The Legacy of Muslim Rule in India c8.s4: The Army

The Legacy of Muslim Rule in India c8.s4

Language: English

The Army

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Like administration the core of the army of the Sultanate and the Mughal empire too was foreign. The establishment, expansion and continuance of Muslim political power and religion in India was due to its army.¹¹⁷ A very important source of strength of this army was the constant inflow of foreign soldiers from Muslim homelands beyond the Indus. These may be called, for the sake of brevity, by the generic terms Turks and Afghans. The Turks came as invaders and became rulers, army commanders and soldiers. The warlike character of the Afghans attracted the notice of the conquerors of India who freely enrolled them in their armies. Mahmud Ghaznavi and Muhammad Ghauri brought thousands of Afghan horsemen with them.¹¹⁸ Indian sultans continued the tradition. They had a preference for homeland troops, or Muslim warriors from the trans-Indus region. In the time of Iltutmish, Jalaluddin of Khawarism, fleeing before Chingiz Khan, brought contingents of Afghan soldiers with him. In course of time, many of them took service under Iltutmish.¹¹⁹ Balban employed three thousand Afghan horse and foot in his campaigns against the Mewatis, and appointed thousands of Afghan officers and men for garrisoning forts like Gopalgir, Kampil, Patiali, Bhojpur and Jalali. In the royal processions of Balban hundreds of Sistani, Ghauri, Samarqandi and Arab soldiers with drawn swords used to march by his side. The Afghans had got accustomed to the adventure of soldiering in India. They joined in large numbers the armies of Mongol invaders as well as of Amir Timur when the latter marched into India. Like the Afghans, the Mongol (ethnically a generic term, again) soldiers too were there in the army of the Sultanate in large numbers. Abyssinian slave-soldiers and officers became prominent under Sultan Raziya. The immigration of foreign troops continued without break in the time of the Khaljis, Tughlaqs, Saiyyads and Lodis. Under the Saiyyad and Lodi rulers, they flocked into India like ants and locusts. As conquerors, officers and soldiers these foreigners were all in pretty nearly the same stage of civilization. The Khurasanis or Persians were, for instance, more advanced and perhaps possessed milder manners than the Turks. But considering their imperial point of view regarding Hindustan, this original difference of civilization was of little consequence. Their constant induction from Muslim lands contributed to the strength and maintenance of Muslim character of the army of the Sultanate.

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Indians, or Hindus, too used to be enrolled. Ziyauddin Barani was against the recruitment of non-Muslims in the army,¹²⁰ but right from the days of Mahmud of Ghazni, Hindus used to join Muslim armies,¹²¹ and lend strength to it.¹²² Most of the Hindus in the army belonged to the infantry wing and were called Paiks. Some of these were poor persons and joined the army for the sake of securing employment. Others were slaves and war-captives. The Paiks cleared the jungles and were often used as cannon fodder in battle.¹²³ But others, especially professionals, joined the permanent cadre of infantry for combat purposes. Barbosa (early sixteenth century) says this about them: They carry swords and daggers, bows and arrows. They are right good archers and their bows are long like those of England. They are mostly Hindus.¹²⁴ They were a loyal lot. Alauddin Khalji, Mubarak Khalji and Firoz Tughlaq were saved by Paiks when they were attacked by rivals and adventurers,¹²⁵ a phenomenon so common in Muslim history. But despite their loyalty the Paiks remained relegated to an inferior position.

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There were also Muslim mercenaries or volunteers enrolled on the eve of a campaign. The volunteer element in the army was known by the name of Ghazi. The Ghazis were not entitled to any salary, but relied mostly on rich pickings from the Indian campaigns. Prospect of loot whetted their thirst for war, the title of Ghazi spurred their ego. The victories of the Ghaznavids had attracted these plundering adventures to their standards. The tradition of enrolling Ghazi merecenaries was continued by the Turkish sultans in India.¹²⁶ Right up to the Tughlaq times and beyond, merecenaries (Muslims says Afif for Firozs times) joined the army for love of plunder and concomitant gains. These enthusiasts naturally added strength to the regular army, and also to its character.

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Soldiers in permanent service, and the kings bodyguards called Jandars, were largely drawn from his personal slaves.¹²⁷ Right from the days of Mahmud of Ghazni the pivot of the regular army was provided by the slave force (*ghilman*, *mamalik*).¹²⁸ Young slaves were obtained as presents, as part of tribute from subordinate rulers and as captives during campaigns. They were also purchased in slave markets in India and abroad. Captured or imported, they were broken in and brainwashed at an early age, their minds moulded and their bodies trained for warfare. The practice may sound cruel but it was eminently Islamic and was universal in the Muslim lands.¹²⁹ Compare, for example, the *Dewshirme* (collecting boys) system of the Turkish empire according to which every five years, and sometimes every year, the Ottomans enslaved all Balkan Jewish and Christian boys aged 10-15, took them to Constantinople and brought them up in Islamic ideology. They were used for the further subjugation of their own people.¹³⁰ The value of the slave troops lay in their lack of roots and local connections and attachment to the master by a personal bond of fealty. The foundation of this relation was military clientship, the attachment of man to man, the loyalty of individual to individual, first by the relation of chief to his companion and, if the warrior master succeeded in conquest and setting up a dominion, by the relation of suzerain to vassal. The devotion of man to man is the basis of the slave system, of feudalism, of imperialism of the primeval type, and of the success of medieval Muslim army. Slaves were collected from all countries and nationalities. There were Turks, Persians, Buyids, Seljuqs, Oghuz (also called Irani Turkmen), Afghans, Khaljis, Hindu etc. in the army of Mahmud. The success of the Ghaznavids and Ghaurids in India was due, besides other reasons, to the staunchly loyal slave troops.¹³¹ This tradition of obtaining slaves by all methods and from all regions, was continued by the Delhi Sultans. In his campaign against Katehar Balban massacred all male captives except boys up to the age of eight or nine.¹³² It was the practice with most sultans,¹³³ and making slaves of young boys by Muslim victors was common. As these slave boys grew in age, they could hardly remember their parents and remained loyal only to the king. Alauddin Khalji possessed 50,000 slave boys,¹³⁴ who, as they grew up, would have made his strong army stronger. Muhammad Tughlaq also obtained slaves through campaigns. Firoz Tughlaq commanded his fief-holders and officers to capture slaves whenever they were at war. He had also instructed his Amils and Jagirdars to collect slave boys in place of revenue and tribute.¹³⁵ In short, the medieval Muslim slave-system was a constant supplier of loyal troops to the Muslim army, from India and abroad.

