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History of the Khaljis, A.D. 1290–1320 c11: Chapter XI. The Mughal Invasions

History of the Khaljis, A.D. 1290–1320 c11

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Chapter XI. The Mughal Invasions

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The military enterprises of 'Alāūddīn were frequently interrupted by the invasions of the Mughal marauders from the north west. From times immemorial a race of barbarians had inhabited the secluded and wild region north of Gobi desert in China. In the 12th century it produced a "scourge of God". And within a couple of centuries after the birth of Changiz Khan¹ the Mughals or Mongols² became so irresistable and invincible that their very name inspired terror in the east and the west alike. Like a huge inundation their innumerable hosts spread from their mountain home in central Asia³ towards Russia, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and India. Gibbon compares their rapid conquest "with primitive convulsions of nature, which have agitated and altered the surface of the globe".⁴ Powerful empires or petty states, all ended in smoke before these free-booters. Strong and cultured monarchies as the Khvarizm Shahi of Turkestan and the Caliphate of the Abassides were put to an end, the last Caliph Almustāsam Billāh being pounded to death.⁵ "No invasion in historical times can compare in its accumulated horrors or in its far reaching consequence with that of the Mughals."⁶ They annihilated populations and destroyed civilization.

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¹ Changiz Khan was born in 1154 A.D. at Dilum Boldak near the river Onan.

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² The word Mongol is derived from "Mong" meaning brave and courageous. Mughal is used by Muslim historians, while Mongol and Tartar are used by European writers. "It denoted, in the first place a group of tribes or nations who composed the armies of the northern invaders, with little or no reference to their racial origin; and secondly, at the time of Babar, it was regarded as something scarcely better than a term of contempt." (Intro. *Tarikh-i-Rashidi* Elias and Ross, pp. 88-89.

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³ For a graphic description of Changiz's atrocities in Central Asian towns see Vambery: *History of Bokhara* pp. 119-139.

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⁴ Gibbon: *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Modern Lib. vol. II, p. 1201.

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⁵ The gallant resistance of Muḥammad of Khvarism and his son Jalāluddīn even extracted the admiration of their bitterest enemy Changīz.

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⁶ Sykes: *History of Persia*, vol. II, p. 70.

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In the early days of their history the Mughals⁷ lived a miserable nomadic life, breeding cattle and horses, and stood very low in the scale of civilization. The contemporary writings of Ibnul Asīr, Juveni, Rashīduddīn as well as Carpini and Rubruquis specify the Mughals as possessed of "yellow skin, high cheek bones, a flat, broad face, black wavy hair and slanting eyes......small chin, broad fleshy lips, sparkling eyes......big ears and round skull."⁸ The climate of their country had made their skins sunburnt and yellow.⁹ They were essentially a dirty race, their filthiness being abominable. The men rarely bathed, the women never, and consequently the most common disease among the Mughals was scabies. They ate all kinds of flesh not excepting human.¹⁰ The mongol was a mixture of extraordinary contradictions. He was exceptionally dull when allowed to be so, but could bear excessive hardship when he was required to exert. A great glutton when edibles were procurable, he could go on without food for days together.¹¹ He was possessed of enormous endurance and could ride for forty hours at a stretch, but otherwise he loved to be inert. The women worked hard and possessed a fairly good position in society.¹² They performed household duties, went with men for hunting and even took up arms in the field of battle.¹³ The main occupation of the Mughals, which accounted for their vigour and virility were sport, military exercise and actual fighting.

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⁷ The early history of the Mughals is obscure like that of any other tribe of Central Asia. See Sir William Douglas on Mongols in the *Encyclopaedia Britanica*, XIV Edition, Vol. XV, p. 716.

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⁸ Howorth: *History of the Mongols*, Part IV, p. 42.

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⁹ Amīr Khusrau, who once fell a prisoner into their hands, gives a very striking description of the Mongols. *Qirānus S'adāin*, Persian Text, pp. 93-95. Elliot, vol. III, pp. 528-29.

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¹⁰ Vincent of Beavois says that the Mughals were accustomed to eat their bitterest enemies, and to suck their blood. (Yule: *Ser Marco Polo*, Vol. I, p. 30). Carpini writes that in one of the Mongol sieges in China when the army was without food, one man in ten of their own force was sacrificed to feed the rest (Howorth, Pt. IV, p. 53). He gives a horrid account of the dirty feeding of the Mughals. He says that they ate dogs, wolves, foxes, rats and horses.

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¹¹ Carpini, who had occasion to live among the Mughals, suffered continuously from pangs of hunger and was amazed at their frugality. Prawdin: *The Mongol Empire, Its Rise and Legacy*, p. 274.

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¹² Female morality among the Mughals was very low. Kidnapping was common. Motherhood, however, was respected and the chief wife carried on the entire management of the household.

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¹³ Howorth *History of the Mongols* Pt. IV, p. 44. Indian historians also speak of women and children accompanying the Mughal raiders into India, but they are nowhere mentioned to have taken part in the warfare.

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It was Changīz, " the Great " and " the Accursed ", who turned the indolent and uncivilized Mughals into a fighting nation. He trained his troops under a discipline of " Draconian severity " and within the span of a century the Mughals ruled both in Asia and in Europe. Besides, Changīz Khān gave the Mughals a code of law known as Yasak and a number of maxims known as Bilik. The Yasak was applied with unflinching severity and within the life time of Changīz Khān many of the flagrant evils among the Mughals—murder, robbery and adultery—became quite rare.¹⁴ In short this great conqueror and law-giver exploited the qualities of valour and perseverance of the quiescent Mughals¹⁵ and transformed them into the most distinguished warriors of the world.

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¹⁴ Prawdin: *The Mongol Empire*, p. 90.

