Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v5.c77: Chapter LIV.

History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v5.c77

Language
English

Contents

Chapter LIV.

v5.c77.1

AURANGZIB BESIEGES MARATHA FORTS, 1700-1704.

§ 1. Aurangzib's arrangements on leaving Islampuri.

v5.c77.s1.1

On 19th October, 1699, Aurangzib started from Islampuri on that campaign against the great Maratha strongholds which was to occupy the next six years of his life. One by one the famous hill-forts of Satara, Parli, Panhala, Vishalgarh (Khelna), Kondana (Singhgarh), Rajgarh, and Torna were captured by him, besides five places of lesser note. But it should be remembered that with the sole exception of Torna, none of these was taken by assault; all capitulated after a time and for a price; their garrisons were permitted to march out with their personal effects, and their commandants were given costly rewards for ceasing resistance. The first, namely Satara, was long and obstinately defended. And so also was the last, the Berad capital Wagingera (1705.) The capture of Wagingera forms a chapter by itself (ch. lvi.) A minute account of the siege of Satara, based on the details supplied by the daily Court-bulletins, has been published by me in the Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, 1922, and may serve as an example of Mughal sieges at the end of the 17th century. It is, therefore, unnecessary to describe here the sieges of the Maratha forts except in outline.

v5.c77.s1.2

During the Emperor's stay for 4½ years at Islampuri with his family, officers and main army, his camp had grown into a city. Houses of a more permanent structure had in many cases replaced the tents, and a small stone fort had been built in 1698, which sheltered the Emperor's residence. Around the whole camp an earthen wall, five miles in circuit, was now run up in fifteen days, as a protection from the Maratha light horse. [M. A. 388, 408.] We shall, following the Persian histories, henceforth designate it as the Base Camp.

v5.c77.s1.3

Here he left his wife Udipuri and her son Kam Bakhsh, and his daughter Zinat-un-nissa, with all the surplus baggage and unnecessary officials, and the families of his soldiers and camp-followers. The wazir Asad Khan remained in charge of them with a suitable force. Princes Azam and Bidar Bakht joined the Emperor on the way; but Bidar Bakht was soon afterwards detached to pursue Rajaram, who was making a dash for Khandesh and Berar. Zulfiqar surnamed Nusrat Jang, who was coming up from the Madras side, joined the prince near the village of Charthanah (45 m. east of Jalna), but was afterwards given a roving commission, being charged with the special duty of fighting the Maratha field armies that hovered round the siege camp or threatened the Base at Islampuri. Another division, under Ruhullah and Hamid-ud-din, was sent to ravage the country between Satara and Panhala [M. A. 408-409 ; Dil. ii. 129a.]

v5.c77.s1.4

§ 2. Aurangzib begins the siege of Satara.

v5.c77.s1.5

After marching south-westwards from Islampuri to Miraj, as if he were going to invest Panhala, the Emperor made a sharp turn to the north and reached Masur (21 miles south of Satara) on 21st November. A detachment under Tarbiyat Khan, the chief of artillery, went in advance and quickly put his guns in position for bombarding Basantgarh,* a fort 6 miles south-west of Masur. At the Emperor's approach the garrison lost heart and fled away in the night of the 24th. The imperialists entered the fort the next day and named it the "Key to Victory" (Kilid-i-Fath), as a happy omen of their success in the ensuing campaign. [M. A., 411.] Some buried treasure, weapons, and provisions were seized by the victors here.

v5.c77.s1.6

Marching thence, the imperialists arrived before Satara on 8th December. Aurangzib took up his quarters at the village of Karanja, a mile and a half to the north of the fort-walls. Azam's division was posted on the west, on the way to Parli, Tarbiyat Khan opposite the northern wall, and Ruhullah Khan on the south side.

v5.c77.s1.7

∗ Bombay Gaz. xix. 238, 11, some seven miles n.w. of Karad, which is 8 m. s. of Masur. Basantgarh is 3000 ft. above sea-level, and just south of Talbid, and 3 m. w. of the Krishna.

v5.c77.s1.8

The Mughal army with its followers and transport animals was concentrated in one spot, five miles round, and this encampment was walled round to keep out the Maratha raiders. A body of musketeers patrolled round it thrice daily.

v5.c77.s1.9

Siege operations began on 9th December, the different nobles being given different sections round the fort to entrench.

v5.c77.s1.10

From his position opposite the Mangalai or northern gate of the fort, Tarbiyat Khan, the Chief of the Mughal Artillery, made a covered lane, and arriving 13 yards from the gate, began to build a raised battery opposite the tower guarding the gate. The rocky soil made digging a very slow and difficult work. The garrison fired upon his men day and night without cessation with every kind of missile. The Mughals mounted a big gun, and began to reply. The marksmanship was bad on both sides, and not much loss was done by the firing.

v5.c77.s1.11

But the lines of investment were not complete. The enemy entered and issued from Satara almost to the end of the siege, Prince Azam being suspected of conniving at their efforts to provision and reinforce the fort.

