The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India: A History of the Establishment and Progress of the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi, 1206–1290 A.D. c16.9

c16.9

³ *Cf.* Raverty's note on p. 634-35 of his translation of the *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri*, wherein he contends that "this centre was not the centre division of a corps d'armee under the regular military organization stationed at Delhi, but refers to the contingents which formed the centre of the Delhi forces when in the field; these contingents were furnished by numerous feudatories....whose fiefs lay in the immediate vicinity of the capital and whose contingents could be summoned to the King's standard at a very short notice". This conclusion appears untenable in view of the fact, that the *qalb* is always found associated with the Sultan and Delhi and that whenever any provincial contingent from far or near was required to join, it is usually mentioned in the account. That the *qalb* should not be identified with the provincial contingents is clearly proved by the fact that when confronting the rebel Kashlu Khan in 1256, Balban kept his own troops and those of Sher Khan, the Governor of Bhatinda, separate from the *qalb-i-sultani* and other troops from the capital over whom he placed Kashli Khan; Minhaj p. 308. It is inconceivable that in normal times the king was left with no troops at all. In the same year when Delhi was besieged by Kashlu and Qutlugh Khan, the citizens prepared for defence since "the royal troops were absent from the city"; *ibid*, p. 224. Barani, p. 33, also mentions the *hashm i-qalb* whom Balban took with him in his expedition against the Katehryyasi; the *hashm-i hazrat*, mentioned, on p. 115, also seems to refer to the same force.