Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v3.c44: Chapter XXXIII. The Afghan War

History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v3.c44

Language
English

Contents

Chapter XXXIII. The Afghan War

§1. Forward frontier policy followed at Aurangzib’s accession.

v3.c44.s1.1

When the extinction of his rivals at last left Aurangzib the undisputed lord of Hindustan, he had leisure to turn to the civil government, which had fallen into slackness during Shah Jahan’s last years and into great disorder during the all-engrossing War of Succession. The Emperor set himself to restore order and to infuse vigour into the administration, as he had promised to the public in the manifesto issued by him to justify his usurpation of the throne. A period of strong government began. Everywhere the provincial viceroys began to assert imperial prestige. Energetic *subahdars* extended the bounds of the empire to Assam, Chatgaon, Palamau and other districts. Local notables found out that disobedience of orders or independence of attitude on their part would be tolerated no longer. The border tribes were taught that no violation of the imperial frontier would go unpunished. This policy precipitated a long and costly war with the Afghans.

§2. The Afghans, their social organization and character.

v3.c44.s2.1

Along our entire north-western border,—in the valleys leading from India to Kashmir and Afghanistan, and in the encompassing hills, live numberless Turko-Iranian clans, called Pathans in the north and Baluches in the south. Nine centuries ago we first hear of them as an obscure and savage people against whom the Turkish rulers of Ghazni had to wage occasional war. Later they were converted to Islam, but the new creed made no moral transformation among them. They retained their old speech, their old tribal organization, and their immemorial profession of brigandage. In the course of time, after long wanderings from the cradle of their race in southern and south-eastern Afghanistan, the Pathans settled as the dominant class in the regions where we now find them.

v3.c44.s2.2

Brave and hardy as these people are above all the races of the plains, they are torn by the feud of clan against clan and often of family against family. In all their history they have failed to establish any large and compact State, or even any enduring confederacy of tribes. The promise of a career of plunder has held together these born warriors for a time, but they have always separated on the death of the successful leader. The Afghans have never sent any large military force outside except as the mercenaries of some great conqueror, and in their homes they have united only under the stress of a common danger, such as an invasion of their entire country. They have never formed a nation, but always clans. Within the clans even, the strict discipline of the Rajput tribal system is wanting. The Rathor or Sisodia obeys his chieftain as a demi-god, or at least as the father of a family of which all who bear the tribal name are the children. But the Yusufzai or Afridi follows his chieftain only while it is his interest or pleasure to do so.

v3.c44.s2.3

Weak as the Afghans are for conducting distant or long campaigns on a large or organized scale, they are weaker still in diplomacy and internal administration. An ambitious man among them gathers together a number of families and makes himself chief for the time being; another man does the same thing, and, if more successful in rapine, supplants the former. These ever-forming ever-dissolving groups of families are the only effective forces of an Afghan clan for offence or defence; the nominal chieftain merely governs on the sufferance of his followers. This lack of a common head makes it impossible for an Afghan clan to enter into any treaty obligation for the whole body, even if they knew the sacredness of plighted word,—for they have no machinery for ensuring respect for such undertakings from all their members. The family and not the clan is the true unit of Afghan society.

v3.c44.s2.4

Such were the enemies with whom the empire had to wage an intermittent war ever since the days of Akbar, and who taxed all the resources of Aurangzib during the second decade of his reign.

v3.c44.s2.5

The trouble began with the Yusufzais. The present home of this clan lies in the Swat and Bajaur valleys and the plain of north Peshawar,—a rough semi-circle bounded on three sides by the Indus, Kabul and Swat rivers, and on the fourth by the lower Kashmir hills. Hither they had migrated in the 16th century from the Qandahar region and settled in the lands of the Dalzaqs, an Indian race, whom they gradually ousted. Their progress was unwittingly aided by the Mughal emperors who slew and deported the Dalzaqs in large numbers, so that the district was almost entirely denuded of them. Thus, by the end of the reign of Jahangir the occupation of this tract by the Yusufzais was completed.*

§3. The Afghans as professional robbers, ever at war with Government.

v3.c44.s3.1

The new comers proved themselves the most formidable enemies of the peace of the country and the safety of the roads ever seen in that unquiet region. Highway robbery was the hereditary profession of these hardy savages, as cunning as they were bold. The plains of Peshawar and the narrow valleys embosomed among the rugged hills, yielded too scanty a sustenance for their fast-growing numbers; and the peaceful gains of agriculture were too poor and slow a reward in comparison with the plunder of their more industrious neighbours and of the rich traders passing within easy reach of them. The right of the hillmen,—Afridis, Shinwaris, Yusufzais and Khataks,—to levy toll on the traffic between India and Kabul, had been practically admitted by the Mughal Government, which had found by long experience that it was cheaper to bribe the clansmen than to coerce them, as a means of preserving order in that region and keeping the roads open. But even political pensions were not always effective in securing their obedience. Every year this prolific race multiplied, and the growing population, “more numerous than ants or locusts,” and ignorant or contemptuous of peaceful industries, pined for some outlet for their martial instincts. A leader sprang up, pretending sanctity or princely descent, organized a band of young men by feeding them for some time at his own cost, and then swooped down upon the fields of rival clans or the imperial territory below, and recovered his expenses and rewarded his retainers by plunder. The gang held together so long as the stream of booty did not fail; but when it ran dry, or the least inequality in its division was suspected, these natural democrats turned their arms against one another, and the league broke up.*

