The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India: A History of the Establishment and Progress of the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi, 1206–1290 A.D. c14.73

c14.73

These offices functioned normally and their influence on the policy of state was indirect and depended mostly on personal factors; the appointment to one or other of the household offices did not necessarily imply the conferment of over riding authority. Such power was however associated with the office of the *naib-i-mamlikat*, a special post created by Turkish ingenuity. As the deputy ruler, his powers even exceeded those allowed to the *wazirut-tafwiz* of al-Mawardi¹. The *naib* was even greater than the regent for, when he functioned to the admitted extent of his powers, he practically superseded the king. The *wazir* was mainly a bureaucrat and, unless specifically empowered, could have little initiative or independence in matters of policy. But the *naib* controlled all aspects of government and supplied the directive; constitutionally he was meant to exercise sovereign powers and also the prerogative. The circumstances in which the office was created prove clearly the super-legal powers that it was intended to possess. It was the work of the Turkish military oligarchy who, after Raziah’s deposition, resolved to safeguard their own domination by compelling the king to abdicate his powers. Bahram was made to agree to the appointment of Aetigin as his *naib* “for at least one year” and to place him in control of the entire kingdom “by issuing an order in accordance with all this²”. Aetigin’s subsequent assumption of the Sultan’s prerogative of the ‘*naubat* and the elephant’ would thus appear to have been implicit in his position. After Bahram’s fall, the process was repeated and Masud’s *naib* wielded exactly the same powers. The personal factor, however, became active on this occasion and the powers theoretically conceded to the *naib* were overshadowed by the superior ability and cunning of Balban, the new *amir-i-hajib*. But when the latter acquired the office himself, the *naib’s* powers were fully exercised and for the rest of his reign Mahmud played the role of a constitutionally powerless monarch. It is tempting to speculate whether, given the necessary dynastic and political continuity, the experiment of the *naib* would not have resulted in the evolution, in course of time, of something like a constitutional monarchy and of a representative prime minster. The method of selecting the *wazir*, adopted by Mahmud and Masud of Ghazni¹, held out a precedent of appointing the nobles' nominees and thus giving them an indirect share in running the government. But dynastic continuity, sufficient to allow the growth of a political convention, never obtained in India. Besides, Balban, the new *naib*, himself was a monarchist to the core and his eventual accession to the throne meant a cessation of the experiment.