§ 3. Fighting before and around Satara.

v5.c77.s2.1

The garrison made frequent sorties, all of which were repulsed with more or less loss. But the greatest danger to the Mughals came from the Maratha field forces, which practically reduced the besiegers to the position of a beleaguered city. Foraging parties could leave the Mughal camp only under very strong escorts, led by the foremost nobles. Dhana, Shankara, and other enemy leaders spread through the Mughal possessions, raiding villages, cutting off outposts, and closing the roads to the grain-dealers (banjaras.) Ghori Khan, the faujdar of Kararabad, was captured by Dhana (19 Dec.) but rescued by Hamid-ud-din three days later near Masur, though with heavy losses on both sides. On the 27th, Ikhlas Khan, when patrolling only four miles from the camp, was enveloped by Hanumant and slain with his son and many followers, and all his property was looted. The enemy appeared here, there, and everywhere, round the camp. On 10th January 1700, Nusrat Jang, Bahramand, and Hamid-ud-din attacked Dhana Jadav, Hanumant Nimbalkar, and Ranuji Ghorparé, and after a pitched battle six miles beyond Rahmatpur, repulsed them with slaughter. By order of the Emperor, a pyramid was built with the severed enemy heads (500.) On the 22nd, Dhana captured the thanadar of Khanapur.

v5.c77.s2.2

Enemy activity stopped the coming of grain and foraging in the vicinity of the Mughal camp, and produced scarcity. Ramchand, the thanadar of Khatau, received lavish rewards for bringing a convoy of grain into the imperial camp (10 Jan.), as also did some other local officers. On 3rd Feb. 8,000 oxen loaded with grain were escorted into the camp, which gave some relief.

v5.c77.s2.3

Tarbiyat Khan raised his gun-platform 24 yards high, to the level of the bastion of the fort gate. "In procuring materials for it, not a tree was left standing within thirty or forty kos of Satara." [M. A. 414.] Eight thousand sacks were taken from the grain market and filled with sand to form a bulwark round it. Three hundred oxen were set to transport timber for the battery. But the stones showered down by the enemy made further progress impossible. Orders were then issued to fill the empty chests of the public treasury and of the money-changers with stone and sand and line the battery with them,—150 water-carriers being posted there to put out fires promptly.

§ 4. Attempts to storm Satara fail.

v5.c77.s3.1

Tarbiyat Khan by hard labour dug a mine 24 yards long and carried it under the fort-wall. But assault by breaching was deemed inadvisable. Then, a surprise escalade was attempted by 2,000 Mavlés in Mughal pay,—who were experts in hill-climbing,—on 23rd January, an hour before dawn. Three years' salary was paid to them in advance to inspire them to the deed of daring. But the garrison were warned by some friends outside and the attempt failed.

v5.c77.s3.2

Then Ruhullah Khan carried another mine under the fausse braye (rauni) of the fort, on the other side of the gate. On 13th April the two mines were fired. The first killed many of the garrison and buried the havladar Pragji Prabhu under the debris of the wall, but he was dug out alive. The second exploded outwards with disastrous consequences to the Mughals. A tower was blown up and fell upon the Mughal troops densely assembled at the foot of the wall for the assault. Nearly two thousand of them, including 500 Mavlés, perished.

v5.c77.s3.3

This explosion made a breach in the wall, 20 yards wide. Some brave imperialists, notably Baji Chavan Daflé, the son of Satva Daflé (the founder of the State of Jath in the Bijapur district), ran up to the top of the wall, shouting to their comrades, "Come up! there is no enemy here!" But none followed them; the men in the Mughal trenches who survived were too dazed and alarmed by the catastrophe to stir outside. The garrison now recovered from their surprise, and rushing up to the breach, slew the gallant forlorn hope.

v5.c77.s3.4

The huge raised platform had collapsed and its guns lay overturned on the hillside. The Mavle infantry, saddened by the loss of 500 of their kinsmen and comrades and unable to recover their bodies from under "that hill of stone and clay," at night set fire to the entrenchments, which were entirely made of wood, so as to ensure the Hindu form of funeral for their dead! The fire burnt for a week and these costly siege-works were reduced to ashes. [M. A. 419.]

v5.c77.s3.5

§ 5. Satara capitulates, 21st April, 1700.

v5.c77.s3.6

Meantime Rajaram had died (March) and his minister Parashuram offered submission to the Mughals. Tarbiyat Khan had demolished 70 yards of the fort walls, 400 of the garrison had been killed by the mines. Considering all these facts, Subhanji, the qiladar of Satara, lost heart and made terms with the Emperor through Prince Azam. On 21st April he hoisted the imperial flag on his fort and vacated it with the garrison the next day. Subhanji was taken into the Emperor's service as a 5-hazari zat (2,000 troopers) with a cash reward of Rs. 20,000, besides many presents. His relatives and followers were also enlisted.*

v5.c77.s3.7

The fort was renamed Azamtara in honour of Prince Md. Azam.

v5.c77.s3.8

§ 6. Parli besieged.

v5.c77.s3.9

Satara fell on 21st April, 1700. On that very day Fathullah Khan was sent in advance to open trenches before Parli, six miles west of Satara. This fort had been the seat of Shivaji's guru Ramdas Swami and it was serving as the head-quarters of the Maratha Government while Satara was invested by the enemy. The siege materials used at Satara were quickly transferred to Parli, and the Emperor arrived before the fort on 30th April. The Mughal lines of investment encircled the hill.

v5.c77.s3.10

∗ M. A. 410-420; Akhbarat (years 43 and 44); Ahkam (my ed.) § 71.

v5.c77.s3.11

Parashuram, the chief revenue officer of the Maratha Government, being disheartened by the death of Rajaram and the fall of Satara, escaped from Parli and sent to beg for terms of peace. Parli, however, continued its resistance under his subordinates, with whom he frequently corresponded from outside.

v5.c77.s3.12

But the invaders suffered terribly from excessive rain and the scarcity of grain and fodder. Aurangzib held grimly on. Fathullah's covered way having reached the foot of a big sloping rock in front of the smaller gate of the fort, his men scaled it with ladders on 4th June. The general wished to hold the top of the rock, mount guns there, and batter down the fort-gate. A few of his men had entered the fort pell-mell with the fugitives, but they were killed, and the garrison, soon recovering from the panic, shut the door and shot down the Mughals standing unsheltered on the rock. They also blew up a mine previously laid by them under the road leading from this rock to the gate. Fathullah had, therefore, to abandon his gain after losing 60 or 70 men.

v5.c77.s3.13

Terms were now made with the qiladar of Parli.

v5.c77.s3.14

and he evacuated the fort (on 9th June) for a bribe. The old and neglected mosque built within it during the Bijapuri occupation was restored and used again for prayers, while the new temple of Shivaji's reign was demolished. "Thus was verified," as the pious official chronicler writes, "the Quranic verse, *Truth came and falsehood disappeared*." The fort was newly named Nauras-tara. (*M. A.* 428, Hamid-ud-din's *Ahkam* § 17.)

