New History of the Marathas v1.c18: Chapter XIV.
New History of the Marathas v1.c18
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Chapter XIV.
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1689 Feb. 9 Rājārām proclaimed King. ,, March 25 Zulfiqar Khan besieges Raigad. ,, April 5 Rājārām escapes from Raigad. ,, Matabar Khan overruns North Konkan. ,, August Santāji raids the Emperor's camp at Koregaon. ,, Septr. Rājārām leaves Panhālā for Jinji. ,, Novr. 3 Raigad falls into Mughal hands along with Shahu and Yesu Bai. ,, ,, 15 Rājārām reaches Jinji and forms his court. ,, ,, 30 Zulfiqar Khan moves towards Jinji. ,, Dec. 18 Aurangzeb leaves Koregaon for Bijapur. 1690 The Emperor's camp moves to Galgale. ,, March 2 Rājārām's inspiring appeal to Bāji Sarzarao and others. ,, June Zulfiqar Khan arrives before Jinji and besieges it. 1691 . Zulfiqar in great straits before Jinji. ,, Octr. 4 Aurangzeb despatches Asad Khan and Kambaksh to succour Zulfiqar Khan. ,, Dec. 16 Asad Khan and Kambaksh arrive before Jinji. 1692 Dec. 13 Ali Mardan Khan defeated and captured near Kanchi by Santāji Ghorpade. ,, ,, Kambaksh kept under arrest by Asad Khan. 1693 Jan. 1 Ismail Khan Maka defeated by Dhanāji Jadhav. ,, ,, 5 Santāji raids Zulfiqar Khan's camp at Desur. ,, ,, 23 Mughal forces retire from Jinji to Wandiwash.
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1694 Rājārām’s queens join him at Jinji.
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” Death of Pralhād Nirāji at Jinji.
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1695 May Aurangzeb removes his camp to Brahmapuri.
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” Octr. Rāmchandra Pant holds a conference at Vishalgad and plans an offensive.
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” Novr. Aurangzeb despatches Khanazad Khan to put down the Marathas in the Karnatak.
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” ” 20 Kasim Khan meets his death at Duderi : Khanazad Khan obtains release by ransom.
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1696 Jan. 20 Himmat Khan and son killed in battle by Santāji Ghorpade.
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” Feb. 26 Santāji defeats Hamid-ud-din Khan.
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” April Santāji demands reward for his services.
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” June 9 Birth of son Shivaji to Tārābai.
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” ” Santāji deprived of his office of Senapati.
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1696 June Santāji defeats Dhanāji at Aiwargudi and puts to death Amrit Rao Nimbālkar.
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1697 March Santāji routed near Bijapur and again near Dahigaon.
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” June Santāji murdered by Nāgoji Mane.
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” Dec. Rājārām escapes from Jinji.
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1698 Feb. 7. Zulfiqar Khan captures Jinji.
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” ” 22 Rājārām reaches Vishālgad.
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” May 23 Birth of Sambhāji (second son of Rājārām).
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” Oct. Rājārām establishes capital at Satara.
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1699 Battle of Talner : Hussain Ali Khan captured by the Marathas.
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” Oct. 31 Rājārām starts ravaging Mughal territory.
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” Dec. 22 Marathas raid the Emperor’s camp at Brahmapuri.
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1700 March 2 Death of Rājārām at Sinhagad.
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RAJARAM THE QUIESCENT
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1. Two stars of dazzling brilliancy.
2. Fall of Raigad, and Ramchandra Pant's leadership.
3. Maratha Trek to Jinji.
4. The Emperor's movements.
5. Jinji besieged.
6. The Maratha aims.
7. Besiegers besieged.
8. Heroic deeds of Santaji.
9. Santaji's tragic end.
10. Guerilla warfare described.
11. Rajaram escapes, Jinji falls.
12. Rajaram's death and character.
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1. Two stars of dazzling brilliancy.—Rājārām, the younger son of Shivaji, was at the time of Sambhājī's death, nineteen years old, having been born on 24 February 1670. The news of Sambhājī's capture did not take long to reach Raigad. Rājārām was then in nominal confinement in the fort, whose commander, under the advice of the veteran Yesājī Kank, brought him out and proclaimed him king on 9th February, i.e. a week after Sambhājī had been seized. This procedure did not fail to disillusion the Emperor and prove that the Maratha monarchy was not at an end. Pralhād Nirājī, Mānājī More and others who had been unjustly confined by Sambhājī, were set at liberty and restored to their offices. In order to nip this revival of the Maratha royal power in the bud, the Emperor at once despatched his able commander Itikad Khan (afterwards surnamed Zulfiqar Khan, Nusrat Jung, son of Aurangzeb's long standing minister Asad Khan), with orders to invest Raigad and to capture both that fort and the new Maratha king. The Khan arrived before the fort on 25 March 1689 and at once laid siege to it. The inmates were terribly dismayed by this fresh onslaught and held frequent consultations under the direction of Yesu Bai, the widowed queen of Sambhājī, a wise and patient woman intensely devoted to her nation's cause. She heartened the drooping spirits of the Maratha garrison by her brave words and offered the following sound advice: "Raigad is doubtless a strong fort and can hold out long ; but it is hazardous that we should all remain confined in this one small spot. In order to distract the Emperor's attention, I should advise you that Rājārām with his wives and followers should clear out before the siege becomes too stringent. I can stay here with my little son Shāhu and defend the capital, fearlessly awaiting the result. Our principal commanders should carry on their usual harassing operations in all directions against the Mughal forces, and convince them that the death of their King has made no difference in our resistance."