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¹⁵ Changiz Khan used to say: "Man's greatest pleasure is to defeat his enemies, to drive them before him, to take from them which they possess, to see those whom they cherished in tears, to ride their horses, to hold their wives and daughters in his arms." Juveni, Translation in Vladimirtsov, *The life Changiz Khan*, p. 160. This betrays the true spirit of nomad war-lord and shows, how gladly the nomad barbarians would have listened to such sermons and flocked to his standard.

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Thuswise Chingiz Khan made a nation out of dust. He gave the Mughals a huge empire and large armies well disciplined and trained in the art of warfare. In fact he overhauled and organized all spheres of social as well as military life of the Mughals. He divided the inhabitants of a locality by the number of their tents; towns and cities among the early Mughals being unknown. A collection of ten tents was called *aouls*, that of ten *aouls* was called *ulus* or *otaks* and that of these ten *obog* or clan. This order in social life was also preserved for military organisation. From one single individual to a division of ten thousand horsemen all were kept under strict control and supervision. The smallest unit of the Mughal army consisting of ten horsemen (or *fard*) was called *urban*. Ten *urbans* made a *doh* or a division of one hundred. Ten *dohs* formed a *minjan* and ten *minjans* a *tuman*—a division of 10,000 horses, so often alluded to by Persian historians. On each of these units were appointed officers; a *tuman* in the early days of Mughal conquest was commanded by a prince of the royal blood.¹⁶ The Mughal military organization was based essentially on cavalry, the greatest wealth of the Mughal being a horse; and horse stealing among them was considered to be the highest crime punishable by death. The equipment of a Mughal warrior consisted of a javelin; a hook, to pull the enemy from off his horse; bow and arrows; and a sword. The Mughal was a born fighter; the environment as well as tradition made up for his deficiency if there was any. From the very early days of Changiz, brothers and cousins and friends fought side by side, and a defeat even in a sham fight was considered to be a disgrace.¹⁷ The exercises were actual fighting except for the profusion of blood.

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¹⁶ Also see Petis de la Croix: *The History of Changiz Khan the Great*, pp. 81-2. Thus the *Mansabdāri* system, developed by the Mughal rulers of India, had its seed in the military organization of Changiz Khan.

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¹⁷ Michael Prawdin: *The Mongol Empire*, p. 44.

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Mobility was a great quality of the Mughal army. As the Mughals had hardly anything that did not decay, their armies were not burdensome. Their equippage consisted of bare essentials and they carried no paraphernalia with them. They carried their felt tents—"all grimy and greasy, and ready at any moment to be taken down by the women of the tribe ... Of forts, walls, or streets there could have been no sign."¹⁸ A modern authority on Mughal strategy aptly remarks that the Mughals had "grasped the essentials of strategy, while their tactical mechanism was so perfect that a high conception of tactics was unnecessary."¹⁹ Therefore, when Barani says that the Mughals, who came prepared for big battles sometimes vanished in one night, there is nothing surprising. The mobility of the Mughal army was proverbial. Both in their attack and their retreat they baffled their adversaries more by their movements than by their fighting power. It was dangerous to give them chase for as they fled they shot back over their heads and did much persecution upon their pursuers. "They understood the art of feigning retreat, of envelopment and of surprise, and, as battle after battle was fought against nations employing different methods of warfare, the sum of their experience had made them invincible." Marco Polo describes in detail how in their fights the Mughals never got into a regular mêlée, but kept perpetually riding round and shooting at the enemy; and as they did not count it any shame to run away in battle, they would sometimes pretend to do so, killing in stray attacks and then wheeling round and returning to the charge in perfect order and routing their enemy.

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¹⁸ Introduction to the *Tarikh-i-Rashidi* Pt. III p. 59.

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¹⁹ Capt. Liddle Hart. *Ency. Brit.* Vol XV, pp. 705-70.

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And the rapaciousness of the Mughals after a victory was unbounded. The complete destruction of the chief cities of Transoxiana clearly shows the inhuman callousness of these free-booters. "Their uniform plan was to convert cities into desert and to leave no human being that could rise in their rear. By the barbarities of their massacres, in which age, and sex, and conditions were alike disregarded they spread horror and dismay around them". On one occasion they put to death a man by dropping molten silver into his ears; and such horrible crimes were committed by them in the sack of Bokhara, Samarqand and Balkh as can hardly be imagined. Juveni relates that in the sack of Tirmiz a captured woman begged for mercy promising the man who was to kill her a pearl of high value which she had swallowed. The cold blooded Mughal ripped open her body and as the pearl was really found in it an order was immediately given to open and examine all the bodies.

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²⁰ Sykes: *History of Persia*, II, p. 85.

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²¹ Howorth: *History of the Mongols* Pt. IV, pp. 84-85.

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²² William Erskine: *History of Babur and Humayun* Vol. I p. 13.

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²³ Such barbarous punishments to which the Muslim historians of Central Asia give exaggerated colour, were not uncommon in those days. The treatment accorded to the vanquished Mughals by 'Alāuddīn was in no way better than what the Mughals gave to their enemies. In spite of their inhuman punishments the Mughals were tolerant of other peoples' religions. Religious scruples did not prompt them to commit atrocious crimes.

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Killing a person by breaking his back-bone was a common practice among them. Of the prisoners of war the Mughals derived the greatest utility. The healthy prisoners were used for hard work and as screens to the invading divisions, while the women were captured as prize of war. Such was the horror inspired by their invasions in European countries that till the other day in some of the churches in eastern Europe the litany included "From the fury of the Mughals good lord deliver us".²⁴

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²⁴ Sykes: *History of Persia* Vol. II p. 71.

