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The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India: A History of the Establishment and Progress of the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi, 1206–1290 A.D. c11: Chapter VII

The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India: A History of the Establishment and Progress of the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi, 1206–1290 A.D. c11

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English

Chapter VII

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For nearly twenty years Mahmud reigned but he never ruled. His piety and simplicity may have been overstressed but of his unassertive nature and weak resolution there can be little doubt¹.

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¹ Ibn Battuta, 11, p. 26; Haji Dabir, 1, p. 726; *TA*, 1, trans. p. 92-93: Ferishta, 1, p. 74, summarised in Elphinstone: *History of India*, p. 371.

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Balban as *naib*. His excessive modesty ill-served the king of a conquering race, for a strong will was an essential pre-requisite for Iltutmish’s representative. The king’s lack of vigour threatened to destroy respect for the crown. A change on the throne became necessary even in his own lifetime but Mahmud escaped his brother’s fate because of the loyal and devoted service of the *naib*, Bahauddin Balban, the Ulugh Khan. Born of the Ilbari sept of the Turks, Balban was sold to slavery early in life and was eventually purchased by Iltutmish. How he rose in state service will have been noted in the foregoing chapters. His complicity in the revolution leading to Mahmud’s accession seems more than probable; in the fourth year he established relationship by marrying his daughter to the young king. His promotion thereafter to the rank of Ulugh Khan and the post of *naib-i-mamlikat*, followed as a matter of course. The failure of Rayhan’s intrigue improved his position; as the leader of the Turks solidly united to meet the threat of dispossession, he obtained a further lease of power.

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This power he, however, exercised purely in the interests of the crown. He infused vigour into the administration, and if his master's dynasty proved impossible to revitalise and perpetuate, he certainly helped in arresting the monarchy's downward progress. Forces of disintegration were constantly challenged and overcome; Hindu aggression was sought to be firmly resisted and, as will be shown in a subsequent chapter, by a judicious combination of diplomacy and military action, he prevented the Mongols from having an easy walk-over. It is true, he substituted the domination of the maliks by that of his own, but despite Barani's introductory remarks, the Delhi Sultanate was demonstrably stronger at the end than it was at the beginning of Mahmud's reign.

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How his reign terminated can never be known with certainty, for Minhaj died before the event and Barani's account opens with Balban's accession. The 14th century accounts of Ibn Battuta and Isami hold the latter guilty of poisoning his sovereign¹. It is however, difficult to put much credence to the story. Balban had very close relations with the royal family; both Masud and Mahmud were his sons in-law; his own son, Bughra Khan, was married to the only daughter of Mahmud by a second wife². The line of Iltutmish was thus almost merged in his person, for Mahmud is not known to have left any male issue. Even as the naib, Barani tells us, he used to have the insignia of royalty³. His accession, in 664/1265¹, only formalising a long-practised usage, was thus almost in the nature of things and presumably unopposed.

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¹ Kitabur Rahlah, II, p. 29; Isami, p. 158; Wassaf, f. 254b, probably copies from Ibn Battuta. The TM, p. 39, dates Mahmud's death on the 11th Jamadi I, 664.

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² Barani, p. 23. Haji Dabir, II, p. 728; Amir Khusrau: Qiranus-Sadain, p. 18.

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³ Barani, p. 26.

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¹ All the Mss. of Barani's history, as well as the printed text, date Balban's accession in 662/1263. But this is clearly wrong for the latest of Mahmud's coins is dated 1265; CCBM: the Sultans of Delhi, p. 26, no. 93. Alfi places the accession two days after Mahmud's death on the 13th Jamadi, I, 664; f. 61a. Cf. also Haji Dabir, II, p. 725.

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His immediate task was to restore the crown's prestige and inspire respect for its sanctity and power. For, an effective answer to the Hindu and Mongol aggression could only come from an integrated and centralised state, symbolised by a strong, unquestioned monarchy. Iltutmish had only outlined the institution; it was left to Balban to regenerate and raise it to its full stature. Conscious of his lack of an absolute hereditary right to the throne he sought increased personal prestige by claiming descent from the mythical Turkish hero, Afrasiyab². By word and by deed he constantly emphasised the sacredness of the king's person and the awe which he should inspire in the hearts of his people. "Kingship is the embodiment of despotism" he said to his son Bughra Khan³ "The heart of the king is the special repository of God's favour and in this he has no equal among mankind" "It is the king's super-human awe and status," said he on another occasion, "which can ensure the people's obedience"⁴. Such despotism, he realised, exposed the king to great risks of assasination and so he lived constantly attended by body guards⁵. He never wearied of impressing on his sons the crown’s sanctity; the king’s awe-inspiring grandeur was to reflect the state’s power. He re-organised the court etiquette so as to manifest the order and splendour of his kingdom. Even before his accession, when a party of Mongol envoys from Hulaku visited Delhi in 1259-60, Balban carefully planned a splendid and colourful reception; the ambassadors left with a profound respect for the magnificence of the mighty Sultan of Delhi¹. The regalia of the Seljuq and Khwarizmi kings were faithfully copied and high-salaried, fearsome body-guards were appointed round the king’s person to ‘blind the onlookers’ by their drawn swords dazzling in the sun. He insisted on the *sijda* and the *paibos* (prostration and kissing the monarch’s feet) in the court and surrounded his person by pompous ceremonies “such as was never done by any other king of Delhi”². Even his private conduct he sought to make an embodiment of kingly dignity. A great convivialist in early life, he gave up drinking on accession and interdicted the use of wine by his courtiers. He firmly refused even to speak to the common people; a rich Delhi merchant offered all his wealth for the honour of one interview with the Sultan; his ambition was never fulfilled. Even to his personal attendants he never showed light-heartedness or betrayed his human feeling³. The death of his eldest son broke the old monarch’s heart, and he melted in tears; but he disdained to show his weakness and to be seen mourning. He bore himself in steely coolness among his attendants, only to break down in heart-rending sobs in the midnight secrecy of his apartment. Ruthlessly he thus sacrificed himself to the king in him. Mongol devastations also contributed to the enhancement of his prestige, for, as the only Muslim state not yet submerged under the Mongol flood, Delhi offered honourable asylum to eminent princes and men of letters who shed lustre on Balban's court. By allotting them residence in quarters named after their country or race his magnanimity received due recognition from his contemporaries as the saviour of Muslim culture¹.