v3.c44.s3.2

∗ Migrations of the Pathan clans: *A.N.* 1039; Bellew's *General Report on the Yusufzais* (1864), 64-67, 152-179; *Encyclopædia of Islam*, i. 149—154; *Peshawar District Gazetteer*, (1898), 49-58. Pathan character and government: Bellew, ch. v. *Peshawar Dist. Gaz.* 119-122, 129-134, Elphinstone's *Caubul* (1815), Bk. II. ch. 2, 6, 7, Bk. III. ch. 1.

v3.c44.s3.3

But the dissolution of a powerful band in this way gave no enduring peace to the plains; the units of Afghan society,—the families of fighting men under their grey beards,—remained intact, and soon formed a new combination and under a new leader returned to their occupation of plunder. The occasional victories of the guardians of law and order checked for a time, but could not finally remove this source of disturbance, as its economic causes remained unchanged. A strong Mughal emperor would resolve to enforce his authority and protect his subjects; armies would be poured into the valleys of the clansmen and after heavy losses their organized resistance would be beaten down, their houses demolished, the level country held by means of a chain of military posts, their crops cut down and the Afghan population thinned by the sword. But every now and then they would cut off a weak garrison; the Mughal outposts would have to be withdrawn in winter and the work of pacification renewed in spring.

v3.c44.s3.4

When the Government, firmly disregarding the huge expenditure of men and money in these hills, persisted in the policy of annual invasion and chastisement, the tribes would make peace, promise tribute and obedience, and the weary Mughal troops would gladly withdraw. But such promises were forgotten as soon as the sufferings of the late war became a shadowy memory. In a few years the growth of population would more than fill the void caused by the Mughal sword; and the hungry hordes would again begin to swarm into the neighbouring districts or plunder trade-caravans.

v3.c44.s3.5

∗ Bellew, 204, "A famous saint among the Yusufzais is said to have left his tribe a blessing and a curse, 'That they should always be free, but that they should never be united.'" (Elphinstone, 338.)

v3.c44.s3.6

The first serious attempt to enforce peace on the n. w. frontier was made by Akbar. Incautious Mughal commanders suffered losses, and the terrible disaster of February 1586, when an army of 8,000 men under Rajah Birbal was cut off in a Swat defile, created a terror of Afghan prowess and aversion to hill fighting throughout the imperial dominions. The defeat was, no doubt, soon avenged by Rajput valour and skill, but the Mughals had finally to patch up a peace by pensioning the tribal leaders and overlooking their depredations. Under Jahangir and Shah Jahan, the same state of things continued, varied by occasional risings of the clans, which cost the Mughals dear. The march of vast armies from India into Afghanistan for the wars in Balkh and Qandahar awed the frontiersmen into peace for a time in the middle of the 17th century. But there was a revival of trouble in the closing years of Shah Jahan's reign. With the accession of Aurangzib the evil grew worse.*

§4. Yusufzai rising of 1667.

v3.c44.s4.1

Early in 1667 began another movement for expansion among the Yusufzais. One of their great men, named Bhagu, drew the heads of other families into his scheme, crowned a pretended scion of their ancient kings as Muhammad Shah, and secured religious prestige to his banners by association with Mulla Chalak,† who enjoyed a great local reputation for sanctity. A central authority and rallying point for the tribesmen being thus found, Bhagu as *wazir* and virtual king, organized an expeditionary force of 5,000 clansmen under Mulla Chalak. They crossed the Indus above Attock and invaded Pakhli, a plain lying east of that river, in the Hazara district, through which ran the principal road to Kashmir. Here Shadman, a local chieftain, and other Mughal officers entrusted with the defence of the Attock region had their estates. The Yusufzais captured the fort of Chhachal, the seat of Shadman, drove away the lawful owner's agents and began to levy rent from the peasantry for themselves. Their success attracted more of their clansmen into the district; the number of invaders daily increased, other Mughal posts were attacked and the hard-pressed officers prayed to the authorities at Peshawar and Delhi for relief. Other Yusufzai bands began to plunder the imperial territory on the bank of the Kabul river in the western Peshawar and Attock districts.*

v3.c44.s4.2

∗ *Tab. Akb.* 369. *Al Badayuni*, ii.

v3.c44.s4.3

³⁵⁰ *Imp. Gaz.* (3rd. ed.), xix.

v3.c44.s4.4

¹⁵² *Bellew*, 72-74. *Peshawar Dist. Gaz.*, 58 61. *M.U.* i. 279-280.

v3.c44.s4.5

† *A.N.* 1041. *The Hazara Dist. Gaz.*, ed. 1907, p. 123, says, "The latest inroad was probably early in the 18th century, and was led by a Saiad named Jalal Baba, whose tomb is in the Bhogarmang valley." If, as I suspect, Chalak of the *M.A.* is a misprint for Jalal, the invasion took place half a century earlier than the time stated in the Gazetteer.

