New History of the Marathas v2.c29: Chapter XX. From Patdur to Panipat [1760 March-December]

New History of the Marathas v2.c29

Language: English

Chapter XX. From Patdur to Panipat [1760 March-December]

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1 Bhau Saheb's advance to Delhi. 2 Shuja-ud-daula joins Abdali. 3 Negotiations for peace. 4 Kunjpura captured. 5 Face to face at Panipat.

1. Bhau Saheb's advance to Delhi.—The news of Dattaji's death at Barari Ghat reached the Peshwa at Ahmadnagar on 13th February, 33 days after the event. He at once called back Bhau Saheb from Udgir with all his troops in order to concert measures for avenging Sindia's death. Patdur near Jalna was chosen as the place where they could all conveniently meet and whence the armies could proceed direct to the north without delay. The news from Delhi certainly staggered the Peshwa and his advisers, but did not damp their spirits. The Maratha State had just reached the zenith of its power, it had ample resources in men and money, and during the last 25 years a large number of capable young leaders had been trained to discharge both military and civil functions efficiently. The whole service was never better manned than at this moment. A loud cry therefore arose from all quarters at once for fully equipped armies being hurried to Delhi in order to drive away the invader. It took Bhau Saheb a week or two to close his operations and effect a favourable peace with the Nizam, although he could not owing to this trouble in the north exact the fullest reparations as he had all along intended. The Nizam too on getting news of the changed military situation in north India, demurred to fulfil the promises which he had made under pressure of arms. The Peshwa, Bhau Saheb, Raghunathrao and other leaders and diplomats all met at Patdur on 7th March 1760 and deliberated upon future measures night and day for a whole week. A free discussion took place among responsible leaders and every detail of past mistakes and shortcomings and future possibilities came under a scathing scrutiny and thorough investigation. Sindia and Holkar were the only leaders who were absent from this conference. The gist of the discussion was the disclosure of the mismanagement and disorder that largely figured in the two expeditions of Raghunathrao, who was found to be incapable of exercising power or controlling subordinates and punishing them properly for dereliction. Hingne, Antaji Mankeshwar, Bundele and so many others required checks by a supervising master which Raghunathrao failed to exercise. A woeful mismanagement of his accounts also became all too plain. These matters which used to be publicly talked of and discussed before now, came up for a searching criticism at this conference. The result was a startling revelation to the Peshwa. A strong man clever with the pen and the sword, possessing experience of warfare and diplomacy, one who could create order out of chaos, was now needed; and everybody pointed to Bhau Saheb as the right leader to handle the situation in the north. It till now had been the Peshwa's settled intention to nominate Raghunathrao again to go to the north. But a different resolution was taken at Patdur : the die was cast.

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Sadashivrao who had developed after his great uncle Bajirao I, was nominated to command the expedition which was hurriedly organized. Most of the young and old soldiers and diplomats were immediately told off for that duty. Sadashivrao was asked to take the Peshwa's eldest son Vishvasrao a lad of 18 with him, both by way of giving him an invaluable training for the future Peshwaship and also as a convenient check upon the former's, impetuosity. The whole plan was arranged deliberately by the Peshwa going into every detail of the past and selecting the present personnel. Nothing was left to chance or extraneous influences. Damaji Gaikwad, Yeshvantrao Pawar, Naro Shankar, Vithal Shivdev, Antaji Mankeshwar, Balavantrao Mehendale, and the young Nana Phadnis, then not yet twenty and only five months older than the Peshwa's son Vishvasrao, these with thirty thousand select and well armed troops with the best military equipment and the finest artillery, the best horses and the choicest elephants were placed under the command of Bhau Saheb. This force in due course increased on the way as it proceeded, through allies joining in and fresh enlistments made.

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The brave and faithful Ibrahim Khan Gardi with his efficient park of artillery made a valuable addition to Bhau Saheb’s equipment. It must, however, be remembered that although the Maratha assemblage at Panipat numbered about 2 lacs of souls, quite two-thirds of these were non-combatants, being personal servants, clerks, shopkeepers, and other non-descript people. Bhau Saheb left Patdur on 14th March 1760 and exactly after ten months later on 14th January 1761, met his fate at Panipat. Raghunathrao was asked to remain watching the mischievous activities of the Nizam in the Deccan.