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² Barani, p. 102. For an account of the Afrasiyabi Turks, see JRAS, 1898, pp. 467-502, Browne: trans, Chahar Maqala, notes, p. 22; also Raverty: trans. Tab. Nas. pp. 900-910, note.

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³ Barani, p. 37; see also pp. 40, 70-71.

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⁴ Ibid, p. 34.

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⁵ See his advice to his heir-apparent to constantly beware of his enemies and to provide against assasination; Barani, p. 80. An earlier reference to this aspect of despotism is contained in the Adabul Harb, f. 12a.

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¹ Minhaj, pp. 317-19.

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² Barani, p. 30.

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³ *Ibid*, p. 33-4.

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¹ Ferishta, I, p. 75; see also Barani, pp. 30-31, and p. 112.

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To enhance respect for the crown he administered justice with extreme impartiality and the slightest disregard of his authority was attended with a punishment which verged on cruelty. Two high-ranking officers, the governors of Budaun and Awadh, were given exemplary punishment for reported cruelty to their personal slaves²; the general who was defeated by Tughril of Bengal, was hanged for his failure to carry out the royal command³. To ensure efficient and faithful discharge of duties he improved the system of espionage and placed secret reporters in every department. He took great pains in ascertaining the character and loyalty of the news writer (*barid*) whom he made one of the most potent instruments of his despotism⁴.

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² Barani, p. 40. The news writer of Budaun who had failed to report the governor's conduct in time was also publicly hanged.

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³ Ibid, p. 74.

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⁴ Ibid, p. 44-45.

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Balban's despotism was of the extreme kind in which the right of the military aristocracy even to a share, not to speak of domination, in the government, could find no place. This absolutism he worked out with singular success, for during his twenty years' deputyship, most of the leaders of the aristocracy—the 'forty'—had either died or been reduced to impotence. With the death of his cousin, Sher Khan¹, of whose ambition and ability Balban was reported to have been highly apprehensive, he was left with no potential opponent to the execution of his policy. This development of the monarch's absolutism is the central event of his reign; success of his security measures followed as a direct consequence. The chronicler is markedly sparing in giving details of his fairly long reign of twenty years, but his achievements, so far as they have been recorded can be listed under the single heading of 'consolidation.' This included provisions for internal security, involving reforms in the army organisation and also a re-orientation of policy towards the unconquered Hindu powers. His foreign policy and defence measures, equally co-ordinated with his consolidation plans, we, however, propose to deal with fully in a separate chapter.

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¹ According to Barani, p. 65, he was poisoned to death by Balban's orders. His death is said to have occurred four or five years after Balban's accession.

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To perfect the coercive instrument of his authority, he turned his attention first of all to the army whose organizational deficiency had become noticeable during the last reign. The militiry personnel was, as a result, greatly increased and officers of proved ability and loyalty were appointed to the commands. He enhanced the soldiers' pay and gave some of them assignment of villages in lieu of cash salary². Soon, however, he found out the disadvantages of this form of payment. In the second or third year of his accession, during an expedition to Lahore, he discovered that about two thousand cavalrymen who, since the days of Iltutmish, held villages in the Doab in payment for personal service, had been failing in their duties. Most of the

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² Barani, p. 29.

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Reorganization of the army.