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Enrolment in the regular cadre depended on a number of considerations like personal prowess, skill in weaponry and family background. The times believed in the theory of martial class. Fakhr-i-Mudabbir advises that those whose ancestors had not been soldiers should not be made officers, Sawars or Sarkhails.¹³⁶ Ziyauddin Barani also expresses similar views.¹³⁷ In practice recruitment of troops was based on merit which was determined after a severe test.¹³⁸

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Like the procedure of recruitment, the schedule of training too was strenuous. If the Samanid traditions had not been given up in India, the training of a slave-soldier described in Nizamul-Mulks *Siyasat Nama* should have turned him into a veteran warrior in the course of a few years. In the first year after his purchase, the *ghulam* was trained as a foot-soldier, and was never permitted, under penalties, to mount a horse. In the second year, he was given a horse with plain saddle. After another years training he received an ornamental belt, and so on. By the seventh year alone was he fully trained and fit to become a tent-commander.¹³⁹ The training of a boy-slave recruit in the Sultanate might have been more or less similar. Details about such training are not available in medieval Indian chronicles, but Barani does hint at it when he speaks about Balbans trained soldiers (*tarbiyat-yafta lashkar*).¹⁴⁰ For experienced soldiers constant campaigns, tournaments, sports, *shikar* and regular reviews were enough to keep them fit and alert.¹⁴¹

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The Sultanates army comprised both cavalry and infantry. It had an elephant corps. Camels and ponies and other animals were also used for commissariat service. But the most important wing of the army was the cavalry. Cavalry comprises the man and his mount. In India, only in some places of eastern Punjab like the Shiwaliks, Samana, Sunnam, Tabarhind, Thanesar and the Country of the Khokhars, good quality horses were found in sufficient numbers.¹⁴² But these horses were inferior to the horses of West-Asia breed, and importation of war-horses from abroad became an imperative necessity for the Sultans of Delhi.¹⁴³ Medieval chroniclers speak of Yamani, Shami, Bahri and Qipchaqi horses as being in use by soldiers in India, and there was large-scale importation of horses into India from Arabia.¹⁴⁴ According to Ziyauddin Barani, Alauddin Khalji is said to have had 70,000 horses in his *paigahs* (stables) in Delhi.¹⁴⁵ The Arab geographer Ahmad Abbas Al-Umari states that Sultan Muhammad Tughlaq distributed to his retinue 10,000 Arab horses and countless others. Even Firoz Tughlaq, who is said to have neglected the army, maintained extensive *paigahs*.¹⁴⁶ Horses were a perishable commodity and deaths and even epidemics among them were common.¹⁴⁷ Therefore, foreign breed war horses were constantly imported in India at great cost to keep the *paigahs* well stocked.

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Alauddin Khalji (1296-1316) had under his command 475,000 horsemen,¹⁴⁸ and Muhammad Tughlaqs cavalry is said to have consisted of 900,000 soldiers.¹⁴⁹ Of course, the size of the army varied from time to time. The Saiyyads were weak and Lodis not so strong. But even in the newly created kingdoms of the fifteenth century like Gujarat, Malwa, Jaunpur etc. Muslim cavalry generally had an edge over the armies of the neighbouring Rajas. Under Alauddin Khalji the custom of branding horses and keeping a pen-picture of the soldier (*dagh-wa-chehra*) was strictly followed.¹⁵⁰

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As against the cavalry of the Sultans, the Indian rulers depended for military strength primarily on elephants. But even in this sphere the Sultans excelled them in a short time. The Sultans obtained for their *pilkhanas* elephants from all possible sources, as plunder, as tribute from subordinate rulers or provincial governors, by purchase from the outside Muslim ruled territories, or by trapping them directly from the forest regions. There is, and will always be, a controversy about the real efficacy of the elephant in medieval warfare. Still, the elephant occupied an important place in warfare throughout the medieval period. Heavily armoured, it could be used as a living battering ram for pulling down the gates of a fortress. Many of the strongest fortresses in India have elephant spikes upon their doors to hinder such form of assault. The elephant could also serve as a pack animal carrying a very large load. Its gigantic size created a feeling of terror in the enemy ranks.¹⁵¹ War elephants could kill and destroy systematically.¹⁵² And they looked awe-inspiring and majestic.