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It was expected that the Shah Abdali would as usual march back to his country in summer, and in that case most of the Rajput and other powerful chiefs would readily join the Maratha standard. But this did not prove true. Abdali stayed on in India and most of the northern potentates did not venture to incur his displeasure by joining the Marathas: indeed several remained simply watching the game, waiting ultimately to throw in their lot with the successful party. Yet another disappointment was in store for Bhau Saheb. He expected to reach the Doab in about two months and to attack the Afghans at once in summer by crossing the Jamuna in boats. He therefore asked Govindpant Bundele to keep ready for this purpose a large number of boats. But the whole project fell through as the Marathas were unavoidably detained for over a month in crossing the small river Gambhira beyond the Chambal, both of which were in untimely flood that year on account of early rains.

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Bhau Saheb reached the Narmada on 12th April, crossed at Handia and proceeded straight north via Sihore and Sironj, without visiting Bhopal or Bhilsa. By the end of May he reached Gwalior, but thereafter took more than a month to cover the short distance of 70 miles to Agra. On 16th July he was at Mathura.

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While nearing Agra he met first Malharrao Holkar near Dholpur and Jankoji Sindia a little later, in the last week of June. Surajmal Jat who was already at war with Abdali, came and joined Bhau Saheb, cordially offering presents and dresses. He only stipulated that as his country lay in the main route of the Maratha army, no damage should be done to it, that no tribute should be demanded, that he would willingly serve the Marathas with a contingent of ten thousand troops and give shelter to their ladies and non-combatants. Bhau Saheb readily accepted these conditions and issued strict instructions to his men that the Jat territory should in no way be molested.

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As soon as reports arrived of Bhau Saheb having left the Deccan with a large army, Najib Khan begged the Shah to remain in India for the hot season and thus preserve the work that had been so far accomplished. Najib agreed to defray the Shah's expenses. Ultimately the Shah yielded and pitched his camp at Ramgarh which he had recently captured from the Jat and named as Aligarh, and himself with a party of followers took up his residence at Anupsahar on the Ganges about 40 miles away.

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In July the Jamuna was found unfordable and no means could be obtained for the Maratha artillery to cross over so as to get at the enemy and finish the contest quickly. Heavy rains prevented all movement. It was, therefore, decided to advance to Delhi and capture the capital from Abdali's agent, Yakub Ali Khan. He was easily overcome, and was allowed to return to his master's camp if he surrendered the town. Delhi was taken after a slight bombardment of the fort; and Bhau Saheb and the whole party of Maratha chiefs made their formal entry into the capital on 2nd August 1760. The Abdali Shah sent out parties for the succour of the capital but the Jamuna proved an impassable barrier. The possession of Delhi by the Marathas at once changed the aspect of the war. The centre of political activity and imperial transactions, now came back to Delhi from the hands of Abdali, who for a time had wielded all power. The Marathas were now in high spirits and confident of driving out the Pathan invaders from India.

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2. Shuja-ud-daula joins Abdali.—Shuja-ud-daula of Oudh was then a very powerful potentate with a large army and ample funds, whose support was likely to turn the scale in this war. Both Bhau Saheb and Abdali tried their best to win him over. The former despatched his agent to Lucknow first from Gwalior and again Naro Shankar and Ramaji Anant, both influential and well-known to Shuja almost agreed to join the Marathas. They were his father's friends and he had no regard for the profession of Najib Khan whom he hated, both as a Sunni and as a treacherous time-server. When this inclination of Shuja was revealed to Abdali, he became extremely anxious and deputed Najib Khan to go to Shuja personally and win him over. He quickly proceeded towards Shuja’s quarters, kept an armed force at Kanauj and crossed over to Mehdi Ganj where he met that chief for a short time and so overwhelmed him with arguments of common interests and professions of fidelity that Shuja had to yield. He soon prepared his forces, marched with them into the Doab and was cordially received on 18th July in their camp at Anupshahar both by Najib Khan and the Abdali Shah.