§5. Mughal victories over Yusufzais.

v3.c44.s5.1

The Emperor took measures of defence. His plan was to invade the enemy's country in three divisions. The *faujdar* of Attock, Kamil Khan, was ordered to march against the rebels with the available forces in his neighbourhood, the governor of Kabul to send 13,000 men of his contingent, and Muhammad Amin Khan to go there from the Court with 10,000 picked troops. The last two divisions took time to arrive on the scene, and therefore Kamil Khan, the energetic man on the spot, without waiting for them left Attock with the loyal Khatak and Khokhar levies under their own chiefs, and marched towards the ferry of Harun wishing to cross the Indus there and enter the Yusufzai country. The enemy anticipated the invasion by coming over to the south side of the river in full force and holding the ferry of Harun against the imperialists. On 1st April, Kamil Khan was reinforced by a detachment of Khokhars and Rajputs sent by the deputy governor of Peshawar. The small Mughal army marched north-eastwards, the Indus protecting their Left flank, their Van being led by the Khokhar chieftain and their Right by Rajah Maha Singh of the Bhadauriya clan of Rajputs. They boldly attacked the ten thousand men who formed the Yusufzai front ranks, and behind whom stood 15,000 others. After a stubborn fight, the enemy broke and were driven into the river; two thousand of them were slain, many wounded, and many more drowned; but the remnant of their army found a ford and escaped. Forty prisoners were taken, and a pyramid was built with the heads of the slain. The imperial territory on this side of the Indus was cleared of the enemy. (A. N. 1042-'44.)

v3.c44.s5.2

∗ A.N. 1042; *Akhbarat*, year 10, sheets 3 and 4.

v3.c44.s5.3

But the Mughal force was not yet strong enough to attempt an invasion of the north bank. So, Kamil Khan made a long halt at Harun. Throughout April reinforcements continued to pour in, and on 2nd May Shamshir Khan, at the head of a large detachment from Afghanistan, reached Attock, took over the supreme command, and crossed the Indus into the Yusufzai country. The enemy took post at Ohind, 16 miles above Attock, at "the mouth of their hilly country."

v3.c44.s5.4

Shamshir fought many a battle with them and gained many a success. Entrenching his camp at Ohind, he occupied the level country of Mandaur where the Yusufzais used to grow their food crops, and destroyed all their farms and homestead in the lowlands. On 4th June, he marched out of Ohind to attack Bhagu in his present position. The villages of Panjpir, Chand, Mansur, and four unnamed hamlets 10 miles from Murghiz, were taken after hard fighting against heavy odds and with considerable losses; the houses were burnt down, the property looted and no vestige of cultivation left. The unrest had spread to other frontier tribes, and now the Akuzais and Malizais of Swat and Tirah came to the help of the Yusufzais. The vast numbers and excellent marksmanship of the hillmen at one time threatened a reverse to the Mughal arms, but in the end the imperial artillery triumphed, and the enemy were pushed back to their trenches at Mansur on the Panjshir river, which the Mughals carried at the gallop. (28th June, 1667.) A hilltop where the remnant of the enemy made a last stand, was stormed. The victory was complete; three hundred prisoners including several headmen (*maliks*) were taken, and many Afghans were slain or drowned in the river.¹

v3.c44.s5.5

¹ A.N. 1044-'45, 1052-'56. Life of Shamshir Khan, (Haiyat, of the Tarin clan), M.U. ii. 677-679.

v3.c44.s5.6

Meantime, a force of 9,000 men, with a large staff of Rajput and Muslim officers carefully selected by the Emperor himself, and including 500 gentlemen-troopers (*ahadis*), had been sent from the Court on 2nd May, under the Pay-master General Muhammad Amin Khan, one of the highest grandees of the realm. He crossed the Kabul river at Nari (22nd August), reached Lakhi, and took over the supreme command from Shamshir. That able officer had already brought the Utmanzai clan over to the imperial side, and the alliance was now cemented with gifts. After a three days' halt at Lakhi, Muhammad Amin Khan set out against the Shipa sept near Shahbazgarhi, and sent out strong detachments against the tribes of Bajaur. The Mughal advanced guards under Mir Khan, after plundering the villages near Shahbazgarhi and penetrating to the valley of Karahmar, lifted 6,000 heads of cattle, and fell back on the main army. The Commander-in-Chief himself entered the Swat valley, destroyed the village of Hijaz, and returned to Ohind on 6th October. Here he received orders recalling him to Court. Shamshir was left in command with an addition of 2,000 men to his contingent.*

v3.c44.s5.7

For a time the Yusufzais seem to have been quieted by these hard blows or weakened by internal quarrels; at all events there was no general rising of the frontier tribes before 1672. In the middle of 1671 Maharajah Jaswant Singh with his brave Rathors was appointed to hold the outpost of Jamrud. The strong Mughal garrisons succeeded in keeping the country under control.

v3.c44.s5.8

∗ A.N., 1046, 1058-1060. Akhbarat, year 10, sheets 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. (useful details).