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Weapons, equipments, engines etc. for waging war are mentioned in the *Sirat-i-Firoz Shahi*, and some other works. There are manuals in the Persian language written right from the tenth century onwards dealing elaborately with the art of warfare. These would have provided guidance to the Indian Sultans on military matters. The *Qabus Nama*, for instance, written by Kaikaus in the year 475 H. (108283 C.E.) has three chapters- On Buying Horses; On Giving Battle to the Enemy and On the Art of Controlling An Armed Force. Similarly, Nizam-ul-Mulks *Siyasat Nama* written in 485 H. (1092-93 C.E.) contains two short chapters On Having Troops of Various Races and On Preparing Arms and Equipment for War and Expeditions.¹⁵³ In India Fakhr-i-Mudabbir and Ziyauddin Barani wrote on the theme.

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What did the Muslim army look like? There are excellent pen-pictures by Fakhr-i-Mudabbir in his *Adab-ul-Harb* and Amir Khusrau in his *Khazain-ul-Futuh*, besides of course many others. Similarly, there are descriptions of the Rajput army. Padmanabh, in his *Kanhadade-Prabandh* (written about the middle of the fifteenth century) has this to say about the Rajput warriors: They bathed the horses in the sacred water of Ganga. Then they offered them Kamal Puja. On their backs they put with sandal the impressions of their hands They put over them five types of armour, namely, war armour, saddles acting as armour, armour in the form of plates, steel armour, and armour woven out of cotton. Now what was the type of Kshatriyas who rode these horses? Those, who were above twenty-five and less than fifty in age, shot arrows with speed and were the most heroic. (Their) moustaches went up to their ears, and beards reached the navel. They were liberal and warlike. Their thoughts were good They regarded wives of others as their sisters. They stood firm in battle, and struck after first challenging the enemy. They died after having killed first. They donned and used (all the) sixty-six weapons. If any one (of the enemy ranks) fell down they regarded the fallen person as a corpse and saluted it. Similar descriptions are found in the *Pachanika* of Achaldas and other books.¹⁵⁴

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The most graphic description of the Muslim army is by a Hindu, the famous Maithli poet Vidyapati of the fourteenth century. Vidyapati was patronised by Sultans Ghiyasuddin and Nasiruddin of Bengal. Writing about Muslim soldiers, he says: Sometimes they ate only raw flesh. Their eyes were red with the intoxication of wine. They could run twenty *yojanas* within the span of half of a day. They used to pass the day with the (bare) loaf under their arm (The soldier) takes into custody all the women of the enemys city Wherever they happened to pass in that very place the ladies of the Rajas house began to be sold in the market. They used to set fire to the villages. They turned out the women (from their homes) and killed the children. Loot was their (source of) income. They subsisted on that. Neither did they have pity for the weak nor did they fear the strong They had nothing to do with righteousness They never kept their promise They were neither desirous of good name, not did they fear bad name¹⁵⁵ At another place he says: Somewhere a Musalman shows his rage and attacks (the Hindus) It appears on seeing the Turks that they would swallow up the whole lot of Hindus.¹⁵⁶

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A comparison of the two armies at once shows why the Muslim army was one up. It was, in one word, because of its strategy and tactic of terror, and it was because of this that Muslim state in India was like a police state.

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The description of Vidyapati clearly shows how impressive and awe-inspiring the army of the Sultanate looked. The soldiers had excellent horses, magnificent armour, and fine costumes.¹⁵⁷ A soldier usually carried two swords.¹⁵⁸ Besides he had bows and arrows, maces and battle axes. The Muslim soldier was an enthusiastic fighter. Psychologically, he was a soldier of Allah. The word *Jihad* had a magic appeal for him. His enthusiasm for war was whetted by the promises of rewards, prospects of plunder and religious slogans.¹⁵⁹ Consequently, he exhibited great zeal and practised extreme ruthlessness and cruelty.¹⁶⁰ This cruelty gave the army of the Sultanate superiority over indigenous forces because it inspired terror wherever it went. The Turushka had become a bogey and everywhere inspired a paralysing fear.¹⁶¹ As Ruben Levy points out, the Turks have always been amongst the most active of Muslim peoples, and if they are not greatly given to pious exercise they are bigoted believers in this faith and excellent fighters in its cause.¹⁶² The Afghans were equally ferocious. These and other Central and West Asian soldiers of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate were neither merciful nor compassionate and created consternation whenever they launched an attack. Balban in the thirteenth century held the conviction that no king could succeed against the army of Delhi, be he a Hindu Raja or a Rana (*Midanam ke pesh lashkar-i-dihli hech badshahi dast astad natawaned kard fikef rayan wa rajgan-i-hinduan*).¹⁶³

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But that is not entirely true. Local resistance against Muslim armies continued throughout, and hundreds of Hindu inscriptions claim victories for their kings. Battles between Muslim invaders from Delhi on the one hand and Rajput defenders on the other were always very hotly contested. For the Muslim army the going was tough from the very beginning; otherwise Fakhr-i-Mudabbir would not have declared that peace is better than war,¹⁶⁴ and as far as possible war should be avoided because it is bitter fa.re.¹⁶⁵ Such statements from one who, while describing five types of warfare and considering war with the *kafirs* as the most righteous,¹⁶⁶ are not without significance.

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In fact the army of the Sultanate suffered from a number of weaknesses. One was its heterogeneous character. Troops of the various racial groups, foreign and Indian, could not always pull together well nor were they all equally loyal to the regime.¹⁶⁷ Slaves, for instance, made good soldiers but they are of one group and one mind and there can be no permanent security against their reVolt.¹⁶⁸ The Afghans had been freely employed by Muhammad Ghauri, and Turkish Sultans of Delhi, but under the Saiyyads and Lodis the whole complexion of the army was changed from Turk to Afghan. The Afghans were brave, sometimes even reckless. But traditional devotion to their own clan leaders was not conducive to discipline in the army.

