New History of the Marathas v2.c28: Chapter XIX. Abdali's Triumphant Advance [1759-1760]
New History of the Marathas v2.c28
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- v2.c28.s1 4. Dattaji locked at Shukratal — 48 parts
Chapter XIX. Abdali's Triumphant Advance [1759-1760]
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[1759—1760]
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1 Raghunathrao at Delhi. 2 The Marathas reach Attock. 3 Failure to restrain Najib Khan. 4 Dattaji locked at Shukratal. 5 Dattaji falls at Barari Ghat.
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1. Raghunathrao at Delhi.—It has already been mentioned that it was never the intention of Shah Abdali of Kabul to gain the crown of Delhi and rule India. He scrupulously avoided entanglements and commitments in Indian affairs. His only purpose was to hold the Punjab if possible up to the river Satlaj, and assure himself of a steady income to meet the expenses of his large army and the administration of his poor country. If Najib Khan, Malika Zamani, and other anti-Maratha elements had not played a hostile part, there was every possibility of matters being settled amicably between the Marathas and the Afghan King. Whenever there appeared a chance for such rapprochement, Najib Khan intentionally came in the way and prevented an understanding with the Marathas.
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From Attock to the Bay of Bengal stretches a vast plain of enormous extent unimpeded by any natural obstacles except the numerous rivers all easily fordable in the dry season, and unless some special arrangement was made at Attock or Lahore to hold a strong enemy in check, any conqueror from beyond the Indus valley could easily sweep down the whole north Indian region, as had been exemplified times without number ever since the day of Alexander. The Wazir and the Marathas failed to make proper provision in this respect. Raghunathrao left Poona in October 1756 and should have reached Delhi in time to face Abdali and compel him to return. But moving slowly and having no strength to enforce his own judgment, he reached Indore on 14th February 1757, when Abdali had sent out parties against Mathura. Raghunathrao and Malharrao occupied themselves in exacting tributes from the Rajput thereby contracting their ill-will, and reached Agra in May, where Ghazi-ud-din welcomed them with all his heart. In the absence of Abdali, Najib Khan felt terribly afraid of Maratha vengeance and proposing the following terms of submission, thus wrote to Malharrao :
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1. I am your son, not deserving chastisement at your hands. I am ready to hand over Delhi to your possession and walk away to my own lands beyond the Jamuna.
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2. If you so desire, I am quite ready to bring about a permanent understanding between you and the Shah Abdali and fix up the demarcation of the spheres between you two.
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3. I am prepared to keep my son Zabeta Khan with a party of seven thousand armed followers in your camp, as my hostage, by way of guarantee for the due performance of my undertaking.
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4. If with all this you are bent upon waging a war against me, I am ready to accept the challenge, placing my faith in God and His decision.¹
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¹ P. D. 2. 77. See also Nuruddin Hussain’s *Life of Najib-ud-daula* translated by Sir J. N. Sarkar (Marathi version in *Ait. Patrav.* No. 447). Dr. Shrivastav in his life of Shuja-ud-daula (I) writes (p. 30 and 53) :— “Determined to revive the long forgotten days of Aurangzeb, the Qazi of the town of Benares rallied a party of fanatical Muslims and demolished on 2nd September 1755 the renovated temple of Vishveshwar situated in a corner of the Alamgiri mosque. Upon this the Peshwa asked Shuja to hand over the holy city to the Marathas. He prepared a sanad to that effect and made it over to the Maratha agent Gopalrao Ganesh. But Raghunathrao broke off the negotiations with Shuja.” P. D. 21. 124 ; 27. 165.
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This was a reasonable proposal and should have been readily accepted. But Najib Khan had made himself so odious to the Emperor that the latter preferred Ghazi-ud-din to him. The Marathas entered the Doab and soon captured not only all the territory up to Saharanpur, but easily took possession of Delhi itself in August, after a fortnight’s struggle. Najib Khan was captured with all his friends and followers by Vithal Shivdev, who for that achievement was rewarded by the Emperor with dresses and ornaments and given the title of Umdat-ul-mulk and a jagir near Nasik, which his family still holds.
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Najib Khan's character was well-known to every Maratha and even every Muslim in the north. He had all along been the chief source of mischief for the Marathas, and had early in the year himself participated in the atrocities inflicted upon the Hindus of Mathura, Agra and other places and in the terrible desecration of Hindu shrines. It was, therefore, highly necessary to keep him permanently secured, preferably in a distant southern fort after the fashion of Chanda Saheb at Satara. Every Maratha of Delhi and the north advised such a course to Raghunathrao. But Najib wormed himself into Malharrao's bosom. He made piteous appeals to him, that if he were saved from death or indignity he would serve the Maratha cause with all his heart. Malharrao was moved; the author of *Siyar-ul-mutakherin* says, Holkar received large bribes from Najib Khan and earnestly pleaded with Raghunathrao to release the Khan and utilise his services to strengthen the Maratha hold not only over Delhi and the surrounding regions but also through him and the Pathans of the lower Doab, over the eastern lands of Benares and beyond. The prospect was indeed alluring. Raghunathrao could not resist Holkar, and yielding to his entreaties, allowed Najib to depart unscathed to his home on a verbal promise never more to interfere with the concerns of Delhi and to surrender all his fortified posts in the Doab to the Marathas. The serpent's tail was merely trodden upon. On 6th September Najib left Delhi for his patrimony.