§6. Afridi rising of 1672; disaster to Md. Amin Khan's army.

v3.c44.s6.1

In 1672, however, began a formidable danger. The tactless action of the *faujdar* of Jalalabad bred discontent among the Khaibar clans. The Afridis rose under their chieftain Acmal Khan,* a born general, who crowned himself king, struck coins in his own name, and proclaiming war against the Mughals, summoned all the Pathan clans to join the national movement. With a following "more numerous than ants and locusts," he closed the Khaibar Pass.†

v3.c44.s6.2

† For the passes of the Afghan frontier, see Markham's paper in *Proceedings of Royal Geogr. Soc.* Jan. 1879, pp. 38-62.

v3.c44.s6.3

In the spring of 1672, Muhammad Amin Khan, now viceroy of Afghanistan, after passing the winter in the milder climate of Peshawar, started for Kabul, with his army and suite, and accompanied by their families and household property. At Jamrud he learnt that the Afghans had blocked the way ahead. But the son of Mir Jumla was notorious for his insane pride and self-will, which he did not care to curb even in the Emperor's presence, and which turned his subordinates into trembling flatterers. When they at last mustered courage to inform him of his danger and to advise a parley with the Afghans, they met with an angry rebuff. Intoxicated with wealth and power, ignorant of the enemy's numbers and despising their prowess, he rushed blindly in to his doom. Advancing to Ali Masjid (21st April) he entrenched. At night the Afridis descended from the hillside and cut him off from the stream whence he drew his water supply. Next day men and beasts in the imperial army began to perish of thirst from the heat of the sun. The Khan now opened negotiations, but the Afghans demanded a special blackmail in addition to the restoration of their annual subsidies. He rejected the terms and sent a body of veterans under his son Abdullah and other high officers to dislodge the foe. The Afghans assailed them with a storm of missiles. From the lofty peak of Tartara, 3,400 feet overhead, stones were rolled down on the doomed men crowded in the narrow gorge below. The leaders were soon killed, and disorder seized the Mughal army. "Horses, elephants and men were mixed up in confusion." The Afghans now charged down the hillside, slaying and plundering the entire Mughal camp. "Every one fled to the hill or desert.........Sons were separated from fathers, daughters from mothers, wives from husbands, masters from servants."

v3.c44.s6.4

∗ So the name is spelt by Biddulph, while K.K. ii. 232 and M.U. i. 281 have 'Aimal', and *Akhbarat* has 'Aiman,' evidently a copyist's error. The provocation given to the Afghans is mentioned by Ishwardas, 63a, and Manucci (*Storia*, ii. 199).

v3.c44.s6.5

Utterly humbled and exhausted, Muhammad Amin Khan, and some of his high officers, succeeded in escaping to Peshawar with their bare lives; but everything else was lost. "Ten thousand men fell under the enemy's sword in the field, and above two krores of Rupees in cash and kind was looted by the enemy. They captured twenty thousand men and women and sent them to Central Asia for sale."* The viceroy's family—his mother, wife and daughter,—had been made captive, and though he secured their release by paying a huge ransom, his wife in bitterness of disgrace refused to return to him and took the veil as a nun at a local saint's tomb. Among the slain were his son Mir Abdullah, his son-in-law Mirza Sultan, Jahangir Quli Khan, and Mirza Bakhshi.

v3.c44.s6.6

Returning to Peshawar, Muhammad Amin Khan took impotent vengeance, for the consequences of his own folly. "In anger he killed Mustajab, one of the chief men of Peshawar, who had accompanied him but had not reported anything about the wickedness of the Afghans though he knew of it. In his death agony Mustajab cried out for a little water to drink. The Khan answered, 'Many Muslims have died of thirst. It is not wrong that you should die of the same cause, as a reparation for it.' "*

v3.c44.s6.7

∗ The booty taken was enormous, as M. Amin Khan had inherited the fabulous wealth of Mir Jumla. Khush-hal sings, "Forty thousand Mughals were cut to pieces. Their wives and their daughters were the prisoners of the Afghans, And strings on strings of horses, camels, and elephants were taken." (Caubul, 196.) See also Manucci (Storia, ii. 199, 201) for his wealth.

v3.c44.s6.8

The disaster was complete. For the nearest parallel to it men had to go back a hundred years to the reign of Akbar, when an entire Mughal army, under Rajah Bir Bal, had been cut off by the Afghans in the same province. This signal victory increased the prestige and resources of the Afridi leader. The tale of his rich booty went the round of the hills, and lured recruits to his banners.

§7. Khush-hal Khan Khatak, the enemy of Aurangzib.

v3.c44.s7.1

Khush-hal Khan,† the chieftain of the Khataks, seems to have taken up arms against the Mughals at this time. This large and warlike clan occupies the southern part of the Peshawar district and much of Kohat and Banu. Khush-hal had years ago inspired defiance of the imperial Government. But an Afghan's kinsmen are his greatest foes. The Khatak chieftain was invited to a *darbar* at Peshawar, treacherously arrested in concert with his uncles, fettered with shackles weighing 10 lbs. each, and sent off to Hindustan as a prisoner. The viceroy of Kabul objecting to the release of this turbulent man, the Emperor kept him in prison at Delhi (April 1664) and Rantambhor. The poet solaced his captive hours by writing spirited verses in Pushtu, denouncing Aurangzib's injustice and cruelty. and cursing the Indian climate. But he evidently made terms with the Government, for he returned to Delhi in December 1666, and three months later we find him and his son Ashraf in the Mughal force that invaded the Yusufzai country. The Yusufzais were the hereditary enemies of the Khataks, as the boundaries of the two clans met in the middle of the Peshawar district, and a wedge of Khatak settlement was also inserted in the body of the Yusufzai territory north of the Indus. Khush-hal's father had been slain by the Yusufzais. Prompted either by love of revenge or by the wish to secure release from prison, he readily accepted a command in the Mughal service, and fought in the Yusufzai campaign at the head of his clansmen.