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Another weakness was that soldiers were habituated to plundering even in peace times. In war loot for the Musulmans was justified,¹⁶⁹ but when there was no war the soldiers were enjoined to behave with the civilians and not to loot or destroy their property.¹⁷⁰ But exceptions apart, rowdyism and extortion had become the norms of their behaviour.¹⁷¹ The massacre of the people of Delhi by Amir Timur was a direct consequence of his soldiers misbehaviour with the market people.¹⁷² The phenomenon repeated itself during Nadir Shahs invasion. As a result, sometimes the rough and disorderly behaviour of the armymen, especially of the temporary troopers, brought discredit to the regime. Again, keeping a large army on a permanent basis had to be ruled out for reasons of finance, security and convenience, and a large portion of the army of the Sultanate remained temporary with loot as its only source of sustenance. Often it was a string of military camps more interested in campaigns and booty-gathering than in administration. Alauddins keeping an army of about five hundred thousand made him resort to collecting fifty percent of the produce as land revenue even when the imperial resources were large and gains and tribute from his conquests were immense. Other rulers were not financially so sound. The army, besides, could not all be stationed at Delhi; it was distributed all over the Sultanate under provisional governors and garrison commanders.¹⁷³ And they could make use of it against the regime itself if they chose to revolt.

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Thus the weaknesses in the army of the Sultanate were many. But since it won most of the battles and occupied the whole of northern India in the thirteenth century and penetrated into the South in the fourteenth, its superiority must be acknowledged. This superiority consisted first in the slave system. The system provided the Sultanates army with loyal soldiers. The strict process of recruitment and hard training was another factor. Another reason for its having an edge over that of the local rulers was the constant and unbroken arrival of foreign troops from Turk and Afghan homelands. Rajputs could not replenish their manpower from a similar source. That is why if and when the contact of the Delhi Sultans with Muslim homelands was partially or wholly snapped (as for example because of the Mongol upheaval in Central Asia) the Rajput princes could contain Turkish expansion in India as the history of the Sultanate shows. The Ghazi element was peculiar to the Muslim army. While its cupidity resulted in too much cruelty in warfare, it added a very zealous element to the fighting forces. Islam gave them a unity of thought, interest and action. Man to man the Rajput was not inferior to the Turk, but on the basis of the evidence available, the armymen of the Sultanate, on the whole, had an upper hand over the indigeneous warriors. Their highly caparisoned cavalry was an additional strong point. Good quality horses in India were scarce and had to be imported by Hindu Rajas both in the South and the North. This placed Indian rulers at a disadvantage. The Turkish army had many engines of war. An elaborate army administrative system, constant inspection and reviews of troops too increased the striking power of the army of the Sultanate.

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The discussion on the Muslim army of the Sultanate period (C. 1200-1526 C.E.) has been elaborate, deliberately. For the Muslim rule in India remained army rule and the army of the Mughal emperors (1526-1707-1857) was a continuation the Sultanates with its merits and weaknesses. Francois Bernier says: the *Great Mogol* is a foreigner in Hindustan Consequently he finds himself in a hostile country, or nearly so; a country containing hundreds of *Gentiles* to one Mogol or even to one Mahometan. To maintain himself in such a country he is under the necessity of keeping up numerous armies, even in the time of peace.¹⁷⁴ Babur was a foreigner and so were Humayun and even Akbar. With Akbars accession, it is generally believed, that an era of government for the people had started.¹⁷⁵ But this view stands challenged by Berniers statement. He wrote at a time when the Mughal Empire had reached the pinnacle of glory and when, it is believed, syncretism in society had become the order of the day. And yet he found the Mughal King a foreigner and his army an apparatus of oppression. The administration of the Sultanate and Mughal Empire was bureaucratic throughout. Over long periods this administrative system was dominated by immigrants from abroad, mainly West Asia and North Africa and this gave it much of the character of foreign and Islamic rule. Commenting on the list of *mansabdars* in the *Ain-i-Akbari*, Moreland says that while about 70 percent of the nobles were foreigners belonging to families which had either come to India with Humayun or had arrived at the court after the accession of Akbar, of the remaining 30 percent of the appointments which were held by Indians, rather more than half were Moslems and rather less than half Hindus.¹⁷⁶ This high proportion of Muslim *mansabdars* belonging to families from foreign lands continued under Akbars successors. Thus Bernier described the nobility under Aurangzeb as a medley of foreign elements like Uzbegs, Persians, Arabs, Turks and indigenous Rajputs. A medley, so that by playing the one against another, one group could be controlled and dealt with by the other - Irani by Turani, Shia by Sunni and so on.¹⁷⁷ The Rajputs could be put to manage all these by turns, or those other fellow Rajput Rajas who showed reluctance in making submission. Late in the seventeenth century, with the advance of the Mughal power in the Deccan, there was an influx of the Deccanis - Bijapuris, Hyderabadis. An interesting description of this composite Mughal nobility is given by Chandrabhan Brahman, who wrote during the last years of Shahjahans reign.¹⁷⁸ And yet the regime remained exotic in nature. There was little trust existing between the various sections of the nobility and the Mughal King. Bernier did not fail to note that the Great Mogol, though a Mahometan, and as such an enemy of the Gentiles (Hindus), always keeps in his service a large retinue of Rajas appointing them to important commands in his armies. And still about the Rajputs, Bernier makes a startling statement. It debunks the generally held belief that the Mughal emperors trusted the Rajput *mansabdars* wholly, or the latter were always unsuspiciously loyal to the regime. He says that the Rajput Rajas never mount (guard) within a (Mughal) fortress, but invariably without the walls, under their own tents and always refusing to enter any fortress unless well attended, and by men determined to sacrifice their lives for their leaders. This self devotion has been sufficiently proved when attempts have been made to deal treacherously with a Raja.¹⁷⁹ His statement reminds one of the successful flight of Shivaji from Mughal captivity to Maharashtra and of Durga Das with Ajit Singh to Marwar.

