratta MSS., Holkar’s letter, and Seyr Mutuakhereen: all the Mahratta accounts impute Sooruj Mull’s defection wholly to the Bhow’s misconduct. The Asiatic Researches say that he also was advised by the Mahomedans.
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In the meantime, Ahmed Shah Abdallee, whose camp was opposite to Anopshuhur² on the Ganges, had through Nujeeb-ud-dowlah prevailed on Shujah-ud-dowlah to make common cause with the Mussulmans against the Hindoos; but as Shujah-ud-dowlah was less inimical to the Mahrattas than any of the other confederates, Sewdasheo Rao used many endeavours to conciliate or detach him from the alliance, opened a private communication, and also made him the organ of a public negotiation, which continued to be carried on for months between the Mahrattas and the Abdallee.³ Both public and private intercourse was laid open by Shujah-ud-dowlah to his allies, and his answers were dictated at their suggestion.⁴
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² [Anūpshahr (Anopshuhur) is now in the Bulandshahr District.]
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³ [‘The Bhāu was finessing in the hope of extricating himself from a position which was becoming more and more embarrassing.’ The habit of continuing negotiations in the midst of war through the medium of vakīls or agents was common among the Marāthās and other Indian belligerents. Wellesley highly resented this practice; and his brother Arthur, in the Mahratta war, put a summary stop to it.’ (Owen, Fall of the Moghul Empire, p. 245.)]
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⁴ Asiatic Researches.
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When the violence of the monsoon had subsided, Sewdasheo Rao raised Mirza Juwan Bukht, the son of the absent Shah Alum, to the throne of Delhi, and proclaimed Shujah-ud-dowlah vizier of the empire. He then left Naroo Shunkur (Raja Buhadur), with a garrison in the citadel, and proceeded in person to Kunjpoora, a fortified town strongly garrisoned, which he breached and stormed. Ahmed Shah had been very desirous of relieving this post, but the Jumna was not yet fordable. He, however, moved his camp to the banks of that river, continued to amuse the Bhow by negotiation, and after some failures at last discovered a ford, which he crossed, twenty miles above Delhi; a great part of his army had gained the western bank before the Bhow would give credit to the intelligence,¹ and the whole of the Mahomedans were across by the 25th October. On the following morning the advanced guards of the two armies had a severe action, and both sides claimed the advantage; the Mahrattas intended to attack next day, but Holkar was still anxious to adopt the predatory plan and act against their supplies. Ibrahim Khan expostulated in a very violent manner; he said it would be abandoning him and his corps to destruction, and that he would turn his guns on the first body of cavalry that followed such an advice.² These dissensions were with some difficulty suppressed; and during their continuance the Mahrattas retired skirmishing to Panniput, where Sewdasheo Rao, by Ibrahim Khan's advice, entrenched himself. He dug a ditch fifty feet wide and twelve feet deep, and raised a rampart on which he mounted cannon, round both his own camp and the village of Panniput. Ahmed Shah likewise encamped with his allies, and fortified himself by placing felled trees around his army.
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¹ Mahratta MSS. One Mahratta account by Rugonath Yadow, the Buker-Nuwees of the Peishwa, states that they were opposed in fording, but all other authority is against the assertion.
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² Mahratta MSS., confirmed by Holkar's own letter.
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The Mahomedan force consisted of forty-one thousand eight hundred horse, thirty-eight thousand foot, and about seventy pieces of cannon: these were choice troops, but the irregulars not mustered were very numerous, and probably amounted to as many more. The Mahrattas have been reckoned at fifty-five thousand horse and fifteen thousand foot, with two hundred pieces of cannon³ besides their Pindharees and followers, of whom there are supposed to have been upwards of two hundred thousand souls.¹
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³ Asiatic Researches.
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¹ [Both sides used shuternals, or camel-swivels, and rockets in great profusion. The Afghan force, in addition, included ‘2,000 camels, on each of which were mounted two musketeers, armed with pieces of a very large bore.’ The usual name for a swivel-gun carried on a camel was Zambūrak, ‘little hornet.’ (Yule, Hobson-Jobson, p. 985.)]
