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History of the Khaljis, A.D. 1290–1320 c10: Chapter X. Malwa Sevana Jalor

History of the Khaljis, A.D. 1290–1320 c10

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Chapter X. Malwa Sevana Jalor

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*The conquest of Malwa (1305).*¹

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¹ This expedition has not been mentioned by Barani. Khusrau describes it in *Khazāin* and refers to it in *Deval Rani* also.

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The capitulation of the mighty kingdoms of Ranthambhor and Chittor, maintains Amīr Khusrau, opened the eyes of the Rajputs to the irresistibility of the Turkish arms and they all submitted to 'Alāūddīn without risking a battle. Rai Mahlak Deva of Malwa, however, "forsook the path of loyalty" and prepared to defend his country against the Muslim aggressor.²

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² *Khazāin*. Habib Trs. p. 43.

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Muslim arms had penetrated into Malwa long before 'Alāūddīn invaded it in 1305 A.D. In 1231-32 A.D. Shamsuddīn Iltutmish had marched against it, captured the fort of Bhilsa and sacked Ujjain, in the course of which he broke the famous temple of Mahākālī.³ But this was merely a plundering raid, and as soon as Iltutmish returned to Delhi Raja Dēvapāla continued to rule there as before. A tiny expedition was also led during Jalāluddīn's reign, but in the time of 'Alāūddīn it sustained a terrific assault and the kingdom was annexed to the Delhi Empire.

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³ For details see Ojha: *Rājpūtānā kā Itihās* (Hindi) vol. I pp. 201-203.

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According to Amīr Khusrau⁴ Rai Mahlak Deva of Malwa possessed thirty to forty thousand cavalry and an innumerable infantry.⁵ Mahlak's foster brother and commander-in-chief of the forces was Koka Pradhāna, an accomplished statesman and a brave warrior. Seeing their recalcitrant attitude 'Alāuddīn appointed a select body of 10,000 troops under the able commander 'Ainul Mulk Multani⁶ to march against Malwa. On their arrival the royal forces created consternation in the country. In an engagement Koka was killed on the field of battle where "so far as human eye could see, the ground was muddy with blood."⁷ His head was sent to Delhi to be trampled under the feet of the horses below the palace gates. Koka's death precipitated the flight of Rai Mahlak Deva to Mandu.

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⁴ *Khazāin*. Habib Trs. p. 43. *Deval Rani* Text p. 67.

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⁵ Yahya, Ferishtah and Hājiūddabīr all say that the Raja had 40,000 horse and 100,000 foot.

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⁶ 'Ainul Mulk was a master of pen as well as sword. *Deval Rani* pp. 67-68.

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⁷ *Khazāin*, Habib Trs. p. 44.

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'Ainul Mulk Multānī administered the country well and peace was soon established. A short time after he marched with his forces against Mandu which, according to Khusrau was "the key to the conquest of Deccan." A contingent of Mahlak Deva, under the command of his son, encountered the invaders but it sustained a defeat and the prince was slain. The fort of Mandu was beleaguered. Meanwhile a traitor from the town pointed out to the Muslim general a private passage and he entered the fort in the darkness of the night. Mahlak Deva and his garrison were taken aback at the sudden appearance of the enemy inside the fortress and in the confused flight that followed the Rānā was killed and the royal army gained mastery of the city, 5th of Jamādi-ul Avval 705 (November 23rd. 1305).⁸

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⁸ *Khazāin* Habib Trs. p. 46. The author of T.M.S. gives the date of the conquest of Malwa as 700 A.H. (1300-01 A.D.) but he is incorrect. The contemporary Khusrau gives the above date. An inscription incised on a soft white stone refers to the construction of a mosque during the reign of Muhammad Shah ‘Alāūddīn in the country of Koka (Koka Desa) in 711 A.H. (1311 A.D.). This inscription which belongs presumably to Chanderi shows that Koka was either very popular or a very powerful minister and the country was known by his name and not by that of its ruler Mahlak Deva. See *Indian Historical Quarterly* vol. I 1925 pp. 653-56.

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Soon after the fall of Mandu, the cities of Ujjain, Dhārnagri⁹ and Chanderi were reduced and their chiefs were forced to recognise the suzerainty of the sultanate. ‘Ainulmulk sent a detailed account of his exploits to Delhi where rejoicings were held for full one week and sweets were offered to the public on all the seven days.¹⁰ Both Malwa and Mandu were entrusted to the charge of ‘Ainulmulk Multānī as a reward for the brilliant success he had achieved and the eminent services he had rendered.