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According to Bernier, the Mughals maintained a large army for the purpose of keeping people in subjection No adequate idea can be conveyed of the sufferings of the people. The cudgel and the whip compel them to incessant labour their revolt or their flight is only prevented by the presence of a military force.¹⁸⁰ There is no need to wonder why cudgel and whip were used to compel people to incessant labour and prevent flight of peasants from the villages. One function of the army of course was to conquer new regions and crush internal rebellions. Another was meant to coerce the recalcitrant land-holders (zor talab) and keep the poor peasants in subjection. For this second purpose there was a separate set of soldiery who could be called to service from regions and districts when so required. In the time of Akbar the number of such soldiers comes to a little more than forty-four lacs.¹⁸¹ This force was organised on the quota system, each *Zamindar* or autonomous ruler being expected to produce on demand a fixed number of troops. Ordinarily they received no stipends from the imperial government and were, therefore, not required to submit to military regulations which governed the regular army.¹⁸² It was mainly this cadre which kept the common people under subjection. In Indias climatic conditions, vagaries of monsoon, and resistance of freedom-loving though poor people¹⁸³ to oppressive foreign rule, made collection of revenue a perennial problem in medieval times. Right from the beginning of Muslim rule, regular military expeditions had to be sent yearly or half-yearly for realization of land-tax or revenue.¹⁸⁴ Under Afghan rulers like Sher Shah (who adopted the Sultanate model in general and Alauddin Khalji model in particular) the *Shiqdars* with armed contingents helped in the collection of revenue. The Mughals followed suit and troops were pressed into service for the collection of revenue. This constabulary carried long sticks mounted with pikes and was unscrupulous and tyrannical as a rule. Its oppressions inpired terror among the poor villagers. Bernier rightly observes that the government of the Mughals was an army rule even in the time of peace.¹⁸⁵ The rural fear of the *darogha saheb* and his men originated neither in ancient nor in modern times. It is a legacy of the medieval period.

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It may be summarized in conclusion that the nature of the Turco-Mughal state in India was theocratic and military. The scope of the state activity was narrow and limited. Generally speaking it discharged two main functions - the maintenance of law and order according to Islamic norms, and the collection of revenue. In the medieval period both these functions meant suppression of the people. Consequently, throughout the medieval period the administration was army-oriented. It was not a secular state, nor was it a welfare state except for some vested Muslim interests. No attempt was made to build up a national state in the name of a broad-based system working as a protective umbrella for all sections of the people. It is a hypothetical belief that foreign Muslims who came as invaders and conquerors but stayed on in India, made India their home and merged with the local people. They did not prove different from those conquerors (like Mahmud Ghaznavi, Timur or Nadir Shah) who did not stay on and went back. For, instead of integrating themselves with the mainstream of Indian national tradition, it was their endeavour to keep a separate identity. To quote from Beni Prasad: By the fifteenth century the age of systematic persecution was past but the policy of toleration was the outcome of sheer necessity; it was the *sine qua non* of the very existence of the government.¹⁸⁶ Else the Semitic conception of the state is that of a theocracy.¹⁸⁷

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¹ *History of Aurangzeb*, III, pp.269-97.

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² *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration*, p.2.

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³ *Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan*, pp.138-42.

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⁴ *Dictionary of Islam*, p.711.

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⁵ Luzac & Co. (London, 1913-34), I, p.959.

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Footnotes:

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⁶ Tripathi, *op. cit.*, p 2.

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⁷ *The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi*, p.41.

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⁸ Cf. Peter Hardy in Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, p.302.

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⁹ Introduction to the English trs. of Ziyauddin Baranis *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, p.vi.

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¹⁰ Concise Oxford Dictionary, p.1271.

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¹¹ 1950 Edition, p.1005

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¹² Qureshi, *op. cit.*, p.41.

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¹³ Yusuf Husain, *Glimpses of Medieval Indian Culture*, p.69.

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¹⁴ Ibn Hasan, *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, pp.255-56.

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¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.258.

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¹⁶ *Ain*, I, pp.xxxii-xxxiii.

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¹⁷ Quran VIII, 39-40; English trs. by George Sale, p.172; Jadunath Sarkar, *Aurangzeb* (3rd Ed.), III, p.249.

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¹⁸ Quran IX, 5, 6; Sale, p.179.

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¹⁹ P.K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, pp.177, 179.

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²⁰ *Ashiqa*, trs. E and D, III, pp.545-46.

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²¹ *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, I, p. 959; Tritton, *Caliphs and their non-Muslim Subjects*, p. 21; Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, pp.119, 171, 228-45; R.P. Tripathi, *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration*, p.340.

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²² Aghnides, *Muhammadan Theories of Finance*, pp.399-528.

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²³ Barani, pp.216-17; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, I, pp. 958-59.

