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Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c11: Chapter VI

Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c11

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Contents

Chapter VI

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MALWA AND RAJPUTANA, DOWN TO 1741.

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§ 1. Condition of the Rajputs during the decline of the imperial power.

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With the death of Rāj Singh of Mewār (1680), the last hero of the Sisodia clan passed away. The Mahārānā, who had ever since the coming of the Mughals filled the highest place in the public eye among the Hindu chiefs of India, now fell back into complete isolation and obscurity. His unrivalled social status and the mythical glamour of his blood still remained; but in the political field, from the beginning of the 18th century onwards, the primacy among the Rājputs was contested between the Kachhwāh and the Rāthor. The once third-rate and obscure house of Amber had risen in the course of a century and a half to the front rank by the most brilliant and valued service to the empire in far apart fields, thanks to the signal capacity for war and diplomacy displayed by four generations of its chieftains,—Bhagwān Dās and Mān Singh under Akbar, Mirzā Rājah Jai Singh under Shāh Jahān and Aurangzib, and Sawāi Jai Singh under the later Mughals.

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The Kachhwāh dynasty ended by challenging the old hereditary pre-eminence of the Rāthors in the Mughal Court, which the long minority and 30 years' war in Mārwār after Jaswant's death had naturally eclipsed. This jealous rivalry between Jaipur and Jodhpur is the dominating factor of Rājput society* even under British rule.

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The disorder and destruction following from this contest for primacy were immensely multiplied by the entrance of another factor into Rājput politics in the middle 18th century, which ended only with the total ruin and humiliation of this noble race. The imperial Government of Delhi had held together and protected all the feudatory States of India. But when the Emperor became a lifeless shadow confined within the harem, when the wazir's sole pursuit was pleasure varied only by contests with his Court rivals, this unifying bond and common controlling authority was dissolved. No superior power was left to enforce lawful rights and prevent ambitious conflicts between one vassal State and another, one prince and another of the same royal house. All the pent up personal ambitions and inter-State rivalries,—which the strong hand of the paramount Power at Delhi, from Akbar to Bahādur Shāh, had repressed for a century and a half,—now burst forth without fear or check. And Rājputāna became a zoological garden with the barriers of the cages thrown down and the keepers removed. The fiercest animal passions raged throughout the land, redeemed only now and then by individual instances of devotion and chivalry which had not yet totally disappeared from the human bosom.

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∗ In Oct. 1923, when I visited Jaipur to inspect its historical records at the invitation of the Government, the first question that a very intelligent hereditary noble of the State put to me was, "You have studied the history of India much; tell me whether you consider the Kachhwāhs greater than the Rāthors or the reverse"! This is the state of public feeling in that country even in the twentieth century.

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There was no crime which a Rājput would not commit for the sake of land. Father killed son and son murdered father. Women of the noblest rank gave poison to their trusting kinsmen. Kings took the lives of loyal ministers. None, not even the highest born descendant of the god Rāma, shrank from buying the aid of an alien plunderer to decide his domestic contests.

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War is the only profession for which the Rājput gentleman and noble is fitted by character, tradition and training; and land is the only possession that can give him a life of honour and comfort. But when the Mughal empire reached its fullest expansion and the later Emperors became too timid to embark on new wars and too pleasure-loving to maintain large armies for defence, the Rajput manhood became doomed to unemployment idleness and vice. No honourable and lucrative career abroad was left open to them. Confined within the narrow limits of their sterile homes, they turned their swords against one another. Civil war raged in every family, which quickly involved the neighbouring States as the allies of one or other of the rivals. Every prince's land-hunger at the expense of his neighbours now burst forth, heedless of consequences. The Marātha and the Pindhāri ravaged the land. This sickening tale continued for over eighty years, and the sacrifice of the Indian Iphigenia, Krishna Kumāri, was only one among the many tragedies that blackened Rajput history during this truly dark age. Disorder, public plunder, economic ruin, and moral degradation were the chronic condition of Rājasthān from the declining years of Muhammad Shāh to the day when British suzerainty was accepted by the land and British peace came at last to heal the wounds of the long suffering race. War, domestic and foreign, ceased, and since then the martial manhood of Rājputāna has sunk into the placid sleep of opium, for

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Unknown to them when sensual pleasures cloy,
To fill the languid pause with finer joy.