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This disinterested and far-sighted counsel touched every Maratha soul and was at once acted upon. The leaders took solemn oaths of remaining faithful to Shahu as their Chhatrapati and carrying on the warfare in his name till the country was liberated from the enemy's possession. Accordingly Rājārām slipped out of Raigad on 5 April, proceeded to Pratāpgad and despatched his wives and party for safety into the difficult fortresses of Vishālgad and Rāngnā. Some of the other leaders, Rāmchandra Pant Amātya, Pralhād Nirāji and Shankaraji Malhār Sachiv, also left Raigad and in mutual consultation from different places commenced an unprecedented campaign of fire, plunder and brigandage into the Mughal territory, using a net work of spies to obtain information of the enemy's movements.
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While Zulfiqar Khan was busily engaged in operations before Raigad, the Emperor captured several other important Maratha forts such as Salher, Trimbak, Rajgad, Rohida, Torna and Mahuli, which had formed the scenes of the early exploits of Shivaji. Matabar Khan, a shrewd and circumspect general with great organizing capacity, was appointed by the Emperor to hold and administer the important region of north Konkan, now known as the district of Thana, which contained several forts of strategic importance. For nearly fifteen years Matabar Khan held this post with valour and skill and supplied valuable resources to the Mughal captains from his base at Kalyan, where many buildings still preserve his memory.
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But some of Rājārām's young helpmates, particularly Santāji Ghorpade and Dhanāji Jādhav, made wonderful progress in the plan that was adopted. They fell upon Mughal detachments and sometimes routed them so thoroughly that succours could not reach Zulfiqar Khan in time for his operations against Raigad. While Rājārām was cantoning at Pratāpgad, Santājī Ghorpade and Vithojī Chavān accomplished an extraordinary feat of valour and dexterity, which struck terror into the Emperor’s heart. With a few selected followers they made their way on a dark night through torrents of rain to the Emperor’s camp at Koregaum. They fell upon his own royal tent, cut down the supporting ropes and the huge cloth edifice came down in a crash, killing the inmates, including, as was at first supposed, the Emperor himself. They carried away the sets of large gold top-balls of the tent and other valuables and presented them to Rājārām at Pratāpgad. Afterwards it was discovered that Aurangzeb by chance was passing that night in his daughter’s tent and thus escaped death. The incident clearly illustrates the nature of Maratha tactics and gave the Emperor a sure foretaste of what he was to expect in future. "In the long history of his struggle with the Marathas after the sun of Maratha royalty had set in the red cloud of Sambhājī’s blood and the people’s war had begun, Santājī Ghorpade and Dhanājī Jadhav were the two stars of dazzling brilliancy which filled the Deccan firmament for nearly a decade, and paralyzed the alien invader," writes Sir Jadunath.
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Soon a Mughal force came to Pratāpgad and Rājārām had to leave it and take up his residence at Panhālā. Shaikh Nizam, the captor of Sambhājī, came against Panhālā, but was completely routed and put to flight from the foot of that fort, thereby saving Rājārām from a fate similar to that of his brother. In the meanwhile Santājī fell upon Zulfiqar Khan’s besieging army, and brought away five elephants and an amount of valuable plunder. The three Ghorpade brothers, Santājī, Bahirjī and Mālojī were rewarded by Rājārām with the respective titles of *Mamulkat-madar*, *Hindurao* and *Amir-ulumrao*, by which their descendants are still distinguished in the Deccan.
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2. Fall of Raigad and Ramchandra Pant’s leadership.—Of all Maratha forts nature has made Raigad so inaccessible to an enemy that it could hold out for years on end. Constructed on a large plateau it can maintain cattle and grow enough food and other necessaries of life required by a large garrison. After a thorough search Shivaji and his father selected this site and added to its natural defence such fortifications as human ingenuity could devise. But Shivaji’s foresight was helpless against human treachery. This very weakness of Maratha character helped Zulfiqar Khan to capture Raigad on 3rd November 1689 after a siege of 8 months. Suryāji Pisāl of Wāi, one of the important officers in charge of the defence, opened the gates to the Khan on a promise of getting the Deshmukhi Vatan of Wāi which he had long coveted. With the fall of Raigad Yesu Bai, her young son Shāhu and a large number of loyal followers were captured and carried by Zulfiqar Khan in triumph to the Emperor. But his joy at this success was only short-lived. With one voice the Maratha leaders, great and small, pledged themselves to a heroic effort to avenge the national insult of their Chhatrapati having been brutally murdered and his son and wife carried away in captivity. Writes Ranade, "Just when its country’s fortune was at the lowest ebb and everything seemed to be lost beyond hope, these very misfortunes served to rouse a band of patriots who had been trained in Shivaji’s school, to resolve, resourceless and penniless as they were, to secure their national independence and drive Aurangzeb’s armies back into Hindustan." At the head of this band was Rājārām who was hailed by the nation, as the very spirit of his father, although he possessed none of the latter’s capacity or skill in the management of affairs. But he had an amiable docile temperament and a mild liberal disposition, cheerfully accepting what his worthy counsellors suggested in their wisdom.¹ His chief adviser at first was Pralhād Nirāji, the son of Shivaji’s Minister of Justice Nirāji Rāoji, and reputed to be the wisest man of his time among the Marathas.
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¹ The bakhar-writer styles him (स्थिरबुद्धि) of a steady, quiescent nature.