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⁹ A portion of the iron pillar now preserved in the museum at Anand High School, Dhār, is believed originally to have been set up at the principal temple in Mandu (perhaps a Vaishnava one), and was broken by ‘Ainulmulk Multānī in his raid of the city in 1305. *Arch. Sur. India. Rep.* 1902-03 pp. 205-12.

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¹⁰ Ferishtah p. 115.

Capture of Sevānā (1308)

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¹¹ Sevana is a town situated 50 miles to the S. W. of Jodhpur.

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After the conquest of Malwa ‘Alāūddīn sent his brilliant generals Malik Naib Kāfūr and Nuṣrat Khan to the south and himself seized an opportunity to attack Sevana. Sevana was then in possession of a Parmār Rajput chief Sītal Deva. Sītal Deva had witnessed the mighty citadels of Ranthambhor and Chittor succumb to the onslaughts of the Khaljī warlord, but still he refused to submit to the Delhi sultan. Sītal Deva was a powerful and energetic ruler. He had defeated many Raīs in battle and a number of Rajput Rāvats acknowledged his suzerainty.

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The sultan marched on the 13th of Muharram 708 (July 2, 1308)¹² to chastise the ruler of Sevana. On arrival there, he began the investment of the fort. The right wing of the royal army was stationed on two sides, east and west, of the battlements; the left wing on the north; and the centre was entrusted to the command of Malik Kamāluddīn "the wolf." A constant shower of arrows was kept up from the *minjniq* but success was not in sight for a long time. The royal forces resorted to many stratagems, but all in vain.¹³ The Hindus defended the fort stubbornly, threw fire and stone from the battlements and for months together "breath was choked by the sounds of the Turkī flutes and Hindī bells." After great difficulty the imperial forces succeeded in escalding the battlements of the citadel. Sital Deva tried to fly to Jalor,¹⁴ but ran into an ambush and was done to death (23rd Rabīul Avval 708; November 10, 1308). According to Khusrau, Sital Deva possessed an elephantine stature, and when his huge head was presented to the sultan all were astonished to see it. The administration of Sevana was entrusted to Kamal-uddīn Gurg and 'Alāuddīn himself returned to Delhi.

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¹² Alld. Uni. Ms. fol. 34 gives this date. The Ms. of Elliot also had the same date, but Prof. Habib's Ms. has 11th of Muharram 710 H (1310 A.D.). *Khazāin* Trs. p. 53.

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¹³ *Futuh.* p. 307.

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¹⁴ Ferishtah incorrectly says that Sital Deva sent a golden effigy of himself to the sultan and begged for pardon which was granted. Probably, but mistakingly, Ferishtah attributes the story of Ballāl Deva of Deccan to Sital Deva, who according to Khusrau, 'Isāmī and Yahya was killed during the capture of Sevana.

Capitulation of Jalor (1311)

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Rai Mahlak Deva's recalcitrance was imitated by the Chouhan Raja of Jalor,¹⁵ and a similar treatment was meted out to him. Kanhar Deva of Jalor, also known by names of Saligram, Gokalnath¹⁶ and Krishna III, was the son of Sōm Singh a dependent of the Solankī Bhīm Deva of Gujarat.¹⁷ After sultan 'Alāūddīn had consolidated his authority in Marwar Kanhar Deva's semi-independent status was construed as contumacy and his country was invaded.

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¹⁵ In ancient times Jalor was known as Jabalipura. In 1210 Iltutmish had captured it but after a short time it regained its independence. The fort which crowns a hillock is about one thousand feet high. It is situated about 50 miles south east of Sevana.

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¹⁶ Nainst: *Khayat* vol. I p. 153.

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¹⁷ Reu: *Marwar ka Itihās* (Hindi) p. 11.