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This stroke proved a great blow to the Maratha cause. For if Shuja had remained on the side of the Marathas, there was every chance of the Afghan Shah returning in discomfiture. It must, however, be said to Shuja’s credit that he all along exerted his best influence to bring about a lasting peace between the two antagonists and to prevent a recourse to arms, which even Abdali was anxious to avoid. Another loss to the Maratha cause was the sudden desertion and departure of Surajmal Jat from Delhi back to his capital Bharatpur. The Jat Raja had never agreed to serve the Maratha cause beyond his own jurisdiction. He had agreed to do what he could within his own territory. As soon as Delhi was captured, Surajmal demanded that he should be put in charge of its government. This Bhau Saheb for obvious reasons could not do. Delhi essentially belonged to the Emperor now. Shah Alam, who was at Allahabad and Shuja-ud-daula who aspired to the Wazirship would never allow the Jat ruler to be the guardian of that capital town. All other alleged reasons for Surajmal’s desertion of Bhau Saheb are on historical scrutiny untenable and false.

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3. Negotiations for peace.—For two months and a quarter from August to October, Sadashivrao with his whole following of over a hundred thousand souls, stayed at Delhi and practically consumed the entire food supply of the city and its surroundings, so that in a short time the Marathas began to suffer for want of funds and provisions. No supplies could come from outside. Govindpant could not send funds from the Doab, which yielded him little; Bhau Saheb ordered treasure from Poona, which did not arrive. Negotiations which had been gone on with the Shah for settling terms of peace and for the latter's return to his country, did not prove successful, and in a short time Bhau Saheb began to feel the pinch. Bapuji Ballal (Phadke) wrote from the Maratha camp on 15th September, " it is yet a month for the floods of the Jamuna to subside and the river to become fordable : peace does not seem to be in sight : our troops are starving : our horses no longer know what gram is. The army is losing its morale, no funds can be obtained. The prospect appears extremely gloomy." Nana Phadnis wrote to his uncle Baburao about the same time, " After the capture of Delhi by Bhau Saheb, Shah Abdali moved his quarters from Anupshahar to the side of the Jamuna opposite the city. He has secured all the boats. We clearly see his army from our side of the river. Shuja is engaged in mediating terms of peace but he cannot be trusted. We are quite strong, but hunger is staring us in the face. If the water goes down in a month's time, there is likelihood of the two armies coming to close grips. One good thing is that there is perfect harmony in our counsels. Bhau Saheb is sure to carry things to success." Bhau Saheb himself wrote the following letter to the Peshwa explaining the whole position clearly :—

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" We arrived at Delhi with the sardars and took possession of the city. The Shah Abdali with Shuja and Najib Khan has moved to a spot on the opposite side. The river is still in flood. Shuja and Najib Khan have suggested certain terms for a peaceful return of the Shah. They have proposed that the Punjab be ceded to the Afghans with Sarhind as the boundary between the two spheres, that he should take charge of Delhi, appoint Shuja as the Wazir and Najib Khan as the Mir Bakhshi. These are the terms that the Shah Abdali offers. We have urged that the Maratha influence should extend to Attock and that we shall take charge of Delhi and the Emperor, although we shall make such appointments to the high posts as will make no material change from the past. Unless a mid-way between these two extremes is found out, it seems the negotiations will break down. If the river had not been an impediment, we should have come to grips with the enemy long ago. We will not accept any dictation of terms.

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Both the sardars Sindia and Holkar are loyal and contented. There is perfect harmony in our counsels civil and military. Our serious trouble is our low food supply. No loan is available as bankers have closed their operations on account of the serious conflict that is raging. The Shah Abdali is in high spirits, having gained signal victories over the two sardars. Our present position is doubtless grave. We shall try every means to secure a negotiated peace and avoid recourse to arms. If it comes to fighting, we shall acquit ourselves with credit and determination. If His Highness the Peshwa recovers his health, we shall have gained all that we desire.”