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In the 13th and 14th centuries the Mongols had established their power from the Black Sea to the China Sea and from Siberia to Indus and Seistan. They used to fight either amongst themselves or to invade foreign lands in the hope of plunder and conquest. The number of these hordes, which, like swarms of "ants and locusts" issued forth for conquest were mutiplied by the fears of the invaded and the rhetoric of poets and historians. From the days of Iltutmish to those of Jalāluddīn, the rulers of Hindustan had to concentrate all their energies to encounter them. But in vain. It was only 'Alāuddīn who could successfully repulse some of the most terrific Mughal invasions to this country:

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However, before discussing these invasions in detail it would be proper to throw a glance at the contemporary history of Central Asia to examine the causes underlying the so many assaults directed against India. Changīz Khan died in 1226. After his death the empire was divided among his sons. Oqtai became the Great Khan with China and Zungaria, a region that for exact boundaries later became a bone of contention. The descendants of Jūji, who had died in the life-time of Changīz, obtained the Khanate of Qipchāq and Tūli was put in charge of the home clans of Mongolistan. Chaghtai was to rule the kingdom of Transoxiana and Halāgū Khan, son of Tūlī and grandson of Changīz, founded the line of Ilkhān rulers in Persia. Tūlī's son Mangu Khan ousted Oqtai's son Kuyūk from the Khanate and himself became the Great Khan in 1244; and fratricidal war broke out between the houses of Oqtai and Tūlī.²⁵ Mangu died in 1259 and was followed upon the throne by the famous Qublai Khan, another son of Tūlī. Qublai's staunchest enemy was Qaidū, grandson of Oqtai' who never recognized the claims of Tūlī's descendants on his ancestral dominions. Qaidū found a very faithful ally in Dava Khan, ruler of Transoxiana or Mavar-un-Nahr. Dava was a descendant of Chaghtai. Chaghtai had died in 1241 and was succeeded by his grandson Qara Halāgū who ruled until 1265. At his death the great Qublai Khan appointed Mubarak Shah, son of Qara Halāgū to rule Transoxiana, but he was ousted by prince Borak, a great grandson of Chaghtai. He was followed upon the throne by Tuka Timūr, who in his turn was ousted by Dava, son of Borak. Dava in collaboration with Qaidū fought constant wars against Qublai and his descendants on the east and the Ilkhans on the west, both of whom had descended from Tūlī. Now it is with these two houses, the Ilkhans of Persia and the Chaghtais of Transoxina, that we are most concerned; because whenever they found some respite from their fratricidal warfare in Asia they launched upon invasion of India. Thus we find that all the Mughal expeditions of India were sent either from Persia or from Mavarun-Nahr. Either of the two houses wanted to wrest land from each other's territories. And Dava Khan of Transoxiana, who was mostly unsuccessful against his adversaries, wanted to try his luck in India as well, and constantly sent out expeditions to this country. 'Alāūddīn's contemporaries among the Ilkhans of Persia were Ghazān Khan (1294-1304) and his brother sultan Banda Aljaitū (1304-16). In Tranoxiana his contemporaries were Dava Khan (1272-1306) and his sons Kondjuk (Kuyūk), Kubak and Taliku.

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²⁵ Rashiduddin: *Jam'aut Tavārikh*, Tehran Text pp. 132-33.

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Dava was a determined enemy of Hindustan. He was successful in snatching Ghazni from the Ilkhans and made it a base of operations against India. He reigned for thirty six years and all the time he lived, he sent armies to invade India. India had already been subjected to a number of Mughal invasions in 1241, 1245 and 1257. In 1285, Arghūn, the Ilkhan of Persia (1248-1291), had sent his armies to India and this invasion was long remembered in this country as Prince Muhammad, son of sultan Balban, was killed on the field of battle, while Amir Khusrau was taken prisoner. In the time of sultan Jalāluddin the Mughals again attacked India, and as described above, the sultan, unable to defeat them completely, bought a humiliating peace from them. But all these were minor invasions as compared with those that occured in the time of 'Alāuddīn; and it was the good fortune of India that the most tremendous assaults were delivered to this country when a strong monarch like 'Alāuddīn was the ruler.

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*Kadar's raid of the Punjab (1297-98)*²⁶

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²⁶ Barnī gives the date as 696 A.H. Amir Khusrau says that the two armies engaged on the 22nd of Rabiul Akhir 697 (9th February 1298). Ferishtah also has 696. It can clearly be inferred from the account of Baranī that this raid occured some time after the conquest of Multan. Baranī does not give the name of the commander of the expedition. 'Iṣāmī does not mention it at all. *Baranī* p. 250. *Khazain*, Habib Trs., p. 23., *Ferishtah* p. 102.

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The first raid of the Mughals occurred only a short while after 'Alāuddīn's accession. Dava the ruler of Mavar-un-Nahr sent an army of 100,000 strong under the command of Kadar. The raiders poured into the country from the north-west, burnt down the villages of the Gakkhars, descended into the plains of the Punjab, and began to ravage the environs of Lahore. Their advance, as usual, struck terror into the hearts of the people and 'Alāuddīn despatched a large army under his generals Ulugh Khan and Zafar Khan. A battle between the royalists and the Mughals was fought near Jullandhar,²⁷ in which the invaders were worsted. Some 20,000²⁸ of them died fighting and quite a large number of their officers were taken prisoner. They were put to death in the most cruel manner. Ulugh Khan sent the report of the victory to the sultan together with the heads of the Mughal soldiers, their women and children who had been captured and executed.

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²⁷ Amir Khusrau names the site of the battle as Jaran Manjūr; and describes the battle as having been fought near the bank of river Sutlaj., *Deval Rani* p. 60. Barani definitely says that the battle was fought within the environs of Jullandhar, which lies between rivers Sutlaj and Beas. Ferishtah says it was fought near Lahore, which may also mean Jullandhar. *Deval Rani* p. 60; *Barani* p. 250., *Ferishtah* p. 102.

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²⁸ *Khazain*, Habib Trs. p. 24; *Ferishtah*, p. 102, has 12,000.

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This victory in the very early days of his accession enhanced 'Alāuddīn's prestige and stablized his position on the throne.