v3.c44.s7.2

∗ Disaster to M. Amin Khan: M.A., 117-118; Ishwardas, 63a-65a (best account); K. K. ii. 232-233; Storia, ii. 199-201.

v3.c44.s7.3

† My account of Khush-hal Khan is based on Biddulph's *Afghan Poetry in the 17th Century*, supplemented by A.N. 1042, (he joins the Mughal force sent against the Yusufzais), *Akhbarat*, year 10, sheet 9, year 17, sheet 2, (his son at Court,) and Elphinstone's *Caubul*, 193-197. Selections from Khush-hal's poems have been also translated by Elphinstone (*Caubul*, 196-197) and by Raverty in his *Selections from the Poetry of the Afghans*, (London, 1862). I quote Biddulph.

v3.c44.s7.4

But his heart yearned for the free life of a mountain chief, and now, joining Acmal, he became the leading spirit of the national opposition, inspiring the tribesmen with his pen no less than his sword, and winning many a victory over the Mughals.

v3.c44.s7.5

The danger to the empire was very great. Not only was the rising a national one, affecting the whole Pathan land "from Qandahar to Attock," but its leaders were also men who had served in the Mughal army in Hindustan* and the Deccan, and knew the organization efficiency and tactics of the imperialists. The two sides had the same arms, and except that the Afghans lacked heavy artillery, the superiority lay with them, as they were hardy hillmen fighting in their own rugged country, while the Indian troops have always had a horror of mountain war and aversion to facing privation and cold.

§8. Early Mughal failures; Mahabat Khan's slackness.

v3.c44.s8.1

The Emperor, immediately on hearing of the disaster, ordered Fidai Khan the governor of Lahor to hasten to Peshawar (18th May) to guard against any Afghan incursion. Muhammad Amin Khan was degraded and sent off to Gujrat as *subahdar*. Mahabat Khan, who had governed Afghanistan thrice before, and achieved success in dealing with this people, was recalled from the Deccan and sent to Kabul as viceroy for the fourth time. Much was hoped from his proved ability and local knowledge. But the new governor shrank from risking the fate of his predecessor.. He avoided any energetic action against the exultant Afghans, and made a secret arrangement with them, each side promising not to molest the other. In this way he dawdled away months at Peshawar, first urging the smallness of his force and then the approach of winter as a plea for his inaction. Next spring, a sergeant at the mace was sent from the Court to drive him on to Kabul, and at last he went there by the Karapa Pass after bribing the Afghans on the way not to oppose him. But the Khaibar route remained closed as before. The Emperor was highly displeased at Mahabat's conduct* and sent Shujaet Khan in independent command of a large force with abundant war-material and artillery, to punish the Afghans (14th November, 1673). Jaswant Singh was to co-operate with him.

v3.c44.s8.2

∗ Khush-hal Khan was a Mughal mansabdar, as his father Shahbaz had been (Akhbarat, year 10, sh. 9). On 30 March, 1667 the Emperor, who had at first appointed Acmal Afridi to accompany M. Amin Khan to Peshawar, detained him and then sent him to fight in the Deccan, by way of precaution. (Ibid. 10/4.)

v3.c44.s8.3

∗ *M.A.* 121, 129, Ishwardas, 65b-67a. Mahabat's letter to Aurangzib (I. O. L. MS. 2678, pp. 122-126 of the copy made for me). *Storia*, ii. 202, 205. *Life of Mahabat Kh.* in *M. U.* iii. 590-594, 384.

§9. Disaster to Shujaet Khan, 1674.

v3.c44.s9.1

Shujaet Khan was a man of humble origin who had risen to high rank and the Emperor's favour by his success in quelling the Satnami rising. He was therefore regarded with jealousy and contempt by high-born officers like Mahabat Khan and Maharajah Jaswant Singh, and the more so as his appointment implied the Emperor's distrust of their ability. Shujaet, on his part, proud of his master's favour and of his own past triumphs, despised the advice of Jaswant, and took his own line of action. This lack of co-operation among the Mughal leaders caused the disaster of 1674.