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Aurangzib's policy and measures had totally alienated the Rājput race, with the exception of a small number of the Hādā and other minor clansmen, and driven them outside the service and civilising influence of the Delhi Government. The result, as we all know, was harmful to the empire; but it was even more ruinous to the Rājputs themselves. The Rājputs, who had filled Indian history during the preceding three centuries, began in the 18th century to find themselves a played out race, falling steadily to the background in Indian life. Self-centred and doomed to inertia within their own out-of-the-way corner of India, they were year by year outstripped by the moving races of our country.

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The Rājput racial character and habits made them quite unsuitable material for the new type of warfare and the long campaigns which began to prevail in the middle of the 18th century. The use of longer-ranged and more rapidly firing muskets, the elaborate organisation and diversified branches of armies following European lines introduced a radical change to which the Rājputs were incapable of adjusting themselves. The new warfare was incompatible with the system of jealous minutely subdivided clans under which they had been brought up. Moreover, war had now become immensely more costly. The day was past when all fighting could be done by yeomenretainers who left their villages with horse and spear, followed their lord in his battles, and returned to their fields after a brief season's campaign. The poverty of the Rājput States, their sterile soil, sparse immobile population, lack of trade, all kept the resources of their chiefs down to a low primitive standard of scantiness and simplicity. These were quite inadequate for the universal equipment with muskets, the extended use of artillery, the profuse expenditure of munitions both in the field and in the previous training, and the feeding of armies for long campaigns outside the homeland, which the wars of the middle 18th century demanded. The lords of Rājasthān found themselves unable to stand against foes from outside, and could vent their energies in domestic brawls only.

§ 2. The chief centres of dispute in Rājputāna under Muhammad Shah

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The three storm-centres in Rājputāna in the second quarter of the 18th century were Bundi, Jaipur, and Mārwār. In the Hādā country there had recently sprung up a rivalry for the headship of that clan between the old senior branch with its seat at Bundi and the junior branch enjoying the appanage of Kotā, which the Emperor Jahāngir had in 1624 made independent of the former by declaring its chief a feudatory holding direct of the Crown. A quarrel was precipitated in 1707 by the then Kotā chief claiming the headship the entire Hādā clan. Their rivalry was encouraged by Aurangzib’s sons at that time and later by the Sayyid brothers and some other Delhi nobles to serve their own ends. But this quarrel was submerged by a greater threat to the honour of the clan when Sawāi Jai Singh embarked upon a campaign of ambition to make Bundi a vassal of Jaipur by ousting its legitimate ruler Budh Singh and giving his throne to Dalil Singh (a laird of the house of Karwar) in 1729. The various attempts of the dispossessed Budh Singh and his gallant son Ummed Singh to recover their own constitute the history of that part of Rājputāna during the next 19 years and ended in the complete triumph of Ummed Singh.

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In Jaipur the struggle raged between Ishwari Singh (reign 1743—1750) and his younger brother Mādho Singh, the latter claiming to set aside the eldest-born of his father on the ground of his own mother having been the Mahārāna’s daughter, to whose offspring Jai Singh had promised the succession at the time of marrying her. Ishwari Singh held his own during his life time by heavy concessions to his brother, and it was only after his death without issue that the throne passed to Mādho Singh.

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In Mārwār the rivals were Rām Singh, the successor of Mahārājah Abhay Singh, and his paternal uncle Bakht Singh, the chief of Nāgor. The contest began in 1749, soon after the death of Abhay Singh, and though Bakht Singh gained the throne in 1751 and bequeathed it to his own progeny, the land knew no peace till the death of the dispossessed Rām Singh (1773).

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Each of these three dynastic quarrels drew into its vortex the neighbours of the two main contestants, and in time all three became merged into one, with a clear-cut array of allies facing opponents similarly confederated. The Marāthas were called in to decide the issue, and that by every party and almost in every year. In the end the three claimants mentioned above gained their ancestral thrones, but only after ruining and weakening their kingdoms and leaving the Marāthas in supreme command over a divided impotent and impoverished Rājputānā which lay helplessly subject to their annual exactions and ravage. Such is the mournful story of Rājasthān upon which we shall now enter.