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Nainsī descibes two sieges of Jalor by 'Alāūddīn. The first occured at the time of the royal army's return from Gujarat in 1299 and the second in 1311. As the sultan himself did not lead the forces to Gujarat, the details given by Nainsī about the siege of 1299 may not be quite accepted, as he always refers to the king's presence there; but Ferishtah also mentions two expeditions to Jalor. While describing the events of the year 704 H. (1304 A.D.) Ferishtah writes that as the imperial generals Alaf Khan (Alp Khan) and Nusrat Khan were returning from the conquest of Malwa they arrived at Jalor and Nahar Deo (Kanhar Deva) taking lesson from the fate of Kōkā offered his submission to the sultan without even a show of resistance. The other invasion according to Ferishtah came off in 1308 and was the outcome of a very curious incident. One day while Kanhar was present in the court he heard 'Alāūddīn say that there was no one among the Hindu Rajas who could dare challenge the might of his arms. The remark pricked Kanhar's sense of pride and he picked up the guantlet retorting "If I wage a war and do not come out successful, I may be killed."\∗18 This effrontry enraged the sultan and he ordered an invasion of Jalor, while Kanhar had already slipped to Jalor to make preparations for war. Haji uddabir almost repeats the same story.¹⁹ The behaviour of Kanhar Deva, however seems very striking. It is really strange that at one time he flies to Delhi to pay homage to the king of his own accord, professes unflinching obedience for four years and then suddenly adopts such an insolent attitude that he puts himself and his subjects in extreme jeopardy. Neither the reasons given by Nainsi²⁰ nor by Ferishtah and Hajiuddabir are convincing. The real cause of the invasion was in all certainty the determination to put an end to the independence of Jalor as was done with the other states of Rajputana.

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\∗18 *Ferishtah* p. 118.

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¹⁹ *Zafarul Vali* pp. 788-89.

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²⁰ An interesting, though uncorroborated, reason has been given by Nainsi. He says that a princess of 'Alauddin's *haram* fell in love with Vikram, son of Kanhar Deva, who was on attendance at the court in place of his father. The sultan and the ladies of the *haram* first threatend the girl to change her mind, but finding her adamant 'Alauddin insisted on Vikram to marry her. The young Rajput could never think of marrying a "Turk" girl and left for Jalor promising to return with a wedding party (*bārāt*) after some time. The sultan suspected a ruse on the part of Vikram and kept a Rajput prince of the house as hostage. As was expected Vikram never returned to marry the girl and the sultan was so much incensed at his treachery that he invaded Jalor.

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In short, the army marched towards Jalor in A.D. 1311. The name of the commander of the expendition is not known but he does not seem to have been a brave general.²¹ The Rajputs defeated the royalists in a number of engagements and the latter beat hasty retreats. It is certain that the battle of Jalor was terrific, and perhaps a prolonged one. According to the Gujarati epic romance *Kanhad de Prabandh*,²² the contest continued for some years, and the imperialists met with a number of reverses in their first attempts to take Jalor.

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²¹ According to Ferishtah (p. 118), Gul Bihisht, a concubine of 'Alauddin captained the force. She fought valiantly but all of a sudden died of a short illness. Her son Shahin continued the warfare but was killed in an engagement not long after. It seems ridiculous that a concubine was put in command of an army constituted of brave Turkish officers and men, and they willingly served under her. No contemporary historian gives this fact, and the story which appears to be nothing more than a concoction of Ferishtah's imagination, should be summarily rejected.

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²² Commissariate. *Gujarat*, Vol. I, p. 12. K. M. Munshi: *Gujarat and Its Literature* pp. 102-5.

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The news of the humiliating retreats put the sultan to his mettle and he sent a strong force under the veteran Malik Kamāluddin Gurg. On his arrival in Jalor, Kamāluddin pressed the siege with unabated vigour. At last Gokalnath, his son Vikram Deva and their followers were killed in a close combat and the fortress fell. Maldeva, a brother of Kanhar Deva, survived the massacre that followed the fall of Jalor. Later on, he was able to secure the good will of the sultan, who as shown before, appointed him to take charge of Chittor from Khizr Khan.

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Nainsi's date (Sam. 1368, 1311-12 A.D.) of the fall of Jalor is in conflict with that of Ferishtah (708 H., 1308 A.D.). In 1308 the conquest Sevana was undertaken and a large army was sent to the Deccan also. It is, therefore, very probable that Jalor was attacked at a later date. Again Nainsi's date finds corroboration in the *Tirtha Kalpa* of Jaina Prabha Sūri who says that in Sam. 1367, 1310 A.D. ‘Alāuddin destroyed the temple of Mahāvīra at Sanchor, a place near Jalor. The desecration of this temple must have been a part of the larger enterprise, namely the invasion of Jalor.²³ Mr. Reu also concludes that Jalor capitulated in 1311 A.D.²⁴ To commemorate this victory ‘Alāúddin had a mosque erected in the famous fort of Songir at Jalor which is still in existence.²⁵

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²³ Also see Ishwari Prasad: *A History of the Qarauna Turks*, vol. I, p. 26.

