The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India: A History of the Establishment and Progress of the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi, 1206–1290 A.D. c14: Chapter X. The Central Government

The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India: A History of the Establishment and Progress of the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi, 1206–1290 A.D. c14

Language: English

Chapter X. The Central Government

c14.2

The foregoing pages will have shown the extent to which the organisers of the Delhi Sultanate had to busy themselves with problems of expansion and defence. These military problems, in fact, lasted nearly the whole of the century. The state, under such circumstances, was bound to resemble the organization of an army in occupation and hence had to be, in the main, military. Its civil functions emerged only gradually and at a converse ratio to the disappearance of security problems. In its original structure, the Sultanate exhibited little planning. The conquerors imported certain institutions from their homeland and from Persia, most of which they found already in use in the Ghaznawide Punjab and which, but for the designations, were not unfamiliar to Indian practice. The Memelukes started with the minimum of interference with governmental notions and habits; the change, impelled by the conquest, was not so much administrative as political. In the details of local government and revenue practice, in which, it should be noted, the new regime initially affected the conquered people, the Memelukes are not known to have attempted any noticeable alteration at all. In matters which were more or less exclusive to the conquerors themselves, like the central administration, army and the judicial organization, the reproduction of their own familier methods was only natural.

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Inadequacy of such improvised administration was realised only with the passage of time and as the conquerors, loosing contact with their home, were thrown solely on Indian life, and as the occupation, spreading to the country side, tended to become permanent. Within their own ranks new problems arose, and the changing military situation demanded new adjustments. Yet no administrative planning could be undertaken or executed; improvised solutions were all that the situation would permit. The Memeluke administration was, therefore, mainly a series of experiments and tendencies which did not crystallise into a comprehensive system until a new dynasty came to power.

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The appended account of the 13th century Muslim administration is intended to bring out this compromise and provisional nature. The chroniclers, too busy in recording military events, leave large gaps in our knowledge of the institutions and their working; these have to be filled, in a large measure, by reference to the non-Indian setting of such institutions which, as explained above, must have formed the starting point of Indo-Muslim administration.

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As the supreme ruler of Islam, the Caliph had long been reduced to a mere shadow. With the ascendency of the Turks, early in the 9th century, commenced the rapid process of his decline; the Buwide rulers of Hamadan were the first of a series of dynasties, who, by occupying Baghdad and tolerating the Caliph as a puppet, demonstrated the emergence in the bosom of Islam, of what may perhaps be described as nation-states. The Abbaside family retained its moral leadership and even sovereignty over portions of Iraq, but only by the courtesy of the Ghaznawide, Seljuq and the Khwarizmi emperors. Besides the rival Caliphate of the Fatimides in Egypt, new principalities arose whose rulers wielded unquestioned sovereignty, thus converting the *Darul Islam* into a multiple state-system. Yet constitutional law was chary to recognise the passing of the Caliph, for it knew of only one temporal sovereign for the indivisible world of Islam. Juristic ingenuity therefore, found a solution by according to the new rulers the status of a viceroy to whom, either formally or by implicit acquiescence, power was supposed to have been delegated by the Caliph. Religious belief accorded well with this arrangement and the Caliph's exclusive sovereignty over the Islamic world was thus continued by a legal fiction. What was originally a matter of courtesy, however, became, in course of time, a legal obligation and a formal appointment by the Caliph was considered as conferring extra dignity; even where no direct delegation of power took place, legal scruple demanded an invocation of the Caliph's name in the *khutbah* and coin. From the tenth century the Abbaside Caliphate thus lived on merely as a symbol of Islam's original unity to whom almost every Muslim ruler owed at least a token allegiance.