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Soon after the armies had taken post, Sewdasheo Rao directed Govind Punt Boondelay to cut off the enemy’s supplies, in which he was for a time very successful; but Attaee Khan, sent out for the purpose, having come suddenly upon him when in a mango grove with only about a thousand of his men, the rest being dispersed plundering, attacked and killed him, cut off his head, and presented the acceptable present to the Abdallee king. Before the death of Govind Punt there was a probability that a treaty might be concluded, and the officers in both armies had visited each other; but as Sewdasheo Rao declared that Govind Punt was only in quest of forage for his own army, mutual accusations of treachery inflamed both parties, and negotiation for a time ceased.² The loss of Govind Punt was followed by another misfortune; a party of horse in charge of treasure, each man carrying a bag, were returning with it from Delhi, but having in the night mistaken the Afghan camp for their own, they were cut off with the whole of the treasure.³ Nevertheless, the Rajpoots, although they had deserted, contrived to assist the Mahrattas with money, and Sooruj Mull sent a very large sum⁴ which safely reached their camp; but the distress was soon extreme, and the battalions of Ibrahim Khan became clamorous for arrears.⁵ Holkar proposed that they should attack with their horse and leave the Gardees (such was the name by which the regular infantry were distinguished) to take care of the camp;
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a taunt to which the Bhow showed himself superior by acceding to the proposal.⁶ This attack was made on the 29th November on the left of the Abdallee camp, where Shah Wulee Khan, the Vizier of Ahmed Shah, was posted. The Mahrattas, in number about fifteen thousand, broke in, charged at all they met, and although the Afghans stood, they were broken, and upwards of two thousand of them killed; at last the Vizier having been supported from all parts of the camp, the Mahrattas retired with the loss of one thousand men.¹ Holkar led on that occasion; and although there was constant and daily skirmishing, in which the Mahratta horsemen individually killed their antagonists,² there was no action of importance until the 23rd December, when Sewdasheo Bhow, Wiswas Rao, Holkar, Bulwunt Rao Gunput Mendlee, and several other commanders came out to attack Shah Wulee Khan, who, attended by a body of horse, was proceeding to a mosque in the neighbourhood,³ and was surrounded by this host of Mahrattas. Nujeeb-ud-dowlah and many other officers came out to support him, and a very desperate conflict ensued. Nujeeb-ud-dowlah having advanced beyond the others towards the entrenchment, Bulwunt Rao, then acting as the Dewan of Sewdasheo Rao, an officer of courage and experience, instantly seized the advantage and charged him furiously;
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three thousand Rohillas were killed, and Nujeeb-ud-dowlah for a time in great danger of being taken, but Bulwunt Rao, in a moment of victory, was shot after the close of day by a musket-ball, when the Bhow, greatly afflicted by his loss, thought only of retiring to his entrenchment with the body of his friend.⁴ Actions took place almost daily, and the Rohillas and Shujah-ud-dowlah earnestly tried to bring on a decisive action. But Ahmed Shah steadily refused,⁵ in which he showed himself a good general, acquainted both with the minds of men and the science of war. The irritable impatience in his own camp, where the hardships were trifling compared with the Mahratta distress, told him precisely the state of his enemies, and that every day’s delay in the situation only rendered the prey more certain. The Mahrattas were starving:—the improvident waste to which they had long been accustomed rendered them totally unable to bear privation, and inaction gave them full time to reflect on the state to which they were reduced. Sewdasheo Bhow saw that it was now impossible to avoid a decisive battle: and although he still negotiated, his own judgment told him it was hopeless. A vast body of followers, whom hunger had made careless and daring, issued forth from the entrenchment in the night to procure food for themselves or their famished families, when they were discovered, surrounded, and butchered by the Afghans.
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The Mahrattas called to be led forth to fall by the sword, and not to be left to die in long endurance of useless misery. The chiefs applied to the Bhow, who approved of their resolve, and with his ordinary manner and in perfect composure distributed the usual *pan* and betel at breaking-up of the assembly.¹ Orders to prepare for battle were issued to the troops. All the grain in store was distributed, that they might have one full meal that night, and on the 7th January, an hour before the break of morning, the Mahratta troops were moving out of their entrenchment, left in front; their cannon, swivels, *shuternals* or musquetoons mounted on camels, and their rockets marched first, covered by Ibrahim Khan Gardee; next came Dummajee Gaekwar's horse, followed by those of Wittul Sewdeo, Sewdasheo Bhow, and Wiswas Rao, Jeswunt Rao Powar, Shumsher Buhadur, Mulhar Rao Holkar, and Junkojee Sindia.
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² Holkar’s letter.
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³ Asiatic Researches and Tareekh-i-Dukhin.
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⁴ One manuscript says a crore of rupees.
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⁵ Mahratta MSS.
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⁶ Oral information.
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¹ Mahratta MS. Asiatic Researches.
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² Oral information; there was a large post (a run-kham) erected between the camps by the Bhow, where challenges and duels constantly took place.
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³ Tareekh-i-Dukhin.