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But the credit of organizing the scattered Maratha nation against the Emperor’s power goes principally to Rāmchandra Nilkanth, ancestor of the present Amātya family of Bawda, who had been trained under Shivaji but had fallen in insignificance during the fitful rule of Sambhāji. The Pant possessed a peculiar genius for recognizing merit in men and harnessing it to promote the national interests. Rājārām thus describes Rāmchandra Pant's services. "This Maratha kingdom is a gift from Heaven. Rāmchandra Pant saved it in its dreadful crisis by carefully picking up the merits and capacities of men, inspired them with a spirit of service and devotion and employed them in appropriate spheres. With uncommon foresight he employed national resources to the best advantage. He successfully thwarted the heroic efforts of Aurangzeb who with his mighty resources came down upon the Maratha land determined to conquer it. Providence crowned Rāmchandra Pant's endeavours with success and frustrated all the cherished desires of the Emperor." Rāmchandra Pant was no soldier, and hardly moved from his base on any military expedition. He possessed the rare virtue of keeping his subordinates ever contented and willing to execute his commands. From his base at Vishālgad he kept a vigilant eye upon the doings of the numerous Maratha leaders, employed over an extensive field of war stretching from Burhanpur in the north to Jinji in the south.
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Out of a number of young spirited chiefs who wholeheartedly executed the projects and commands of Rāmchandra Pant, we have space to mention only four, two Brahmans and two Marathas. Parashurām Trimbak Pratinidhi, ancestor of the present chief of Aundh, and Shankarāji Nārāyan Sachiv (the founder of the present Sachiv family of Bhor), were mainly occupied in defending, holding and recapturing the important forts of Shivaji's homeland. Santāji Ghorpade and Dhanāji Jadhav were employed in destroying the enemy's field armies and crippling the material resources of the Mughal generals roving over the vast region of Mahārāshtra and the Karnatak.
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3. Maratha Trek to Jinji.—When Rājārām's position at Panhālā was found untenable, it was decided that he with a few followers should save himself by flying to Jinji, a stronghold about 60 miles south-east of Madras and about 40 miles inside from the coast of Pondicherry. "As if he had prescience of coming events, Shivaji by his conquests and alliances formed a new line of defence in southern India in the Kaveri valley to which he could retire in case of necessity." Indeed a continuous line of Maratha possessions from Supa, Sampgaon, Kopbal and Bangalore, to Vellore, Jinji and Tanjore had since been kept up. Such a necessity now arose and Rājārām secretly escaped from Panhālā to Jinji after undergoing many perils and hair-breadth escapes from the Mughal pursuers on the way. Leaving Panhālā at the end of September 1689, Rājārām reached Vellore in a month, deluding the pursuers with various stratagems, and arrived at Jinji on 15 November. Here he now established his residence having been joined in due course by most of his ministers and commandants, Santāji and Dhanāji supplying the necessary convoy guarding the front and the rear. Indeed, Rājārām owed his life to these two watchful generals and the men serving under them. Keshav Purohit, a priest of Rājārām, long in his employ for explaining the Puranas, accompanied the party from Panhālā to Jinji and has vividly described the Maratha king's journey and its perils in a stirring Sanskrit poem called *Rājārām-Charita*.
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Jinji soon became the centre of Maratha activity, where the whole Court was assembled and formed, reviving the Council of eight ministers with an addition of the ninth called the Pratinidhi now specially created for providing a position for Pralhād Nirāji, who had rendered extraordinary services. Tanjore in that vicinity was already a Maratha capital, being at this time ruled by Shahji the eldest son of Ekoji and cousin of Rājārām. Writes Keshav Purohit, "the Chiefs of the Karnatak lands hailed Rājārām as an uncommon hero and made his cause their own. They brought him presents of money, provisions and materials, and having been actuated with a spirit of vengeance against Muslims, offered every kind of service to the Maratha king."¹ A few Muslim Chiefs also made common cause with the Marathas under the belief that they were being persecuted without reason. This indeed helped the extension of Maratha influence over the Karnatak regions.
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कर्नाटकविषयैर्भू पैरैकीभूय महीपतेः । उपायनानि दत्तानि धनानि विविधानि च । सेना बहुविधाः स्वीया दानमानप्रतोषिताः । प्रेषितास्तस्य सैवायै म्लेच्छसंमर्दनक्षमाः ॥ २ . ३—४.
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4. The Emperor's movements.—The Maratha tactics quickly upset the Emperor's plans, of which the student must take note. The removal of the Maratha Court to the distant Jinji created fresh problems for him. To watch the affairs of Jinji and concert measures for putting down the growing Maratha power became his immediate concern. He left his camp of Koregaon on 18 December 1689 and removed to Bijapur and after a few months stay at that place, moved still further south and pitched his camp on the Krishna at Galgale, 34 miles south-west of Bijapur. Here he spent nearly three years visiting Bijapur at intervals. By that time the Maratha pressure had increased in Mahārāshtra; and the Emperor in 1695 moved his camp back to Brahmapuri on the south bank of the Bhīmā not far from Pandharpur. This place he renamed Islampuri, and here he stayed for over four years from May 1695 to October 1699. By the end of this time Rājārām had returned to Mahārāshtra, the fort of Jinji having fallen to the Mughals; but as the Marathas sheltered in their strong western forts proved practically invincible, the Emperor took the fatal resolve of personally marching against them and demolishing these inaccessible haunts of his enemy.
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His officers and soldiers had by then become utterly wearied of camp life, away from their homes now for 17 years, and urged the Emperor to return to Delhi after concluding some kind of peace and understanding with the Marathas. The Emperor felt sorely disappointed at this turn of events, and as he could no longer trust his officers, he himself undertook the arduous campaigns for the reduction of the hill forts of Sātara and others. After capturing Satara in 1700, he encamped during the rains at Khawaspur on the river Mān. Here he encountered a severe disaster, his whole camp was washed away by unexpected floods. The uproar woke him from sleep and while running out in the dark he slipped and became lame for the rest of his life. During the next three years he fixed his monsoon camp at Poona and other adjacent places. In 1703 he captured Sinhagad and then encamped at Poona, which he named Muhiyabad. But the captured forts could not be long held in subjection: they were all recovered by the Marathas by the year 1705.