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*Saldi expelled from Sivistan (1299).*

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In the year 1299 while Ulugh Khan and Nuṣrat Khan were busy with the reduction of Gujarat the Mughals under the command of Saldi reappeared on the frontiers of Hindustan. This invasion has been described by Barani, Iṣāmī and Ferishtah; but curiously enough Amir Khusrau does not mention it at all. According to Ziyā Barani, Saldi and his brother²⁹ invaded the north west part of the country and took possession of Sivistan.³⁰ Sultan ‘Alāūddīn ordered Zafar Khān³¹ to march post haste to Sivistan, invest the fortress, and expel the invaders. The Mughals were soon subjected to a close investment, and although they hurled constant shower of arrows on the royalists they were soon overpowered by Zafar Khān, who did not even use *minjniq* or other heavy engines of war.³² The valiant general with a large number of prisoners of both sexes returned to Delhi. Saldi and his brother were also among the captured.

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²⁹ Ferishtah says that Dava Khan ruler of Mavar-un-Nahr and his brother Chaldi (Saldi) took Sivistān. Barani does not mention the name of the general but simply says "Saldi and his brother." But Dava was all along busy in Central Asian politics and would only have sent one or two generals on so minor a campaign as that of Sivistan. Moreover, Dava was not a man to submit without giving a very tough fight, but the struggle before Sivistan was only nominal. Barani and Ferishtah later say that Saldi and his brother were captured and sent to Delhi chained and fettered. Their fate is not given by any historian but it can easily be surmised when it is borne in mind that these enemies of the state were never spared by ‘Alāūddīn. But Dava was alive in Transoxiana till 1306. The presumption of Ferishtah that the other general with Saldi was his brother Dava is, therefore, incorrect. Moreover all other historians mention Saldi and his brother and do not mention the name of Dava. Had Dava, the ruler of Transoxiana been with Saldi the former’s name should have been more prominent. *Ferishtah* p. 103; *Barani* pp. 253-54. *Futūh* p. 241.

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³⁰ From Sivistan is meant the north west portion of Sindh known as Sehwan.

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³¹ Mīr M‘asūm incorrectly says that Nuṣrat Khān, who had been appointed governor of Sindh after the defeat of Arkali Khān, marched against the Mughals and gave them a crushing defeat. Nuṣrat Khān was then busy in Gujarat. *Tarikh-i-M‘asūmi* Text pp. 43-44.

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³² *Barani* p. 253.

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The ease with which Zafar Khān had won this victory excited the admiration of the people, and the jealousy of the sultān. ‘Alāūddīn was simply amazed at the hardihood, valour and resourcefulness of the brave general and began to look upon him with suspicion. His brother Ulugh Khān nursed similar feelings against Zafar Khān, because the latter’s achievements had thrown into shade the former’s success in Multan and Gujarat. At that time Zafar held the charge of Samanah, and mostly stayed there, for the Mughals were a source of constant danger. ’Alāūddīn now thought of either recalling him to court to remain in constant attendance upon him or to send him away to Bengal which he should subdue and govern.³³ The malicious sultan was even prepared to blind or poison Zafar Khan. But new developments in the political situation gained his object with less cruelty, and with a greater ease and naturalness.

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³³ This statement shows two facts, (i) that ’Alāūddīn had no authority in Bengal and (ii) that in the sultanate period also Bengal was a punitive province as it was under the Mughals. Barani p. 254.

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*Invasion of Qutlugh Khvājā (1299).*

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Towards the close of the year 1299 Qutlugh Khvājā, son of Dava,³⁴ left Transoxiana with twenty tumans (or 200,000 Mughals) for the invasion of Hindustan.³⁵ The humiliating defeat suffered by the Mughals in Sivistan prompted Qutlugh to come with full preparations; and this time they were bent upon the conquest of India. The invading hosts crossed the river Sindh, and by forced marches arrived near Delhi, without distrubing the territories they passed on their way, in spite of the fact that they were actually harassed by the commanders of the frontier posts like Multan and Samanah. The imperialists would retire into their strongholds in the day but would emerge at night and hover at the flanks of the invaders. But the latter were unmoved by these tactics, because they wanted to conserve their energy for the final struggle.

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³⁴ *Barani* (p. 254) has قتلغ خواجه پسر زودالعين. *Lain* means accursed, but there was no king by the name of Zua or Zuda in Transoxiana in the time of ’Alāūddin. The words, therefore, appear to be پسر ذوالعين to mean “Qutlugh Khvājā son of Dava the accursed.” Dava was a direct descendant of Changīz Khān. Abul Fazl gives his genealogy like this:—Dava Khan, son of Baraq Khan, son of Bisutava, son of Mavat Khan, son of Chaghtai, son of Changīz. *Akbar Namah*, Beveridge vol. I, p. 202.

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³⁵ This invasion is not mentioned by Amīr Khusrau in *Khazain* but he makes a passing reference to it in *Deval Rani* (p. 61). The above number of Mughal invaders is given by Barani but at another place he gives the strength of the force as one lac. (*Barani* 254, 256).

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At the rapid advance of the Mughals the inhabitants of the capital as also of the adjoining districts became very panicky, more so because Delhi itself was the objective of the enemy this time. Everybody from far and near flocked into the metropolis. Such a large crowd congregated within the city that men could not find room in the streets, the market places and the mosques.³⁶ To make the matters worse the approach of the caravans and merchants was interrupted by the Mughals who were hovering on the outskirts of the city. The inhabitants of Delhi were reduced to extreme distress as the prices of commodities had become excessively high.³⁷

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³⁶ *Baranī* p. 255.

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³⁷ *Ibid.* p. 255.