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These three authoritative pronouncements explain the situation clearly and at the same time set at rest various controversies and questions that have gathered about the subject, such as reports of severe disagreement between Sadashivrao and Holkar, that Bhau Saheb’s irascible and haughty temper alienated his subordinates leading ultimately to the final disaster, that he haughtily discarded the terms offered by Abdali, and so on. He himself admits the gravity of his situation due to want of supplies and funds. He came from the south with the avowed purpose of opposing the Afghans openly and putting an end to the constant disorder and confusion which had raged at Delhi for years. There was certainly a crop of rumours and bazaar reports spreading at the time throughout the country, which have partly survived to the present time. But these should be discarded in preference to the original and authoritative statements quoted above. Bhau Saheb was a strong man, but not at all vainglorious and overbearing as some writers would make him. Malharrao Holkar had a genuine difference of opinion on the point of military tactics. He was not used to artillery warfare and was out and out an advocate of the guerilla system. But such differences of opinion cannot be construed as disloyalty. Bhau Saheb had come with an efficient artillery to match the Abdali’s, managed by a competent and loyal Muslim officer Ibrahim Khan to whom Bhau Saheb was solemnly pledged, that he would not resort to a running and harassing warfare to which heavy artillery was not suited. That is why the vast plain of Panipat was later selected as the field of operations. Holkar had shielded Najib Khan in the past, but that no longer formed a ground of debate at the present moment. Malharrao too had lost the spirit of his youth, and the infirmities of age were having their effect on him. If he, therefore, looked upon Bhau Saheb and the other youngsters as raw youths, void of experience and circumspection, a certain amount of latitude may be allowed for Holkar to hold such views, so common to old men in all ages.

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The prolonged stay at Delhi began to tell severely upon the Maratha position. Bhau did not obtain funds at Delhi. His monthly expense amounted to about five and a half lacs of rupees : and this amount went on increasing as prices and the time advanced ; so that during the ten months that Bhau Saheb was in the north, he may be said roughly to have required nearly a total of eighty lacs, of which he obtained about 23 lacs in the north from various sources. He obtained in coin about nine lacs from the silver ceiling of the Diwan-i-Khas, which had been partly dismantled by Ghazi-ud-din before, and of which the remaining portion was now utilized by Bhau Saheb in his extreme need of funds. Later on he acquired about 7 lacs out of the plunder of Kunjpura. The balance had to be made up either by loans or by a supply from the south, which did not arrive.¹

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¹ P. D. 2. 130, 131, P. D. 27. 255-258. Purandare Daftar Vol. I, No. 389. Sir Jadunath clearly explains the financial position of Bhau Saheb on page 263 of his *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. 2.

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Nor must one forget that in this respect the Shah Abdali too was in no better position. He too had come to extreme distress, having received only ten lacs from Najib Khan since his arrival. He stayed in India for a full year and a half from October 1759 to March 1761 : and this time he obtained little by plunder. His army was nearly as large as that of the Marathas, although the Rohillas and Shuja-ud-daula, his principal allies defrayed their own expenses. The trans-Jamuna region had for long been severely taxed and stripped of all its wealth. There was often an angry exchange of hot words between the Shah and Najib-ud-daula. The former was so hard pressed and dissatisfied with the Indian situation that he considered it the best policy to arrive at a peaceful understanding with the Marathas and return to his country without damaging his prestige. Sadashivrao thus wrote to Govindpant on 2nd September, “ Naro Shankar has been entrusted with the command of Delhi. The Shah Abdali, the Rohillas and Shuja-ud-daula are conducting negotiations of peace with us, but knowing that these would be protracted and that it is harmful to remain here idle, we have decided to advance to Kunjpura, thus drawing the enemy to the north and relieving the pressure upon Delhi ; you will in the case be free along with Gopalrao Ganesh to move into the Doab and devastate the Rohilla country.”²

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² Raj. Vol. 6. 404.

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Najib Khan was not slow in counteracting this move of the Maratha leader. He circulated false rumours that Vishvasrao was made the Emperor, that money was coined in his name by tearing down the silver ceiling of the Audience-Hall. He also violently opposed every move on either side for coming to a peaceful understanding. Shah Abdali was not at all anxious to hold and occupy Delhi : and Najib Khan rightly feared that if the capital city remained in Maratha possession, he would have to endure the utmost vengeance at the hands of the Marathas after the Afghan monarch had returned to his country. Sadashivrao had deputed his ambassadors Kashiraj and Bhavani Shankar to Shuja for negotiating terms of peace and Shuja’s agent Devidatta was living with Sadashivrao for the same purpose. But the conflicting interests of the various parties and Najib’s obduracy obstructed every attempt to adjust matters. Najib Khan wanted to crush the Marathas finally. Shuja aspired to the Wazirship and objected to any Pathans wielding power at Delhi. The Shah himself desired to secure an honourable retreat to his country, remaining content with the possession of the Punjab only. When Dattaji fell at Barari Ghat, the Marathas retreated to the Chambal and gave up Delhi, which was exactly midway between Sarhind and the Chambal, a distance of 320 miles. If Bhau Saheb had agreed to cede the Punjab and make the Satlaj the boundary line between the two claimants, a negotiated peace was quite possible.