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original assignees had either died or grown too old for military service; the rest stayed at home and lived on the assignments with the connivance of the war-office (*diwan-i arz*). Some even sent proxies, hired men, ill-equipped and utterly unsuited to military work; the heirs of the deceased troopers inherited their assignments and treated them as free gifts, or as rewards for past services. This was a scandalous state of affairs and seriously underminded the army’s efficiency. After a thorough enquiry, Balban ordered a resumption of the assignments and the payment of compensation to the holders. The aged troopers, in recognition of their past services were given a fixed pension in cash; a similar gratuity was given to the widows and the minor heirs, while the able-bodied were enlisted in the regular army, their salary being made a first charge on the revenue of the village to be collected by the central exchequer. The resumption order however, evoked loud protests from the assignees; the old men approached Fakhruddin, the *kotwal* of Delhi and a respected friend of the king, and begged him to intercede on their behalf. The *kotwal* played on the feelings of the old monarch and succeeded in having the order concerning the aged holders rescinded. The rest appears to have been enforced¹. The chronicler leaves us only to infer that cash payment henceforth became the rule for Balban’s military personnel. Whether he realised the need for centralising the army like his Khalji successor, is a point on which little direct evidence is forthcoming. The assignment system certainly remained in force; improvement of the provincial army continued to be the governor's concern; cash payment rule could only be enforced when it was accompanied by direct individual recruitment of the army. The aforesaid reforms were, in any case, confined to the central army which was entrusted to the care of Imadul Mulk, the *diwan-i-arz*. The latter enjoyed the Sultan's confidence and was made independent of the *wazir's* financial control. Imadul Mulk was a capable man; his honesty and scrupulous attention to the details of recruitment, pay and equipment of the troops vitalised the fighting services. Though no fundamental change in the military organisation seems to have been affected, yet the reforms, coupled with the expansion mentioned above, undoubtedly increased the fighting potential of the Sultanate.

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¹ Barani, pp. 60, 61-64, TM and Haji Dabir make no mention of this event. Ferishta I, p. 78 only copies Barani. Cf. CHI, III, p. 77, where the entire measure is stated to have been dropped. The passage, however, does not permit such an interpretation.

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Barani gives a graphic description of the unsettled conditions of life and property which prevailed during the latter part of Mahmud's reign. Even allowing for some calculated exaggeration in the statement, Balban's efforts in the past few years must be regarded as inconclusive. In the Doab and Awadh, roads were poor and infested with robbers who nearly severed all communication with the eastern provinces. Hindu peasants were in perpetual rebellion¹. In the neighbourhood of Delhi dense forests sheltered marauders, while the Mewatis came and plundered the suburbs with impunity. The Katehriya Rajputs also showed no signs of weakness but extended their depredations to Budaun and Amroha². Since the trans-Gangetic tract had only been partially conquered and most of the Rajput ruling families had sought refuge there from the south, it appears highly probable that the rebellions in those parts were engineered by the dispossssed Rajputs and were of a political nature. In Furrukhabad, where the rebels found strongholds in Patiali and Kampil, the later Gahdvala princes are known to have had their headquarters.

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¹ Barani, p. 56.

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² *Ibid*, p. 57.

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The King's prestige, more than a concern for the people's welfare, demanded a concentrated drive against this anarchy. With the army recently fitted, Balban therefore, made the extirapation of the rebels his first care. He started his work in the immediate vicinity of the capital. For a whole year he engaged himself in hunting down the highway robbers and clearing the forests. Having thus destroyed their hiding places, he erected a fortress at Gopalgir guarding the city's southwestern approach against the Mewatis. It was garrisoned with seasoned Afghan troops. Similar posts with Afghan garrisons were established in other corners of the Delhi province¹. The capital was thereby cordoned off and freed from the Mewati robbers, and for the first time in several years the citizens breathed freely. Next year Balban turned to the Doab and Awadh where life was equally insecure. In order to deal effectively with the rebels he divided the area into a number of military commands. These were made into assignments and placed under energetic officers who were to clear the forests and conduct a relentless drive against the insurgents. The measure produced good result, and in a short time order was restored. Brigands were seized and peasants returned to normal obedience and to agriculture. Balban himself remained for a year in the neighbourhood of Kampil and Patiali to clear the highways and build new roads through the forest-clearings. To ensure their safety he erected military posts at Bhojpur, Patiali and Kampil, formerly strongholds of the rebels, and placed Afghan troops there. The ancient fortress at Jalali, situated on the route to Hindusthan¹, was also repaired and strongly garrisoned². From the inscription on the mosque, presumably built on this occasion, this re-settlement of the place, seems to have taken place in 665-6/1266³.

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¹ TM, p. 40; see also Ferishta, I, p. 77.

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¹ Ferishta explains the term Hindusthan as referring to the provinces of Jaunpur, Bihar and Bengal.

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² Jalali is 11 miles east of Aligarh and is reported to occupy the site of an old Hindu town named Nilauti; Carlyle: ASI, XII, p. 12. See also IGI, XIV, p. 14-15.

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³ ASI, 1914-15, pp. 151-52.

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While Balban was still engaged in these parts news arrived of fresh aggression by the Katehriyas on Budaun and Amroha. He immediately returned to Delhi, assembled a larger force, and marching out, ostensibly on a hunting expedition, suddenly appeared before Katehar. A body of five thousand archers was detailed to plunder and set fire to the habitat of the insurgents and to slay the whole adult male population. The punishment was inhumanly severe and calcuated to strike terror; Barani records how at every village and jungle heaps of human corpses lay rotting, the stench poisoning the air as far as the Ganges. The district was almost depopulated, but the measure served its purpose. Adjacent districts were thoroughly cowed and no further action was found necessary. The country was cleared of forest, roads were built and civil government was introduced. The Katehriyas never raised their heads again, for Barani records that from that day the iqtas of Budaun, Amroha Sambhal and Kanuri (?) were rendered safe and permanently freed from trouble⁴. The Tarikh-i-Mubarakshahi adds that Balban on this occasion extended his operations to the *Kohpayah* of Santur¹, probably necessitated by the insurgents obtaining assistance from the hill-chief, who, in any case, had shown particular unfriendliness by harbouring rebels in the past.

