Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c10.s7.3

v1.c10.s7.3

Abdāli also entrenched his advanced camp, five miles north-west of Sarhind and about the same distance in front of the imperial camp at Mānupur. His roving bands had daily skirmishes with the patrols round the Delhi force. He had brought with himself only seven small portable pieces (*top-i-jilau*) and therefore could not reply to the heavier and more numerous artillery of the imperialists, nor venture near the Mughal trenches within the range of these guns. But the imperial host was thrown entirely on the defensive; its unwieldy size made it vulnerable at many points and its surrender through starvation was only a question of time. The imbecile wazir rejected the idea of seeking a decision by fight before his food supply gave out, as "his plan was to avoid an action, but to cut off the enemy's food supply by inciting the neighbouring zamindars to attack his foraging parties and in the end to overpower him with artillery fire." (Anandram, 345.) From 4th to 11th March this fruitless cannonade continued. But at last the wazir's hands were forced when he saw the price he must pay for the policy of inaction which left all the initiative to the enemy. The Abdali had brought a large gun from Lahor and on the 9th mounted it on a hillock overlooking the wazir's camp; its fire began to kill his men and camels, and so he decided to risk a pitched battle two days later as preferable to such helpless slaughter.