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4. Kunjpura captured.—On 7th October Bhau Saheb left Delhi for Kunjpura, a distance of 78 miles, while 78 miles further north was Sarhind. Bhau Saheb went on from Delhi, minutely examining the fords of the Jamuna, and as none was discovered, he made no arrangement for guarding against the eventuality of the Shah crossing over to his side. Sonpat 36 miles from Delhi and Panipat another 20 miles beyond were passed by Bhau Saheb. Kunjpura lay 22 miles further north on the right bank of the river Jamuna, an outpost strongly guarded by the Shah Abdali’s partizans and plentifully stocked with provisions and ammunition as a mid-way base for his return. Having travelled two stages from Delhi, Sadashivrao discovered the mischievous report Najib Khan had circulated and at once arranged for a public ceremonial and declaration at Delhi, proclaiming Shah Alam as the Emperor and appointing in his absence his son Jawan Bakht as his regent (Vali-Ahad) and minting fresh coins in that Emperor’s name, (10 October 1760.)

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Advance parties of Sindia, Holkar and Vithal Shivdev arrived before Kunjpura on 16th October and called upon Najabat Khan, the keeper of the place to surrender. He refused and a severe bombardment by Ibrahim Khan proved effective. Abdussamad Khan and Mian Qutb Shah who were posted at Sarhind ran to the help of Kunjpura and even Abdali sent large succours from the east bank of the Jamuna to that place. But before any effective resistance could be made, the place was captured the very next day, 17th October, Damaji Gaikwad rushing with his valiant parties through the breaches made by the heavy guns in the huge stone walls. Nearly ten thousand Afghans were killed or wounded in the action. Abdussamad Khan was killed and Qutb Shah and Najabat Khan secured alive. Najabat Khan died of his wounds, his son Dilir Khan escaped, while Qutb Shah was put to death by Bhau Saheb in retaliation for his having cut off Dattaji Sindia’s head at Barari Ghat a few months before. Qutb Shah’s severed head was paraded through the Maratha ranks.

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The capture of Kunjpura marked the highest triumph of the Maratha power. For the present the needs of the Maratha army were more than met. Two lacs maunds of wheat, ten and a half lacs in rupees and another ten lacs worth of arms, ammunition and valuables were secured, including some five guns and three thousand horses. The Zaver elephant of Dattaji Sindia which had been carried away at his fall now came back to Maratha possession. Much plunder besides this was appropriated by the various members of the Maratha army. Two days after this happened to be the Dassara day, Sunday 19th October, which was celebrated with the greatest pomp and triumph, such as was never witnessed by any Maratha before or after. A grand Darbar was held at which actual gold was presented to Vishvasrao, instead of the customary leaves of the Apta tree.

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The loss of Kunjpura was deeply felt by the Shah Abdali and excited in his heart bitter animosity towards the Marathas, thus rousing supreme anger and hatred in the Pathan breasts, and hereafter changing the essential character of the struggle, by adding an element of ferocity to what was a mere trial of strength before. The bitterness thus started continued long after Panipat and is even now disclosed in the partisan writings. Abdali at once addressed his soldiers in animated tones, saying, “My men, how do you endure this open affront given us by the Kafir Marathas? Don’t you feel impelled to inflict upon them adequate retribution? You must now be ready to sacrifice all, even your lives, in the grave trial that is awaiting us.”