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⁴ This was the same officer that levied the contribution from the Carnatic, and with whom Mr. Pigot corresponded in 1757. It is mentioned by the author of the Seyr Mutuakhereen that the Rohillas on this occasion penetrated into the Mahratta entrenchment; this is not stated by Kassee Punt or Boodh Sing, and is positively contradicted by Naroo Bhugwunt, the Arla Koolkurnee. Of Naroo Bhugwunt I shall take further notice presently.
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⁵ Asiatic Researches.
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¹ On the breaking up of an assembly or levee, or even in dismissing an ordinary visitor, rose-water, cardamoms, cloves, mace, &c. are first distributed; when the *pan* leaves and betel are given it is the signal for departure.
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In this order they slowly advanced towards the Abdallee camp, with every symptom of hopeless despair rather than of steady resolution. The ends of their turbans were let loose, their hands and faces anointed with a preparation of turmeric,² and everything seemed to bespeak the despondency of sacrifice prepared, instead of victory determined. Sewdasheo Rao gave over his own wife and several of the principal families to the particular care of Holkar. His reason for this is supposed to have been that Mulhar Rao was the only chief who might expect to find favour with the unrelenting Nujeeb-ud-dowlah, by whose counsel Ahmed Shah was greatly swayed, and Holkar was therefore the only person whose influence was likely to obtain their eventual protection. Sewdasheo Rao, just before he moved out, (1761.) sent a note to one of the Carcoons ¹ of Shujah-ud-dowlah, who had been employed as an agent in their negotiation, in which was written, ‘The cup is now full to the brim and cannot hold another drop,’ and requested that if anything could be done, it might be immediate. At the time this note was received, the scouts of Shujah-ud-dowlah brought intelligence that the Mahrattas were moving out, on which he proceeded straight to the king, whom he found asleep in his tent, with his horse saddled at the door. On being awoke he asked what news? and when informed of the exigency, mounted his horse and rode forward about a mile in front of his lines, where he at first began to doubt the intelligence; but by this time the Mahrattas had drawn up their army in the same order as they had moved out, with Ibrahim Khan on the left and Junkojee Sindia on the right; their artillery was placed in front of their line, and a general discharge of cannon announced that they were ready. Upon hearing this, the king, who was sitting upon his horse smoking a Persian kalleoon, gave it to his attendant, and with great calmness said to Shujah-ud-dowlah, ‘Your servant’s news is very true, I see.’ He then ordered out his army, which drew up with its artillery in front. His Grand Vizier, Shah Wulee Khan, with the Afghans, was
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² These preparations signified that they were come forth to die. [Turmeric (*haldi*), the powdered tubers of the *Curcuma longa*, figures very largely in religious and other ceremonies, from the belief in yellow as a potent spirit-scarer. A few days before marriage the bride will wear a robe dyed in turmeric; the marriage letter of invitation is coloured with turmeric; it is used in the ceremony of the boundary oath in Madras, in vows for procuring children, and is frequently waved in a gourd round a sick man. Corpses are often smeared with turmeric before cremation, a custom which is not peculiar to the so-called Aryan Hindus, but prevails also among
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¹ Kassee Punt, the same whose well-written account of the campaign is published in the Asiatic Researches by Mr. James Browne.
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very primitive tribes. The scent of burning turmeric is a well-known demon-scarer. The anointing of their faces and hands with turmeric by the Marāthā hosts was doubtless intended to scare away the evil spirits who would otherwise attack their bodies after death. Compare the Rājpūt practice of wearing a saffron-coloured robe when they went forth to conquer or die, mentioned in the Ballad of Tānājī Mālūsre. This robe is termed in the ballad maranācha poshak, i.e. ‘dead-clothes.’ Note also Fryer’s remark that ‘A soldier that puts on a crocus-dye intimates a resolution either to die or be conqueror.’ (Fryer, ed. Crooke, 1912, ii. 106.)]
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posted in the centre; from which Ahmed Khan Bungush, Hafiz Rehmut and Doondy Khan Rohillas, with Umeer Beg and Berkhordar Khan, formed the right wing; and on the Vizier’s left were posted Shujah-ud-dowlah, Nabob of Oude, and Nujeeb-ud-dowlah Rohilla. Shah Pusund Khan, with a choice body of Afghans, secured the extremity of the left flank. In this order the battle began with a general cannonade, and the lines drew near to each other. Ibrahim Khan Gardee, supported by Dummajee Gaekwar, advanced resolutely on the Rohillas in the right wing of the Mahomedan army, covering his left flank from the attack of Umeer Beg and Berkhordar Khan, by wheeling back two of his battalions in an oblique direction from their right. On the right of the Mahrattas, Junkojee Sindia was immediately opposed to Shah Pusund Khan and Nujeeb-ud-dowlah. The last advanced, throwing up a succession of embankments to cover his infantry,—a most extraordinary labour, which he probably undertook with a view to ultimate defence, that in case, as was not improbable, the desperate impetuosity of the Mahrattas should break through the troops, each embankment might then prove a rallying point.