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During all this time the miseries and hardships which the Emperor and his troops had to suffer went on increasing. They had to trudge through knee-deep mud and raging streams, dragging heavy guns, baggage and ammunition to hills and ramparts, thousands of feet high, not for one or two years but conducting such warfare in a foreign land continuously for a quarter of a century. This would have proved a feat of uncommon heroism if it had had an element of sentient reason in it. History finds in it only a comic picture of obstinacy with tragic results both to Aurangzeb's Empire and the humanity of India. Towards the end, the Emperor's fighting machine broke down; risings became common, which required his attention and once more he moved to the south, into the Raichur Doab against the Bedar Chief of Wakinkheda and Surapur. After two years of vain struggle in that quarter he realized that his whole life had been entirely wasted and returned north in utter weariness and despair to Ahmadnagar, in the midst of severe molestation and mortification caused by Maratha arrogance. Here he finally gave up his ghost on 20 February 1707. It is against the background of these moves of the Emperor, that the Maratha struggle can be properly understood.
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5. Jinji besieged.—We must now go back to the year 1689, a year so full of rapid developments in the annals of this Mughal-Maratha struggle, the capture and death of Sambhājī, the fall of Raigaḍ and the flight of Rājārām to Jinji, all occurring within a few months' time. Immediately on Zulfiqar Khan's arrival at Koregaon with Shāhu and his mother as captives, the Khan was ordered to pursue Rājārām into the eastern Karnatak. He left the Emperor's camp on 30th November, arrived before Jinji in the following June and at once laid siege to that fort. The siege lasted for nearly 8 years and has for various reasons become memorable in history: and although the place was captured at the end of that long struggle, the Maratha king had already escaped back to Mahārāshtra, thus adding to the disappointments and misfortunes of the Emperor.
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The credit of retrieving the Maratha fortunes goes mainly to two men of uncommon ability, Rāmchandra Pant Amātya the consummate planner and Santājī Ghorpade Senapati the adroit executor. Santājī is called the perfect master of guerilla warfare. Santājī as a boy had served Shivaji and possibly Sambhājī also: but there is no evidence on record how he was occupied during the rule of the latter unfortunate monarch. Santājī suddenly emerged from oblivion in the sore need created by the fall of Raigad, when he was called upon to defend his Chhatrapati and the Maratha raj. Writes Sarkar,² “Santāji had an inborn genius for handling large bodies of troops spread over a wide area, changing his tactics so as to take prompt advantage of every change in the enemy’s plans and condition and organizing combined movements. The success of his tactics depended on the rapid movement of his troops and on his subordinates carrying out his orders punctually to the minute. He, therefore, insisted on implicit obedience from his officers and enforced the strictest discipline in his army by drastic punishments. As Khafi Khan writes, “Santa used to inflict severe punishments on his followers. For the slightest fault he would cause the offender to be trampled to death by an elephant.” “His greatest monument is the abject fear he inspired in the ranks of the Mogul army, which faithfully reflected in the curses and abuses invariably used as the epithet to his name by Persian histories. As will be seen later Santāji’s boastful and defiant demeanour made him odious to his master and his harsh ways made him equally disliked by his subordinates. This proved the cause of his ruin.”
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² Aurangzeb, Vol. V, p. 128.
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Dhanāji Jādhav was of a different type. Coming from the same family to which Shivaji’s mother Jija Bai belonged, he supported and co-operated with Santāji wherever he was called upon to do so. Equally brave and fearless, Dhanāji possessed a milder temperament and certainly a sweeter tongue. The Mughal troops looked upon Dhanāji with such awe that Khafi Khan narrates how Mughal troops used to ask their horses, when they refused to drink, whether they had seen Dhanāji reflected in the water. Early in their career Dhanāji and Santāji inflicted a severe defeat upon Sharza Khan, alias Rustam Khan, as he was coming to capture the fort of Satara in May 1690.
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6. The Maratha aims.—The aims of the Maratha government in prosecuting the arduous struggle against the Mughals are repeatedly stated in clear terms in the orders and charters issued by their rulers during this period of war. Hanumant Rav Ghorpade and his relation Krishnāji are definitely told on 4 June 1691 that,³ “ Having clearly grasped your readiness to quit the Mughal service and return to the king's for defending the Mahārāshtra Dharma, i.e., the cherished desire of the Maratha nation, we are assigning to you for your own personal expenses and those of your troops, an annuity of six lacs Hons (Rs. Twenty-five lacs) the first half of which, viz. three lacs is to be paid as soon as you establish possession over (1) the Raigad district, (2) the district of Bijapur, (3) the district of Bhāgānagar (Haiderabad) and (4) the district of Aurangabad, at the rate of 3/4 of a lac for each of these items. The other half of the annuity, viz., three lacs more, will be paid as soon as you capture Delhi. You must loyally execute our commands, and our government will then continue their favour towards you." This is a typical instance out of many, which sets down the Maratha aims as a crusade of a religious character and of an abnormal magnitude. It was a severe and direct attack upon the Mahārāshtra religion, that their Chhatrapati was put to a cruel death and not allowed even the usual funeral rites. It should be noted that these aims included even the conquest of Delhi, so as to make the whole sub-continent of India safe for the Hindu religion, and no more destruction of temples and idols was to be tolerated. Aurangzeb's armies were mostly composed of Hindus, that is, the northern Rajputs and the southern Marathas: it was certainly his duty to respect the sentiments of those who served him. Rājārām's Government deliberately weaned away many Maratha Chiefs who had accepted Mughal service. Aurangzeb profusely offered lands, titles and rewards as inducements to Maratha leaders to renounce their king and accept his service. By way of counteraction the Maratha Government adopted the same methods. This religious motive of the present war appears to have been continued as a national demand throughout the later Maratha expansion directed by the Peshwas.