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⁴ Barani, p. 59.

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¹ p. 40.

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Internal security having thus been restored, the stage seemed set for the resumption of expansionist wars at the expense of Hindu states. Iltutmish’s attempts pointed to this policy. The cessation of offensive action, following his death, had encouraged Hindu aggression; a counter-offensive seemed clearly called for. Balban’s experience and realism, however, dictated a different policy. Internal disorders in the recent past demonstrated what was concealed to the pioneer Iltutmish, namely, the incomplete nature of the state organization. A dynastic, absolutist kingship was yet to take firm root in Delhi; the autonomy of the provincial governors tended to nullify central authority; and the administrative machinery still showed signs of improvisation. Annexation of newer territories was in the circumstances bound to create problems and involve strains which would be far beyond the organisational capacity of the Sultanate to endure. Even in the administered area itself, the process of conquest and pacification had by no means ended. Armed Hindu resistance still continued to be a major problem and promised to consume the state’s available resources. The Mongol threat, above all, was a powerful deterrent to any action likely to weaken the frontier defences. As will be shown in a later chapter, their military and political pressure pushed the Delhi frontier back to the Beas. Lahore formed the Mongol sphere of influence while Multan and Sind were subject to recurring attacks. Balban strove hard to appease them, exchanged friendly envoys and only as a last resort had recourse to armed defence. Like Iltutmish in the early years of his reign, Balban also found his hands tied by defence problems. A new problem was the serious shortage of Turkish man-power in India, caused by the Mongols severing Delhi's contact with Turkestan. Employment of the military personnel simultaneously on two fronts was now possible only by associating men of other races in running the state. To do that would mean undermining the state's racial basis to which, as will be explained later, Balban was, however, deeply committed.

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To expend his limited man-power and military resources in additional conquests of dubious value, was therefore, a course of action whose unwisdom he realised quite early and explained to his courtiers who urged him on to win new territories. Sending punitive expeditions as a defence measure or to obtain treasure, he said, was one thing; to invade and seek to permanently occupy a warlike Hindu state, requiring the employment of a large number of loyal officers and troops, was an entirely different thing¹. "For me to seize and occupy other countries would only bring harm to the kingdom". "If the protection of the Mussalmans (from the Mongols) were not my first care, I would not stay a single day in the capital but would lead my well-prepared forces to capture the treasure, horses and elephants of the distant Ranas and to the destruction of the enemies of Islam". He remembered the wise counsels of the ancient kings: "strengthen and consolidate your own kingdom for it is wiser than to seize others that are difficult to hold and would only weaken your own"¹. Balban was certainly not a contended pacifist, but defence and conservation of resources received his first attention. Internal consolidation therefore became the keynote of his policy and territorial expansion was formally postponed.

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¹ See Minhaj, p. 291, for an instance of such treasure-obtaining expeditions; in 1247 Ulugh Khan represented to Mahmud that since no Mongol invasion had occurred that year, the respite should be spent in ravaging the territory of the Rais and Ranas of Hindusthan and thereby acquiring booty and the "means to fight the infidels."

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¹ His discourse and arguments are fully reproduced in Barani, pp. 50-53.

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His reign thus stands in clear contrast to those of this predecessors. It is marked not by expansionist expeditions or even rebellions but by comparative peace and security. The chronicler is less engaged in recording military events than in observations stressing the order and tranquility of the country. By a timely sheathing of the conqueror's sword Balban certainly created the condition-precedent for the Khalji conquests.

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His autocracy was absolute; he staked everything in uprooting the slightest defiance of his authority. Towards the end of his reign occurred an incident which clearly emphasised the ruthlessness with which the king's absolutism was intended to operate. This was a rebellion of the governor of Lakhnauti. In the year of his accession Tatar Khan who succeeded his father, the rebel Arslan, in Lakhnauti, prudently submitted to Balban and as a token of allegiance, sent a number of elephants to Delhi². Thereupon he was presumably confirmed in the post. How long he ruled there is not recorded; later accounts state that he was removed from his post by Balban's orders³. The next governor,

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² Ibid, p. 53.

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³ Salim: *Riyazus-Salatin*, p. 75. There is confusion with regard to the successor of Tatar Khan. Haji Dabir, II, p. 733, places Tughril's appointment in 664 but contradicts himself on III, p. 965, by dating the event again in 657/1258-9. TM, p. 40, states that Amin Khan was appointed

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Rebellion in Lakhnauti.

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named Tughril, is reported to have been originally one of Balban's slaves. He was a bold and ambitious man and led successful expeditions into the neighbouring Hindu states¹ and obtained reputedly enormous wealth.