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Sewdasheo Rao, with his nephew, and Jeswunt Rao Powar were opposite to the Grand Vizier. The great Bhugwa Jenda, or standard of the nation, was raised in the front, and three Juree Putkas were in the field. Ahmed Shah was at some distance in rear of the Mahomedan army. When the combatants respectively had outmarched their artillery, the Mahratta cry of Hur Huree! Hur Huree! was distinctly heard; the battle then very soon became general, and a tremendous charge was made full on the centre, where the troops of the Grand Vizier, of whom ten thousand were horse, were guilty of a great mistake in not advancing to meet the shock. The Mahrattas, in consequence, broke through them, but riders on both sides were dashed to the ground. The dust and confusion were so great that combatants, whilst they fought hand to hand and grappled in the strife of death, could only distinguish each other by the Mahomedan Allah! and Deen! or the incessant Hur! Hur! Mahdeo! which rent the air from the Mahratta host. Shah Wulee Khan, in full armour, threw himself from his horse, and the bravest of his men followed his example; but most of the Afghans gave way. ‘Our country is far off, my friends,’ said the Vizier, ‘whither do you fly!’ but he was left for a time defended only by the broken remnant of his force. Ibrahim Khan Gardee, though with the loss of more than half his men, and himself wounded, was successful; near eight thousand Rohillas lay dead or wounded; but the left wing of the Mahomedan army was still unbroken. This state of the battle was about noon reported to Ahmed Shah, who now evinced the collected decision of a great commander. He directed a chosen band of his personal guards to enter his encampment, and drive out every armed man who had retired from his duty; an order which they promptly executed. Troops were soon sent to support the right wing, and the Grand Vizier was directed to make repeated charges with ten thousand men at full gallop on the centre of the Mahrattas; whilst Shah Pusund Khan and Nujeeb-ud-dowlah supported the Vizier by simultaneous attacks on the flank. These onsets were still met and repulsed; but the physical strength of the Afghans, in the protracted and close struggle, was an over-match for the slighter frames of the Hindoo natives of the south. The Mahrattas, however, on this terrible day fought valiantly; and no chief was reproachable, except Mulhar Rao Holkar. Of his countrymen none doubted his courage, but he did not do his utmost to support his prince; and some do not hesitate to accuse him of treachery. A little after two o’clock in the afternoon Wiswas Rao was mortally wounded; on seeing which, Sewdasheo Rao Bhow descended from his elephant, sent, as is said, a message to Holkar ‘to do as he had directed,’ and mounting his horse, a famous Arab charger, disappeared in the confusion of the fight. The message to Holkar, if it ever was sent, as he alleges, proved instantaneously fatal. Holkar went off, Dummajee Gaekwar followed, and in a moment resistance on the part of the Mahrattas ceased. All was then flight and confusion. Thousands were cut down, and vast numbers perished by suffocation in the ditch of their entrenchment; men, women, and children crowded into the village of Panniput, where they were surrounded for the night; and here it might seem that the greatest barbarians would have been touched with some feeling of mercy; but the Afghans showed none. To the eternal disgrace of themselves and of humanity, they next morning coolly took out the unfortunate victims and divided them in their camp. They retained the women and children as slaves; but they ranged the men in lines, and amused themselves in cutting off their heads,¹ which they afterwards piled as trophies in front of their tents. The body of Wiswas Rao was found, and Ahmed Shah having sent for it to look at, the Afghans assembled
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¹ They ranged them in lines, gave each of the unfortunate wretches a few grains of parched grain, and the Bihishtee (or water carrier) went along pouring a little water into their palms, after which they were beheaded. Naroo Bhugwunt, Koolkurnee of Arla, one of the persons led out to execution, relates his escape in the following manner. He was Carcoon in charge of the accounts of a party of Afghans belonging to the Bhow's artillery at the time they left the Deccan. When the Mahrattas attacked their countrymen, the Jemadar of the Afghans, Hoossein Khan, who was a person well known, represented to the Bhow that his people were afraid to fight, as they had been assured, both by the Rohillas and the Abdallee, that they should be executed if they appeared in arms against their own king. He therefore solicited and obtained his discharge; but he assured Sewdasheo Rao that he would return when he could with safety; that he had eat his salt and regretted his being compelled to leave his service. He afterwards kept up a correspondence with the Bhow, to which the narrator was privy. The Bihishtee, who poured the water into his hand, was the same that had served with Hoossein Khan. He immediately ran to the Jemadar and told him, ‘here is our Bramin about to be killed.’ Hoossein Khan came forward, said something to his countrymen, which the narrator believed was, ‘he wanted him as a slave,’ and dragged him violently by the arm towards his tent, where he remained for a day. The Jemadar then asked him through an interpreter, if he would like to stay with him or go back to the Deccan. To which the narrator replied, that ‘he would like to stay with him.’ ‘Tell him he lies,’ said the Jemadar; shortly after he called him on one side, told him in Hindoostanee (which he could speak very well when he chose,) that a party of horse belonging to a friend of his would escort him twenty kos from camp; the generous Afghan at the same time gave him five gold mohurs, telling him to be careful his escort knew nothing of his having money, and thus they parted. The narrator, after they had gone some distance, bethought him of the Jemadar’s advice, and conceiving it likely that his conductors might search him, put his gold into his mouth, and shortly after when they turned round towards their camp, thought his treasure quite secure. But one of their party, more cunning than the rest, had observed him put the money in his mouth, and when his companions had got to a sufficient distance he set out after the prize. Presently, the narrator, who was running on as fast as he could, heard a cry of ‘Ho! Bohman!’ behind him, and turning round saw an Afghan with large eyes and a very long beard in pursuit of him;—he stood in terror. ‘Ho, Bohman!’ said he in broken Hindoostanee, ‘what have you got in your mouth?’ and obliged him to give up his gold mohurs; he then told him ‘to go to the devil,’ and galloped back to rejoin his comrades.
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I believe the old man’s narration to be perfectly correct, having at an interval of two years cross-examined him, on all the points which I had before noted down.
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in a tumultuous manner, calling out, ‘This is the body of the king of the unbelievers; we will have it dried and stuffed to carry back to Cabul.’
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Shujah-ud-dowlah and the Rohillas prevailed on Ahmed Shah to permit the body to be burnt by the Hindoos. Shujah-ud-dowlah also endeavoured to save Junkojee Sindia and Ibrahim Khan Gardee, who were among the wounded prisoners; but the enmity of Nujeeb-ud-dowlah to the name of Sindia was inflexible, and the crime on the part of Ibrahim Khan, of having fought on the side of Hindoos against the true believers, decided his doom. They were both put to death. A headless trunk, supposed to be the body of the Bhow,¹ was found at some distance from the field of battle, and there is scarce a doubt of his having been slain, but his fate was never accurately known. Jeswunt Rao Powar fell in the field, but Shumsher Buhadur escaped wounded from the battle, and was one of the many massacred by the peasantry. Wittul Sewdeo (Vinchoorkur), Dummajee Gaekwar and Naroo Shunkur,² with part of the garrison at Delhi, returned to their own country. Of the fighting men, one-fourth only are supposed to have escaped, and of the followers about an equal proportion; so that nearly two hundred thousand Mahrattas perished in the campaign.
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¹ [Waring states that the Bhāu (Bhow) was killed by an Afghan, who had pursued him for the jewels he was wearing. His body was recognized by some Hindus, and was duly cremated according to Hindu rites. (A History of the Mahrattas, 1810, p. 161.)]
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² The author of the Seyr Mutuakhereen says he and his garrison were destroyed, which is a mistake.
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Sooruj Mull treated such of the fugitives as reached his territory with the greatest kindness, and the Mahratta nation, to this day, view the conduct of the Jhats on that occasion with gratitude and regard.
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During the period when Sewdasheo Rao was shut up in his entrenchment, news of his situation from time to time reached the Peishwa, and in the month of November he moved to Ahmednugur, and from thence to the banks of the Godavery. In December the intelligence became still more alarming. Janojee Bhonslay joined him with a body of ten thousand men, and the army moved towards Hindoostan. In the middle of January, when crossing the Nerbuddah, a cossid (or letter carrier) belonging to the Soucars,³ who was engaged to reach Aurungabad in nine days from Panniput, met the Peishwa’s army and mentioned that the Mahrattas were defeated. He was brought to the Peishwa, who opened the letter in his charge and read its fatal contents; ‘two pearls have been dissolved, twenty-seven gold mohurs have been lost, and of the silver and copper the total cannot be cast up.’ From these words the fate of Sewdasheo Rao, Wiswas Rao, the officers, and the army was understood.
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