v3.c44.s9.2

Early in that year many of the clans sent deputations to Peshawar and swore friendship to the Mughals. Shujaet Khan,[*] without waiting for the others to submit, and in disregard of Jaswant's counsel, tried to push on to Kabul. After crossing the Gandab, he ascended the saddle (kotal) of the Karapa Pass (21st February). That night there was a heavy fall of rain and snow; and every one in the Indian camp was brought to death's door by the extreme cold and wet. The Afghans from the heights on the two sides began to harass the suffering army. "The night was so very dark that the planets missed their way in the wide plain of the sky, and, therefore, all men were frightened and troubled,—unable either to advance or retreat. The Khan, proud of his bravery, began to fight with bows and muskets. The Afghans showered stones, arrows, and bullets. But what the imperialists discharged missed the mark, while the missiles of the Afghans all took effect." The imperialists, perplexed and shaken, retreated to a safer position for the rest of the night. But many of them were benumbed to death in the Pass and many others paralysed by the cold. At dawn the Afghans charged the miserable army from all sides. Shujaet Khan, forgetful of his duty as general, sought and found a soldier's death in the front rank. His leaderless troops were hemmed round; but a band of 500 Rathors, wisely sent by Jaswant, arrived with guns, broke the enemy's cordon, and brought the remnant of the army back to camp after a long and desperate fight at close quarters. Three hundred of the Rajputs sacrificed themselves in this heroic exploit. Of Shujaet's followers thousands had fallen before.

v3.c44.s9.3

∗ Disaster to Shujaet Khan: M.A. 131, Ishwardas (the best account) 67a-69a. The Karapa Pass lies north-east of the Kabul river, while the Khaibar Pass lies south-west. (Map accompanying Markham's paper.)

v3.c44.s9.4

§10. Aurangzib goes to Peshawar; Mughal success, peace restored on frontier.

v3.c44.s9.5

This second disaster, occurring less than two years after the first, convinced Aurangzib that a supreme effort should be made to restore imperial prestige. He himself went to Hasan Abdal, between Rawal Pindi and Peshawar, (26th June, 1674), and stayed there for a year and a half directing the operations. A vast army accompanied him with a large park of artillery. Strong and well-equipped columns with plenty of material were sent into the enemy's country. Aghar Khan, a Turkish noble, who had often distinguished himself by fighting the Afghans, was hurriedly recalled from the Deccan and deputed to clear the way in the Khaibar region, (July). Prince Akbar under the guardianship of the minister Asad Khan marched to Kabul by way of Kohat,* with a large army and a number of high officers, (end of September). Mahabat Khan was removed from his post as viceroy, on suspicion of having connived at the destruction of Shujaet Khan.†

v3.c44.s9.6

† On learning of this false accusation, Mahabat Khan wrote a very bitter letter to the Emperor. (I.O.L. M.S. 2678, pp. 122-126 of the copy made for me.) In it he defends his own character and that of Jaswant, calls Shujaet Khan a paji (low rascal), and taxes the Emperor with cherishing base favourites.

v3.c44.s9.7

With Aurangzib's arrival on the scene, imperial diplomacy, no less than imperial arms, began to have effect. Many clans were induced to send deputations to him and were won over by the grant of presents, pensions, *jagirs*, and posts in the Mughal army to their headmen. The Bangashes and some of the tribes of the Peshawar district at once joined the Emperor's side, and sent contingents of their men to fight under his banners. As for the irreconcilables whom neither the concentration of imperial force could overawe, nor the treasures of India could buy, their valleys were penetrated by detachments from Peshawar. Thus, in a short time, the Ghorai, Ghilzai, Shirrani and Yusufzai clans were defeated and ousted from their villages. A Mughal outpost held Bazarak, the Shirrani capital. At this the Daudzai, Tarakzai and Tirahi tribes made their submission.*

v3.c44.s9.8

∗ Aurangzib says in one of his letters that the prince should march by way of Sufed Khak (which, as we know from Kalimat 41a, was the Karapa route). But M.A. (136) says that he followed the Kohat road. Aurangzib renamed Sufed Khak as Mughalabad (M.A. 145).

v3.c44.s9.9

Muhammad Ashraf, the son of the Khatak chieftain Khush-hal Khan, entered the imperial service; but his father continued in opposition. Similarly, the son of Bhagu, the Yusufzai ringleader, offered to wait on the Emperor on receiving an assurance of safety. Dariya Khan Afridi's followers promised to bring the head of Acmal, the Afridi pretender, if their past misdeeds were forgiven, (end of August). [*Akhbarat*, 17—20.]

v3.c44.s9.10

∗ *M.A.* 132-133, 136; *Ishwardas*, 69*a*—70*b* (here followed); K.K. ii. 237.

§11. Aghar Khan's victories.

v3.c44.s10.1

Meantime, great deeds were being done by Aghar Khan west of Peshawar. First he foiled a night attack of the Mohmands and their allies, and retaliated by slaying 300 of them, ravaging their homes, and bringing away 2,000 captives and much booty. Then he tried to open the Khaibar Pass by leading the Van of the army of Fidai Khan, the new governor of Kabul. Forty thousand Afghans opposed him near Ali Masjid, but after a long contest in which both sides lost heavily and Aghar Khan was severely wounded, the enemy fled, leaving behind them many thousands of dead and prisoners.