§ 7. Hardships of the imperialists.

v5.c77.s4.1

These two sieges had caused an enormous waste of men, horses and transport animals in the imperial army. The treasury was empty, the soldiers were starving at their pay being in arrears for three years. Heavy and unprecedented rain began to fall early in May and continued till the end of July. The army was eager to withdraw to a place of greater comfort and plenty. On 21st June the return march towards Bhushangarh commenced, but the sufferings of the miserable soldiers were only aggravated by the change.

v5.c77.s4.2

All transport animals had perished during the siege, and, as the official historian humorously describes the situation, "the gypsies of the army had to load their household goods on their cocks." No camel was left alive in the army, on account of the excessive rain and the unsuitability of the climate for these animals. The few cart-oxen and even the elephants that survived had nothing but their skins and bones left. Only a small part of the property of the Emperor and the nobles could be loaded on these weak elephants, half-dead bullocks, day-labourers and paupers from the charity-kitchens. Much had to be left in the forts or burnt. Many of the elephants and bullocks under their excessive burdens fell down dead and blocked the roads. Many persons of noble birth had to walk on foot through the mud for mile after mile. [M. A. 429; K. K. ii. 472-73; Dil. ii. 133b.]

v5.c77.s4.3

One march was followed by two days' halt, in order to allow the stragglers time to come up. Only three miles were covered by a day's march. The Krishna was in such high flood that the opposite bank could not be seen from this. Great difficulty was felt in crossing such a huge army over the swollen river. Only seven half-broken and clumsily-patched up boats were available for ferrying the men across. The people in their struggle to get seats in them took to their swords, and thus every day some men were killed or wounded at the ferry. Some Turani soldiers seized two boats by attacking them sword in hand, and then made much money by charging one gold mohar instead of the normal Rupee, as ferry-fee from every passenger that they took on board. Many thousands of the poorer people were left behind and died there. [K. K. ii. 473.]

v5.c77.s4.4

Then, by way of Sabitgarh, the army reached Bhushangarh* on 25th July, having taken 35 days to cover some 45 miles! Here a month's halt was made, during which the rain ceased and the camp again "breathed at ease." The generals were dispersed to various fertile comfortable places to recuperate their war-worn men. Prince Azam was sent to Khandesh to refresh, the other nobles to their jagirs, if within 10 or 12 marches, or to Bijapur and other cities. Orders were sent to the provincial governors to send fresh troops to the Emperor's side. Bidar Bakht, who was guarding the Base, was deputed with Nusrat Jang to attack Panhala.†

§ 8. Imperial camp at Khawaspur flooded.

v5.c77.s5.1

After five weeks' rest at Bhushangarh, the imperial camp was shifted (on 30th August 1700), to Khawaspur,† a few miles off, where food-stuffs and grass were abundant. Khawaspur stands on the left bank of the Nandani, a small waterless stream at that point. The tents of the army covered both its banks and even its dry bed, which in that season presented "only the mirage of water." But in the night of 1st October, while the men were fast asleep, a high flood caused by heavy and untimely rainfall on the hills, came suddenly sweeping through the river bed, overtopped its banks and spread over the plains beyond, "turning the land into one sheet of water." Many men and animals perished; many more, including even the nobles, were left absolutely poor and naked; nearly all the tents and property were damaged. Happily, the water went down early in the morning, otherwise "not one man would have survived." [M. A. 431, K. K. ii. 475.]

v5.c77.s5.2

∗ 7 m. s. of Aundh, 10 m. s. of Vaduj, and 30 m. s. e. of Satara in a straight line. [Atlas, 40 N. W.]

v5.c77.s5.3

† I conjecturally place it on the Nandani river (Nandhi in Atlas), west of Bhushangarh, and not on the Yerla (east of B.) which has an unfailing water supply. Bhimsen (134a) says that it stood on the river Man, which is impossible, if we accept the statement of the Masir-i-Alam. that Khawaspur was only one march from Bhushangarh. There is a Khawaspur (17.30 N. 75.1 E.) on the Man river (Atlas, sheet 40 N. E.) ; but it is 36 m. east of Bhushangarh, and 14 m. s. e. of Mhasvad.

v5.c77.s5.4

When the flood first struck the camp, a little before midnight, and the tents began to fill with water, men tried to run to safety, but could see no path of escape in the darkness, only waves on all sides. A loud cry arose throughout the army. The Emperor was in his privy when this universal outcry reached his ears. Imagining that the Marathas had burst into the camp, he rose in alarm, but stumbled and dislocated his right knee. The doctors failed to set it properly, and he remained a little lame for the rest of his life.* The Court flatterers used to console him by saying that it was the heritage of his ancestor Timur the Lame and a token that he would repeat the victories and success of that world-conqueror! [K. K. 476, *Storia* iii. 255, *Dil.* ii. 134a.]

v5.c77.s5.5

∗ He took his bath of recovery, on leaving the sick-bed, on 30th November. [Akhbarat.]

v5.c77.s5.6

But vigorous efforts were made to replenish his army. Orders were sent to the governors of Northern India to enlist strong men and buy good horses in every province and send them to the Deccan. Two thousand horses were bought in Kabul, and 2,000 mares locally, besides the remounts purchased in other provinces. The new recruits began to arrive in January 1701.