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Najib Khan having been removed, Raghunathrao formally installed the Emperor on the throne, confirmed Ghazi-ud-din in the Wazirship and appointed Ahmad Khan Bangash Mir Bakhshi. He then despatched parties to take possession of the Doab and himself proceeded to Garh-mukteshvar apparently to settle the government of the territory surrendered by Najib Khan, but really to take a holy bath in the Ganges and purify his soul by a visit to the numerous sacred spots and scenes reminiscent of the ancient epic days. Renko Anaji and other Maratha captains secured Saharanpur after driving away Najib's deputy Qutb Shah, and proceeded up to the foot of the Himalayas driving Najib Khan to his original home beyond the Ganges. Raghunath wrote to the Peshwa glowing accounts about these achievements. He boasted of having established Maratha supremacy throughout north India from the Satlaj to the environs of Benares and proposed that he would soon release the Punjab from Abdali’s possession. Not a few discerning Maratha agents in the north brought to Raghunathrao’s notice the weakness of these arrangements, but the chief was so hypnotised by Holkar that he turned a deaf ear to them. Antaji Mankeshvar, the Hingnes, Govindpant Bundele, Gopalrao Barve, and others like them were all more or less corrupt, carrying on nefarious transactions to satisfy their selfish greed or private pique. After spending four months in arranging the affairs of Delhi where Antaji Mankeshvar and Krishnarao Kale were stationed, Raghunathrao left for the Punjab on 22nd October, the Dassara day, accompanied by Malharrao. They reached Kunjpura in January, accepted submission from its commandant Najabat Khan in February 1758 and reached Sarhind on 8th March.
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2. The Marathas reach Attock.—Here the Marathas for the first time came into contact with the Sikhs who had been bitter enemies of the Pathans of the trans-frontier regions, and who had the ambition of creating an independent Punjab as their motherland. During the ten years 1755-65 there appeared three powerful leaders of the Sikhs, Jasasinh Ahluwalia, the founder of the present State of Kapurthala, Alasinh Jat (Ala Jat of the Maratha papers) founder of Patiala, and Jasasinh Ramgadia, who all successfully fought and resisted the aggression of Ahmad Shah Abdali, whom they hated more than they did the Marathas. During 1757 Ahmad Shah Abdali after demolishing the Hindu shrines of Mathura, pulled down on his way back through the Punjab the golden temple of the Sikhs at Amritsar and filled up with earth the sacred lake in front of it. But no sooner did the Afghan King turn his back, than the Sikhs rebuilt the temple and restored the lake which we see to this day. Abdali had left his son Taimur Shah and his general Jahan Khan at Lahore for the government of the province with a fairly large army of occupation. At Sarhind Raghunathrao discussed the question whether he should proceed to Lahore or turn back without caring to subjugate the Punjab, which the Sikhs were disputing with the Pathans. But the Emperor and Ghazi-ud-din were anxious to recover the Punjab, and Adina Beg the Mughal Governor of the Jalandar Doab between the Satlaj and the Bias, was already waging a relentless war against the Pathans with the help of the Sikhs and encouraged R'rao in that project. This appeared in a way a mad venture particularly as the Marathas thereby lengthened their line of communication with their base at Poona, while they had no means of holding a territory extending to the Indus. This would have been possible if the Maratha position at Delhi had been made perfectly secure as against their antagonists Najib Khan and Malika Zamani.
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Ever since the invasion of Nadir Shah, the Punjab had been the land of constant contention between various forces and so subject to plunder and devastation that the residents had developed a sort of resigned mentality bowing to the inevitable. Raghunathrao laid siege to Sarhind, which had a garrison of ten thousand Pathan troops commanded by Abdussamad Khan. The Khan was wounded and made his submission to the Marathas, agreeing to serve them in the same way that he had done Abdali before. In this fight of Sarhind Ala Sinh Jat joined the Marathas to expel the Pathans. At this moment Taimur Shah and Jahan Khan were already being harassed at Lahore by Adina Beg and now, learning that the Marathas after capturing Sarhind were coming in strong bodies against them, the two Afghan chiefs evacuated Lahore and fled to their native land with as much wealth and goods as they could carry. They were hotly pursued by the Marathas, and had to leave all their equipage and belongings on the river Chinab as they could not carry them away with safety and these were easily secured by the Marathas. They then gave up the pursuit of the retiring Afghans and returned to Lahore.² Raghunathrao reached Lahore on 11th April and was right royally entertained with joyful illuminations by Adina Beg and others in the Mughal palace of Shalemar. This was the Maratha New year's Day of the Bahudhanya Shaka.