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³ Sh. Ch. Sa. 5.767 in B. I. M. Quarterly 16.1.
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This statement of the Maratha aims is not confined to a few rare documents, but runs through most of the writings detailing the political transactions of the Maratha Government of that period. On 22 March 1690 Rājārām from Jinji assures Bāji Sarzarav Jedhe Deshmukh of Kari of his support, and inspires him how they should exert themselves in their national cause. "We have enlisted on arrival in the Karnatak forty thousand cavalry and a lac and a quarter of infantry. The local Palegars and fighting elements are fast rallying to the Maratha standard. Our raj now has a peculiar message for the people, and you as one of them already suffer the agonies of the wrongs inflicted upon it by the Mughals. You must now put forth the sacrifice required on behalf of our religion. We have despatched Keso Trimal Pingle to Mahārāshtra with a treasure of a lac of Hons, guarded by an escort of forty thousand armed men with Santāji and Dhanāji at their head. As soon as this party arrives in your part of the country, you must join it with your following with the utmost expedition, in order to overcome the common enemy. In fact the enemy is nothing of himself : it is people like you who have raised him into that importance. If our Marathas had not joined him, he would have been nowhere. You alone possess the nerve to overcome this Aurangzeb. He has wronged you by threatening to convert you to his religion. He has already converted Netaji and Sābāji Ghatge and Jānoji Rāje, in addition to several Brahmans also. He also entertains further deep-rooted motives of a sinister nature against our nation, of which you must beware. The Nimbālkars and the Mānes have already deserted him and his ranks are being rapidly thinned. God is helping us. We are sure to succeed.” This letter only one among many is in the handwriting of Khando Ballāl, Rājārām’s Chitnis and shows the depths to which the heart of the Maratha nation was stirred in this heroic crusade.
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Without a careful study of such documents no correct judgment can be formed of this phase of Aurangzeb’s activities in the south. This opposition was a supreme effort to save the Maratha hearth and home. The Hindu-pad sovereignty of the future days was to the Marathas from the beginning a sacred and dear question of preserving their religion, which was found impossible in the absence of political power. Animated by a desire to avenge their wrongs, the Maratha bands spread over the vast territories from Khandesh to the south coast, over Gujarat, Baglan, Gondvan, and the Karnatak, devastating Mughal stations, destroying their armies, exacting tribute, plundering Mughal treasures, animals and stocks of camp equipage. The Emperor soon found himself unable to cope with these methods. He could fight any large army in the open field, but the guerilla tactics, of stealthy secret attacks from inaccessible places and at awkward unsuspected hours, proved too much even for his vast and splendid resources. The Marathas were inured to all kinds of hardship. They could feed upon the most simple food, stand inclement weather, and so proved veritable ghosts to the average Mughal fighter.
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Rāmchandra Pant took effective measures against the Maratha deserters to the Emperor. If a chief or man was discovered to side with the Mughals, their families and relations, their wives and children were arrested and sternly dealt with, so that life became intolerable in Mahārāshtra for such deserters, traitors and renegades. The Pisāl Deshmukhs of Wai who had surrendered Raigad to the Mughal force, had to undergo unbearable persecution for years and were reduced to the utmost misery, although they were amply rewarded by the Emperor for having accepted the Muslim faith. The respectable Beg family of Junnar had to suffer similar persecution.⁴
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⁴ Vide Pisal Papers, Rajwade, III, Nos. 56—64.
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Yesu Bai from her confinement in the Mughal camp did not fail to keep constant contact with the Maratha leaders, and secretly supported them by sending out useful news, and frequent hints through private messengers, who went to and fro between the two camps on various pretexts. On Yesu Bai’s advice Rājārām conveyed to Jinji his wives and their retinue. They sailed in a ship from Vengurla on the west coast escorted by the two brothers Lingo Shankar and Visāji Shankar, trusted relatives of Khando Ballāl Chitnis. They owned cargo ships plying in the western sea, which conveyed these ladies safely to the south in 1694.⁵ The party consisted of Rājārām’s three wives, Tārā Bai, Rājas Bai and Ambikā Bai and their retinue. They disembarked at Honāvar and travelling by the land route through the Bednur territory, reached Jinji safely in due course, unmolested by the pursuing enemy. While at Jinji Tārā Bai gave birth to a son (9 June 1696) and Rājas Bai did the same also two years later (23 May 1698). These two sons, named Shivaji and Sambhāji respectively, figured in the later developments of the Maratha State and originated the Kolhapur branch of the Chhatrapati’s house.
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⁵ Vioaji Shankar's services are seen rewarded in a document dated 19 October 1694. P. D. 31.60.
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7. Besiegers besieged.—The main object of the Maratha administrators and generals at this time was to release their Chhatrapati from Jinji, save him from a fate similar to his brother’s, and liberate the Maratha territories from the Mughal control. The Emperor was by no means blind or ignorant on these points. Through obstinacy he pursued rigorous measures of war in preference to some kind of understanding or accommodation for putting an end to the hostilities. If he had taken a reasonable line of action and employed means to end the war on honourable terms, the Maratha rulers would certainly have welcomed that course and even accepted Aurangzeb’s suzerainty, remaining content with a small subordinate principality in the Deccan. Several well-wishers of the Emperor did not hesitate to persuade him to this line of conduct. But he stoutly resisted it and suffered the consequences. The Marathas in retaliation managed to raise armies and develop a system of harassment, conquest and expansion, by which they regained not only their *Swarajya* of Shivaji’s days, but also the right to levy *Chauthai* and *Sardeshmukhi* over the lands of Mahārāshtra and the Karnatak. Many of the original leaders died in the attempt, but their half-finished work was continued by the next generation with redoubled devotion and success.