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Muizzuddin's kingdom was thus, on paper, a province of the Caliphial empire, and as such, his early coins, issued in Delhi, bore the name of the reigning Caliph as a matter of course. By recieving a formal investiture from al-Mustansirbillah, Iltutmish made the Delhi Sultanate a direct vassal. None of his successors repeated the process but no one repudiated the legal vassalage; in coins and in the *khutbah* the Caliph's name continued as the legal sovereign, even long after the last Abbaside yielded up his life to Mongol brutalities. Meanwhile, to the Sultan's name were added appropriate phrases indicating his lieutenancy. By even inscribing the Caliph's name in Nagari characters on the currency pieces, occasional affirmation was made to the non-Muslims of the Delhi state being part of a world empire¹.

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¹ For some coins of this type see Wright, p. 26. nos. 48, 49.

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Theoretically, therefore, the Mameluke king claimed to be no more than a viceroy, but in actual practice his sovereignty was absolute. But for the personal and religious portion of the *Shariah*, his power knew no limitation. He was the supreme executive and judicial authority and power as well as honour could be held only from him. Like the Caliph, he was the supreme interpreter and enforcer of the *Shariah*. Prudence as well as legal rules, however, suggested recourse to the advice of learned ecclesiastics. But the majority of this class was not above temptation; an unholy alliance with them smoothened the path of the king's despotism. There were on the other hand some practical and hence very real checks on his power. Apart from the consequences of an open violation of religious rules in an age when religion was a much more potent force than can be imagined now, the fear of causing rebellion compelled the kind to abide by some accepted rules of conduct. His legislative powers, like those of the Caliph, were greatly limited and, even in strictly secular matters like administration, at least a formal conformity with the principles of the *Shariah* could not be dispensed with. Though imbued with the Iranian idea of a divinely appointed, almost sacrosanct kingship, yet the Turkish mind still held, though in a diminishing degree, to the racial polity; every clan-leader was a potential king. Dynastic legitimacy was not always a guarantee of continued sovereignty. Even capable and strong rulers felt the need of cloaking their despotism by placating legal opinion and affected great reverence for the personal rules of Islam.

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The Sultan's assumption of such powers was not likely to evoke adverse comment among the Indians, for a Hindu king was also a divinely appointed person and his autocracy was limited only by the practical need to observe the Shastra and forestall rebellion.

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The Sultan was thus the motive force of everything in the realm. His seculer duties he performed himself; those pertaining to the application of the personal and religious law of the Muslims were left to an expert divine, the *Sheikhul Islam*¹.

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¹ Iltutmish offered this office to Qutubuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki, and on his refusal, gave it to Najmuddin Sughra; *Siarul Arefin*, f. 57a. In 1253 Mahmud appointed Jamaluddin Bustami who, on his death, was succeeded by his son; Minhaj pp. 220 and 226.

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Next to the Sultan, the chief executive office belonged to the *wazir*. Primarily he was one of the four departmental heads, the "four pillars of state;" but his rank was a little above the others, for he was the chief minister. The officer, who usually was styled the *Nizamul Mulk*, *Muayyidul Mulk*, *Sadrul Mulk*, or *Ainul Mulk*, was recruited from the writer class (*ahl-i-qalam*) as distinct from the fighters (*ahl-i-saif*)². Over other ministers he exercised a general supervisory authority; that he was in a position to override other departmental heads seems to be implied by the *wazir* Muhazzabuddin taking all power out of the hands of the Turks. Normally, every single act of the *wazir* was to have the Sultan's prior sanction. He does not appear to have had any judicial functions, but as the chief minister, his supervisory jurisdiction would include the organization and command of the army¹; as the finance minister he controlled the military pay office. He even occasionally commanded troops in battle². As the Sultan's chief counsellor, he had access to him at all times. Probably he received a fixed salary for there is no mention of any assignment of revenue in his case; Muhazzabuddin is reported to have appripriated the *iqta* of Kol to him self, but this was considered unauthorised as was also his assumption of two of the royal prerogatives, the *naubat* and the elephant³. Qalqashandi and also Shahabuddin Abbas, referring to the time of Muhammad b. Tughluq, however, speak of official appanages—'a province as large as Iraq'—being enjoyed by the *wazir*, whose assistants and clerks also are said to have held towns and villages, besides pay, "the worst paid among them receiving 10,000 *tankah* per year"⁴. Besides the improbability of this being the case in the 13th century, some exaggeration must be attributed to this account. The *wazir* was assisted by a *naib* who was usually promoted to the higher office⁵.