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²⁴ Tripathi, op. cit., p.340 citing Fagnans French trs. of Abu Yusuf's *Kitab-ul-Kharaj*; Barani, p.291.

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²⁵ Lal, *Twilight of the Sultanate*, p.288.

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²⁶ *Miftah-ul-Futuh* (Aligarh text, 1954), p. 22(*za hindu harche amad zinda dar dast/bazere pae pilan khurd ba shikast/musalmanan-i-bandi gushta ra baz/ bajan bakhshi chu isa gasht damsaz*).

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²⁷ Lal, *Khaljis*, p. 250.

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²⁸ *Waqiat-i-Mushtaqi*, fol. 40 a.

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²⁹ Jadunath Sarkar, *Aurangzeb*, III, p.151 note.

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³⁰ *Times of India*, 6.8.1990, under the caption: Little value for his life.

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³¹ Vol.1, pp.958-59.

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³² pp. 248, 711.

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³³ (New York, 1917), pp. 399, 528.

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³⁴ Introduction.

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³⁵ *Tarikh-I-Firoz Shahi* (Calcutta, 1862), p. 290.

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³⁶ *Sana-i-Muhammadi* (Rampur Ms.) cited in *Medieval India Quarterly*, Vol.1, Pt. III, pp.100-105; K.A. Nizami, *Religion and Politics in India in the Thirteenth Century*, pp.315-16.

c8.s4.59

³⁷ Barani, pp.70-79, 151, 216.

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³⁸ *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, p.64.

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³⁹ Tripathi, *op. cit.*, p.56

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⁴⁰ Afif, p.29.

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⁴¹ Sharafuddin Yazdi, *Zafar Nama*, II, p.15.

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⁴² V.A. Smith, *Akbar the Great Mogul*, p.233. Smith writes on the authority of Du Jarric, III, p.133.

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⁴³ Sri Ram Sharma, *The Religions Policy of the Mughal Emperors*, p.61.

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⁴⁴ Arnold, *The Caliphate*, pp.173, 73, 101, 102; Qureshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 24, 25; Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, p.11.

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⁴⁵ Eg. Minhaj-us-Siraj, *Tabqat-i-Nasiri*, Persian Text, Bib. Ind., Calcutta, pp.16 ff.

c8.s4.68

⁴⁶ Ruben Levy, *The Baghdad Chronicle*, p.13.

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⁴⁷ J.H. Kramers in Sir Thomas Arnold, *The Legacy of Islam*, pp.79-80.

c8.s4.70

⁴⁸ Ruben Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam*, p.282.

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⁴⁹ Murray Titus, *Islam in India and Pakistan*, p.55; Al-Biladuri, E and D, I, p.201. Also E and D, I, Appendix, p.462.

c8.s4.72

⁵⁰ Khuda Bakhsh, *Orient Under the Caliphs*, p.218.

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⁵¹ Al Istakhri, E and D, I, p.28.

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⁵² Bosworth, C.E., *The Ghaznavids*, pp. 53, 54.

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⁵³ Minhaj, Raverty, I, p. 616 and n. 4; Thomas, Edward, *Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, pp.46, 52. The patent of investiture was called *Manshur*, and the robe of honour such as turban, swords, ensigns and other gifts were called *Karamat*.

c8.s4.76

⁵⁴ Thomas, *Chronicles*, pp.168, 173. Also Amir Khusrau, *Aijaz-i-Khusravi* (Lucknow, 1876), p.14.

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⁵⁵ Tripathi, R.P., *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration*, p.26.

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⁵⁶ Minhaj, Raverty, I, pp.610, 774 and n.

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⁵⁷ Thomas, *Chronicles*, pp.179-83.

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⁵⁸ Clearly seen in Ain-ul-Mulk Multani, *Qasaid-i-Badr Chach* (Kanpur, n.d.), pp.13,17, cited in Abdul Aziz, *op. cit.*, p.9. and trs. in E and D, III, p,569. Mahdi Husain lists 22 revolts during his reign (*Tughlaq Dynasty*, p.195).

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⁵⁹ Barani, p.493.

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⁶⁰ Ibn Battuta, p.73.

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⁶¹ Ishwari Prasad, *A History of the Qaraunah Turks*, I, p, 182 and n. 125.

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⁶² Thomas, *Chronicles*, pp. 207-16, 246-53, 259-60.

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⁶³ Barani, p.598; Afif, pp.274-76; Yahiya Sarhindi, *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi*, Bib. Ind. Text, p.126.

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⁶⁴ Translated in E and D, III, P.387.

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⁶⁵ Yahiya Sarhindi, *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi*, p.218; Lal, *Twilight of the Sultanate*, pp.71, 93 and n. 50.

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⁶⁶ Muhammad Bihamad Khani, *Tarikh-i-Muhammadi*, Eng. trs. by Muhammad Zaki (Aligarh, 1972), p.95.

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⁶⁷ *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, Eng. trs. Rogers and Beveridge, preface, p.x.

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⁶⁸ Beni Prasad, *A History of Jahangir*, P.113.

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⁶⁹ Banarsi Prasad Saksena, *History of Shahjahan of Dihli*, p.63.

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⁷⁰ Bernier, p.209.

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⁷¹ Vincent Smith says: Akbar was a foreigner in India. He had not a drop of Indian blood in his veins (*Akbar the Great Mogul*, p.7).

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⁷² Sharafuddin Yazdi, *Zafar Nama*, II, pp.29, 30.