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² Letter of Hari Bhide, P. D. 27. 218.
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The territory between the Satlaj and Attock was in those days distributed for administrative purposes into three divisions, the southern, the middle and the northern, with their capitals at Multan, Lahore and Srinagar. When Raghunathrao with his valiant bands was so enthusiastically welcomed at Lahore and Prince Taimur and Jahan Khan had returned precipitately in great discomfiture, Abdali became almost hopeless of recovering that land, particularly as the Sikhs were his worst enemies. From subsequent events one is apt to ridicule this as an audacious venture of the Marathas trying to hold such an extensive country from Poona. But the conditions of 1758 did not warrant any such fears. Abdali was then finding extreme difficulty even in holding his own. In 1758 he was threatened by the Persians from the west; his own nephew Abdur Rahman rose against him and went to Poona seeking the Peshwa's support in regaining his inheritance. The three Sikh chiefs mentioned above were brave leaders and allies commanding a considerable following of the best soldiers in Asia.
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At Lahore, therefore, Raghunathrao and his advisers found the situation easy and favourable. Abdussamad Khan who was a prisoner in Maratha hands, with characteristic double-dealing offered to undertake the defence of the frontier against Abdali on behalf of the Marathas. From Poona the Peshwa despatched Abdur Rahman with all haste to Lahore with instructions to Raghunath to make the best use of him in the scheme he was now executing. Raghunathrao, therefore, consigned the trans-Indus regions of Peshawar to these two Muslim agents, Abdur Rahman and Abdussamad Khan, posting them at Peshawar, with a considerable body of troops. They were asked to capture the territory of Kabul and Kandahar which had formerly been parts of the Indian sphere of the Mughal Empire and which had been lost since the days of Muhammad Shah. This meant a complete extinction of Ahmad Shah Abdali, a man of supreme resourcefulness and capacity in which he equalled or excelled even Nadir Shah. Herein lay the hidden danger, which no one then could gauge or foresee. After all it is the personal factor that predominates in human affairs and that cannot be predetermined.
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Tukoji Holkar, Sabaji Sindia, Renko Anaji, Rayaji Sakhadev, Gopalrao Barve, and other captains were asked to hold the Punjab for a few months before Dattaji Sindia could arrive and make some permanent arrangement. Dattaji was then at Poona and momentarily expected to come to the Punjab. Obviously the weakest link in the chain was that no strong Maratha leader of prestige was associated with Abdussamad Khan to guard and hold Peshawar, the trans-Indus gateway of India in the north-west. The Peshwa sent distinct orders to station Holkar at Lahore. As Dattaji was shortly expected, the provisional arrangement was hoped by Raghunathrao and Holkar to last a few months without disturbance. But well posted with all Indian details as Abdali was, he struck at this very weak point, utilised Najib Khan and killed Dattaji. One can never leave things to chance. The responsibility for these consequences comes home to Holkar.³
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³ Phalke series, Gwalior 3. 92, 376 and 112.
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Raghunathrao and Holkar left for the Deccan towards the end of May 1758 having on the way performed their religious ceremonies on 5th June at Kurukshetra. The other party of Abdur Rahman and Abdussamad with Tukoji Holkar and Sabaji Sindia left for the frontier and about July planted the Maratha standard on Attock and established revenue administration in that extreme north-western region. Adina Beg accepted the responsibility of paying 75 lacs to the Marathas by way of income from the newly conquered territories of the Punjab. The revenue management was entrusted to Sadiq Beg and his Hindu banker Lakshmi Narayan. All Maharashtra felt electrified with the proud performance of Raghunathrao and his bands having reached the extreme frontier of India and bathed their horses in the Indus.⁴ It is, however, true that the Maratha possession of these distant regions did not last long, perhaps half a year. Adina Beg's death on 16th September 1758 gave the first signal of the impending danger; and later on Abdali during the summer of 1759 was able to recover from his internal troubles. He retook Peshawar in August and shortly after marched into the Punjab. But before we take up the narrative of 1759, we must first conclude the story of the return journey of Raghunathrao and his party in a false hope that all was well on the frontier.
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⁴ Sir Jadunath in his Fall of the Mughal Empire II, p. 76 wrongly asserts on the strength of P. D. 27. 218 that the Marathas never went beyond the Chinab river. But Chandrachud Vol. 1. 49 and another part of it printed later at Gwalior by Dongre No. 4, (two important papers) clearly prove that the Marathas captured Attock and for a time collected taxes and administered the districts right up to the Indus. Akhbarats and other sources support this conclusion.