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¹ Barani, p. 82. Among the states raided by him, Barani mentions one Jajnagar or Jajinagar (the printed text has Hajinagar); The I. O. Ms. 177, f. 53b-57b, consistently spells it Jajinagar. The TM, p. 41 has Narkilah (?) while Ferishta has Jajinagar; I, p. 79-80. Elliot, III, p. 112 and 120, rightly held that it could not be Orissa; Stewart: op. cit. p. 70, calls it Jajnagar-Tipperah. Raverty's identification with Orissa, supported by Banerji: Banglar Itihasa, II, p. 70-71, is obviously untenable. For, Balban's arrival at Sunargaon, in his pursuit of Tughril, known to be flying towards Jajnagar, and the conclusion of an agreement with the local raja for preventing the rebel's flight along the rivers, would point to a country in the south east of Bengal. Stewart's identification with Tipperah also does not seem satisfactory. The Tipperah chronicles, it is true, refers to a Turushka king of Gour who helped with troops one of the rival claimants to the Tipperah throne sometime towards the end of the 13th century and who conferred the title of Manikya on the ruler named Ratnapha, a title borne by the Tipperah house ever since; Rajmala, ed. K. C. Sinha, pp. 29-31; also Long's analysis and abridged translation, in JASB, 1850, p. 533 sq. One can understand the flight of Tughril, if he is really identified with this Turushka king, to the country where he could expect to be received by the grateful raja; this treatment he could hardly expect from the king of Orissa whose territory he allegedly raided in the recent past. But the Rajmala is a later compilation and the Turushka king's identification is not beyond doubt. Besides, the existence of Tipperah as an important state in those days is not borne out by epigraphy or archaeology. Such evidences, on the contrary, have recently been unearthed to reveal the existence, in the Tipperah, Noakhali and the Meghna region, of a flourishing kingdom with its capital at Pattikera, now located near what is called the Mainamati hills near Comilla. Its ancient dynasty is proved by archaeological evidences to have been replaced about the middle of the 13th century, by a line of kings whose names end in Deva. Two kings of this line have so far been known, but not only extended the Pattikera kingdom but also seem to have supplanted the later Senas in Vikrampur and Dacca, for the second king, Danujamardana Deva, according to modern epigraphists, is identical with Danuja Rai of Barani (Raja Nauja of Abul Fazal); for this kingdom of Pattikera and the Deva dynasty, see DHB, I, pp. 254-259. Whether Tughril's flight was directed towards this Pattikera is a point worth considering. In that case Danuja Rai's readiness to help in siezing the rebel should be regarded as prompted more by his hostility to him for the recent aggression than a desire to please Balban. Hajinagar is probably the correct version, for it can be equated to Jahajnagar, a popular name of the Tipperah-Noakhali tract on the Meghna-Padma confluence. Ferishta, I, p. 79, and Haji Dabir, III, p. 966, place Tughril's raid on 'Jajnagar', in 671/1272; Stewart: op. cit. p. 70, has 1279.

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to succeed Sher Khan (possibly a misprint for Tamur Khan) whose naib, Tughril, however, usurped all power and dispossessed him. Stewart: History of Bengal, p. 69, states, on what authority is not mentioned, that Tatar Khan was confirmed by Balban and ruled in Bengal until his death in 1277. Barani, however, places Tughril's rebellion "15 or 16 years after Balban's accession."

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True to the name of Balghakpur which Lakhnauti had earned in the past¹, Tughril, feeling confident of his power, eventually asserted independence and withheld the king's share (*Khums*) of the spoils. He finally assumed sovereignty and like Yuzbak took the regal name of Sultan Mughisuddin². By liberal distribution of offices and emoluments he won over the people to his side, and counted on the pre-occupation and old age of Balban for uninterfered enjoyment of power.

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¹ Barani, p. 82.

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² *Cf.* TM, p. 41, from which Ferishta seems to copy the statement that Balban fell sick at this time and the rumour of his death spread to Lakhnauti. Tughril thereupon declared his independence. See Barani, p. 82-83.

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Tughril apparently possessed a very poor knowledge of his old master's character. On receipt of the news Balban flew into a rage and immediately directed Amin Khan, the governor of Awadh to proceed with his army and bring him to submission³. Tughril brought up his forces and opposed Amin Khan's progress. In the battle that followed near the Gogra in north Bihar, the royal forces were however completely defeated; some of the Delhi troops deserted to Tughril, while the rest, retreating, suffered heavy losses at the hands of the Hindu tribes of Awadh. News of this defeat, damaging as it was to the prestige of the reputedly invincible king, upset Balban's equanimity and in rage he ordered the defeated officer to be hanged at the Awadh gate⁴.

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³ Ferishta I, p. 79, states that Amin Khan was on this occasion appointed governor of Lakhnauti. See also Blochmann: *JASB*, 1874, p. 287, who reproduces Budauni's account; *Muntakhab-ut-Twarikh*, I, p. 127.

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⁴ Barani, p. 84. TM, p. 41, states that the general was taken prisoner and was confined by Tughril at Narkilah.

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A similar fate overtook the army which Balban despatched next year under Tirmiti. Tughril seems to have enormously increased in strength for, according to Yahya Sirhindi, he defeated a third army led by Shahabuddin, Amin Khan's successor in Awadh⁵.

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⁵ TM, p. 41-42.