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For the first few years of the present phase of the war, Jinji formed the main objective of the Emperor’s efforts for putting down the Marathas. Zulfiqar Khan exerted himself to the utmost, but was severely hampered by the hostile surroundings in which he was placed. He realized the hopelessness of subduing the Marathas under the prevailing conditions and tried for a time the policy of conciliating them. Very often the troops of Dhanāji and Santāji pressed him so hard from without, that instead of his besieging Jinji, he often found himself and his host surrounded and starved, so that in his extremity he had to raise the siege and seek replenishment of his forces in the outlying districts, during the summer of 1691.
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At the end of 1692 Ali Mardan Khan a daring Mughal officer in charge of Kanchi, boldly came out and encountered Santāji Ghorpade with a view to preventing him from falling upon Zulfiqar Khan. A stiff action was fought on 13 Dec. 1692 in which Ali Mardan Khan was defeated and taken prisoner to Jinji, where he had to pay a large ransom to effect his release. Ismail Khan Maka, another Mughal general, was similarly dealt with by Dhanāji, (9 Jan. 1693). Thus Zulfiqar Khan found himself in sore straits. His two valiant helpmates Daud Khan Panni and Sarfaraz Khan also turned against him, making his situation precarious. His only recourse was to send frequent piteous appeals to the Emperor for reinforcements.
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On receipt of such pressing appeal for help and funds, the Emperor sent him fresh contingent under his own son Kam Baksh and his minister Asad Khan, father of Zulfiqar Khan. But the arrival of these two important personages on the scene of Jinji towards the end of 1691, only created fresh complications and did anything but remove Zulfiqar Khan’s difficulties. Kam Baksh followed the example set earlier by his brother Akbar. Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan charged the Prince with collusion with the Marathas and openly placed him under arrest in Dec. 1692. The confusion became worse confounded, when a false report went round that the Emperor had died. The two Khans abandoned their operations before Jinji and being severely pressed by the Marathas retired to Wandiwash under the most distressing circumstances, which are vividly described in Martin’s Memoirs.
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Zulfiqar and Asad Khan in utter despair of opposing the Marathas or even of saving themselves and the Emperor’s son Prince Kam Baksh under their care in the siege camp before Jinji, paid a large sum to Rājārām and his minister and were thus permitted to withdraw to Wandiwash without serious opposition. This lame conclusion of their wonderful victories caused a rupture between the Maratha generals and Rājārām. Martin writes “The commanders who had come to Jinji from Mahārāshtra in December 1692, were extremely irritated that Rāmrajā without their participation, by the advice of his minister alone, had made a treaty with the Mughals. They bore a particular grudge against Rājārām’s minister whom they accused of having received a large sum for allowing the Mughals to escape safely, when the Marathas could have held them all at their discretion, i.e., Kam Baksh, the Wazir Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan along with a large number of persons of rank who were in the army. The Maratha commanders represented that they could have extracted large sums as their ransom, besides being able to secure an advantageous treaty with the Emperor himself by restoring to him men of such importance. Santāji Ghorpade was so incensed by this conduct of Rājārām that he withdrew his troops to some leagues from Jinji. It was believed that Rājārām had acted in gratitude. He well knew that Zulfiqar could have easily taken Jinji. This mutual accommodation between Rājārām and Zulfiqar Khan was the result of a secret understanding, which they had formed in view of the expected death of the Emperor and the inevitable war of succession among his sons, so that Asad Khan and Zulfiqar planned to establish themselves as independent sovereigns in the southern peninsula with the kingdom of Golkonda as their share and the kingdom of Bijapur as the share of Rājārām.” “ Rājārām managed to appease Santāji by paying him a visit and also presents. Such squabbles throw a lurid light on the confused and mismanaged operations of the Mughal-Maratha war extending over the vast regions of Mahārāshtra and the Karnatak. For a time Santāji became the master of the situation and reaped the utmost advantage.
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It is easy to understand why the siege of Jinji dragged on so languidly and how much on that account the Emperor became exasperated, when he was apprized of the true state of things at Jinji. To remedy the situation he despatched another competent and trusted general Kasim Khan, posting him midway on the road to Jinji so that he could crush the bands of Santāji and Dhanāji and enable Zulfiqar Khan to prosecute the siege without outside molestation. He instructed Zulfiqar Khan to capture both Jinji and Rājārām at a stroke. Kasim Khan, although an opium-addict as Khafi-Khan records, was indeed a tried and resourceful general, and was enthusiastic in carrying out the heavy task that was entrusted to him. But how he too was over-matched by the superior genius of Santāji has become a dazzling episode in the history of Indian warfare, to which it is now necessary to advert before taking up the story of Jinji.