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In this agonising mood Abdali moved slowly along the left bank of the Jamuna from opposite Delhi to the north, carefully looking out for a ford and utilising local men in effecting a crossing with his whole army and guns on to the other side, in order to get at the Marathas for a close combat. About 20 miles north of Delhi he reached Baghpat on the east bank of the river, where after four days inspection he decided to cross the river on October 25. It was a daring experiment which might as well have proved disastrous. But Abdali had gained uncommon experience in crossing numerous rivers and streams during his long previous career throughout Central Asia and India, so that he could fully gauge the possibilities of a successful fording. His followers hesitated, when after a devout prayer to Allah, he untied the girth of his horse and rushed into the stream followed by an equally enthusiastic train. The water level had now considerably subsided and the horses could get across swimming part of the way where the water was deep. Within three days, he carried across without being detected, his whole army and heavy artillery on the backs of elephants and camels. This dexterous move is highly extolled by all writers as a rare feat of generalship.

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5. Face to face at Panipat.—On 28th October 1760 Abdali started north in search of the Marathas along the right bank of the Jamuna, and after a journey of 7 miles reached Sonpat. Bhau Saheb received this news of Abdali's crossing over on the 28th while he was proceeding northward having left Kunjpura on October 25 with a view to replenishing his supplies and crossing the Jamuna on to the other side to get into contact with Abdali. He also meant to gain the friendship of the Sikhs if possible. But rejoicing that Abdali had himself come over and was now within his easy reach, Bhau Saheb immediately retraced his steps and arrived at Panipat within five miles of Abdali's advance troops. The two forces sighted each other towards the end of October, when the advance parties of the two combatants had slight skirmishes. Bhau's original plan was to encounter Abdali before he had time to organize his troops in battle array and even during the act of crossing if possible. But by the time he arrived at Panipat, he found the Shah well prepared for a combat, and realized that the determined stand of the Afghans and their perfect order were not to be trifled with. Bhau Saheb could not easily rout them and find his way back to Delhi, unmolested.

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He, therefore, decided on the advice of Ibrahim Khan Gardi to entrench himself on the plain with the town of Panipat north of him, and remain on the defensive until the other party got weakened by starvation, so as to combine guerilla tactics with the use of trained infantry and artillery. He was encumbered with a large number of non-combatants and some ladies; these now formed a drag on him consuming his supplies and requiring protection. If Bhau had only the fighting force with him, he would have easily fought his way through the enemy's ranks. But this did not now seem possible, and in order to save them he created a defensive camp, of tents and huts, about 6 miles in length from east to west and about 2 miles deep north to south. He dug a large trench round this camp about 25 yards broad and 6 yards deep³ ; and the heaps of earth thus brought up formed a huge wall upon which guns were mounted. The Abdali Shah too formed a permanent camp facing the Marathas, about three miles to their south with the village of Sonpat behind. He fortified his position with trenches and wood defences made of felled trees. In this way the passage home of the two antagonists came to be blocked against each other. None could escape without annihilating the other. On 4th November Bhau Saheb wrote to Govindpant, “We are now face to face with the enemy and have prepared ourselves for an encounter, having pitched our camp on the plain of Panipat. Abdali’s way home is completely blocked by us. Every day we capture his camels, horses and oxen in large numbers. Now the Doab is freely open to you. You must bring treasure and supplies from your district and deliver them at Patpatganj opposite the south corner of the city of Delhi, whence we shall manage to take them. You must stop any treasure and supplies reaching Abdali from the Doab. The Jat Raja is quite friendly and will in no way obstruct you. Now is the time for you to do your utmost.” On 5th November Krishna Joshi, one of Bhau Saheb’s retinue, wrote from Panipat a full account of Bhau Saheb’s position, in which he said, “Bhau Saheb has returned to Phanipath from Kunjpura, and daily skirmishes are occurring between the two opponents. The Muslims fear our strong artillery. No corn now reaches the Abdali’s camp, where there prevails extreme scarcity. If he within the next three or four days advances against us, he will be annihilated by our guns. Our camp has plentiful supplies which can be had very cheap. There are good auguries all round and our men are in high spirit. Abdali, Najib Khan and Shuja will now meet with their ruin within a week. The Shah, although a general of standing and experience, is now so humiliated that he dare not advance all these days. His road to his country is blocked; and he has no hope of success in a fight and, cannot afford to remain idle where he is for want of food.” This was the condition of affairs in the first week of November, and the Marathas could then have attacked Abdali with success. Why Bhau Saheb waited thereafter for the two long months of November and December is a mystery which cannot be satisfactorily explained. But the accounts presented by the two invaluable compilations, Bhau Saheb’s *Kaifiyat* and his *Bakhar* give the whole story lucidly, and doubtless they bear marks of having been compiled from original documents, which are now not forthcoming. The *Kaifiyat* is very accurate and the *bakhar* an enlarged edition of it, quoting long passages exactly as they are in the former.