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3. Failure to restrain Najib Khan.—All friends of the Maratha cause sent urgent and pathetic appeals to Raghunathrao not to think of returning to the Deccan quickly, but to canton at or near Delhi in order to give stability to the arrangements just made, and to exercise a check upon evil-doers and inspire confidence among those who like the Pathans of the Doab were vacillating. In fact Raghunathrao received strong appeals from various quarters that he should stay on till at least Dattaji Sindia or some other responsible leader should arrive on the spot. But Raghunathrao played into the hands of Malharrao Holkar, who was deluded by the mischievous Najib Khan's assurance that all was well and that he would see to it that Abdali did not return. While he was making these professions, Najib was actively intriguing with that monarch to come to India and save the Muslim interests from Maratha aggression. Even this double dealing of Najib Khan was plainly reported to Raghunathrao by several responsible agents, but he turned a deaf ear to all such suggestions and directly set out in haste from Karnal on his homeward journey without visiting Delhi on the way.⁵ He should have at least clearly reported these protests to the Peshwa before going back.
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⁵ A vast number of letters speak this sad tale, which the student should carefully note. P. D. 2. 88, 89; P. D. 21. 156-158; P. D. 27. 150, 156, 226, 229. *Bhau Sahib Bakhar* is most eloquent and records facts from authentic sources.
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As Malharrao was anxious to collect tribute from the Rajputs, the two marched separately through Rajputana to Malwa. On the way they accosted first Jankoji Sindia and then Dattaji both proceeding to the north. These two had not started from the south together. Jankoji left Poona in February 1758 and Dattaji in May after having celebrated his own marriage with Bhagirathibai in March. Jankoji reached Ujjain in March and after spending a couple of months there proceeded to Kotah, where in July he met Raghunathrao then on his return home. In this visit they fully discussed matters of moment and the general situation at Delhi and in the Punjab.
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Raghunathrao strongly impressed on Jankoji's mind how Malharrao obstructed any action being taken against Najib Khan, who required to be checked in time and prevented from creating mischief. How utterly foolish was it to expect Jankoji to do what he as a master had failed to effect! Raghunathrao begged Jankoji, "You must do me this one favour, never mind even if it cost a crore or vast armies, viz., you must restrain this Najib Khan finally. Malharrao considers Najib as his adopted son. He has many such sons to look after. Najib is terribly wicked and will surely ruin the Maratha prospects."
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In a few days, on 19th August, Jankoji saw Malharrao himself returning. He tried to avoid a personal meeting after his experiences of Nagore and the murder of Jayappa; but Gangoba Tatya brought about an interview between them. After all Najib Khan was not restrained. He did the mischief for which the Marathas had to suffer in the end.⁶ Dattaji reached Ujjain in June and in a short time met Raghunathrao and Malharrao returning from the north. The same talks were held between them as with Jankoji.
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⁶ See P. D. 2. 94. 21. 162; Kotah Daftar 1. 183, 190. Note the strong words used by Marathi writers in describing Najib Khan.
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Raghunathrao reached Poona on 16th September and in his own way communicated a full tale to the Peshwa of what he had been able to accomplish in the north, particularly how, owing to Malharrao's interference Najib Khan was left at large. The Peshwa at once detected the lurking danger and sent for Malharrao to Poona in all haste for a personal explanation. Unfortunately Malharrao then was seriously ill at Indore during October and November. He sent Gangadhar Yashvant on to Poona to explain matters and himself followed in December. In January the Peshwa directed Malharrao immediately to repair to the north and support the Sindias. This Malharrao failed to do, why it is not possible now to determine. He spent one full year (1759) doing nothing important, mostly in Rajputana, from whence he hastened to Delhi on 13th January 1760 after learning at Jaipur that Dattaji had fallen at Barari Ghat on the 10th of that month.
4. Dattaji locked at Shukratal
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how the mistakes of Raghunathrao and Malharrao and incidentally of the Peshwa brought about the ruin of Dattaji Sindia. In November 1758, Dattaji and Jankoji met at Rewari and proceeded to handle the situation of Delhi with which they had no occasion till then to be conversant, nor a first hand acquaintance particularly with the character of Holkar’s proteges Ghazi-ud-din and Najib Khan. This meant that they were called upon single-handed to execute the commitments which had been already made, viz. to restrain Najib Khan, provide for the defence of the Punjab, release the Hindu holy places from Muslim control, and acquire funds to the extent of a crore or two for paying off the Peshwa’s debts. The last item required the extension of Maratha power on the east up to Patna. These were the grand tasks entrusted by the Peshwa to the Sindias and solemnly accepted by them, in colossal ignorance of the circumstances.
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When the Sindias arrived at Delhi, Vithal Shivdev was near Saharanpur seizing the Rohilla possessions. Najib Khan had then collected a large force and was openly defying the Marathas. Arriving at Delhi in December the Sindias were compelled to waste three precious months in arranging the affairs of the Emperor and the Wazir, in which they had to act with unprecedented sternness. The Emperor’s son and heir apparent Ali Gauhar, later known as Shah Alam II, had left Delhi the previous year and was trying to take possession of the eastern territories of Bihar and Bengal, which had now been practically seized by the English East India Company. He invaded Patna in conjunction with the Nawab Shuja-ud-daula of Lucknow in March 1759 but was turned back by Clive’s troops under Col. Knox.