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These successive defeats and the continued defiance of his authority made Balban almost mad with rage. He was now in his eigtieth year and the Mongol pressure had by no means subsided. But he decided to lead the fourth expedition personally and thus stake his all to vindicate the Crown's authority. And he swore never to return without the rebel's head. Taking with him his second son, Bughra Khan, and having appointed his friend, the *kotwal* Fakruddin, to act as the regent during his absence, he set out, determined and well-prepared for a long campaign. He requisitioned troops from the adjoining provinces and at Awadh enlisted, in addition, about two hundred thousand men. The rainy season was approaching, but his iron will would suffer no obstacles.

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The old king's courage and ruthless will at last unnerved the rebel. Afraid to offer any frontal resistance he collected his treasure and followers and leaving Lakhnauti, made in all haste for what Barani writes as Jajnagar but which undoubtedly lay towards the south-east¹. He depended on the climate and the waterlogged soil of the province to wear out the Delhi forces and the king's patience when he hoped to emerge from his retreat and reoccupy the capital. Balban pushed on with utmost speed and occupied the evacuated city. Leaving it in charge of Malik Husamuddin with instructions to keep him informed about affairs in Delhi, he immediately set out in Tughril's persuit. It led him to East Bengal and on arrival at Sunargaon he is reported to have met the local *raja* who agreed to co-operate in seizing the rebel¹. Barani calls the Hindu raja by the name of Nauja, who is obviously identifiable with the king of the Deva dynasty, named Danujamadhava Ariraja Dasaratha, one of whose fragmentary grants has been discovered at Vikrampur, Dacca district². Danuja must have been independent, for Balban, according to Yahya Sirhindi, in asking for his co-operation, was obliged to show him respect due to a sovereign prince³. On obtaining from him an assurance to prevent Tughril’s flight by the rivers flowing through his kingdom, Balban resumed the persuit and arrived within 140 miles of the ‘Hajinagar’ frontier⁴. No trace of the rebel being still found he detatched and sent ahead a part of his force under Bektars and himself followed in the rear. A party of scouts from Bektars’s detachment unexpectedly succeeded in locating the rebel’s camp on the Hajinagar frontier. Bektars suddenly fell upon Tughril’s unsuspecting troops resting beside a stream. They all fled in confusion at the sudden attack and the rebel himself was slain while attempting to flee. The triumphant officer returned to Balban with Tughril’s head and received liberal rewards. On the king's return to Lakhnauti, after rewards and promotions were distributed, an exemplary punishment was meted out to the captured adherents of Tughril; every one, suspected of having the slightest connection with him was hanged on gibbets erected along the two sides of the Lakhnauti bazaar. The deserters from the royal army were also rounded up and kept in chains for a similar punishment at Delhi¹.

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¹ Barani, p. 85-86; *TM*, p. 42 states that he fled to Narkilah. See Haji Dabir, III, p. 967, who calls it Jajnagar.

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¹ See Rennell; Memoirs of a map of Hindusthan, p. 57, for the location of Sunargaon.

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² It has not yet been edited fully; a tentative reading was published in the Bharatvarsha, B.S. 1332, part II, pp. 78-81, from which an account was given in Mazumdar, N. G; Inscriptions of Bengal, III, p. 181.

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³ The TM, pp. 42-43, gives a confused itinerary of Balban’s march : On his marching out from Delhi Tughril fled by the river Saru or Sarf and went to Narkilah; Balban despatched Bektars to persue him; at that stage the representation of Rai Danuj was received who expressed a desire to see the Sultan provided the latter honoured him by standing up when he arrived; Balban was chary to honour an infidel, but Bektars suggested that he should keep a falcon on his hand and when the Rai arrived, should stand up to let it loose after some bird, so that the significance of the gesture should not be clear to the spectators. The Rai then came and agreed to seize the rebel by every means at his disposal. Then Balban arrived at Lakhnauti and an advance body of scouts unexpectedly came upon Tughril’s camp in a jungle.

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⁴ In the Fathnamah, composed by Amir Khusrau, who had accompanied the expedition with Bughra Khan to Lakhnauti, Bektars’s conquests in Lakhnauti are recounted but no mention is made of Tughril’s

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¹ Barani, p. 91-92.

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Having at last re-established his authority, Balban appointed Bughra Khan to the province and, pointing to the corpses hanging from the gibbets and visible from the palace balcony, he warned him of the consequences of rebellion against Delhi. After giving him a final advice as to his duties he set out on his return journey and made a triumphal entry into the capital after three years' absence. On the supplication of the army qazi, who was prevailed upon by their relatives to inter-

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rebellion. He is described as having been sent for the subjugation of 'Jajnagar' and Awadh. On arrival at the former place he defeated a strong force of the Rai, commanded by Maldeo Rana. He then pushed on to 'Jahanbar (? Add. 16842, f. 513b, has Maha-Benares), the residence of the Rai and even captured the strong fort of 'Asirgaon' (The two B.M. Mss. have Gaonsunar; Sunargaon is possibly meant) by defeating the Rawats. The Rai, Beerajit Mal, thereupon sued for peace and offered to acknowledge Muslim suzerainty and pay tribute. The offer being accepted, the Rai presented himself to the Sultan and was enrolled as a vassal. Thereafter, the Muslim army, accompanied by the Sultan returned to Delhi, on the 5th Shawwal, 680/1281; Ijaz-i-Khusravi, (Lucknow edition) V, pp. 5-14. Place names in this account are difficult to identify; it could hardly refer to the conquest of Orissa. 'Asirgaon' is probably Sunargaon, which soon appears under Muslim rule. The duration of Danujamadhava's reign is not known, but Battashali is inclined to place its termination sometime about 1280; Is it probable that Danuja Rai was reduced by Bektars before Tughril could be pursued any further and that the agreement recorded followed this event? Beerajit Mal, in that event, should be supposed to be the name of Danuj Rai's general. Barani, in any case seems to allude to the annexation of Sunargaon when he records Balban's warning to Bughra (p. 93) that 'whoever among the muqtis of Hind, Sind, Malwah, Gujrat, Lakhnauti and Sunargaon revolts against Delhi, he would meet with a fate similar to that of Tughril'. The undoubted occupation of Sunargaon is proved by the issue of a coin, a few years later, by Bughra's son and successor, Kaikaus from the Kharaj of Bang' dated 690/1291; JASB, 1922, p. 410.