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³ पन्नास हात रुंद व बारा हात खोल., भाऊसा० बखर.

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In a few days, however, the position came to be reversed. Abdali moved his camp quite close to the bank of the Jamuna, although at first he was a few miles away from it. This gave his camp not only a plentiful supply of water, but made his communication easy with the region of the Doab which was in Najib Khan’s possession and from which he arranged to obtain plentiful supplies. The Doab was essentially a Muslim-ruled country, and as feelings ran high at the time, Govindpant or any of the Maratha officials could obtain no supplies for delivery into the Maratha camp. There was a strong anti-Hindu feeling and it was with difficulty that Govind Ballal held his position round about Etawa. In a few days the Shah Abdali posted strong guards all round the Maratha camp and prevented any supplies reaching it. He cut off Maratha communications towards the south with Delhi and Rajputana, and the east beyond the Jamuna. The way north towards Kunjpura was for a time open, but Kunjpura was soon retaken by Abdali and all Maratha communication stopped on that side. The west was a thorny uncultivated country, full of brambles and jungle. For two months no news reached the Deccan from Panipat.

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After the first week of November Abdali’s position began to improve daily, and in proportion that of Bhau Saheb began to deteriorate. He could not get supplies from any quarter. Abdali slowly gathered into his hands all the points that first appeared to be an advantage to Bhau. But the latter’s courage was undaunted, against which was matched the superior generalship of the Abdali Shah, who had seen fighting throughout his life.

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The field of Kurukshetra stretching down to Panipat is a wide plain, battles on which from uncounted ages, have decided the fate of India and now yet another momentous decision was to be reached on that battle-scarred plain. The moment arrived for Bhau Saheb to grapple with the Abdali troops, for which he had been longing ever since he left the Deccan.

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From 1st November 1760 to 14th January 1761 for full two and a half months, the Marathas remained entrenched in their camp and lost whatever chance they at first had of achieving success, every day that passed making their position worse. They gradually lost heart and despaired of victory. During these two and a half months light skirmishing was going on constantly between the two armies, but three or four stiff actions also took place. Once on 19th November Ibrahim Khan's brother Fath Khan Gardi executed a secret night raid upon Abdali's camp, dragging light guns by the hand : but he was easily repulsed and returned discomfited. Three days after in the afternoon of 22nd November, the Durrani Wazir was detected by Sindia's men reconnoitering a well near the Maratha camp, and he was immediately attacked by Jankoji Sindia with fury. Nearly all the Wazir's party was cut down and he was hotly pursued right up to the Durrani camp. In this encounter Sindia showed unexampled impetuosity, but could not win all the success his efforts deserved on account of the failure of the Peshwa's troops to render him timely support. A thousand Rohillas were killed and a few of their guns were captured by the Marathas. Darkness set in and the combatants parted, otherwise greater havoc would have been inflicted upon the Afghans.

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All this while Bhau Saheb and the other leaders were constantly urging Naro Shankar at Delhi and Govind Ballal in the Doab to do their utmost to send supplies and cash to Panipat and relieve their misery. But the Durranis were so watchful and alert that they successfully prevented any article or cash reaching the camp at Panipat. Another serious encounter occurred about a fortnight after the one described above, on 7th December, when Najib Khan without permission from the Shah and acting on his own responsibility, made a precipitate attack on a party of the Marathas who were manœuvring their guns in certain positions. The small party was severely handled and pressed back right to the ditch by Najib Khan. But the latter’s presence being noticed, huge Maratha parties came upon him like lightning. More than three thousand Rohillas were mown down by the guns of Ibrahim Khan and the swords of the Huzrat under Balavantrao Mehendale. But a chance shot killed this brave young leader of promise and marred the value of the success the Marathas had attained. That night Balavantrao’s wife became Sati. The death of this hero spread a heavy gloom throughout the camp. The slide down of the Maratha hopes definitely began from this moment.