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Dattaji found Ghazi-ud-din utterly worthless for the execution of any useful plan, so that the former paid no attention to him and managed matters independently. He sent his forces to capture Najib Khan but failed. He, therefore, decided first to settle the affairs of the Punjab and then start operations against Najib. With this object he left Delhi on 1st February 1759 and proceeded to the Satlaj where Sadiq Beg and Adina Beg’s widow and son met him. In consultation with them and with the other advisers he posted Sabaji Sindia at Lahore for the protection of the Punjab as Sabaji had already subjugated the territory right up to the Indus. The Peshwa had suggested the name of Naro Shankar for the sole charge of the Punjab and Dattaji also accepted the suggestion, but Naro Shankar was not very enthusiastic on the point and would not accept the commission without express written orders from the Peshwa. Dattaji did indeed realize the necessity of a first class Maratha sardar being permanently posted to Lahore : but this he thought could be later done by the Peshwa himself. Dattaji could not personally remain in Lahore as he had other momentous affairs on hand. There was then no news of any threat from Abdali and things were quiet beyond the frontier.
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After making the best arrangements he could, Dattaji returned from the Punjab in May, crossed the Jamna into the Doab on 1st June and set himself to overcoming Najib Khan. Dattaji was accompanied by Govindpant Bundele, a steady and conciliatory man who had direct intimate dealings with Najib Khan and the other Rohilla Pathans. Many advised Dattaji to ignore Najib Khan and push on. But this was neither advisable nor possible, as Najib Khan at large was the greatest mischief-maker of the day. In the meantime Najib too, with deep treachery at heart, professed readiness to perform whatever Dattaji would ask him to do. A personal visit was arranged between them through the mediation of Govindpant. But the visit proved abortive. Najib Khan came all alone into Dattaji's tent, but before talks could be started, some of his followers rushed in and carried Najib Khan away forcibly, under the supposition that his life was in danger. Whether the whole plan was a prearranged ruse or not cannot be ascertained. Thereafter negotiations began through agents. Najib Khan agreed to help Dattaji in carrying all his troops across the Ganges by means of a bridge of boats which he agreed to construct ; and with this understanding both proceeded to Shukratal,⁷ a place suited to the construction of a bridge, as the river bed there was full of small islets, and the mud banks sufficiently high. It proved a fatal step for Dattaji to have tried to conciliate Najib Khan. He could easily have been attacked and captured, but on the advice of many experienced men on the spot, Dattaji decided to utilise Najib’s services as was suggested by Malharrao. Najib Khan had said when coming out of Dattaji’s tent, “the looks of these Marathas appear wicked : they cannot be trusted.” Jaitsinh Gujar, a zamindar of Shukratal and the environs, was entrusted with the task of constructing the bridge, as he was considered an expert. Najib Khan reached Shukratal at once, while Dattaji followed slowly, to allow time for the construction of the bridge. But the monsoon arrived, the river rose in floods and Najib Khan urged that the operations of the bridge could not be pushed on. Dattaji finished his holy baths on the way at Garhmukteshvar and pushing on encamped at Mirapur about a couple of miles from Najib’s camp, which was pitched in a huge bend of the river.
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⁷ Shukratal on the western bank of the Ganges, 40 miles south of Hardwar, and 16 miles east of the railway station Muzaffarnagar. Beyond the river lay Najib's own residence Najibabad about 20 miles to the east.
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Heavy rains had made the whole place muddy and movement was impossible. Najib utilised this circumstance to his best advantage. He was fully conversant with the situation and the surroundings, the range of rain, the country paths and the prominent people, to which Dattaji was an utter stranger. Najib Khan sent his secret personal agents to Shuja-ud-daula, to Hafiz Rahmat and the other Pathans and also to distant Afghanistan inviting Ahmad Shah Abdali quickly to India and giving him all possible details of the situation at Delhi and Shukratal and of the Sindia’s position. Thus he organized a formidable coalition against the Marathas with such secrecy that Dattaji soon became perplexed. Najib Khan represented to Shuja that to allow Dattaji passage to the east was suicidal, as he would soon wrest from Shuja his two Subahs of Oudh and Allahabad. If on the contrary he would help Najib in his distress and join the Muslim combination, Shuja could become Wazir and restore the prestige of the Mughal Empire. But Shuja knew Najib better than Dattaji, and did not at all put trust in the professions of one who was known to be so unfaithful. Besides in religious matters the Shia Shuja was no friend of the Sunni Najib. However, the only object which Shuja wished to secure was to resist by all possible means the cession of Prayag and Benares to the Marathas. That was indeed a sentimental point, but the surrender of these two places would spell disaster to Muslim prestige throughout India. With this view Shuja sent his two Gosavi captains with about ten thousand men to the Ganges opposite Shukratal to help Najib Khan and safeguard his own position.