v5.c77.s5.7

The Marathas put the misfortunes and weakness of the imperialists to the best account. In addition to their normal raids, Hanumant Rao* plundered the *thana* of Khatau and killed its Mughal officer Ramchand (a Maratha), 16 August, 1700. The Berad chief, Pidia Nayak, posted his infantry all over the Bijapur district levying *chauth*, while the Marathas plundered up to the very tank of Shahpur, outside Bijapur city, (*c.* 15th Nov.) Ranuji killed the Mughal thanadar of Bagehwari (30 m. s. e. of Bijapur) and looted that outpost as well as Indi (north-east of Bijapur city.)

v5.c77.s5.8

The camp was broken up on 16th Dec. 1700, and the city of Miraj was reached on 1st January 1701. Here the Emperor spent the month of fasting (29 Jan.—27 Feb.) and received during the interval the new recruits and materials sent up from the provinces.* The imperial Paymaster Mukhlis Khan (a grand-nephew of the prime minister of Persia) died on 3rd January and was buried in the tomb-garden of the saint Sayyid Shams-ud-din in Miraj. [M. A. 434.]

v5.c77.s5.9

∗ His adopted son Anantaji died of wounds received in this battle, and Hanumant himself was soon afterwards taken ill of dropsy (swelling of the body.) [*Akhbarat.*]

§ 9. Siege of Panhala, 1701.

v5.c77.s6.1

Panhala was the next point of attack. An advanced force under Bidar Bakht had been sent to that region in the autumn of 1700; the prince lay encamped at the foot of the fort, while his lieutenant Nusrat Jang besieged its western (or Konkani) gate. [Dil. 134b.] The Emperor himself arrived there on 9th March 1701 and formed a complete circle of investment, fourteen miles in length, round Panhala and its sister fort of Pavangarh. A mobile force under Nusrat Jang was sent out to "chastise the robbers wherever they should raise their heads."

v5.c77.s6.2

Tarbiyat Khan, the chief of artillery, worked hard in running lanes and raising gun-platforms. In a short time five towers of the fort were battered down to half their heights. A mine, large enough for three armed men to walk abreast erect, was gradually carried under the tower and outer breast-work of the fort-gate. It was a most elaborate structure, with a chamber for 20 soldiers furnished with windows on both sides for admitting air and light and musketry-holes for firing at the ramparts.

v5.c77.s6.3

∗ Akh. 2, 3 Aug. 1700, 11 Jan. 1701. Horses were ordered to be bought in Kabul and Surat.

v5.c77.s6.4

But in that stony region the progress of mining was necessarily very slow, and the dreaded rainy season was approaching. In addition to the notorious rivalry between his two highest generals,—Nusrat Jang and Firuz Jang,—which made it impossible to employ both at the same place, there now broke out a bitter jealousy between Tarbiyat Khan and Fathullah Khan and another between the older officers in general and a very able upstart from Gujrat named Muhammad Murad.

v5.c77.s6.5

The Emperor had summoned Fathullah from Aurangabad and charged him to lay a mine from Kam Bakhsh's position. Working incessantly in rivalry with Tarbiyat, he carried his mine to the foot of the gate in one month. Tarbiyat, on his part, in order not to be outdone, pushed his covered lane further onwards. But the mutual jealousies of the generals made true co-operation among them impossible. They secretly thwarted one another, and thus spoiled their master's business and prolonged the siege. [K. K. 488 ; M. A. 437.]

v5.c77.s6.6

Muhammad Murad, a petty officer (faujdar) of Godra in Gujrat, had suddenly risen in the Emperor's favour by coming to his side in his need with 500 well-mounted recruits raised at his own initiative, while his superior, the subahdar of the province, had pleaded inability to enlist a single soldier in the province and had even tried to hinder recruitment by Md. Murad. At the siege of Panhala, Murad was given charge of the attack on Pavangarh. [K. K. 478, 485.]

v5.c77.s6.7

Midway between Panhala and Pavangarh there is a lower hill, with some enemy houses on its top, sheltered by the guns of the two forts. One day Murad chased up the hill a party of the enemy who had descended from it to carry off some camp cattle out grazing there. Arriving at the top, he planted his flag there, sat down in a shelter of the rock, and sent to beg for reinforcements planks and trenching tools in order to entrench and hold the position gained.

v5.c77.s6.8

The Emperor wrote to Ruhullah and Hamid-ud-din with his own hand, ordering them to go and help Murad. These two arrived at the foot of the hillock, but sent word to Murad saying that he had made an inadvisable advance and that it was impossible to send up succour to him where he was; so that if he wanted to entrench on the top he must do so by his unaided efforts, or else he must inform the Emperor and abandon the position. The day was wasted in this exchange of messages.

v5.c77.s6.9

Murad refused to come down and persisted in his demands, but the other two generals taunted him, saying "Do you expect us to act as your subordinates and do you wish to nullify all the exertions of Tarbiyat Khan and other nobles up to this time?" Then Ruhullah (the imperial Paymaster) reported to Aurangzib that the hill-top was untenable, and a night attack on it by the enemy might lead to a disaster. So, the Emperor censured Murad for having made a rash advance, whose only result was disgrace to his arms. The courtiers took up the cue, and were now loud in their blame of Murad, whom they had been extolling above all other generals only a few hours before, when his flag was first hoisted on the hillock!

v5.c77.s6.10

Next day Murad was received in audience and highly praised. Tarbiyat Khan was urged to deliver an assault, but he ironically replied, "The preparations for an assault are complete. Please order Md. Murad, who has done such heroic deeds, to support us on the day of storming." [K. K. 485-489.] With this spirit animating Aurangzib's generals, it was only natural that all his efforts came to nothing. A few attempts at escalade were made, but failed with loss, and the siege dragged on for two months, without success seeming to come any nearer.