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² Fakhre Mudir: *Adabul Harb*, f. 56b.

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¹ Fakhre Mudir: *Adabul Harb*, f. 36 & 53b. In the 13th century however, the *wazir* was overshadowed by other officers and generally was anything but the highest executive officer. Under the later Tughluqs he rose in power and really became the prime minister when he personally looked after the equippment of troops and even held reviews; Afif; *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi*, 193, 442. Such assumption of interfering authority in other departments must be ruled out under the Memelukes; even his jurisdiction over the military accounts was put an end to by Balban, as will be noticed hereafter. Cf. Qureshi: p. 78-79.

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² *Tajul Maasir*, f. 237a; Minhaj, p. 173.

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³ Minhaj, p. 198.

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⁴ *Subhul A'sha*, V, p. 94; Elliot: III, p. 578.

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⁵ For the *naib-wazir*'s duties see Barani, p. 454. Instances of promotion are afforded by the careers of Muhazzabuddin, and Khaja Khatir; Minhaj p. 187 and Barani, p. 24.

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Although technically the chief minister, his powers fell far short of what al-Mawardi describes as the *wazirut-tafwiz* (the *wazir* with unlimited powers)¹.

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¹ Al Mawardi: *op. cit.* pp. 21-24; see also Khudabukhsh; *Contributions to the History of Islamic Civilization*, pp. 246-248.

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Finance Ministry. The Memelukes appear to have had one *wazir* at a time, but Minhaj ascribes three to Muizzuddin². Even as a bureaucratic administrator he lost much of his importance after Iltutmish's death, when the *amir-i-hajib*, the *wakil-i-dar*, and finally the *naib-i-mamlikat* superseded him in power. He was then reduced, in practice at least, to a mere departmental head, in charge of finance and revenue; the *masnad-i-wazarat* (office of the prime minister) continued to be held by him, but the *diwan-i-wazarat* (finance ministry) was the only department be really controlled, and which always formed his own portfolio. Through his fiscal staff he collected land revenue from the unassigned land, (*khalisah*) and tribute from the vassal princes. By far the largest amount of his department's routine work was auditing the accounts of the provincial governors and realising the surplus revenue, sometimes even by violent methods³. He had an army of clerks under him. The audit section of the ministry was run by two officers, the *mushrif-i-mamalik* and *mustaufi-i-mamalik* whose functions correspond to those of the chief accountant and auditor general of the kingdom⁴. The *amil*, *karkun* and *mutasarrif*, comprised his fiscal and clerical staff¹. The office work of the *diwan-i-wazarat*, must have been elaborate, even in that early stage of governmental organization, to merit Fakhre Mudir's description of the *wazir* "as ruling over a highly complex department²." We hear of Muhammud Tughluq's *wazir* having four *dabirs* (secretaries) under him each of whom had a staff of 300 clerks³. Afif, writing of Firoz Tughluq's time, remarks, "if one wants to describe the work of the *diwan-i-wazarat*, one has to write a book⁴."

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² p. 126.

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³ No direct reference is found in the 13th century chronicles to such duties, but instances from Khalji and Tughluq history confirm the above statement. For Ghiyasuddin Tughluq's instructions to his *wazir* regarding the collection of the land revenue, see Barani, p. 429. For a reference to the ministry's audit work under Firoz Tughluq, see Afif: *op. cit.* p. 414. The ministry sometimes sent auditors to provincial governments; such auditors were called *muhasib*. See Amir Khusrau: *Ijaz-i-Khusravi*: f. 106 sq, for the copy of a report sent by the *Muhasib* about the refusal of the *muqti* of Manikpur, in 909/1309, to render his accounts or pay up the surplus due.