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⁷³ Habibullah, A.B.M., *The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India* p.233.

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⁷⁴ Tripath, *op. cit.*, p.26.

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⁷⁵ It were not only the sultans of Delhi, but also of Jaunpur and Bengal who called themselves viceregents of the Abbasid Caliphs (Thomas, *Chronicles*, pp.194,197, 321-322). The Caliph Al-Mustanjid Billah sent to Sultan Mahmud Khalji of Malwa robes of honour and a letter patent. Mahmud accepted the gifts of the Khalifa with due honour and gave in return to the envoy *tashrifat*, and a large amount of gold and silver. Even some rebels of the Delhi Sultanate received the Caliphal investure (Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p.10).

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⁷⁶ Lal, K.S., *Early Muslim in India*, p.90.

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⁷⁷ But as the Muslim empire expanded, Muawiyah founded the line of Umayyad Caliphs at Damascus (661 C.E.). The Abbasids who succeeded them, became Caliphs at Baghdad (750 C.E.) and Samarra (836 C.E.). Another line of Umayyad Caliphs ruled at Cordova or Qurtuba (756 C.E.). The Fatamid Caliphs were rulers in Cairo upto 1751 and the Ayyubids up to 1836.

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⁷⁸ Ruben Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam*, p.284.

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⁷⁹ Arnold, *The Caliphate*, p.33.

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⁸⁰ M. Habib, Introduction to Elliot and Dowsons *History of India as told by its Own Historians* (Aligarh reprint, 1952), II, p.6.

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⁸² *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, p.39.

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⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp.30-40.

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⁸⁴ Arnold, *The Caliphate*, p.202.

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⁸⁵ Habib, Introduction to E and D, II, pp.23-24.

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⁸⁶ Ruben Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam*, p.168.

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⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p.258.

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⁸⁸ Barani, p.153.

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⁸⁹ *Adab-ul-Harb*, Br. Museum Ms. fol. 52(a).

c8.s4.111

⁹⁰ *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, p.10.

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⁹¹ Lal, K.S., *History of the Khaljis*, 2nd Ed., p.157.

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⁹² *Adab-ul-Harb*, op. cit., fol. 52(a), 56(a). Shams Siraj Afif goes even as far as to say: If one wants to describe the work of the Diwan-i-Wazarat, one has to write a separate book Afif, (pp.420-21).

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⁹³ For qualities of Ariz see *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, p.24.

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⁹⁴ Barani, pp. 65, 319.

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⁹⁵ Steingass, *Persian English Dictionary*, p. 574.

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⁹⁶ Wahed Hussain, *Administration of Justice During the Muslim Rule in India* (Calcutta,1934), p.22.

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⁹⁷ M. Bashir Ahmad, *Administration of Justice in Medieval India* (Aligarh, 1941), p.117.

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⁹⁸ Barani, *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, p.30.

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⁹⁹ Barani, p.313; Hasan Sijzi, *Favaid-ul-Fvad*, Lucknow text, pp.53-54.

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¹⁰⁰ About the importance of and the risks involed in the office see Minhaj, *Tabqat-i-Nasiri*, Reverty, I, p.694. Also Yahiya, *Tarikh-i-Mubark*

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*Shahi*, p.72.

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¹⁰¹ Barani, pp.34, 46, 61.

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¹⁰² *Ibid*., p.30.

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¹⁰³ *Ain*, I, pp.5-6.

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¹⁰⁴ Tripathi, R.P., *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration*, pp.105-124.

c8.s4.127

¹⁰⁵ N.P. Aghnides, *Muhammedan Theories of Finance*, pp.207, 399.

c8.s4.128

¹⁰⁶ Mujeeb, *Indian Muslims*, p.43.

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¹⁰⁷ Minhaj, *Tabqat-i-Nasiri*, Bib. Ind. (Calcutta, 1864), p.138.

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¹⁰⁸ Farishtah, I, p.67. Also Isami, *Futuh-us-Salatin*, Agra (1938), p.122.

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¹⁰⁹ Farishtah, I, p.75. Also A.B.M. Habibullah, *The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India*, p.272.

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¹¹⁰ Qureshi, *op. cit.*, p.4.

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¹¹¹ Barani, pp. 27-29, 30-32, 127-28.

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¹¹² Nigam, S.B.P., *Nobility under the Sultans of Delhi*, pp.106-107.

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¹¹³ Barani, pp.462, 487-88.

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¹¹⁴ At times there were tragically comic occasions in this situation. Sher Shah Suri sent an embassy to Shah Tahmasp requesting the extradition of Humayun, but the Suri envoys ears and nose were out off by the order of the Shah and as a reprisal several Persians were mutilated in India (Aziz Ahmad, *Studies*, p.26, quoting Riazul Islam, *The Relations between the Mughal Emperors of India and the Safavid Shahs of Iran*, Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge, 1957).

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¹¹⁵ Cited in Sukumar Ray, *Humayun in Persia*, The Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, Monograph Series, Vol. VI (Calcutta, 1948), p.40.

c8.s4.138

¹¹⁶ *Mughal Administration*, Orient Longmans Edition, 1972, p.120.

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¹¹⁷ I have made a detailed study of this army in my article The Striking power of the Army of the Sultanate in the *Journal of Indian History* (Trivandrum), Vol. LV, Part III, December 1977.