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In the meantime Najib Khan entrenched himself at Shukratal so formidably that the Marathas could not easily attack him. He collected troops and within a couple of months as the bridge became ready, instead of its serving Dattaji's purpose, it became a most convenient channel for Najib Khan himself to bring in supplies and maintain communication with the Pathans beyond. Before the end of August Dattaji saw through Najib's game clearly and began counter measures to defeat it. On 15th September Dattaji made a sudden attack on Najib Khan's camp, but it failed, the Marathas lost some men and retired at nightfall. Thereafter skirmishes occurred for nearly two months, but on account of the broken terrain Dattaji could not close with his opponent; ignorant of the latter's schemes he persisted in his efforts, never suspecting that Shah Abdali of Kabul would come upon him suddenly from the north-west. In order to cut off Najib Khan's supplies and support from beyond the river, Dattaji despatched Govindpant Bundele on 21st October with ten thousand troops via Hardwar where there was a ford. The Pant went straight against Najibabad plundering and burning on the way, but was repulsed by Hafiz Rahmat and Dunde Khan who rapidly came upon him in response to Najib's call. Govindpant was forced to beat a hurried retreat. Anupgir Gosavi too crossed the river by the bridge and joined Najib Khan at Shukratal by the end of October. Dattaji besieged the camp of Najib Khan at once. With an efficient army under him and many devoted followers, Dattaji never till the last moment felt daunted.
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Early in 1759 Shah Abdali was reported to be in extreme peril, but he soon recovered his position and was agitated in his mind to learn that the Punjab for which he had toiled for the past several years had been lost to the Marathas, that his son and Jahan Khan had returned after suffering a terrible defeat, and lost their valuables and a large number of fighting men, that the Marathas had planted their flag on Attock and that a rival to him had appeared at Peshawar, in the person of his own cousin Abdur Rahman, with Maratha support. Fully informed of Dattaji's position at Shukratal the Abdali Shah immediately organized his forces, despatched Jahan Khan with a sufficient army to take possession of Lahore in July 1759, just at the moment when Dattaji was persuading Najib Khan to build for him a bridge of boats on the Ganges. The Shah himself took post in Peshawar and stood ready to support Jahan Khan who had advanced into the Punjab. It has already been mentioned that no permanent arrangement had been made by the Peshwa for holding the Punjab. Sabaji Sindia was merely a temporary caretaker, with only slight forces at his command, with which he certainly could not defend a territory extending over more than 300 miles. Short work was done of the many scattered Maratha parties in the outposts of the province and Jahan Khan appeared before Lahore in August. Sabaji maintained his position with great valour and strength, inflicted a crushing defeat upon Jahan Khan, who was severely wounded and lost his son in the action. Jahan Khan's return to Peshawar in discomfiture so roused the fury of the Shah that he immediately came upon Lahore, with all his strength. Sabaji Sindia could not oppose him and retreated in extreme consternation reaching Dattaji's camp at Shukratal on 8th November to tell the sad tale that the Punjab had been lost, that many Marathas in different places had been cut down to the number of about one thousand, that most of the survivors had lost all their belongings and were helplessly fleeing about to save their lives from the merciless Afghans.
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In this dangerous predicament the heroic Dattaji was not at all daunted. He possessed wonderful courage but did not unfortunately combine it with prudence and circumspection. Instead of at once falling back upon Delhi and calling in sufficient aid from different quarters, he attempted alone to oppose the full force of the Afghan King, who was advancing with the fury of a tempest. Dattaji clung to his position at Shukratal for more than a month even after the arrival of Sabaji Sindia and tried to force Najib Khan into surrender.⁸ This proved an impossible task, Najib Khan continued freely getting supplies and men in large numbers from across the Ganges and the news of Abdali's rapid advance heartened Muslim resistance.
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⁸ See Phalke series 3. 190.
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Another evil effect of Abdali's advance was that the Wazir became entirely unnerved. He was in extreme fear of life and suspected that the Emperor would give him up and join the Afghan King. So being out of his wits he had the Emperor Alamgir II murdered on 30th November 1759 along with the former Wazir Intizam-ud-daula and four minor persons, having taken the party out under the pretence of paying a visit to a Muhammadan saint who had arrived in the vicinity. He thereupon raised to the throne a princeling and gave him the name of Shah Jahan Sani. When Ali Gauhar learnt of his father's murder in Bihar he declared himself Emperor on 22nd December, 1759.
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5. Dattaji falls at Barari Ghat.—The news of this diabolical crime reached Abdali at Sarhind on the third day, and so enraged him that he at once proceeded to Delhi to punish the wicked wrongdoer, although he had originally formed no intention this time of proceeding beyond Sarhind. The Marathas had absolutely no hand in the murder, but their general support to Ghazi-ud-din made them responsible for the miserable fate of the Emperor. The whole course of events from now on to the battle of Panipat, took an entirely different turn, rousing feelings of anger and revenge.