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The moment 'Alāuddīn was informed of the invasion he issued urgent instructions to the provincial governors to send reinforcements to the capital. Without waiting to ponder over the gigantic task that lay ahead of him, he began feverish preparation to encounter the invader. Malik 'Alāulmulk, the Kotval of Delhi, who had full knowledge of the vast equipment of the Mughals and their objective, dissuaded the sultan from any hurried action. "Ancient monarchs", said he, "have invariably abstained from hazardous conflicts in which it is impossible to say as to which side victory is likely to incline. In case of conflicts between equally powerful chiefs, when the kingdom is staked on a single throw of the dice, monarchs have exercised their utmost discretion and have warded off the event as long as they could...Why does Your Majesty then purposely and wilfully, and without paying any heed or attention enter a perilous crisis? You may delay in engaging these Mughals....Our army is composed principally of the soldiery of Hindustan, who have spent their lives in warfare with the Hindus only, and have never yet joined in battle with the Mughals, and are consequently ignorant of their cunning system of tactics, their sallies their ambuscades and other strategems"²⁸. Malik 'Alāulmulk continued his harangue in which he tried to impress upon the mind of the king the benefits of delaying an engagement until the enemy fell short of provisions and then pursuing him when he went about searching for food and fodder. The peroration of the Kotvāl betrays the seriousness of the situation. Not only had the Mughals come determined to capture Delhi, they had even brought with them fodder and provisions to last for some time, lest they should waste their strength in securing them. Hence, they did not plunder even in the environs of Delhi. Without detaching even a dozen warriors from their main army they stood with their united strength before the capital of Hindustan ready for an encounter.

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²⁸ *Ibid.* p. 255-57.

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'Alāuddīn had always given heed to the mature advice of the experienced Kotvāl but could not agree with him on the present occasion. He called together all the high officers of the army and in their presence addressed 'Alāulmulk. It was meaningless, said he, to assume a menacing attitude towards the Mughals and yet avoid an engagement with them. How could he hold the sovereignty of Delhi if he shuddered to encounter the invaders? What would his contemporaries and those adversaries who had marched two thousand *kos* to fight him say, when he hid himself "behind a camel's back'.³⁹ And what verdict posterity would pronounce on him? How could he dare show his countenance to anybody, or even enter the royal *haram* if he was guilty of cowardice and endeavoured to repel the Mughals with diplomacy and negotiations? In the end the Sultan exclaimed: "Come what may, I am bent upon marching tomorrow into the plain of Kīlī where I propose joining in battle with Qutlugh Khvājā. ... Oh 'Alāulmulk, to thee have I confided the post of Kotvāl and the charge of my seraglio, and treasures, together with the whole town. Whichever of us two, whether he or I, prove the conqueror, salute the victor with the keys of the gates, and of the treasures, and lay them before him, and become his obedient servant and vassal."⁴⁰

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³⁹ This phrase has been used by Baranī at many places during the course of this conversation. Hiding behind a camel's back or rather hump کوهان شتری simply means avoiding a battle.

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⁴⁰ *Baranī* p. 258.

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After thus giving vent to his feelings, which indicate the true spirit of a statesman-cum-warrior, 'Alāuddīn marched with the royal forces and encamped at Kīlī⁴¹ where Qutlugh Khvājā had arrayed his men on the opposite.

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⁴¹ Kīlī lay north of Delhi, not very far from it. Keene: *History of Hindustan*, vol. I, p. 76. Thmas: *Chronicles* p. 261.

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*Battle with the Mughals.*

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The army was stationed in a very secure position at Kīlī. On the one side was the Jumna and on the other side were thorns and bushes and in between these two stood the royal forces.⁴² 'Alāuddīn drew up his army in the traditional style. Malik Hizabruddīn Zafar Khān, the governor of Samanah, the Punjab and Multan was entrusted with the command of the right wing, and with him were attached some Rajas of Hindustan—a group of veteran warriors. Ulugh Khān was put in command of the left wing, with orders to reinforce any other wing which showed signs of weakness in the course of the battle. The king with Nuṣrat Khān and 12,000 men commanded the centre.⁴³ Twenty-two elephants were stationed in front of each division as bulwark against a terrific assault by the enemy. Having thus dispositioned his troops the Sultan personally reviewed the whole army, and ordered that nobody should move from his place without his orders.⁴⁴

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⁴² *Futūh* p. 249.

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⁴³ *Futūḥ* p. 250. Ferishtah p. 104.

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⁴⁴ According to *Ferishtah* (p. 103) the royal army consisted of 3,00,000 horses and 2,700 elephants, but the figure seems inflated as the sultan would not have been so much worried about this invasion had he possessed such a large force in readiness.

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The Mughals also arranged their men in the same manner. Qutlugh Khvājā was in the centre, whereas Hajlak and Tamar Bugha commanded the left and the right wings respectively. Targhī, another Mughal general, commanded a major division. Isakilba, Kījya, Utnā also held ranks in the Mughal army.⁴⁵

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⁴⁵ *Futūḥ* pp. 246-60. ‘Iṣāmī gives the most detailed account of the invasion.

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Zafar Khān was so restless to fight the enemy that, even before the Mughal army could arrive near Delhi, he had sent a personal challenge to Qutlugh Khvājā to meet him in a duel.⁴⁶ Having ordered his rank and file to be ready for an assault on the Mughal left, he delivered it. Hajlak and his men were gripped in a hand to hand fight with Zafar Khān. Simultaneously Dilēr Khān, son of Zafar Khān, made a furious charge on the Mughals and created a consternation among them. Tamar Bugha could not withstand this attack and fell back. The Mughal army, broken and routed, was hotly pursued by the royalists while Tamar Bughā's men continued to shower arrows behind their back on their pursuers—a practice in which the Mughals were past masters. An assault by the enemy on the centre of the royal army was met by the Sultan, who repulsed it and killed a large number of them.⁴⁷ In this conflict the king rescued a large number of Indian soldiers whom the Mughals had captured as prisoners of war. 'Alāuddīn, however, did not pursue the retreating enemy.

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⁴⁶ *Futūḥ* pp. 247-49.

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⁴⁷ The sultan offered his soldiers one gold *tankah* for each Mughal head. *Deval Rani* p. 61.