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8. Heroic deeds of Santaji.—On the occasion of the Dasarā celebration of October 1695, Rāmchandra Pant called together at Vishālgad most of the responsible Maratha leaders for a conference and a personal consultation, with a view to taking stock of the situation as developed by the various scattered units wanting in cohesion and acting independently of each other, and for concerting effective measures to conduct a further offensive, as much to meet the danger signified by the Emperor's appointment of Kasim Khan, as to secure a rapid victory. They planned fresh grand operations : two main parties were formed, one to devastate the northern portions of the Mughal territories, and the other to operate in the region of the Tungabhadrā, so as to overcome Kasim Khan and relieve the pressure against the Chhatrapati at Jinji. Santāji agreed to execute the latter portion of the scheme, and Dhanāji was asked to remain in the region of Bijapur keeping an eye on the Emperor's moves as well as being ready to support Santāji if any danger threatened him. The Emperor was then camping at Brahmapuri, where he was soon apprized of the plans formed by Ramchandra Pant. He immediately despatched another tried general Himmat Khan to prevent Santāji from committing mischief. The two Mughal generals undertook what may be called a pincer movement to hem in Santāji both from front and behind. Dhanāji got scent of this move and made rapid marches towards the Karnatak to save the situation if it became serious. The Emperor became extremely ill at ease about the fate of his armies before the combined manoeuvres of Santāji and Dhanāji. Kasim Khan also reported to the Emperor how the situation was developing against him and pressed him for more troops and war material. In this crisis Aurangzeb selected another trustworthy young enthusiast, a rising star of his Court, Khanazad Khan, son of the revered Ruhulla Khan and despatched him with all haste to the south with a party of his own select body-guard, and several more tried officers, such as Safshikan Khan and Muhammad Murad Khan.
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⁶ Sarkar's House of Shivaji, XIII, p. 219.
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With such grand arrangements speedily set in motion, the Emperor felt confident that all would go well. These generals marched through the Karnatak regions and joined Kasim Khan at the beginning of November 1695. How Santāji overcame this critical situation is a marvel in the art of war. He was well served by his numerous spies, knew the terrain, as the sequel shows, changed his movements to suit the shifting situation and managed to win signal success out of what had appeared to be a terrific ordeal.
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When Kasim Khan received the report that a noble of the high rank of Khanazad Khan was coming to his help, he thought it necessary to accord him a fitting reception. He ordered from Adoni costly tents, furniture and dining sets of high value, and arranged a gorgeous camp for his honoured guest, not suspecting danger in these open preparations. The Naik of Chitradurg who had been wronged by Kasim Khan, secretly communicated to Santāji all the vulnerable points of the Mughal arrangements and the shrewd Santāji was not slow to take full advantage of it. He arranged his troops in three parties assigning definite tasks to each, so as to fall upon the various Mughal chiefs separately, before they could join. Just before Kasim Khan’s arrival at the decorated camp for the reception of Khanazad Khan, Santāji suddenly swooped down upon it in the small hours of the morning and set the whole place on fire. No sooner was the occurrence reported to Kasim Khan than he hurriedly attacked Santāji and was himself shortly after joined by Khanazad Khan. Santāji was quite prepared for such an eventuality and had kept a concealed reserve force near, which suddenly fell upon these attackers and caught them between two opposing bodies. Unable to withstand the withering fire of the Marathas, the two Khans escaped in consternation to a small neighbouring citadel called Duderi, about 22 miles east of Chitaldurg. “The imperialists, giving up all plan of fighting took the road to Duderi in confusion, reached the place in extreme difficulty and were invested.”⁷ Santāji quickly followed and at once closely surrounded the place, which had in it no food or water and which was not prepared to stand a long siege. The Mughals found themselves in extreme peril during three days of want and starvation and exposure to the deadly effect of the Maratha guns. Kasim Khan was addicted to a regular use of opium which he could not now procure and died on 20th November 1695 in agonies consequent on such privation. It was reported that he swallowed poison and put an end to his life for fear of being disgraced by the Emperor. Poor Khanazad Khan appealed to Santāji’s mercy and surrendered. Santāji was not wanting in magnanimity to a fallen foe. He accepted Rs. 20 lacs by way of ransom in addition to all the belongings of the camp, worth about 30 lacs more, gave his own escort to accompany the noble Khan back to the Emperor's presence, with a personal message to him to take back this human treasure, as his own worst enemy. Kasim Khan had already paid for his sins.
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⁷ Sarkar’s *Aurangzeb*, V. 113.
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9. Santāji's tragic end.—As these developments were being reported to the Emperor, he had already despatched another brave general Hamid-ud-din Khan with a full fighting train to the relief of the first two forces. Another Mughal officer Himmat Khan Bahadur who was not far off, also came in hurriedly to pounce upon the Marathas. Santāji encountered Himmat Khan and his son in a sanguinary action near Basawa-Pattan in which both the father and the son were routed and killed (20 January 1696). Then came Hamid-ud-din Khan who was able with his fresh troops to inflict a defeat upon Santāji and put him to flight (26 February), as his men were already fully exhausted and wearied after months of severe fighting. The story of these wonderful achievements of Santāji reverberated throughout the land causing high admiration in Maratha hearts and extreme depression in those of the Mughals. But Santāji was now to experience a sudden fall. Providence had not provided him with a suave tongue or an agreeable temper. There was only one person whom Santāji respected and obeyed, and that was Rāmchandra Pant who was far away in Mahārāshtra.
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A large number of the letters that passed between them during all these years has been published and these clearly show how difficult Rāmchandra Pant found the task of handling Santāji. The general is here repeatedly admonished to be sweet and accommodating towards his co-workers and superiors and particularly towards the Chhatrapati. Santāji's biting tongue and boastful demeanour had more than once disgusted Rājārām. After these unequalled successes over the various Mughal generals, Santāji went straight to Jinji (April 1695), and demanded an adequate reward for his services. But Rājārām and Santāji had become gradually so estranged that a severe altercation took place between them, which soon rose to bitter invective. Both were touched to the quick. Santāji openly charged Rājārām with pusillanimity and disburdened his mind to some such effect. "Your position is all due to me. I can make and unmake the Chhatrapati." This was too much even for the mild temper of the King. Santāji was at once dismissed from his office of Senapati and Dhanāji appointed in his place.⁸
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⁸ Vide P. D. 31.68 dated 27 Oct. 1696; Sanads and Letters by Mawji and Parasnis, p. 177.