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The Peshwa in Poona hardly knew anything about this development. Holkar roved in Rajputana dealing with trivial matters and acted criminally in not running to save the situation in the Punjab, brought about by Najib Khan and Ghazi-ud-din, both helped by Holkar from the beginning.
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As Abdali came rapidly marching upon him in the first week of December, Dattaji was compelled to give up his attempt against Najib Khan. He hurriedly broke up his camp and left Shukratal on 11th December to face Abdali beyond the Jamuna, which he crossed on the 18th, and arriving at Kunjpura he learned that about 40 thousand Afghans under Taimur Shah had reached Ambala. It was quite rash on his part to proceed alone against Abdali's full force, but retreat was a word which Dattaji never knew, and he at once divided his forces into two parties, the light one of twenty-five thousand he led himself against the advancing enemy and the other consisting of heavy baggage, artillery and the camp folowers, were sent back to Delhi under Govindpant Bundele. On 24th December he met the Afghans near Sthaneshwar and had a stiff encounter with them for a couple of hours, in which the two parties remained equally balanced. Dattaji lost about four hundred of his men but held the ground.
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Evidently Abdali avoided an open encounter with Dattaji at this time and waited to be joined by the Rohillas so that he could attack the enemy with success. Therefore Abdali crossed the Jamuna the same night at Buriaghat⁹ and proceeded towards Saharanpur, where Najib Khan joined him. Thereafter the combined armies marched along the eastern bank of the Jamuna towards Delhi. Dattaji at once turned back to save the capital, moving by the opposite bank of that river. By the end of December the two opponents stood parted by the river facing each other some ten miles north of Delhi, Abdali taking his position at Luni and Dattaji at what was known then as Barari-ghat. Ghazi-ud-din, now thoroughly terrified, was assured of safety by Dattaji, who asked him to organize the defence of capital by all means.
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⁹ Buriaghat is about 130 miles north of Bararighat.
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Dattaji was advised by many well-wishers to fall back from Delhi, join Holkar, obtain further reinforcements and then oppose Abdali with a sure chance of success; but he declined to follow such a defeatist course : losing Delhi meant, in his opinion, the loss of so many years of labour and success. He considered himself quite able to hold his own and save Delhi until succours arrived, for which he had sent urgent demands. Malharrao was expected every moment, and why he did not at once move north from Jaipur is a mystery, which can be explained only on the supposition that he wished to benefit himself by the sacrifice of Sindia. Dattaji had about him, devoted veteran men of his own, besides Naro Shankar and Bundele. Dattaji cared rather to prevent the harm and atrocities sure to happen to Delhi in case he gave the place up to Abdali's vengeance.
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On 6th January Dattaji sent away all his camp followers, non-combatants and heavy baggage to Rewari, and prepared to encounter Abdali if he should venture to attack Delhi, remaining entirely on the defensive until Holkar should arrive, and guarding the fords of the river with strict vigilance. It was the height of the cold season in north India. Dattaji did not expect a direct attack either on Delhi or on his camp at Bararighat. The river at this place was divided into two streams of scanty water enclosing between them something like an island overgrown with tall reeds which could easily conceal men and horses. Abdali sent Najib Khan to attempt a crossing at this place on the morning of Thursday, 10th January 1760. The Rohillas came on camels and small elephants with only two light guns on each, all hidden by the tall reeds. Sabaji Sinde was guarding the ghat and resisted the attackers with his few men, after reporting the attack to Dattaji. The latter without knowing either the exact numbers or the concealed guns of the enemy, proceeded rashly to protect the ford with a handful of men wearing only swords and not equipped with any firearms. A deadly combat ensued in the dried bed of the river and Jankoji soon after came up and joined in, but a chance bullet struck Dattaji dead and another wounded Jankoji making him unconscious. The loss on the Maratha side was by no means heavy, certainly less than a 1,000. But the death of Dattaji created a panic and severely damped the Maratha spirit. The army at once dispersed, everybody running to save himself in whatever way seemed possible. Dattaji's head was cut off by Kutb Shah, the reputed Guru of Najib Khan, and presented to the Shah Abdali. Jankoji was removed hurriedly by his followers, who all ran south to Kotputli, in Jaipur State, about 28 miles north-west of Alwar. Here Malharrao Holkar joined the fugitives on 15th January. Najib Khan immediately after raided Dattaji's camp and carried away some plunder and a few Muslim prisoners such as Sadiq Beg's children, Lakshmi Narayan, (Adina Beg's manager), and others, who could not save themselves otherwise. Dattaji's headless body was duly cremated by his followers.