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*Death of Zafar Khan.*

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On the right, however, Zafar Khan was hard pressed by the Mughal veteran Hajlak. He had not received any reinforcement from the king nor had he received any orders of withdrawl; and the enemy all the while was gaining ground. Ulugh Khan, who kept an ill-will against Zafar Khan on account of the latter's popularity, did not move to help him in distress.⁴⁸ At last Zafar Khan, left to himself, ordered his men to make a desparate charge upon the enemy. Hajlak could not withstand it and hurriedly retreated. Zafar Khan killed a large number of Mughals while pursuing the flying enemy for eighteen *kos*.⁴⁹ But the pursuit of the vanquished army was imprudent, or at least unfortunate. During their retreat about 10,000 Mughals had fallen in ambush under the leadership of Targhī. They now determined to cut down the royal troops on their way back from the pursuit. As soon, therefore, as they saw Zafar Khan returning, they left the ambuscade and stood arrayed for battle. The valiant Zafar found himself at bay, his wits all at an end. He had about a thousand horsemen with him, while the Mughals were ten times more. He held an emergent consultation with some of his officers like 'Uśmān, the Ākhūrbēg, and 'Alī Shāh, the Rānā-i-Pīl. All of them unanimously decided to give a last desperate battle thinking that even if they escaped alive from the clutches of the Mughals by not giving them a battle, they would surely be punished by the sultan for their cowardice.

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⁴⁸ *Zafarul Vali* p. 797.

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⁴⁹ This distance is not given in the Bib. Ind. Text of Baranī, but Major Fuller's Ms. has it.

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The result of the impending battle was foregone conclusion. The Mughals encircled the royal forces and delivered fatal blows on them. Nonetheless, Zafar Khan was successful in breaking the encirclement. He fought here, there, and everywhere, but still no help was forthcoming either from the Sultan or Ulugh Khan. The battle raged fiercely, and if 'Iṣāmī is to be believed, when 5,000 of the Mughals had been killed Zafar had lost 800 men only. With the remaining 200 horsemen Zafar Khan fought on till the last, and even when his horse had been cut down he fought on foot. The contemporary chronicler gives a graphic description of Zafar's bravery. "His horse died under him", says he, "and that renowned and unmatched warrior began the struggle on foot. Having strewn his shafts on the ground before him he charged with great violence, and every shaft brought one Mughal cavalier down."⁵⁰ The gallantry of such an incomparable general, though not valued by his own jealous sovereign, received a just appreciation from Qutlugh Khvājā who sent him a message saying, "Come over to me, so that I may take you to my father who will treat you with higher honour than the emperor of Delhi has done." But Zafar Khan spurned such an offer and fought as valiantly as ever. Finding it impossible to capture Zafar Khan alive the Mughals pressed upon him from all sides and killed him in a close combat. The gallant soldier had fallen victim to an unequal fight excited by his own unbounded zeal. None of the royalists returned alive from that pursuit that day.

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⁵⁰ Barani pp. 160-61.

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*Retreat of the Mughals.*

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The Mughals had killed Zafar Khan but they had seen the mettle of the army of Hindustan. Under the cover of the night they departed to a distance of thirty *kos* from Delhi.⁵¹ From thence they returned to their country by continuous marches without stopping on the way.⁵² The contemporary chronicler mentions with pride that the dread of the attack of Zafar Khan remained in the breasts of the Mughals for years and when their cattle would not drink water they would ask, "What! Have you seen Zafar Khan that you do not drink water?"⁵³

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⁵¹ 'Iṣāmī, however, says that they hovered about Delhi for a few more days without daring to give a battle and then retired. *Futūh* pp. 258-260.

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⁵² Amīr Khusrau writes that Qutlugh Khvājā died on his way back to Transoxiana (*Deval Rani* p. 61). It is quite correct because after Dava's death in 1306 Kuyūk, Kubak and Taliku, ascended the throne of Transoxiana one after another while this warrior son is not mentioned to be living to claim the throne.

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⁵³ Barani p. 261.

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After this victory the Sultan returned from Kili. By the irony of circumstance, nobody praised the hero of the battle, Zafar Khan, for his sacrifice and gallantry. On the contrary the Sultan blamed him for fighting recklessly and pursuing the enemy without his orders.⁵⁴ In his heart of hearts 'Alāuddīn was happy at the death of Hizabruddīn and considered his death another welcome event, only next in consequence to the defeat of the Mughals.

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⁵⁴ *Futūh* p. 258.

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The Mughal deluge having receded, the Sultan embarked upon the conquest of Rajputna. He sent an army to Ranthambhor in 1300 A.D. and himself went to the scene of action after some time. The Mughals kept quiet for some time, firstly because they had seen the strength of the Indian soldiers and secondly because they were busy with their internal affairs in Central Asia.⁵⁵ All this time 'Alāūddīn was planning further conquests. Towards the close of the year 1302 A.D. he despatched an army towards the Deccan via Bengal and himself proceeded to the conquest of Chittor in February 1303. While 'Alāūddīn was at Chittor the Mughals regained strength enough to invade Hindustan again.

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⁵⁵ At this time Qaidu and Dava were busy fighting Qublai Khan and his successors. After Qutlugh's expedition into Hindustan Dava and Qaidu marched to fight the Mughal Khaqān but they were defeated. Qaidū did not outlive his defeat for long and died in 1302. The great Khans contemporary of 'Alāūddīn were Aljāītu (1294-1307), Kubak (1307-11) and Buyantu (1311-1320). See Lanepoole: *Muhammadan Dynasties* p. 215.

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*The invasion of Targhī (1303).*

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Hardly a month had elapsed since Sultan 'Alāūddīn's return from Chittor, when the Mughal general Targhī invaded India with 120,000 horsemen.⁵⁶ The situation at the capital was very critical indeed. In the siege of Chittor the royal army had suffered terribly, and what little stores and equipment had been saved in the warfare were lost on the return march to Delhi,—a march conducted through the dreary desert of Rajputana and at the height of the rainy season. So that when the Mughals were approaching Delhi ‘Alāuddīn’s forces were not fit to be mustered, they had not renewed their kits even. The army which had been sent to the east had not yet returned. Still ‘Alāuddīn did not lose heart. He sent orders to provincial governors in the east and the west to send reinforcements to the capital and prepared to fight the Mughal invader.