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How could it be expected that a hero of Santāji's calibre, a winner of a hundred battles would meekly submit to such insult, or hand over his office to a successor without striking a blow? The Emperor had already advertised a prize on Santāji's head. It is not necessary to suppose that the Mughals had any hand in bringing about a mortal ill-feeling between Dhanāji and Santāji. From words they came to blows over the question as to which of them should hold the Senapati's office. In June 1696 they fought an action near Aiwargudi on the river Manimukta near Kanchi, in which Dhanāji was worsted and his valiant young partizan Amrit Rao Nimbalkar was taken prisoner, whom Santāji cruelly trampled to death under the feet of an elephant. This Amrit Rao's sister Rādhā Bai was married to Nāgoji Māne of Mhaswad near Satara. Nāgoji was playing a game of selfish ambition and intriguing with the Emperor for the destruction of Santāji. In this he was encouraged by his wife Rādhā Bai out of a desire to avenge the death of her brother. The monsoon months of 1696 passed critically for Santāji on the one hand and for Rājārām and Dhanāji on the other. As Santāji was not to be easily overcome, his followers were seduced and won over by secret methods. In this destructive game Nāgoji Māne had a principal share. Santāji's ranks came to be slowly thinned and his strength fearfully weakened. Indeed many instances are found recorded of Maratha Sardars constantly plying between the two opposing camps during this long drawn war in which time-serving selfishness and divided loyalties played no small part.
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Rājārām ordered Dhanāji to capture Santāji and bring him a prisoner before him. Santāji then fled away, being hotly pursued by Dhanāji from the Karnatak into Mahārāshtra. During the flight they fought an action near Bijapur in which Santāji sustained a severe defeat in March 1697, and to save his life he made his way into the hills of Mahadev east of Satara. He had only a few personal servants left with him in his solitary wanderings. Nāgoji Māne hung on his track. One hot noon in June 1697 as Santāji came to a spring and was having his bath, some armed men suddenly fell upon him, cut off his head and brought it to Nāgoji Māne, who immediately rode with it to the Emperor's camp at Brahmapuri and presented the head to him. In return Nagoji obtained the promised reward and a handsome jagir from the Emperor, who was highly pleased with this end of his mortal enemy.⁸ Santāji is now remembered as the past master of guerilla warfare, the highest and best instrument which enabled the Marathas to attain a rapid rise before the development of artillery warfare in India. The death of this unmatched hero was a severe blow to the Marathas fortunes.
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⁸ There are various versions of the circumstances under which Santāji met his tragic death. The exact truth is nowhere recorded. Passions were then running high and gave colour to a variety of tales. Sir Jadhunath has tried his best to evolve a most likely story after consulting the Persian, French and other sources. See his *House of Shivaji*, pp. 215-238; also his *Aurangzib*, Vol. V.
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10. Guerilla warfare described.—This peculiar form of war-fare called by the Marathas Ganimi-Kava requires a word of explanation. The Marathas took pride in being called ganims or “plunderers,” and developed their peculiar method of fighting which the chronicler Chitnis thus describes. “The Mughal forces are huge in numbers, standing firm only in open ground. The Marathas on the other hand suddenly erupt at one place to-day and tomorrow elsewhere some fifty miles away. Then they come round again and execute unexpected raids, making only a show of a fight, plunder and fly away. They fall upon foraging parties, attack weakly held Mughal posts, capture strategic points and thus inspire confidence among their followers. They devastate Mughal territory from the river Godavari to Bhaganagar, carrying away pack animals, horses and elephants, create confusion among the enemy, and remain concealed in unfrequented thickets widely apart and make a sudden dash upon the Mughal armies proceeding towards Jinji, occasionally engaging in an open encounter and any how preventing them from reaching their destination. The Emperor found himself non-plussed how to overcome these pests. They seemed to be ubiquitous and illusive like the wind. When the attacking Mughal forces had gone back, the scattered Marathas, like water parted by the oar, closed again and resumed their attack as before.” “ If a Mughal officer resisted the Marathas and was defeated and captured by them, he had to provide his own ransom, and the Emperor would often dismiss such unfortunate sufferers on the suspicion of cowardice. Hence it was safer for a Mughal commander to bribe the Marathas than to fight them. Certainly it was cheaper. Worse than these, many imperialists made a concert with the enemy and enriched themselves by robbing the Emperor’s own subjects and innocent traders.⁹
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⁹ Rajaram's life by Chitnis, pp. 41-43 ; Sarkar : Vol. V. p. 12.
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“ Thus the Marathas held their life as trash and defended their raj. They were rewarded with lands and titles. On the one side stands the Emperor with his whole might, countless forces, immeasurable treasure carried in thousands and thousands of train-carts ; on the other side these scanty numbers of the poor Marathas carefully husbanding life and resources but relentlessly acting like packs of wolves against Mughal hordes and creating dearth of comfort in the midst of their own plenty.¹⁰
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¹⁰ Grant Duff, Vol. I, p. 338, describes this guerilla warfare.
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Santāji left behind him an inspiring name and a large family of brothers and nephews, who fortunately did not imbibe his spirit of insubordination and irascible temper : nor did they entertain any traces of hatred towards Dhanāji Jādhav, who had been already exalted to the position of the Senapati. They all joined him in continuing the war with full cordial cooperation, and when after the fall of Jinji, Rājārām and his Court returned to Mahārāshtra, it was the combined effort of all the Ghorpades that conquered and saved the distant Karnatak lands for the Maratha dominion, leaving a precious legacy to one of their distinguished descendants, Murār Rao of Gutti, whose career extending over more than half a century of troublesome times, forms an important part in Maratha history. Gajendragad, Sandur, Kapsi, and other small principalities in the south are still extant as reminders of the departed glory of the Ghorpades.
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