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cede, the captives were pardoned and released. Governors and feudatory chiefs all flocked to pay homage to the victorious Sultan whose unconquerable will to assert his absolute authority was brought home to them in such a forceful manner. His eldest son, Muhammad, the viceroy of Multan, Lahore and Dipalpur, also paid him a visit and brought the spoils obtained in expeditions in lower Sind¹. He had already been nominated for the succession and was now sent back with further honour and rewards.

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¹ Amir Khusrau : *Gurratul-Kamal*, dibacha quoted by Budaoni; *op. cit.*, trans. I, p. 216; Barani, p. 69.

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Barani remarks that after the suppression of Tughril the Sultan's authority rested securely in the people's heart and peace and order was manifest in every corner of the kingdom². Balban was thus at the height of his power and prestige and the country, for the first time in many years, witnessed a strong government which guaranteed the security of the people's life and property. Against external foes his anxious preparations had borne equally good results. Early in the reign he had led a punitive expedition against the ever-turbulent tribesmen of the Salt Range who not only periodically ravaged the settled districts but were in alliance with the Mongol invaders and acted as guides. Lahore, abandoned for all practical purposes since Mahmud's reign, was recovered and rebuilt³. The district was incorporated within the frontier province of Multan and Dipalpur which, after Sher Khan's death, was placed in charge of prince Muhammad. A standing force of about seventeen to eighteen thousand horses, was set apart for dealing with the Mongols who were, as a result, effectively held on the line of the Beas¹. The rest of the state forces, maintained in a high state of efficiency by constant exercise², was also kept ready for the invaders.

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² p. 109.

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³ Barani, pp. 59-61.

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¹ Barani, p. 81. For a detailed discussion of the frontier situation see chapter IX.

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² See Barani, pp. 54-55, how by his frequent hunting expeditions he kept his army in trim.

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Balban lived long enough to reap the fruit of his labours. His achievements, in ensuring peace and order, made such a profound impression on the people that the prosperous reign of Iltutmish was almost forgotten; the Sultanate, in the peoples' mind, was nearly merged in Balban and his house. It seemed that his dynasty had come to stay. He himself entertained no doubts and never tired of advising his heir-apparent, Muhammud, as to his kingly duties. Barani, Amir Khusrau and Amir Hasan all bestow lavish praise on the prince's mental and moral accomplishments³. He would undoubtedly have proved a capable ruler, but fate had decided otherwise, and like Iltutmish's eldest son, prince Muhammud was not destined to wear the crown. In a fierce battle with the Mongols, in one of their periodical invasions in the Lahore-Dipalpur province, he was slain in February, 1286⁴. The death of his accomplished and favourite son, more than the disaster to his forces, came as a terrible blow to the aged monarch and he never recovered from the shock. His policy, no less than his dynasty, seemed doomed to frustration, for his next son, Bughra, was ease-loving, mediocre and shirked responsibilities. Barani gives a touching description of the iron king's grief; he bore it lightly in public but wept bitterly at night.

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³ Barani, pp. 67-69.

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⁴ Ibid, p. 109; T.M., pp. 44-45, quotes in full Amir Hasan's account of

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The consuming grief and anxiety for the future of the state, to the building of which had gone more than fifty years of his life, soon proved too much for his failing health, and sickness at last confined him to bed. He perceived his approaching end and summoned Bughra to stay near his death-bed. Barani describes how the terribly autocratic king entreated his son not leave him in his last moment. ‘He had no other son, and if his grandsons, Kaikhusrau or Kaiqubad, still in their teens, were to succeed, the kingdom would go to ruins’. It was more than a hint; it was a clear request to accept the crown. But the unfeeling, slow-witted son preferred the luxury and the easy life of the distant Lakhnauti. But he dared not disappoint his father openly, and stayed on for three months, at the end of which, when Balban slightly recovered, he quietly left for his eastern appanage. While still on his way he heard of his father’s relapse; but to retrace his steps and be prepared to accept the Delhi crown required courage which he woefully lacked. His cowardice and irresponsibility thus left the old king no other choice but to nominate the ‘martyr’ prince’s son, the young Kaikhusrau, for succession. The prince was inexperienced and admittedly made a poor choice, but, unless he preferred to set aside his own dynasty and consequently the policy it symbolised, Balban found no better alternative¹. Kaikhusrau was however brought up under his strict supervision and could, perhaps, be counted upon to imbibe some of his own qualities in preserving the throne, delicately balanced as it was, between so many contending forces. Balban’s ultimate reliance was in any event, on his trusted counsellors, his friend the *kotwal* and the *wazir* whom he requested to give all protection and advice that the prince may need. He died within a few days of Kaikhusrau’s nomination, about the middle of 1287 A.D.¹.