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⁵⁶ Baranī says (p. 300) دوازده تمن سوار, *i.e.* 12 *tumans* or 120,000 horse, but shortly after writes طرغی ملعون باسی چهل هزار سوار گیوا گیر در آمد which means, "Targhī the accursed advanced with 30 to 40 thousand horses". The former figure seems more correct because (1) On this occasion also the conquest of Hindustan was the aim of the Mughals. For such a great undertaking a large force was needed. On a previous occasion like this 2,00,000 horsemen had come. (2) 30 to 40 thousand horses would not have caused so much anxiety to 'Alāūddīn. The consternation at the capital shows that the calamity was as great as ever. Ferishtah also has 1,20,000 horsemen. *Futūh* (p. 276) has 2,00,000.

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Targhi had determined to see that the disaster sustained by Qutlugh Khvājā’s forces was not repeated. He, therefore, had gathered definite information that the Sultan had marched to a distant fortress while another force, under veteran generals, had gone on a distant expedition. By forced marches and without disturbing the territory on his way Targhi arrived on the confines of Delhi. Sultan ‘Alāuddīn gathered together whatever troops he had in the capital, and arrayed his forces in the plain of Siri. As it was impossible to fight the Mughals in an open engagement with so small an army, ‘Alāuddīn decided to exhaust the patience of the besiegers by strengthening his defence lines. On the east of Sīrī lay the river Jumna and on the south-west was the old citadel of Delhi, although by the time of Targhi’s invasion it had not been repaired. In the south lay the dense jungle of Old Delhi. The only vulnerable side, therefore, was the north, where the Mughals had pitched their camp. Sultan ‘Alāuddīn ordered large trenches to be dug up round the encampment and strengthened them by constructing walls of wooden planks around them. In those times when artillery and other modern siege implements had not come in vogue, palisades, trenches and ramparts served best for purposes of defence. In each trench were stationed five huge elephants “incased in armour”, one division of cavalrymen and a guard party to keep a constant watch. These prompt measures of the Sultan prevented the Mughals from forcing an entrance into the royal camp.⁵⁷ While the Mughals used to move about the trenches in search for passage or recess through which they could suddenly fall on the royalists, the Sultan kept his troops ever alert and vigilant and constantly under arms for a combat, although he was determined to avoid an engagement till succour arrived from other quarters. In vain, however, did he hope to receive reinforcements from Multan, Samanah and Deopalpur for the Mughals had completely blockaded all passages of the capital from the east and the west. The army under Maliks Jūna and Jhūjhu had returned from Bengal completely shattered and ruined. The passage of even this dilapidated force had been stopped by the Mughals, while the organized armies of some feoffees of the east had failed to join the king at Sīrī and had been compelled to stop at Kol and Baran.

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⁵⁷ The position of ‘Alāuddīn’s entrenchment at Sīrī has been discussed in detail in *J.A.S.B.* 1866 pp. 199-218.

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Meanwhile the Mughals had begun to raid the environs of Delhi. They had so completely encircled the metropolis that supplies of water, forage, firewood and all other necessaries of life had been stopped from coming into it and an acute scarcity of grain was felt. The Mughals on the other hand used to march in groups to places like the Chabūtras of Sub-hānī, Morī and Hudhī and even up to the Hauz-i-‘Alāī and lay hands upon grain and other stores of the market. Sometimes they even raided the city of Delhi itself and looted the royal granaries.

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Minor skirmishes were desultorily fought on two or three occasions, but neither party could gain any decisive advantage. The patience of Targhī, who had come prepared only for a victory, had been well-nigh exhausted, and finding the lines of ‘Alāuddīn’s entrenchment impenetrable he retired after a stay of about a couple of months.⁵⁸

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⁵⁸ Baranī p. 302. *Futūh* p. 277 has forty days only.

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The flight of the Mughals seemed miraculous indeed. Barani describes the situation in the following words :—"This occasion, on which the army of Islam had received no injury from the Mughal force, and the city of Delhi had escaped unharmed, appeared one of the miracles of the age to all intelligent persons ; for the Mughals had arrived in great force early in the season, and had blockaded the roads against the entry of reinforcements or supplies ; and the royal army was suffering under the want of proper equipment, while they were in the most flourishing and hearty condition".⁵⁹

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⁵⁹ Barani p. 302.

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It is not difficult to surmise the cause of so quick a retreat of the Mughals. Although Barani attributes it to the supplications of the poor and the prayers of Shaikh Nizām-uddin Auliā, the venerable saint of the time, yet the real reason of the Mughal retreat lies in something else. It lies, firstly, in the prompt action of the Sultan who would not yield to the enemy on any ground whatsoever, and who undertook such defensive measures as even to baffle the Mughal veteran. Secondly, it lies in the fact that the Mughals on account of their preoccupation in Central Asia, referred to above, could never permit themselves to stay in Hindustan for long. Consequently, if they could not overcome the armies of Hindustan within a short time they would surely and suddenly return to their home land in Central Asia.

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*Steps taken to prevent further Mughal Inroads.*

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Targhi had returned, but the Mughal menace was not over for all time. Their successive invasions impressed upon the mind of the Sultan the gravity of the Mughal danger. For some time, therefore, he refrained from any further conquests and concentrated on the problem of defence. The palace of Siri having been almost completed, he transferred his headquarters there. Subsequently Siri came to be known as the capital. Old citadels were repaired and new ones constructed on the regions through which the Mughals generally passed into India. A strong wall was also built around the city to check the invaders from entering the town. The army, too, was reorganised and new enlistments were made.⁶⁰ Experienced officers and well-equipped soldiers were garrisoned in each of the forts on the north-west frontier. They were to resist the invaders on their march towards the capital city.