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Govindpant in the lower Doab was, however, fully apprized of the state of things prevailing at Panipat and strove hard to collect supplies and cash from the region east of Delhi, and tried to forward them to the beleaguered camp. He made a large stock of things gathered from Sikandarabad and other places, and his parties were moving within ten to twenty miles of Shahdara (opposite Delhi), Ghaziabad and Jalalabad. The agents employed by Najib Khan watched these operations of the Pant and communicated the news of their activities to the Rohilla chief. He at once despatched Atai Khan and Karimdad Khan with a party of some five thousand fresh troops that had just arrived from Afghanistan. These troops crossed the Jamuna and moved rapidly in search of the Maratha foraging parties. On the evening of 16th December they came upon a small party of Naro Shankar’s men, and cut them all down. The country around was all hostile to the Marathas and burning for revenge against their fearful depredations in the past. The next morning, 17th December, the Afghans started again and came across a Maratha party at Ghaziabad, who were all similarly cut down. Thence they rode about ten miles north-east to Jalalabad where they found Govindpant himself, who not suspecting any sudden attack by the enemy, was engaged in saying his prayers and preparing his meal, with only a small party of personal servants. As soon as they were attacked, they mounted their ponies and ran to save their lives in different directions. They were hotly pursued and a bullet shot brought the Pant down from his horse. The Muslims closed upon him, cut off his head and carried it to the Shah in triumph. Abdali paraded the head in his camp and sent it as a present to Bhau Saheb. Govindpant’s son Balaji was with his father, but was saved by his servants. Thus perished an old and faithful servant of the Peshwas who had for thirty years laboured hard to keep the Maratha flag aloft in Bundelkhand and the Doab. Essentially a non-military man, proficient in accounts and revenue matters, he happened to be the only prominent Maratha in the north at the time of Bhau Saheb’s expedition. Naturally, therefore, Bhau Saheb called upon him to execute many responsible functions and duties, which he was unable to perform owing to the disturbed condition of the regions in which he worked. His descendants still live at Saugor.

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The Marathas were now faced with terrible starvation brought about by a complete stoppage of food supplies from outside. As the high price of food exhausted the money in Bhau Saheb’s treasury, he with Sindia and Holkar erected three separate mints in the camp and melted down all the men’s and women’s gold and silver ornaments, thus producing a quantity of fresh rupees stamped with the words *Bhaushahi*, *Jankushahi*, and *Malharshahi*. But this money did not last for more than two weeks.

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Still neither side was willing to attack the other. For two months they had tried to obtain a superiority in light cavalry actions. It was clear that so long as the main armies chose to remain stationary, the force whose light cavalry held the command of the open country would starve the other force out. In this game the Shah Abdali ultimately succeeded in getting the Marathas in his strong grip. Bhau Saheb ever since his start from the Deccan had placed his main confidence in the infantry corps of Ibrahim Khan and they had so far given a very good account of themselves. The idea of remaining entrenched at Panipat was a result of this confidence. The Marathas were rendered unassailable so long as they remained within their entrenchments. Bhau Saheb waited long in this entrenched position expecting Abdali to attack him, as he was sure of victory in the event of such an attack. Abdali saw through Bhau Saheb’s game and studiously avoided an open attack upon the Maratha camp, hoping to get the victory when the Maratha army would be forced to come out through sheer starvation. Bhau’s letters to Bundele are full of rage and railing for the latter’s failure to goad the Abdali Shah into an attack upon the Maratha camp.

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When thus reduced to extremity, Bhau made, so says Nuruddin Husain Khan, a last moment attempt to negotiate peace with the Afghan monarch, and offered to pay him a heavy fine for being allowed to withdraw from the contest and retire safely to the south. But, as before, Najib Khan persuaded the Shah to reject the proposal and welcome an opportunity to slay the infidels in a holy war. Indeed Najib Khan was instrumental in bringing about the Maratha ruin, proving thereby the character that Hafiz Rahimat had given him.⁴

Linked texts (1)

Bhāūsāhebāñcī bakhar — Marathi