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⁴ The *mushrif* is not mentioned as an accountant in the 13th century writings, but Afif speaks of his functions in the ministry as of long standing; *op. cit.* p. 409-410. Firoz Tughluq raised the *mustaufi's* importance and empowered him to interfere with all sections of the *diwan-i-wazarat*; he was finally made the auditor-general of the kingdom; Afif; *op. cit.* p. 376. Under the *Mustaufi* was another official called *waquf*, created by Firoz Khalji, to examine the items of expenditure. He also created the post of *nazir* to examine the returns of the *Amil* submitted to the *mushrif*, Afif; *op. cit.* p. 420.

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¹ Barani, p. 288-89.

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² *Adabul Harb*, f. 36a.

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³ Abbas; *Masalikul Absar*, Elliot, III, p. 578.

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⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 420.

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Next in importance to the *wazir* was the *ariz-i-mamalik*, the head of the army department (*diwan-i-arz*). He kept the *iqtadar's* (military assignee) muster-roll, recruited new troops, and looked after the equipment and efficiency of the fighting forces⁵. He was, besides, the paymaster-general of the army. His *naib* of whom there could be more than one at a time, accompanied the army in campaigns and arranged for provision and transport and took charge of the booty⁶. The *ariz* occasionally held reviews of the fighting services. These were meant, in addition to inspecting the equipment and general smartness, to facilitate the disbursement of pay and also to receive the contingents furnished by the provincial governors. Balban's *ariz*, Imadul Mulk, used to reward the troops out of his own resources and is specially praised for his conscientious discharge of duties⁷. He was given wide powers to increase the rate of soldiers' pay, and was made independent of the *wazir's* financial control. Barani records his practice of occasionally entertaining his office staff and begging of them not to take bribe from the *muqti's* representatives or to misappropriate any portion of the soldiers' pay, a vice which would thus appear to have been quite common and which by later instances is not proved as having been rooted out. The *ariz* was probably paid in assignments for Imadul Mulk is said to have granted may villages for public charities out of his own *iqta*¹.

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⁵ Barani, p. 61.

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⁶ *Ibid*, p. 326.

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⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 115-16.

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¹ *Ibid*, p. 117.

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The third ministry was the royal chancellery, which Minhaj seems to designate as *diwan-i-ashraf* but which, subsequently and in general practice, was known as the *diwan-i-insha*². Its function was to draft royal proclamations and despatches and to communicate with the local executive officers. It had a large staff of secretaries, called *dabir*, the head or *sahib* was usually known as the *sadrul mulk*. The Sultan's private *dabir* was known as the *dabir-i-khas*. His duty was to accompany the king and, besides taking charge of his correspondence, to compile the *Fath Namah* (victory communique)³. The *sahib-i-diwan-i-insha* was in close touch with the Sultan and was the keeper of government records.

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² Minhaj, p. 185. In Firoz Tughluq's time, the *Mushrif* was the accountant, the chancellor being then known as the *sahib-i-diwan-i-insha* who had lost his cabinet rank; see Afif: *op. cit.* pp. 279 and 409.

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³ Tajul Maasir, f. 73a, 124b; see also Barani, p. 158.

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In Bughra Khan's description of the state in course of his advice to Kaiqubad, the fourth ministry is called *diwan-i-rasalat*⁴. Its functions are not outlined but the term *rasalat* suggests foreign and diplomatic correspondence and as such must have been a kind of foreign office, in close touch with ambassadors and envoys sent to and received from foreign potentates¹.

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⁴ Barani, p. 153. *Cf.* Qureshi: *op. cit.* p. 84, who propounds a theory that this department dealt with religious affairs and was allied to the *diwan-i-qaza*, the two being usually presided over by the same person. No definite authority for this statement is however cited, nor is any available in the early chronicles. His statement that "the *Diwan-i-Rasalat* dealt with religious affairs, pious foundations, stipends to deserving scholars and men of peity and that it was presided over by the *Sadrus-Sudur* "is based purely on supposition, for the references given do not admit of such an inference. His ingeneous explanation of why the term *rasalat* applied by the Ghaznawides to the chancellery, was, under the Memelukes, transferred to the ecclesiastical department, hence becomes pointless. The Memelukes in fact made little change in what they found of the Ghaznawide institutions in the Punjab and seem to have followed administrative traditions current in other Muslim countries of Asia. See Nazim; pp. 142-43, for a description of this department's functions under Mahmud of Ghazni.