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⁶⁰ For details see chapter XVI.

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The defensive measures effected by 'Alāūddīn by no means stopped the Mughals from pouring into India occasionally, but now the Sultan was ever prepared to receive them. In future whenever the Mughals invaded India they were successfully defeated, their women and children were taken prisoner and they themselves were trampled under the feet of the elephants or struck by the sword.

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*Invasion of 'Alī Bēg, Tartaq and Ṭarghī (1305).*

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The Mughals had suffered defeats at the hands of the army of Delhi on many occasions; the insult rankled deep in their hearts. Ṭarghī could never forget the humiliating retreat of Qutlugh Khvājā. He had got an opportunity to avenge the insult in 1303 but even then he had achieved but little.⁶¹ But all these defeats did not dishearten Ṭarghī; on the contrary they whetted his thirst for revenge. When, therefore, 'Alī Bēg and Tartāq⁶² advanced towards Hindustan Ṭarghī accompanied them. This invasion was in no way less formidable in nature than those of 1299 and 1303. The Mughals, about 50,000 in number⁶³, crossed the hilly region lying north-west of the Indus, crossed the Indus itself and by forced marches advanced towards the east. According to Amīr Khusrau, Targhī, "who had once or twice fled away from the attacks of the victors...was at last shot by an arrow"⁶⁴ and killed in a fray even before the invading army penetrated into the Doab. That probably is the reason why Barani does not even mention the name of this prominent general among those who led the expedition. 'Alī Bēg and Tartāq moved on, inflicting barbarous cruelties wherever they passed. Having learnt that the capital was strongly defended, and knowing as they did that the Mughal army had failed in capturing it on many earlier occasions, they decided to by-pass it and march straight on the Doab and Avadh, the most fertile and prosperous tract in the country. "The confounded inhabitants...rushed to the fords of the Ganga", says Amīr Khusrau, "and smoke rose from the towns of Hindustan. People fled from their burning houses...and threw themselves into rivers and torrents".⁶⁵

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⁶¹ 'Iṣāmī mentions another invasion of Ṭarghī between 1303-1305. No other historian corroborates him and his version seems to be wrong. *Futūḥ* pp. 283-84.

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⁶² Ziyā Barani and 'Iṣāmī call him Tartak, Amīr Khusrau Tartāq and Badaoni Taryāq. Ferishtah has Khvājā Tarpāl which Briggs changes into Khvājā Tāsh.

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⁶³ This is the figure of Amīr Khusrau (*Khazāin*, Habīb Trs. p. 26) Barani has 30 to 40 thousand. According to Baranī 'Ali Beg was a descendant of Changiz Khan.

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⁶⁴ *Khazāin* Habib Trs. p. 26.

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⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p. 26.

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When the report of the enormities of the invaders and the desperation of the people reached the Sultan, he appointed Malik Naik⁶⁶, Master of the Horse (Akhūrbēg-i-Maisrah)

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⁶⁶ Khusrau says that Malik Naik was a Hindu. Baranī also names the commander as Malik Naik. 'Isāmī incorrectly reads Malik Nanak. 'Alāuddīn had a *paik* Manik by name who had saved him at the time of Ikat Khan's assault (*Baranī* p. 273). But the general who fought the Mughals was surely Malik Naik as mentioned by two contemporary authorities Barani and Khusrau. Ferishtah says that Malik Naib and Malik Tughlaq were sent.

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with a strong force of thirty to forty thousand to deal with the invaders. The royal army met the Mughals in the vicinity of Amroha and inflicted upon them a crushing defeat on Thursday 12th Jamādus Sānī 705 (December 30, 1305).⁶⁷ A large portion of the Mughal army was "put to sword, scattered and dispersed". Twenty thousand horses belonging to the Mughals were seized by the victors and the Mughal corpses lay right and left.⁶⁸ The two Mughal generals were captured alive and sent to Delhi in chains and fetters. Exultant with joy ‘Alāuddīn ordered a *durbār* to be held on the Chautrā-i-Sub-hānī, where he sat in all his kingly glory to receive the prisoners of war and decide their fate; his victorious army standing in double rows from the royal seat to Indrapat. Large was the crowd which had assembled to witness the scene. The price of a flask of water rose to twenty *jītals* and half a *tankah*. The Mughal prisoners of war were led through this mass of humanity and were presented before the royal throne. By the order of the Sultan they were paraded in the city on camels, after which they were beheaded; and their heads were used in the construction of towers outside the fort. According to Ferishtah 8,000 heads of Mughal prisoners were used instead of stones and bricks to build the towers of Sīrī, which were then under construction; and his statement is confirmed by Amīr Khusrau who writes: "They (the Mughals) give blood to new buidlings."

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⁶⁷ This is the date of Khusrau a contemporary; Ferishtah has 704 A.H.

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⁶⁸ Barani p. 320.

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*Deval Rani* p. 61.
*Futūh* p. 297.
Barani p. 320.
Ferishtah p. 114.

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As to the fate of 'Alī Bēg and Tartāq, accounts vary. According to Baranī all Mughal prisoners, together with their chiefs, were crushed under the feet of the elephants.⁶⁹ Amīr Khusrau, however, says that 'Alī Bēg and Tartāq were granted amnesty. He further adds, "In course of time one of them died, without any harm having been done to him, and the other remained alone. The emperor was so successful in sport that he took their lives in one game after another."⁷⁰ The last sentence of this passage is not very clear, but 'Iṣāmī makes a statement which corroborates it as well as throws fresh light on it. He says that 'Alāuddīn pardoned 'Alī Bēg and Tartaq, gave them robes of honour and provided for them all necessaries and amenities of life. After a short time, however, Tartaq, while under a fit of drunkenness, was heard to enquire about his crown, armour and army. When the Sultan came to know of it, he ordered his head to be chopped off immediately. 'Alī Bēg also met the same fate after one or two years.⁷¹

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