§ 10. Panhala gained by bribery.

v5.c77.s7.1

The terrible loss caused by the exploded mine at Satara and in the failure of the assault on that fort, had effectually damped the spirit of the Mughal army. Two mines had been completed at Panhala, but the generals shrank from firing them, as no soldier could be depended upon to rush to the breach and face the enemy's fire or even show himself in the open within range of the fort guns. So, the Emperor, after this heavy loss of money time and labour in mining and bombardment, was at last driven to bribery for gaining the fort before the rains began. Through Tarbiyat Khan secret negotiations were opened, a large bribe was paid to Trimbak, the qiladar, and he delivered the two forts on 28th May, 1701, the garrison being allowed to depart with their lives and property. Sir William Norris, the English ambassador, witnessed the scene.

v5.c77.s7.2

When its defeated commandant Trimbakji went to the royal minister Ramchandra in Vishalgarh, the latter charged him with treachery, saying "You turned faithless to your master's salt and gave the fort up to the Mughals." Trimbak retorted, "My artillery munitions ran short, and yet you did not care to inquire about my state. I had therefore to give up the fort." For this he was put in prison. [Akhbarat, 7th June.]

v5.c77.s7.3

§ 11. Maratha activities during the siege of Panhala.

v5.c77.s7.4

We shall now describe the efforts of the Marathas to relieve the siege of Panhala. On 23rd January, Dhana Jadav appeared two miles from the imperial camp, and a fierce battle raged all the day, the entire imperial army being engaged. There were heavy losses, and the Mughals had to entrench their position at night. Two days later, on hearing that Nusrat Jang was coming up from Panhala, Dhana Jadav fell back four miles; Hamid-ud-din followed him, but the Marathas fought while fleeing, inflicting a heavy slaughter and drawing this Mughal force 22 miles away from its camp. Next day there was another pitched battle towards Raibagh (in the east), and yet another battle on the day following. Then Dhana rapidly retreated and the Mughal general returned to the Emperor's side (29th January). [Akhbarat and Dil. 134b.]

v5.c77.s7.5

The pursuit of Dhana was continued by Nusrat Jang, who drove him back after an attack on him 12 miles beyond Chikodi (40 m. s. e. of Panhala), and then fell back on Panhala. Dhana then resumed his activity and sent Krishna Malhar with 10,000 horsemen to raid the highway near Panhala,—evidently to cut off the grain supply and communications of the besiegers (4th Feb.) Dhana himself tried to intercept some Mughal heavy guns which had reached Kararabad, while Krishna Malhar attacked the outpost of Khatau, and Ramchandra and Dado Malhar descended into Konkan to fight Siddi Yaqut of Danda-Rajpuri (4th Feb.) A little later, while Ramchandra was trying to convey provisions under escort of 2,000 foot-musketeers to beleaguered Panhala, Nusrat Jang came upon him, slew many of his men and looted most of the provisions. Ramchandra, however, succeeded in entering the fort, (24th Feb.)* Before the fall of Panhala, the elusive Dhana Jadav was roving here and there, vainly pursued by Nusrat Jang, who could not keep pace with him and constantly lost troopers and horses through forced marches. On 20th April Raṇuji was reported as coming towards the fort at the head of 20,000 men, and Baharji as having been captured by the imperialists. Dhana now halted for some time in Singhgarh, with only 400 men, while the main division of his army (15,000 strong) was sent under Dado Malhar to raid Mughal territory.

v5.c77.s7.6

∗ Nusrat Jang also rescued and safely escorted to the siege camp a party of *banjaras* whom Ramchandra had invested in Kolhapur, 10 miles from Panhala. [Dil. 135a.]

v5.c77.s7.7

The day after the fall of Panhala, Aurangzib began his return from it (29th May, 1701), wishing to encamp in the safer and more fertile region of Khatau (25 miles east of Satara and on the left bank of the Yerla river). Quick as the departure was, it had not been made soon enough. A cyclone passed over the camp "blowing away tents and sheds like paper. Kings and beggars had to sit down in the sun. Veiled ladies became exposed to the public gaze." [K. K. 490 ; Akh. has 17 May 1703.]

v5.c77.s7.8

Fathullah Khan, highly promoted and created a Bahadur, was sent ahead to take Wardhangarh (8 m. n. w. of Khatau) and three other forts in the neighbourhood. Wardhan was vacated by the enemy on 6th June; it was renamed Sadiq-garh after Fathullah's original name of Md. Sadiq. The Khan Bahadur next took Nandgir (6th July), Chandan, and Wandan (6th Oct.).

v5.c77.s7.9

The wazir Asad Khan was recalled to the Emperor's side, arriving there on 28th August, while Firuz Jang, who had been recalled from Berar, took his place as defender of the Base Camp at Islampuri.

§ 12. March to Khelna.

v5.c77.s8.1

When the campaigning season reopened in October 1701, the Emperor set out for the conquest of Khelna (or Vishalgarh). This fort stands thirty miles west of Panhala, on the crest of the Sahyadri hill, 3,350 feet above the sea and overlooking the Konkan plain lying on its west. The district is wet and cool, and the hills were thickly covered with trees and dense underwood in the 17th century.* Even now, though most of the timber has disappeared, there are still fine groves and stretches of hill-side closely covered with brushwood. The scenery is wild and picturesque. The fort stands on an isolated spur jutting into Konkan and is joined to the Sahyadri range by a narrow neck of land. The easiest means of reaching it is by the Amba pass, five miles north of it, and some 35 miles n. w. of Kolhapur. [Bombay Gaz. xxiv. 2—5.]