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²⁴ Reu: *Marwār ka Itihās* (Hindi), p. 15.

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²⁵ The building now known as Topkhānā was originally a mosque said to have been built by ‘Alāúddin. *Arch. Sur. India Rep.*, 1930-34, Part I, p. 50. Also Commissariat;: *Gujarat*, vol. I, p. 50.

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After some time the Rajputs recovered their sway over Jalor and it continued till nearly the end of the 14th century.

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With the capitulation of Jalor almost all the leading states of Rajputana had been subdued one after another. Jaisalmer, Ranthambhor, Chittor, Sevana and Jalor, and the kingdoms adjoining them—Būndi, Mandore and Tonk had all been invaded²⁶ Jodhpur (Marwār) also appears to be under the Sultanate. Although there is no specific mention of its capture by ‘Alāuddīn, yet in an inscription at Pandua (in Jodhpur), dated Sam. 1358 (A.D. 1301), Alavadi (‘Alāuddīn) of Joginipura (Delhi) is mentioned as the ruling king.²⁷

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²⁶ Tod: *Annals*, vol. I, p. 311.

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²⁷ *Arch. Sur. India Rep.* 1909-10, p. 131.

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Thus by the end of the first decade of the 13th century, the whole of Rajputana, the glorious land of Indian chivalry, lay bare at the feet of the emperor of Delhi. But complete subjugation of Rajputana was impossible, and ‘Alāuddīn's success there was of a dubious nature.

The Character of Rajputana Campaigns and the Causes of Rajput Defeat

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Ever since the sultan had embarked upon the conquest of Ranthambhor in 1300, till the fall of Jalor in 1311, his armies had constantly fought in Rajasthan. It was below the dignity of the sultan to recall his forces once the siege of a fortress had been begun, and the valour of the Rajputs could not brook the insult of giving way to the enemy. The result was that bloody battles were fought before each and every fortress. To enumerate the various wars in Rajputana, then, is to repeat the horrors of blood and slaughter, of gallant fight, of glorious martyrdom. Sometimes before a single citadel the contest prolonged for years, and ended in a general massacre of its population accompanied by the gruesome destruction of the womenfolk in the fire of Jauhar.

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Unluckily the Rajputs who spurned life without freedom, possessed valour without the spirit of union. Individual fortresses offered stubborn resistance; but singly none of them was a match against the sultanate of Delhi. Had even two or three Rajput princes combined against the sultan, they would surely have succeeded in defeating him. But secure in their mountain fortresses, each one of them was content to mind his own affairs and exult in his own pride, while ‘Alāuddīn raided and subdued one kingdom after another. The case of Sevana and Jalor is a glaring example of the callous indifference of the Rajput chieftains towards one another. While the fall of Sevana was imminent the ruler of Jalor, living only about fifty miles from there, was unmoved, with the result that after a couple of years Jalor was also taken in another assault.

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Another reason of the Rajput defeat was their forts. They were generally contructed on the top of some hillock and were designed to protect women, children and cattle when the brave defenders sallied out to encounter a sudden invasion. And although it was difficult for the invaders to ascend step by step the steep cliffs of the hillock, yet the citadel, when subjected to a siege, was always rendered separate and secluded from the plains below. Thus the corns and revenues of outlying districts automatically fell into the hands of the enemy. During investment not all the people of the vicinity escaped in time to seek shelter inside the citadel; a large number of them were left on the plains below. Their distress though made them hate the enemy, did in no way dispose them loyally towards their rulers inside the Citadel.

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The conditions inside the fortress, again, were not very satisfactory. During an investment the crowd far exceeded the number of the normal inhabitants, and there were no special arrangements for extra provisions and vegetables.