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¹ See Fakhre Mudir: *Adabul Harb*, f. 57a, for the regulations concerning the despatch of ambassadors.

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Besides these principal departments, there was the *barid-i-mamalik*, chief news writer of the kingdom under whom were numerous *barids*, posted in towns, bazars and in almost every inhabited locality². They reported every important incident to the chief who communicated them to the Sultan. Besides reporting on public affairs they also spied on the conduct of the local officials. In effect, the *barid-i-mamalik's* department combined the functions of an exclusive government news organization with those of the secret intelligence service³.

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² Barani, pp. 24 and 38.

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³ See Siyasat Namah, pp. 57-58, and 65; Aufi: *Jawamiul-Hikayat*, f. 319.

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Another equally important department was the *diwan-i-qaza*, (judiciary) presided over by the *sazi-i-mamalik* (chief justice of the kingdom) who sometimes also held the office of the *Shei-khul Islam*, in charge of the ecclesiastical affairs. In the latter capacity he was known as the *Sadr-i-Jahan*, or *Sadrus-Sudur*, a designation which the chronicler Minhaj held on a number of occasions. As the king's advisor on religious affairs he controlled the educational establishments, led the Friday prayeyrs and appointed khatib and imam to local mosques. He was also the head of the ihtisab organization and controlled the large staff of muhtasibs, (religious and moral censors) placed in every Muslim locality. As the head of the judiciary, the chief qazi was responsible for the recruitment and posting of the judicial staff and working of the judicial institutions.

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Of lesser importance were the departments of inland shipping under the amir-i-bahr¹ and the armoury (zarrad khana) under the shahnah, (superintendent), the last being clearly affiliated to the army ministry². The treasurer (khazin), must have been under the orders of the wazir³.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 258.

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² Ibid, p. 254. In Barani's time it was known as the Salahkhana and the officer, called Sar-i-Salahdar, had a rank in the army; Barani, p. 24.

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³ Minhaj, p. 249.

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These were the normal institutions of the central government and their working was little affected by political changes. These changes, in so far as they influenced governmental policy, were caused not so much by successions on the throne as by the holding of certain posts in the royal household. As in all despotically ruled states, the king's household was the pivot on which the entire administration turned and functionaries in that household naturally enjoyed great power. One such officer under the Memelukes was the amir-i-hajib, also called malikul-hujjab and shariful hujjab⁴, the master of ceremonies. He enforced the court etiquette and acted as the intermediary through whom the Sultan communicated with his officials and the people; no one could gain access to the king without his permission. He was assisted by a large number of *hajibs* or ushers who accompanied the king; his personal *attaché* was called the *khas hajib*. The chief was assisted by a *naib* who was also a high noble. In Barani's time the *amir-i-hajib* seems to have been better known as *barbak*¹.

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⁴ Ibid, p. 294; Barani, p. 527-28.

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¹ Barani, pp. 34, 36 and 61.

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Placed as the *amir-i-hajib* was near the Sultan's person, he could wield dictatorial powers specially when the king was weak or young; significantly enough, we do not hear much about the *hajib* and his actions under Aibak, Iltutmish or Balban. The office therefore was the bone of contention between rival factions of courtiers; and a change of government, consequent upon a new faction coming to power, meant changing the incumbents in such offices as that of the *amir-i-hajib*. On Balban's dismissal in 1253, his brother Kashli Khan was also made to relinquish the *hajib's* post; Raziah's *hajib*, Aetigin, by virtue of his position, took the main part in the conspiracy that led to her downfall. Bahram's *hajib*, Badruddin Sunqar, was able to supersede the *wazir's* authority and even to issue orders without the king's sanction².

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² Minhaj, p. 193.