v3.c44.s10.2

But still the Afghans were not crushed; they rallied in a short time and closed the path further ahead. The jealousy of his colleagues, especially of the Hindustani nobles, added to the difficulties of Aghar Khan and his brother Turks. So, he escorted Fidai Khan to Jalalabad by way of Bazarak and Seh Chuba, fighting all the way. Next, with a force of 5,000 Rajputs and Afghan friendlies, he occupied Nangrahar and tried to keep the roads open. The Ghilzais who had seized the Jagdalak Pass were repeatedly defeated and expelled from it. When he was staying at the outpost of Gandamak, the Afghans, 30 or 40 thousand strong, attacked him at night. The battle raged till the next afternoon, when the enemy were repulsed. Of all the Mughal generals he alone was uniformly victorious over the frontier tribes, and Afghan mothers, it is said, used to hush their babies to sleep with his dreaded name. (K. K. ii. 237—246.)

v3.c44.s10.3

The Emperor's plan was that Prince Akbar should advance eastwards from Jalalabad, sending his Van under Jaswant Singh by way of the Khaibar and a division under Hasan Beg Khan by way of the Karapa defile,—while a detachment from Peshawar under Aghar Khan would march westwards, so that the Khaibar tribes would be enveloped and crushed by this simultaneous attack, and no grain from outside would reach the Afghan rebels.* We have already seen what Aghar Khan did. But evidently Prince Akbar could not carry out his part of the plan of campaign. He passed a short time at Kabul, settling the affairs of the province, and then returned to Hasan Abdal, leaving Fidai Khan in command.

§12. Fighting in 1675; disaster to Mukarram Khan.

v3.c44.s11.1

In the spring of 1675, when Fidai Khan set out on his return from Kabul to Peshawar, the Afghans attacked him in the Jagdalak Pass. His Van was defeated, its Arab commander was slain, and many of the elephants, artillery, baggage and women of this division were carried off by the enemy. But the viceroy's courage and steadiness saved the Centre. Aghar Khan, then at the *thana* of Gandamak, on hearing of his critical situation, came to the rescue by rapid marches, took charge of the viceroy's vanguard, and forced the Jagdalak Pass in the teeth of Afghan opposition, routing the enemy from the hilltops.

v3.c44.s11.2

∗ Akhbarat, 17—2, (Aurangzib's instructions to Akbar).

v3.c44.s11.3

Early in June, however, "a great defeat befell the imperial army." Mukarram Khan with a large force was operating against the Afghans near the saddle (*kotal*) of Khapush in the Bajaur country. After defeating several bodies of the enemy and plundering their villages, he was one day decoyed by the appearance of a small band of them to advance and give chase. Suddenly two large Afghan forces which had been lying in ambush, "concealed in the waist of the hill," fell upon him. The Mughals were hopelessly outnumbered, and lost heavily, including the youthful hero Shamshir Khan, a brother of Mukarram, and Mir Azizullah, his sister's husband. "Lack of water and of paths on any side whatever caused the death of many soldiers, both horse and foot." Mukarram Khan with a handful of survivors escaped to Bajaur and took refuge with its *thanadar*. (*M.A.* 144—145).

v3.c44.s11.4

Retributory measures were taken immediately, and all the Mughal positions in Afghanistan were strengthened. The imperial Paymaster, Sarbuland Khan, was sent with 9,000 men and a vast quantity of material against the enemy (14 June). The ever-victorious Aghar Khan was appointed to Jalalabad, and other capable officers to Jagdalak, Laghman, Gharib-khanah, Danki, and Bangashat, in command of outposts. Fidai Khan, the governor of the province, was given the title of Azam Khan Kokah, in reward of his activity in punishing the Afghans.

v3.c44.s11.5

At the end of August came the news of two reverses, though on a small scale : Hazbar Khan, the *thanadar* of Jagdalak was slain with his son and other Mughal soldiers; Abdullah, the *thanadar* of Barangab and Surkhab, was driven out of his post, after losing many of his troops. (*M.A.* 146.) But, on the whole, the imperialists held their own by means of outposts and forts at strategic points in the Pathan country. By the end of the year 1675 the situation had sufficiently improved* to enable the Emperor to leave Hasan Abdal and return to Delhi (where he arrived on 27th March next).

§13. Amir Khan, able governor of Afghanistan.

v3.c44.s12.1

On 15th October, 1676, Prince Muazzam was appointed to the Kabul expedition. He was given the high title of *Shah-i-Alam* (King of the Universe), a hundred thousand gold pieces, and two lakhs of Rupees in jewellery, and sent from Delhi with a splendid train of the most distinguished officers, artillery, material, and a well-filled war-chest. Among his lieutenants was Mir Khan, the son of Khalilullah, who had previously distinguished himself by leading a successful punitive expedition against the Yusufzais of Shahbazgarhi and suppressing two rebellious Afghan chiefs in Bihar. Once he had fallen under royal displeasure on the suspicion of having encouraged Prince Azam in disloyal ambition. But the cloud had blown over; he had been reinstated and created Amir Khan* (January, 1675). And now he fought so well under the banners of Shah Alam that at the prince's recommendation he was appointed viceroy of Kabul (19th March, 1677), in the place of Azam Khan. The prince himself arrived at Kabul on 15th August, 1677 and after a few months' stay returned to India, reaching Delhi on 20th January, 1678. Throughout the year 1677 peace was observed between the Mughals and the Afghans, as both sides suffered from the effects of a seven months' drought and famine.

v3.c44.s12.2

∗ This is my view, based on Ishwardas (71a). But Manucci and Khush-hal Khan state that the Emperor returned with failure. It is evident that he had not achieved success.