v5.c77.s8.2

The road to Khelna passes through Malkapur, fifteen miles north-west of Panhala. Eight miles further on begins the head of the Amba pass. These eight miles leading to the defile were very difficult ground. There was in that age no road here for wheeled traffic and the ups and downs were so sharp and the path so narrow that even horses could not use it with ease or safety.

v5.c77.s8.3

∗ The *Masir-i-Alamgiri* (458) writes, "The hills and soil of this tract are wonderful: there is no trace of hill or land, you only see herbs and flowers...There is not a tree that does not cause some gain [to man.] It has no flower that does not charm the brain with its fragrance. Every particle of this wide plain can supply the revenue of kingdoms from its fruits and aromatic roots...It was a frontier fort,...and the vast provinces of Konkan Upland and Lowland were annexed to the empire through its conquest." Khafi Khan, as usual, gives a mere paraphrase of the *Masir*.

v5.c77.s8.4

Leaving Wardhangarh (8 m. n. w. of Khatau) on 7th Nov. 1701, the Emperor arrived near Malkapur* in 12 marches. Here he halted for a week, while pioneers were set to make a road ahead. Bidar Bakht, who had cantoned for the rainy season in the Gokak-Hukri region (Belgaon district, in the south-east), here joined the Emperor, after taking some Maratha forts and burning some enemy villages on the way. On 6th December [23rd ?] the Emperor encamped on a high and broad open space on the side of the Sahyadri, seven miles north of Khelna.

v5.c77.s8.5

But the Amba pass itself had yet to be made fit for the passage of an army. This was a formidable task. "In all the paths of this hilly region there are impregnable forests and dense thorny jungles through which the sun cannot peep. Lofty and stout trees abound on all sides. The branches were so intertwined that even an ant could hardly pass through them. The track was difficult even for footmen. The defiles and pits were deep, the rocks firmly rooted in the soil." [M. A. 448-449.]

v5.c77.s8.6

But Fathullah Khan after one week's incessant toil with an army of pioneers and stone-cutters, made a broad level road through the pass. Then Asad Khan was detached on 26th December to begin the siege. His vanguard under Fathullah and Hamid-ud-din forced the defile before sunrise. A hillock overlooking Khelna had been fortified by the enemy and was held in force. Fathullah charged up its side and drove the defenders away from the top. In their attempt to escape to Khelna through the valley on the left, these Marathas fell into a Mughal ambuscade planted there and were forced by its matchlock fire to run into the woods, where most of them were captured and put to death by being flung into the chasms with stones tied to their waists. Next day the Mughals captured another hillock from which arrows could be shot into Khelna. Guns were mounted here and began to set fire to the houses of the garrison. A covered lane was also begun.

v5.c77.s8.7

∗ On 15 Dec., according to *Akhbarat*.

v5.c77.s8.8

On 16th January 1702, the Emperor's tent was pitched a mile from Khelna. His followers suffered terrible hardship and loss in crossing the pass and bringing his camp and equipage to the foot of the fort.

§ 13. Siege of Khelna, 1702.

v5.c77.s9.1

Bidar Bakht was posted to guard the environs of Panhala and keep the road to Khelna open, while Md. Amin Khan descended into the lowlands of Konkan and ravaged the country up to the Konkani gate on the further (or western) side of Khelna, trying to close the enemy's grain supply to the fort through that side. The head of the Amba pass was held by Hamid-ud-din.

v5.c77.s9.2

The siege dragged on for five months (January-June 1702). During this year Nusrat Jang with his mobile division marched in pursuit of the Maratha field forces* nearly 6,000 miles and fought 19 great battles with them, besides numberless skirmishes. The details of his doings fill ten pages in the memoirs of his eulogist, Bhimsen. [Dil. 129a—138b, 141a.] It will be enough to say here that he passed fighting and chasing all the time, by way of Parenda, Charthanah, the lake of Lonar (in pargana Mehkar, Berar), to 20 miles from Elichpur, Nander, Maloni, Kaulas (in Haidarabad territory), Bidar, Maloni again, Mudgal (on the Bānganga), Maluni and Nander† again. No wonder that Bhimsen, a sharer in these campaigns should write of the result as, "This year much forced marching was done. All the troops became worn out and distracted in mind." And again, "The enemy were kept in rapid movement for eight successive months......The horses of the imperialists were so worn out as to be unable to walk, and many of our troopers had to march on foot....The elephants became lame and weak...I too lost my horses and camels." [Dil. 135b, 132b.]

v5.c77.s9.3

∗ The Marathas in Khandesh and Berar mustered nearly 60,000 men in concert with the local zamindars. Nusrat Jang's strength at one time sank to 2,500 only [Dil. 137 a.] The imperial subahdar of Berar at first durst not leave his capital Elichpur for joining Nusrat Jang, lest his small force should be cut off by the enemy in the open.

v5.c77.s9.4

† Parenda, 2 m. e. of the Sina, (18·15 N. 75·31 E.) Charthanah, 45 m.e. of Jalna, and 25 m.s. of Lake Lonar, (20 N. 76·33 E.), which is 12 m. s. e. of Malkapur in Berar. Nander, on the Godavari, 80 m. s. e. of Lonar. Maloni is either Billoli, 35 m.s.e. of Nander and 30 m.n. of Kaulas, or Banouli, 11 m.s.e. of Mudhol. Mudgal is said to be a dependency of Nander and situated on the Bānganga. There

v5.c77.s9.5

§ 14. *Fathullah's heroic efforts : fall of Khelna.*

v5.c77.s9.6

Meantime, the siege of Khelna went on. Fathullah advanced his covered lane to the ditch in front of the fausse braye (*rauni*) of the fort, in the face of a terrible fire from the walls which did heavy loss to the sappers and soldiers working there. "He spent *mohars* like cowries, and worked day and night with pickaxe and hammer in his hand, like one of the labourers," [K. K. 496.]