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¹¹⁸ *Makhzan-i-Afghana*, N.B. Roys trs. entitled Niamatullahs *History of the Afghans* (Santiniketan, 1958), p.II; Sir Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans*, Macmillan & Co. (London, 1958),p.135; *Tabqat-i-Nasiri*, p. 315; Barani, pp.57-58.

c8.s4.141

¹¹⁹ Jauhar, *Tazkirat-al-Waqiat* trs. C. Stewart, Indian Reprint, 1972, p.7.

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¹²⁰ *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, pp.25-26.

c8.s4.143

¹²¹ Utbi, *Kitab-i-Yamini* trs. by Reynolds, p.335-336. Also Shihabuddin al-Umri, *Masdik-ul-Absar*, E and D, III, p.576; Farishtah, I, p.18.

c8.s4.144

¹²² Bosworth, *op. cit.*, p.107.

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¹²³ The infantrymen were so placed as to bear the first brunt of the enemys attack. Consequently, the temptation to flee was great. But they could not leave their posts, for on the field of battle horses are on their right and left and behind (them) the elephants so that not one of them can run away (Al-Qalqashindi, *Subh-al-Asha*, trs. Otto Spies, p.76).

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¹²⁴ Barbosa, *The Book of Duarte Barbosa*, I, p.181. It may be noted that when Alauddin Khalji, as Prince, marched against Devagiri, he had with him about 2,000 Paiks (Barani, *Tarikh*, pp.222).

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¹²⁵ Barani, pp.273, 376, 377.

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¹²⁶ e. g. Minhaj, *Tabqat-i-Nasiri*, text, p.317; Barani, p.80; Afif, p.289; Fakhr-i-Mudabbir, *Adab-ul-Harb un Shujaat*, Hindi trs. from photograph copy of the British Museum Ms. by S.A.A Rizvi in *Adi Turk Kalin Bharat* (Aligarh, 1956), fol. 109 b. Also Habibullah, *The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India*, pp. 262, 265.

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¹²⁷ Minhaj, *Tabqat-i-Nasiri*, trs. by Raverty, I,p. 180.

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¹²⁸ C.E. Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids*, p. 98.

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¹²⁹ Ira Marvin Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages*, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967), pp. 6, 44.

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¹³⁰ *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (1913-38), II, pp. 952-53.

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¹³¹ Lal, K.S., The Ghaznavids in India, in *Bengal Past and Present*, Sir Jadunath Sarkar Birth Centenary Number, July-December 1970,pp. 131-152.

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¹³² Barani, pp. 58-59; Farishtah, I, p. 77.

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¹³³ For detailed reference from Persian sources see Lal, *Indian Muslims*, pp. 23-26.

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¹³⁴ Afif, p. 272.

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¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 267-72.

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¹³⁶ *Adab-ul-Harb*, fol. 49a.

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¹³⁷ Barani, *Fatazm-i-Jahandari*, p. 2.

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¹³⁸ Ibn Battuta, p. 14. Also Barani, p. 102.

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¹³⁹ Ruben Levy, *Social Structure of Islam*, p. 74.

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¹⁴⁰ Barani, pp. 51, 52.

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¹⁴¹ Minhaj, p. 225; Al-Qalqashindi, p. 75; Afif, pp. 317, 322.

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¹⁴² Barani, p. 53.

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¹⁴³ Lal, The Ghaznavids in India, *op. cit.*, pp.131-152, esp.157; Barani, pp. 57-58.

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¹⁴⁴ Simon Digby, *War Horse and Elephant in the Delhi Sultanate*, Orient Monographs (Oxford, 1971), pp.34-36; Barani, pp. 461-62; Lal, *Twilight*, pp.131-32.

c8.s4.167

¹⁴⁵ Barani, p.262.

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¹⁴⁶ Afif, pp.339-340.

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¹⁴⁷ Sharafuddin Yazdi, *Zafar Nama*, II, pp.59-79.

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¹⁴⁸ Farishtah, 1, p.200

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¹⁴⁹ Ahmad Abbas, *Masalik-ul-Absar*, E and D, III, p.576; Al-Qalqashindi, *Subh-ul-Asha*, p.66.

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¹⁵⁰ Barani, p.145.

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¹⁵¹ Price, Major David, *Memoirs of the Principal Events of Muhammadan History* (London 1921), III, p. 252. Also Yazdi, Zafar Nama, II, pp.102 ff.

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¹⁵² Barbosa, *The Book of Duarte Barbosa*, 1, p.118; Barani, p.53.

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¹⁵³ Thomas, *Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, pp.78-79; A Study of the Rare Ms. *Sirat-i-Firoz Shahi* by 5.M. Askari, *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. LII, April, 1974, Pt. I, pp. 127-146, esp. p. 139; M.S. Khan, The Life and Works of Fakhr-i-Mudabbir, *Islamic Culture*, April, 1977, pp. 138-40.

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Tārīkh-i Firishta — Muḥammad Qāsim Hindū Shāh Firishta 1606, Persian
تحفة النظار في غرائب الأمصار وعجائب الأسفار — Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, Arabic
Kampil
Jalālī
Kīrtilatā — Vidyāpati Ṭhākura, Apabhraṃśa
Kānhaḍade Prabandha — Padmanābha, Gujarati
Qaṣāʾid-i Badr-i Chāch — Badr-i Chāch
Khazāʾin al-futūḥ — Amīr Khusraw Dihlavī
Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī — Shams-i Sirāj ʿAfīf, Persian
Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī — Minhāj al-Dīn Jūzjānī, Persian
Tārīkh-i Mubārakshāhī — Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad Sirhindī
Fawāʾid al-fuʾād — Amīr Ḥasan Sijzī Dihlavī