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§ 3. *Character of the leading Rajput princes.*

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A study of the characters of the chief actors in this tragic drama will help us to understand the course of events better. The two outstanding personages of this period, in energy persistence and courage, were Bakht Singh Rāthor and Ummed Singh Hādā. The other Rājahs and princes of the time fell below the average of human character and intellect. Jai Singh II had begun his reign as a lad of 18 (in 1699) with the brightest of promises and had won honours under the very eyes of Aurangzib, as a lieutenant of Prince Bidār Bakht, during the strenuous warfare in the Marātha hills. Later, he rose to command supreme influence for a Hindu at the imperial Court and to hold the government of important provinces like Agra and Mālwa. His intellect was exceptionally keen and versatile for a Rājput. But his later record was barren of glory or success, and he failed utterly when sent against the Marāthas, either through disloyal collusion or through equally disgraceful cowardice. Indeed, if the Emperor’s cause had been served with the courage enterprise and fidelity of his illustrious grand-father Mirzā Rājah Jai Singh, instead of Sawāi Jai Singh’s love of sensual ease, misappropriation of the imperial chest of military defence, and treacherous subserviency to the enemies of the country, the Marāthas would have been successfully kept out of Northern India, and Rājputāna would have been spared the horrors of Marātha domination. After failing to make a stand against the Marātha invaders in Mālwa, and inducing the Emperor to make a complete surrender to them (1736), Jai Singh returned to his own State and gave himself up to sexual excess. He had always been a deep drinker and now the habitual use of aphrodisiacs to stimulate his failing powers entirely ruined his health, till at last he died of a loathsome disease on 21st September, 1743. [*Vam. Bh.*, 3322.]

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The next king of Jaipur, Ishwari Singh (r. 1743-1750), lacked his father's courage and cleverness, though he inherited most of his vices. He was a weak-minded man, liable to sudden and capricious changes of opinion under the lead of rogues or fools. The exceptional capacity and devotion of several hereditary officers of his house often saved his troops in battles, where their chieftain's cowardice and incompetence would have ruined them, as he had covered them with shame and loss on the field of Mānupur (1748.)

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The ruler of Jodhpur, Mahārājah Rāj-Rājeshwar Abhay Singh, for such were his superlative titles, (r. 1724—1749), had been solicited by the Emperor to take up the *subahdāri* of Gujrāt (1729.) After a year spent at home in making preparations, he had reached Ahmadābād (October, 1730) and made his appointment good by defeating his refractory and dismissed predecessor Sarbuland Khān. The spoils of this campaign were reported in the pardonable hyperbole of his Court poets as "four *kror* of Rupees and 1,400 guns of all calibres, besides military stores of every description." His bardic flatterers sang, "Abhay Malla rules over the seventeen thousand towns of Gujrāt and nine thousand of Mārwār besides one thousand elsewhere. The princes of Idar, Bhuj, Pārkar, Sind, Sirohi, Jesalmir, Jhunjhuno, Dongarpur . . . . and Nāgor every morning bowed the head to Abhay Malla." Though his governorship of Gujrat had ended ingloriously in two years in his surrender of *chauth* to the Marāthas and his return home with failure, such eulogies would have turned a stronger head than his. He became insane with pride. "His ferocious courage was tempered only by excessive indolence . . . . and his love of ease and opium increased with years." (Tod, ii. Marwar, ch. 11.)

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His son and successor, Rām Singh (r. 1749—1751), "inherited the arrogance of his father with all the impetuosity of the Chauhāns" (of Sirohi, his mother's stock.) Utterly lacking in self-control, foresight and consideration of his own good, this youngman came to unbridled sovereign power at the age of nineteen, and very quickly alienated all his nobles and kinsfolk by the display of boundless pride, violence of temper and insolence of tongue.

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§ 4. First Marātha conquest of Malwā.

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The Marātha penetration of the province of Mālwa supplied the most convenient starting point for raids into Rājputānā. Indeed, the Rājput States, though under Hindu rulers, could not remain outside the sphere of Marātha aggression as, apart from their untapped wealth, their two greatest princes, Abhay Singh of Mārwār and Sawāi Jai Singh of Jaipur, were appointed by the Emperor governors of Gujrāt and Mālwa respectively and were bound in duty to oppose Marātha encroachments upon their charges.

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Girdhar Bahādur, who was *subahdār* of Mālwa from September 1722 to November 1728 (except for the two years, 1723—1725, when he had to make room for the Nizām’s nominee), was defeated and killed by Chimnāji, the younger brother of the Peshwā Bāji Rāo, near the fort of Māndu on 29th November 1728. His cousin Dayā Bahādur, who then took up the command of his forces, met with the same fate at the hands of the same general, close to the same place (Amjhera) about the 14th December following.[*] Girdhar Bahādur’s son Bhavānirām was next appointed by the Emperor as acting *subahdār* of Mālwa, and for two years (1729-30) battled manfully against increasing difficulties to hold his own. In January 1731, Muhammad Khān Bangash reached Ujjain as the new viceroy, but he could effect nothing with his own resources which the Emperor did not supplement. His stay in his new charge was short and he failed in his struggle with the Marāthas here as completely as he had failed in Bundelkhand in 1729. Next year he was replaced as governor by Sawāi Jai Singh,* who started from his capital on