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The enemy lying at the base of the hill on which the fort stood, could easily cut off the convoy, and it was always the dearth of provisions that rendered defence impossible. The mighty fortresses of Ranthambhor, Chittor and Jalor—all surrendered to famine. Again, medieval conditions of sanitation were no preventive against outbreak of epidemics. To add to this, caste considerations and orthodoxy reigned supreme. The enemy was alive to these weaknesses of the Hindus and took full advantage. The instance of Ranthambhor is worth repeating. Through the services of some traitor, hides were thrown inside the grain cellars, povisions were threreby rendered "desecrate" and the fortress surrendered.

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The Rajputs were still steeped in their age long traditions of warfare and had little opportunities of developing their military strategy. They had little or no connections with Central Asian countries and were quite ignorant of the revolutionary changes the Mongols had introduced in the art of warfare. Every now and then the sultans of Delhi had to fight the Mongol invaders and were quite conversant with their tactics of ambuscade, comouflage and feigning retreats. They possessed engines of war like *arrada, gargach* and *minjniq*. The Rajput fought with huge elephants, in open engagements. Their government was based on feudal principles and fixed quotas of soldiers were provided by the various dependencies in times of war. During an investment such reinforcements could not always arrive because of enemy activity and the beleagured had to fight single handed.

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Moreover, the resources of a Rajput Raja were limited. His country was barren; there was dearth of crops and of water. His only fortune was the hilly nature of the country. How could the Rajput princes then succeed against the sultans of Delhi who possessed the Punjab and Avadh, the most fertile regions of the country, and who could depend upon an unlimited supply of provisions and reinforcements?

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Then, the Rajput only knew how to die. To him death on the field of battle was the greatest bliss, the greatest honour. Chivalry was crammed into his very marrow; he hated trick and treachery. As to the Turk, bravery was his first, trickery his second, nature. To him death was the greatest misfortune. He wanted to live in this world and enjoy the fruits of victory. So victory he must have, whatever the means he adopted to obtain it. Thus, while the Rajput flung himself into the battle, the Turk moved after calculating the enterprise. The Rajput fought desperately, the Muslim diplomatically. Diplomacy with the Rajputs was zero, with the Muslims it was the very secret of their success.

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But the success of the Sultan in Rajputna was short lived. The Rajputs who had a country to love and an honour to maintain never gave way to 'Alāuddīn's governors. If the day was irrecoverably lost they well knew how to deliver themselves and their families from the insulting invader, and as soon as the deluge of the invasion had ebbed they reclaimed their territories. The result was that 'Alāūddin's hold over Rajputana was precarious. The occupation of Ranthambhor after Ulugh Khan left it not more than six months after its capture, is uncertain. Khizr Khan had to vacate Chittor in 'Alāūddīn's life time. Bardic literature enumerates continual struggles between the Muslims and the Rajputs. Obviously Rajputana had not completely submitted, and one or the other kingdom in that land of born warriors was always successfully defying the authority of the Sultanate of Delhi.

Achievements of 'Alāūddīn in North India

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But the adventurer who had raided Devagiri just for possessing gold and silver and had murdered his uncle to wear the imperial diadem, was something more than a vile robber or murderer. He had shown his true mettle in Rajputna where he had fought in the sandy deserts of Jaisalmer and the rocky land of Chittor and Ranthambhor, not simply to conquer, nor only to exhibit the prowess of his arms, but to unify the country under his suzerainty. No greed of gain had hunted him there. With the fall of Jalor not only the whole of Rajputana but the whole of north India had passed into the hands of the sultan of Delhi. In the north-west his armies had marched into Ghazni²⁸ and in the north-east his power had been felt in the far-off land of Nepal.²⁹ From a petty sultan of Delhi 'Alāuddīn had become the emperor of Hindustan by dint of his merit and the burning zeal of his heart. His far-flung dominions were ruled by provincial governors or *muqta's* appointed by him, and all of them served him loyally and obediently.

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²⁸ Vide Chapter XI.

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²⁹ Vide Appendix A.

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Side by side the conquest of north India, 'Alāuddīn embarked upon the conquest of the southern peninsula. There his armies were constantly engaged from 1308 to 1312. The hero of these campaigns was not the emperor himself but his favourite general Malik Kāfūr, who marched out from Delhi and pulled down all the kingdoms of the south one after another. But before making a study of the campaigns into the south, it is necessary to know in detail about the Mughal invasions to India which have been briefly referred to at many places in the preceding chapters.

Cites (4)