History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v5.c72.s2.2

v5.c72.s2.2

But at the end of 1689 the new Maratha king Rajaram was known to have reached the fort of Jinji in safety, and the Emperor's forces had henceforth to be directed south-eastwards into the Mysore plateau and the Madras Karnatak if he was to preserve his rightful gains from Bijapur and Golkonda in those quarters and to check Maratha activity there. Thus, the brilliant success of Mughal arms since 1687 received a sharp set-back in 1690. Jinji became a centre of Maratha enterprise in the East Coast, while their ministers left at home organised resistance to the Mughals in the west. The difficulties of Aurangzib were only multiplied by the disappearance of a common head and a central Government among the Marathas, as every Maratha captain with his own retainers fought and raided in a different quarter and on his own account. It now became a people's war, and Aurangzib could not end it, because there was no Maratha Government or State-army for him to attack and destroy. The imperial forces could not be present everywhere in full strength; hence, they suffered reverses here and there. The enemy forts which the Mughals had captured or bought during the first panic following Shambhuji's downfall, now began to be recovered by the Marathas. The tide first turned against Aurangzib in May 1690, when his general Rustam Khan was captured and his whole camp looted by the Marathas.