v3.c44.s12.3

Amir Khan arrived at his post on 8th June, 1678, and continued to govern Afghanistan with signal ability till his death twenty years later. His first attack on Acmal's troops in the Jalalabad district having failed, he took to diplomacy. He set himself to win the hearts of the Afghans and enter into social relations with them, with such success that the chiefs of the clans "left their shy and unsocial manners and began to visit him without any suspicion." They became very friendly to him, and every one of them looked up to him for advice in conducting his domestic affairs. Under his astute management, they ceased to trouble the imperial Government and spent their energies in internecine quarrels. Once he broke up the confederacy under Acmal by secretly instigating that chieftain's followers to ask him to divide the conquered territory among them. Acmal declined the proposal, saying, "How can a small territory be divided among so many men?" The disappointed hillmen threw up his service and began to return home in anger. Acmal had at last to make a division of the land; but as he naturally showed greater consideration to his own clansmen and kinsfolk, his other followers were disgusted and left his camp. Much of Amir Khan's administrative success was due to the wise counsel tact and energy of his wife, Sahibji, a daughter of Ali Mardan Khan.

v3.c44.s12.4

∗ For the history of Amir Khan, *M.A.* 82, 113, 146; Ishwardas, 61b, 73a; *M.U.* i. 277-286; *Studies in Mughal India*, 111-115.

v3.c44.s12.5

§14. Emperor's Afghan policy; peace restored.

v3.c44.s12.6

The Emperor triumphed in Afghanistan by following the policy of paying subsidies and setting clan against clan,—or, to use his own metaphor, "breaking two bones by knocking them together." (K. T., 47a, 74a.) The imperial dominions were no longer invaded from beyond the border. The Khaibar route was kept open by paying regular pensions to the hillmen. And though some tribe or other continued refractory, the Emperor had no anxiety about that region during Amir Khan's viceroyalty.*

v3.c44.s12.7

This conciliatory policy created a division among the frontier clans. The Yusufzais, who had begun the trouble, submitted early, and the north Peshawar district was soon pacified. The Afridis remained in arms longer. But an Afghan confederacy is short-lived. Amir Khan's diplomacy broke up the following of Acmal. And when that self-styled king died, the Afridis made terms with the empire.

v3.c44.s12.8

§15. Khush-hal Khan continues resistance.

v3.c44.s12.9

The struggle was however continued for many years afterwards by the stern and unbending independent Khush-hal Khan Khatak, with the memory of his captivity in Aurangzib's dungeons rankling in his bosom. The Bangashes and Yusufzais,—his very son Ashraf,—were fighting against him in the Mughal ranks; but neither age, nor a growing sense of the hopelessness of his cause, could tame his bitterness of feeling and obduracy of spirit. Alone he kept the flag of Pathan freedom flying, till his own son betrayed him into the enemy's hands. As he complains,—

v3.c44.s12.10

∗ In *Kalimat*, 16b, Aurangzib describes the deceased Amir Khan's administrative methods,—how he was a just governor, possessed of practical skill and tact in dealing with all; how he used to make savings in the budgeted expenditure of the province and keep the passes open to traffic; and how he kept many of the hillmen usefully employed by enlisting them in the imperial service, and profusely bribed the clans out of the imperial coffers, his own income and his illegal exactions. Also 11b.

v3.c44.s12.11

"Gone are Acmal Khan and Darya, who had good
judgment ;
Now Khush-hal alone stands in the Mughal's way.
* * * *
I alone amongst them am concerned for my nation's
honour.
At ease are the Yusufzais cultivating their fields—
The Afridis, Mohmands, Shinwaris, what are they
about?
Spread is the Mughal army in Nangrahar,
With calls for succour to them am I wearied ;
Deaf are they, no attention is paid to my cries,
While all the other Pathans from Qandahar to Attock
Are openly or secretly combined in honour's cause."

v3.c44.s12.12

But one solace he had in his deathless hate of the unjust Emperor who had imprisoned him by stratagem. An exile from his country, a captive in the enemy's fortress, he could still boast,

v3.c44.s12.13

"I am he who has sorely wounded Aurang's heart.
Khaibar's pass have I made to the Mughals their
dearest purchase,

v3.c44.s12.14

In every spot have they paid taxes to the Pathans.
* * * * Of his armies destroyed what account is there? The treasures of Hindustan have been scattered before us, Swallowed by the mountains has been his ruddy gold."

v3.c44.s12.15

Ruinous as the Afghan war was to imperial finances, its political effect was even more harmful. It made the employment of Afghans in the ensuing Rajput war impossible, though Afghans were just the class of soldiers who could have won victory for the imperialists in that rugged and barren country. Moreover, it relieved the pressure on Shivaji by draining the Deccan of the best Mughal troops for service on the n.w. frontier. (*Storia*, ii. 203.) The Maratha chief took advantage of this diversion of his enemy's strength to sweep in a dazzling succession of triumphs through Golkonda to the Karnatak and back again through Mysore and Bijapur to Raigarh, during the fifteen months following December 1676. It was the climax of his career; but the Afridis and Khataks made its unbroken success possible.