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Of greater importance, from the point of view of administration, was the *wakil-i-dar*, another household officer. The office is first mentioned in the reign of Mahmud when the upstart Rayhan got himself appointed to this post, but obviously, it must have existed earlier. From Minhaj's statement that on getting the post Rayhan "took into his own hands the direction of the affairs within the hall of the pavilion of majesty"³, he would appear to be the administrative head of the king's household establishment, and as such was the successor to the Ghaznawide *sahib-i-diwan-i-wakalat*⁴. Fakhre Mudir, in outlining his duties and privileges, considers him as the functionary whom every member of the royal household and family was bound to show respect¹; the *Siyasat Namah* refers, among others, to his duty of looking after the education of the children of the royal family². The *wakil-i-dar* was thus, in fact, the king's steward, a comptroller of the royal household and so anticipated the Mughal *mir-i-saman*. Like the *amir-i-hajib*, the *wakil* also commanded great potentialities and under weak kings like Mahmud or Kaiqubad, could play the dictator. He had also a *naib*, but no smaller *wakils*³.

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³ *Ibid*, 298; Raverty's trans, p. 827.

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⁴ Nazim: op. cit, p. 147.

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¹ *Adabul Harb*, f. 42-43.

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² p. 82.

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³ Barani, p. 36.

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Another officer attached to the court was the *sar-i-jandar*. He commanded the king's body guards called *jandars*, among whom a large group was possibly formed by the younger slaves of the king. The *sar-i-jandar* was a salaried officer⁴ and a high noble. There was, it appears, more than one *sar-i-jandar* at a time, possibly in command of different groups⁵. His primary duty was to guard the king's person and the *jandar* formed an integral part of his retinue. A passage in the *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri* seems to suggest that the *sar-i-jandar* was also entrusted with the custody, punishment and execution of prisoners of war and also of convicted criminals; Malik Aibak was offered this post by Iltutmish, but he excused himself by saying that "the Sultan.... commands his slave to take an office of affliction (*musaderah*), while his humble slave is unable to practise bloodshed, torture and extortion and oppression upon Muslims and subjects⁶.

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⁴ Minhaj, p. 237. His salary was under Iltutmish three lakhs *jitals*.

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⁵ See Minhaj, pp. 236 and 252.

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⁶ *Ibid*, p. 237.

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Other household dignitaries were the *amir-i-akhur* (master of horse) with his *naib*⁷, and the *shanah-i-pilan* (superintendent of the elephant)⁸. The *amir-i-shi-* kar, in charge of the king's hunting establishment, had a number of subordinates to look after the different hunting animals and birds¹. A number of other functionaries is mentioned in the chronicles, but these held minor posts, more of decorative than administrative value. These were generally given to newly purchased slaves to whom they served as training ground for offices of real responsibility².

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⁷ Minhaj, p. 247.

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⁸ *Ibid*, p. 256-57.

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¹ Barani, p. 54.

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² Such offices were those of the *chashnigir* (food taster), *saqi-i-khas*, (purveyor of drinks) *dawat-dar* (keeper of the writing case), *bahlah-dar* (?), etc. An *amir-i-majlis* is also mentioned in Iltutmish's reign; Minhaj, p. 238.

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King's guards.

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A kind of advisory council for the Sultan was formed by the *amir-i-hajib*, his deputy, the *wazir*, the *ariz*, the *wakil-i-dar* and the *kotwal* of Delhi³. There was however no hard and fast rule as to its constitutional functions and much deparded on the Sultan's whim. Non-officials also were normally consulted, who together with the officers, were known as the *Arkan-i-Daulat*; Bughra Khan was specially instructed to follow the advice of these counsellors⁴. Kiqubad was urged to refer all problems of government to his cabinet of four ministers composed of the *wazir*, the *ariz*, and the heads of the *diwan-i-insha* and *rasalat*⁵.

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³ Barani, p. 36. The *kotwal's* inclusion was due to his personal qualities and as a close friend of Balban; his office presumably did not warrant his membership.

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⁴ Barani, p. 81.