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¹ the prince’s fight and resulting death; Budauni: op. cit. p. 138 (text). quotes Amir Khusrau’s ode. See T4, I, p. 88 for an unconfirmed story of how the prince’s sad end was supposed to be the result of the displeasure of the contemporary saint Sadruddin of Multan. In a fit of drunkenness the prince is reported to have divorced his wife, a daughter of the house of Iltutmish; on his subsequently desiring to take her back, she had to be married to another and then divorced. The saint was persuaded to agree to taking her in marriage but later the lady refused to return to the prince and consequently the saint refused to divorce her. The prince thereupon flew into a rage and swore to kill Sadruddin, the first thing next morning; but the Mongol invasion occurred to take him away to his fateful expedition before he had time to execute his plan.

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¹ Barani, p. 121-22.

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¹ TM, p. 52. Barani gives no date but on p. 127, places Kaiqubad’s accession in 685, which is wrong.

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"The *maliks* in grief at Balban’s death," remarks Barani, "tore their garments and threw dust on their heads as they followed, barefeet, the king’s bier to the burial ground at Darul Aman. For forty days they mourned his death and slept on the bare floor"². That the austere and terrible monarch was popular, is hard to believe; respect for his abilities and a fear for his power would be more natural. Enough has perhaps been said to evaluate his contributions to the making of the Delhi Sultanate. In continuing Aibak and Iltutmish’s work be applied an energy and calculation that brought forth warm tributes even from his adversaries. To him, unquestionably, is to be attributed the preservation of the state’s integrity at a time when unrestricted expansion threatened to overstrain its resources. By consolidating the conquered areas, and destroying the forces of anarchy, he fulfilled a historical need, namely, preparing the Sultanate for further territorial expansion as the next stage of its development. Balban’s greatest single achievement lay in the revival of the monarchy as the supreme factor in the state. By the centralisation which it involved—although detailed instances are lacking—Balban’s work thus definitely shortened the period of administrative improvisations that marked the 13th century Sultanate. In a large measure he prepared the ground for the Khalji state-system.

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² Barani, p. 122-23.

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In one aspect of his policy however, he showed a lamentable lack of statesmanlike vision. This was his extreme racialism which led him to make the Sultanate an exclusively Turkish concern. He affected a great repugnance to associating with what he called men of “low origin” and could not bear the sight of the native Mussalmans in his government. On one occasion he administered a sharp rebuke to his courtiers for having selected a native Mussalman for a clerical post in Amroha¹. His autocracy was intended to emphasise the unchallenged domination of the Turks, although they themselves were conceded very little share in the exercise of sovereign power. It would therefore be wrong to designate Balban’s state as an oligarchy, but there seems little doubt that he considered himself more the custodian of Turkish sovereignty than a king of the Mussalmans. In so doing, he admittedly was following his master Iltutmish who is also reported to have felt an equal abhorrence for the Indian Muslim. But what was defensible in Iltutmish’s time was fraught with ruinous consequences in that of Balban. The initial conquest, as has been noted earlier, had the character of a racial movement; its easy success was largely conditioned by the uninterrupted flow of immigrant Turks from beyond the Hindukush. A loose political organisation, held together largely by a common race-sentiment could, and was forced by circumstances to, insist on the preservation of this dominant characteristic; while the overrunning was in progress this sentiment, coupled with the equally potent tie of religion worked wonderfully well. This insistence on racialism proved a great help in focussing opposition to the racial aggression of the Mongols. Most of these factors however, had ceased to be operative by the time Balban commenced his reign. No fresh immigration could reach India from Turkestan on a large scale; conversion and inter-marriage steadily increased the non-Turkish Mussalmans. Balban himself put an end to continuous territorial expansion and devoted himself to defending the Muslim state from the Hindus and the Mongols; common interests of safety, which thereby were emphasised, were bound to transcend racial and even religious barriers. Imperceptibly, but with irresistible progress, an integrated Indo-Muslim society was coming into being and the transformation of the Sultanate, from a Turkish to an Indo-Muslim state, was well on its way. To resist this process was therefore not only useless but highly unwise. For the steadily-diminishing number of the pure-born Turks it was impossible to maintain predominance. Balban’s uncompromising will only gave it an unreal lease of life; his death, consequently, meant the passing of the Turk as the controller of India’s destiny.

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¹ Barani, p. 36. For other instances and for Iltutmish’s and Balban’s views, see pp. 37-39.

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This impending change was apparent to all his contemporaries. "Every upstart" said the *kotwal*, while delivering the funeral oration as Balban’s coffin was being lowered into the grave, "will now aspire to the throne and ancient families and the old aristocracy will be for ever ruined"¹. This change, surely as it was coming, was hastened by the new reign surveyed in the next chapter.

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¹ Barani, p. 123; see also Barani's observations on the termination of Balban's reign.

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