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This terrible news spread all over India like wild fire. Sabaji Sindia who was in charge of the Barari Ghat ford, ran and joined the camp at Kotputli. Poor Ghazi-ud-din sought the shelter of the Jat Rajah. Abdali immediately took possession of Delhi and appointed Yakub Ali Khan as its Governor. He was in great straits regarding money. He had a large army to maintain and Delhi had nothing to offer, having been completely sacked by him two years before. Najib Khan could not pay him anything but begged the Shah to stay on and not to depart immediately, otherwise, he argued, the Marathas would return and destroy him in no time. At his request Abdali sent insistent demands for funds to Shuja-ud-daula, Surajmal Jat, and Madho Sinh Raja of Jaipur; but all returned a negative answer, urging they had no funds to spare. The Jat indeed made a very bold reply, “You must first drive the Marathas away from Delhi, assure us that you are the master there, and then we shall be your willing vassals.” Abdali was not inclined to remain as the Emperor of India. He had his best interests centred in Afghanistan. The Peshwa in the south was preparing a powerful expedition for the relief of Delhi, with which the Abdali Shah was not at all inclined to entangle himself. Ali Gauhar had already declared himself Emperor and was waiting at Allahabad for a favourable turn of events, which would enable him to proceed to Delhi and secure the throne.
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At Kotputli the funeral ceremonies of Dattaji were performed, and the party moved back to Sabalgad on the Chambal where in February Dattaji’s wife Bhagirathibai gave birth to a son. Malharrao Holkar comforted them all as an elderly guardian. They then began measures for recovering their lost position and driving away the invader by employing guerilla tactics in which Holkar was an adept. On 24th January a campaign was commenced. Abdali was watching the Maratha movements, having advanced parties of his men to prevent any Maratha move against Delhi, which he did not leave for some time. During February and March skirmishes took place between the Afghan parties and Holkar’s bodies. The latter while plundering in the Doab suffered a severe defeat near Sikandarabad on 4th March. Full accounts of these occurrences quickly reached the Peshwa at Poona with a united demand that unless a strong and efficient artillery and some commander of outstanding merit appeared in the north, to conduct operations against the Durani Shah, it was not possible to drive him away and recover the lost position.
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CHAPTER XX
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1760, February 13 News of Dattaji’s death reaches the Peshwa.
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1760, March 7-14 Meeting of leaders at Patdur : Bhau Saheb nominated to lead a well prepared expedition to Delhi with Ibrahim Khan’s artillery.
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1760, March 14 Bhau Saheb starts from Patdur.
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1760, April 12 Bhau Saheb reaches the Narmada.
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1760, May 31 Bhau Saheb reaches Gwalior.
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1760, June 27 Sardars meet Bhau Saheb near Agra : also Surajmal Jat. Abdali encamps near Aligarh.
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1760, July 13 River Gambhir crossed by Bhau.
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1760, July 16 Bhau Saheb reaches Mathura.
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1760, July 18 Shuja joins Abdali in his camp.
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1760, August 2 Delhi taken from Abdali’s possession.
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1760, August Abdali moves his camp to the Jamuna opposite Delhi : negotiations conducted for peace.
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1760, Aug.-Sept. Food scarcity in Maratha camp.
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1760, October 7 Bhau Saheb leaves Delhi for Kunjpura.
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1760, October 10 Shah Alam proclaimed Emperor.
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1760, October 17 Kunjpura captured: Qutb Shah put to death.
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1760, October 25 Abdali crosses over at Bagpat to the right side of the Jamuna.
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1760, October 28 Abdali halts at Sonpat.
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1760, October 31 Bhau Saheb returns and forms his camp at Panipat.
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1760, November 4 The two parties face to face at Panipat.
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1760, Nov. 19 and 22 Light actions take place.
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1760, December 7 A severe battle, Balavantrao Mahendale killed.
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1760, December 17 Govindpant Bundele killed in a surprise attack. Abdali’s position highly satisfactory.
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The first of these, the *Gospel of the Hebrews*, was used by the Jewish Christians of Palestine, and was probably a version of the Gospel of Matthew, though it contained some traditions not found in our canonical books. The *Gospel of the Egyptians* was used by the ascetic sects of Egypt, and was marked by a strong tendency towards mysticism and asceticism. The *Gospel of Peter* was used by the Docetists, and taught that Christ did not really suffer, but only appeared to do so.
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These gospels, and others like them, were not accepted by the Church as a whole, and were gradually lost or suppressed. The Church, however, felt the need for a standard collection of writings that would serve as a guide for faith and practice. This led to the formation of the New Testament canon, a process that took several centuries to complete.
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The first step in this process was the collection of the letters of Paul, which were widely circulated among the churches. Then came the four Gospels, which were accepted as the authoritative accounts of the life and teachings of Jesus. The Acts of the Apostles and the other epistles were gradually added, and finally the Book of Revelation.
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By the end of the second century, the core of the New Testament was generally accepted by the Church. The process of canonization was not a formal act of a council, but rather a gradual recognition by the churches of the writings that were most valuable for their life and worship. It was only in the fourth century that the canon was formally closed by the councils of the Church.
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The formation of the New Testament canon was a crucial event in the history of the Church. It provided a standard of faith and practice that helped to unify the Church and to protect it from the influence of heretical sects. It also ensured that the teachings of Jesus and the apostles would be preserved for future generations.