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⁵ *Ibid*, p. 153.

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These offices functioned normally and their influence on the policy of state was indirect and depended mostly on personal factors; the appointment to one or other of the household offices did not necessarily imply the conferment of over riding authority. Such power was however associated with the office of the *naib-i-mamlikat*, a special post created by Turkish ingenuity. As the deputy ruler, his powers even exceeded those allowed to the *wazirut-tafwiz* of al-Mawardi¹. The *naib* was even greater than the regent for, when he functioned to the admitted extent of his powers, he practically superseded the king. The *wazir* was mainly a bureaucrat and, unless specifically empowered, could have little initiative or independence in matters of policy. But the *naib* controlled all aspects of government and supplied the directive; constitutionally he was meant to exercise sovereign powers and also the prerogative. The circumstances in which the office was created prove clearly the super-legal powers that it was intended to possess. It was the work of the Turkish military oligarchy who, after Raziah’s deposition, resolved to safeguard their own domination by compelling the king to abdicate his powers. Bahram was made to agree to the appointment of Aetigin as his *naib* “for at least one year” and to place him in control of the entire kingdom “by issuing an order in accordance with all this²”. Aetigin’s subsequent assumption of the Sultan’s prerogative of the ‘*naubat* and the elephant’ would thus appear to have been implicit in his position. After Bahram’s fall, the process was repeated and Masud’s *naib* wielded exactly the same powers. The personal factor, however, became active on this occasion and the powers theoretically conceded to the *naib* were overshadowed by the superior ability and cunning of Balban, the new *amir-i-hajib*. But when the latter acquired the office himself, the *naib’s* powers were fully exercised and for the rest of his reign Mahmud played the role of a constitutionally powerless monarch. It is tempting to speculate whether, given the necessary dynastic and political continuity, the experiment of the *naib* would not have resulted in the evolution, in course of time, of something like a constitutional monarchy and of a representative prime minster. The method of selecting the *wazir*, adopted by Mahmud and Masud of Ghazni¹, held out a precedent of appointing the nobles' nominees and thus giving them an indirect share in running the government. But dynastic continuity, sufficient to allow the growth of a political convention, never obtained in India. Besides, Balban, the new *naib*, himself was a monarchist to the core and his eventual accession to the throne meant a cessation of the experiment.

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¹ See note 1, p. 221, *supra*. Cf. Qureshi, p. 77-78, who considers the *naib* as only another name for the chief *wazir*, the *wazirut-tafwiz*, but the fact is, that the *naib* functioned side by side with the *wazir* and was therefore an extra-bureaucratic officer.

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² Minhaj, p. 253.

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¹ On the dismissal of Ahmad b. Hasan al-Maimandi, Mahmud called for nominations from his courtiers; they submitted a list of four names out of which he appointed Hasanak; Masud also followed the same practice; see Baihaqi; *Tarikh-i-Masudi*, pp. 453-54.

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Extraordinary officer, the naib-i-mamlikat.

c14.78

The *naib's* office was entirely abolished; it was made use of sometimes but it was never allowed all its recognised powers. Even the *wazir* became an unimportant functionary under Balban who dealt directly with every departmental head. His *naib*, the *kotwal* Fakhruddin, was merely his representative, a proxy, who was left to carry on the routine administration during the king's absence on the Lakhnauti campaign². Even then, he was left with no discretionary powers for every important matter or despatch was to be sent to the Sultan for final orders³. The *naib* appointed for Kaiumars was also far from what Aetigin or Balban was to the reigning king, for he was intended to exercise powers on behalf of the king, not to supersede him⁴; it was purely a regency. It was in this capacity of a regent that the *naib* functioned in the Khalji period; as the wielder of sovereign power, to the nullification of that of the king, the officer disappeared from after Balban's accession. He was the last incumbent.

Linked texts (3)

Tāj al-maʾāthir — Ḥasan Niẓāmī, Persian
Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī — Shams-i Sirāj ʿAfīf
Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī — Minhāj al-Dīn Jūzjānī