v5.c77.s9.7

The enemy in the *rauni* demolished the first ladders that Fathullah had planted in front of the end of his covered lane, reaching up to the height of the level ground below the fort-gate. But the Khan made more ladders, and by driving rafters (*dhab*) into the hard rock where the ladders ended, he reached the waist of the tower, but could

v5.c77.s9.8

is a smaller Mudgir 11 m.e. of Nander (on the Sitaba) and a much larger Mudhol, 40 m.e. of Nander but on a river unnamed in map. *Kaulas* is 30 m.n. of Bidar, and 65 m.s. of Nander. [Atlas, Sh. 56.]

v5.c77.s9.9

advance no further. The Mughal artillery beat in vain against the solid rock of the walls of Khelna; only a few stones were loosened from the tower, and success seemed as far off as ever.

v5.c77.s9.10

On the other hand, the catapults of the garrison showered huge stones ("100 to 200 maunds in weight"!) upon the advancing siege-works. They also raided the trenches at night. One day Fathullah himself was struck on the head by the flying splinters of a plank of the covering of the lane, smashed by a Maratha stone, and so severely injured that he could not leave his bed for a month afterwards.

v5.c77.s9.11

In fact, Fathullah was the hero of this siege. "He was of the same age as Aurangzib and a Turani (Central Asian) by race like him. Therefore, the Khan was fearless in speaking to the Emperor. When he was recovering from these injuries, a eunuch was sent by the Emperor to reprimand him for the folly of exposing himself to danger so recklessly. The grey-haired veteran replied, 'Tell His Majesty that when a wise man reaches the age of 80 or 90, his intellect suffers decay, his five senses do not remain unimpaired. I am a soldier, and therefore a hundred stages behind the prudent man, being as thoughtless now as on the day of my birth'! [K. K. 498.]

v5.c77.s9.12

But all his valiant exertions were thrown away against that impregnable rock. No better success was achieved at the Konkani (or western) gate of the fort. Here Muhammad Amin Khan had stormed the fortified hillock opposite this gate and commanding its *rauni* (4th March.) Bidar Bakht, who replaced the Khan, delivered an assault led by Jai Singh, the young Rajah of Amber, on 27th April, and captured the *rauni*, in spite of heavy losses. The next step was to drag big guns up to the position and batter down the Konkani gate with them.

v5.c77.s9.13

But the terrible monsoon of the Bombay Coast now burst on the heads of the devoted Mughal army. The rain fell incessantly for weeks on end. There was a race among the nobles for the capture of the fort by bribery, every one of them sending a private message to the qiladar Parashuram,* offering him a large sum of money if the key was surrendered through his hands, so that in the official history he might be described as its captor! [K. K. ii. 500.] Bidar Bakht seems to have bid the highest. On 4th June the Maratha commandant planted the prince's banner on the ramparts, and in the night of the 7th the garrison evacuated the fort. By the Emperor's command, none hindered them. [M. A.

v5.c77.s9.14

∗ On 9 March 1702 [copyist of *Akhbarat* wrongly writes 20 Shaban year 45=19 March 1701], we have this entry in the Court news-letter,—"Spies report that Parashuram, the head assistant (*peshdast*) of Ramchandra, is in Khelna and wished to cede the fort to the Emperor. Hearing of it, Trimbak Inglé [Dinglé] and other officers of the enemy have arrested and imprisoned him."

v5.c77.s9.15

457.] The Mughals lost at this siege six thousand mansabdars, according to Manucci, [iii. 419.]

§ 15. Sufferings of Mughal army during return from Khelna, 1702.

v5.c77.s10.1

In fear of the malarious climate of Konkan during the monsoons, the Emperor beat a hasty retreat from its neighbourhood, on 10th June, only three days after the fall of the fort. But the rain had already begun with tropical fury and the Mughal army underwent terrible hardships in crossing the dreadful Amba pass again in this weather. "The camels refused to set foot on this path. The elephants, in a dazed condition, tried to carry the loads, but sank into the mud like donkeys. The only goods carried were on the heads of porters." [M. A. 463 ; Dil. 142b.] A sudden rise of a nala on the way, "running like a race-horse," cut the imperial army into two, and many were drowned. Nalas in a similar condition intersected the path of retreat at three places. Grain sold at one Rupee a seer. "Fodder and firewood appeared in the isolated camp only by mistake." Many men also perished of cold amidst the incessant rain, from having no tent or change of clothing left to them. [M. A. 464-466 ; K. K. 503-505.] Even the princes and nobles could not always get tents to shelter their heads in. At some stages only a small canvas cover was all that could be pitched for the Emperor himself.

v5.c77.s10.2

One day the prime minister, after crossing a nala, could not find a single dry spot on which to pitch a tent for himself. He set up a small square canopy (raoti) ; but at night it rained heavily and the canopy twice came down on the wazir's head ; and for the rest of the night his servants stood holding the canvas sheet up by the corner-ropes and thus saved him from being smothered to death. It was impossible to cook anything. "The condition of poorer men can be imagined from this," as Khafi Khan says, (ii. 505.)

v5.c77.s10.3

In this condition, after covering 30 miles in 38 days, the miserable army arrived near Panhala (17 July 1702.)* Then the sun reappeared, after having been hidden by the clouds for 3½ months, as also had been the Moon. The remnant of the people revived. Food and porters began to come from all sides.

v5.c77.s10.4

After a halt of five days here, the march was resumed on 23rd July, and Vadgaon (13 miles east of Panhala) was reached on the 30th. Here a month's halt was made, while a suitable camping ground was being searched for. It was decided to cross the Krishna near Miraj (40 m. e. of Panhala.) The river was in high flood. The incessant rain had turned the roads into quagmires. The 18 miles leading to the river's bank took 16 days to traverse, and many men and beasts sank down in the mud before reaching it. The Krishna was crossed in eight days (19-26 September.) Then, by way of Miraj, Daflapur, Bhalavani, Akluj, and Indapur, the army reached Bahadurgarh or Pedgaon on the northern bank of the Bhima, on 13th November.

v5.c77.s10.5

∗ The above account of the return journey from Khelna is based upon the Akhbarat, year 46. M.A.'s dates are incorrect and self-inconsistent. Aurangzib's itinerary was the following :—Khelna (departure 10 June)—Ambaghat (5 days' halt)—Malkapur (20 June)—two nalas—near Panhala (17 July, 5 days' halt)—Bānsgāon—Vathar—Vadgaon (30 July)—...—Krishna crossed near Miraj—Idgah of Miraj (25 Sep.)—Malgaon—Dhulgaon—Daflapur (5 Oct.)—Pratap-pur—Jujharpur—Najra (on the Man)—Yaqutpur—Vaki—Bhalavani—Velapur—Akluj (24 Oct., three days' halt)—Baura—Babulgaon—Indapur—Kalthan—Warkuti—Palasdev (on the Bhima)—Jiti—Pedgaon (13 Nov.) [Akh. year 46.]

v5.c77.s10.6

§ 16. Siege of Kondana (Singhgarh) 1703.

v5.c77.s10.7

But even here there was no rest for Aurangzib's army. After a stay of only 18 days, he set out on 2nd December to capture Kondana (Singhgarh), which was reached on the 27th [M. A. 469.] The imperial family, offices, and heavy baggage were removed from the Base Camp at Islampuri to Bahadurgarh, and the former post was made Nusrat Jang's cantonment. Bidar Bakht was sent to Aurangabad as viceroy (arrived 15 Nov.) and later (Feb. 1703) given the subahdari of Khandesh in addition, [M. A. 461, 471, 470], the last-named province being governed by his deputy.

v5.c77.s10.8

The Mughals began the siege of Kondana in their usual manner with entrenching and cannonade from a hillock opposite the tower of the fort. They lost many men. But there was no life in the work of the besiegers, and success seemed as remote as ever. Three months were wasted in this way. The rainy season was now approaching. So, the Emperor's servants secured the fort on 8th April 1703, by heavily bribing the qiladar.* [K. K. 510, Dil. 145a.]

v5.c77.s10.9

From Kondana the army marched back to Puna in a week (1 May), in the neighbourhood of which it spent nearly seven months, before setting out against Rajgarh and Torna.

v5.c77.s10.10

The excessive rainfall of 1702 had been followed by a drought in 1703-4, and there was famine throughout Maharashtra, with its natural companion, pestilence. Large numbers of the poorer classes perished,—two millions, according to Manucci [iv. 96.] But nothing could bend Aurangzib's obstinacy. On 10th November he issued for fresh conquests [M. A. 477.]

v5.c77.s10.11

∗ This act of bribery is cleverly hinted at in the official history, which says, "Kondana was newly named Bakhshenda-Bakhsh, or the Giver's gift. Truly, it is so strong a fort that nothing save the gift of God could have led to its capture." [M. A. 474.] The qiladar had died during the siege [Akh. 10 March 1703], and the fort was surrendered by his subordinates.

v5.c77.s10.12

§ 17. Capture of Rajgarh and Torna, 1704.

v5.c77.s10.13

From the neighbourhood of Puna, the Mughal army reached Rajgarh in 18 days, and began its siege on 2nd December, 1703. The entire hill, 24 miles in circuit, is really one stronghold. To borrow the hyperbole of the Persian chronicler, "Imagination cannot estimate its height. The wind alone can cross its thorny jungles and spectre-haunted chasms." [M. A. 478.] So vast a position could neither be invested, nor its food supply from outside stopped. The Mughals bombarded it for two months, and then captured the first gate by assault on 6th Feb. 1704. The garrison under their chiefs Firangji and Hamanji retired to the inner citadel, and kept up the resistance for ten days more, during which the Mughal troops in their unsheltered newly-won position suffered heavy losses from the enemy's fire. At last the qiladar made terms, hoisted the imperial flag on his tower, and fled away at night (16 Feb.) [M. A. 484-485, K. K. 513.]

v5.c77.s10.14

Extreme scarcity had been raging in the Mughal camp all this time; even grass sold at two seers for a Rupee. A desolating Maratha raid into Berar and Malwa had been repulsed with much difficulty by Firuz Jang.

v5.c77.s10.15

But Aurangzib blindly persisted in following his own plans. He next laid siege to Torna, eight miles from Rajgarh, on 23rd February. In the night of 10th March (which was the Emperor's 89th lunar birthday), Amanullah Khan with only 23 Mavle infantry silently scaled the fort-wall by means of rope-ladders, blew his trumpets, and charged the enemy. Other Mughal generals, drawn by the noise, followed him. Those of the garrison who resisted were put to the sword, the rest fled to the citadel and cried for mercy. They were permitted to go away without their arms. This was the only Maratha fort that Aurangzib captured by force without resort to bribery. No wonder then that it was named by the pious Emperor as *Fatuh-ul-Ghaib* or ‘Victory from the Invisible.’ [M. A. 487, K. K. 521-523.]

v5.c77.s10.16

From Torna the imperial camp set out on its return (on 15th March) and after arriving at Khed (7 miles north of Chakan, and 25 m. n. of Puna,— on the left bank of the Bhima) encamped there for six months, from 17 April to 21 October, 1704. From this place the Emperor started on 22nd October for Wagingera, the Berad capital, some 250 miles south-eastwards, which was reached after a slow march of three and a half months, on 8th February 1705, and immediately besieged. This was the last campaign of Aurangzib.