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∗ When I edited William Irvine’s *Later Mughals* in 1920, I could give only my conjectures for the dates of the death of

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Girdhar Bahādur and Dayā Bahādur and the governorship of Bhavāni-rām (ii. 243-249), because the Persian authorities are silent on the point and I had before me only a rough translation of the Persian correspondence of Girdhar Bahādur’s sons, the *Ajāib-ul-āfāq*, no ms. of which is available in India, so that I could not utilise the dates (if any) given in the original. The Marātha letters printed by Parasnis contain gross errors of date. But the chronology and main features of the history of this period have been correctly established by the recent publication of the State-papers of the Peshwas, *S.P.D.*, xiii. and xxii.

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∗ *Farman* of appointment dated 28 Sep. 1732. *Vamsha Bhāskar*, p. 3133, states that Jai Singh being ordered by the Emperor to go to Mālwa started from Jaipur on 23rd Oct. 1729. But he was sent there this time not to act as governor but to drive the Marāthas out with his own forces. *Ibid*, p. 3212. Jai Singh’s more engrossing cares were the decoration of his new capital and the construction of four astronomical observatories. For the latter purpose he summoned the Jesuit Father Boudier from Bengal in 1733 and Fathers Antoine Gabelsperguer and Andre Strobl from Germany in 1736 to Jaipur, paying their

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20th October 1732 and reached Ujjain in December.

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But the Emperor's Mālwa viceroys, old and new, were equally unsuccessful against the Marāthas. Jai Singh received large sums (20 lakhs of Rupees) from his impoverished master on condition of raising an army and driving the Marāthas out of the province. But he only made a show of fighting and preferred the policy of buying them off for the time with a part of the money given him, pocketing the balance, and thereafter passing his days in his own kingdom regardless of the fate of the province entrusted to his care. [*Warid*, 115-116.]

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§ 5. *Jai Singh defeated by the Marathas in Malwa.*

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At the beginning of 1733, Malhar Rāo Holkar and Rānoji Sindhia, after finishing their work in Gujrāt by taking Champānir and provisioning Pāvāgarh, came on raid to Mālwa. Jai Singh was then at Māndesar. The Marātha generals, leaving their camp behind, advanced with a light force, hemmed the Rājah round and put his troops

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expenses. (Tieffenthaler, tr. by Bernoulli, i. 307.) *S.P.D.* xiii. 51. *Vam. Bh.* 3212.

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Order by Rajah Shāhu, 18 March 1730, "Jai S. has come to the Ujjain province. Chimnaji Udaji Pawar and Malhar Holkar are ordered to treat him with respect in view of the old hereditary friendship between the two royal families. Give him Māndu fort if he asks for it." [*Vad.* i. p. 95.]

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to great distress by cutting off their grain and water supply. Krishnāji Pawār and Udāji Pawār, out of jealousy for the Peshwā, had been tempted to join their forces with Jai Singh. But Holkar plundered a part of Udāji’s baggage, and mutual friends intervened, severely rebuked the Pawārs for their alliance with their nation’s enemy and induced them to withdraw from the Mughal side. Jai Singh had to sue for peace, offering six lakhs of Rupees to the Marāthas, but Holkar held out for more. While these negotiations were going on, the Rājput captains, emboldened by a rumour that the Emperor in person was marching from Delhi to Agra to support them, came forth to battle. The commander of Jai Singh’s rear-guard was slain. On Holkar’s side a hundred or two hundred horses and some fifteen high officers were killed, and he fell back about 30 miles, while Jai Singh advanced 16 miles. Then Holkar rapidly doubled back to Jai Singh’s position. The Rājput prince had no more stomach for fighting left; he made peace by promising to pay six lakhs in cash and to cede 28 parganahs in lieu of chauth. This happened at the end of February. (S. P. D., xiv., 2, xv. 6.)

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From April to December 1733, Bāji Rāo was engaged in the war with the Siddis of Janjirā and the main Marātha forces were concentrated there.

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Pilāji Jādav planned to march into Hindustān at the end of this year, and skirting Narwar on his right, enter Kotā and Bundi territory and levy contribution there for a month or so, finally returning by way of Orchhā and Datiā, where the Marāthas had already established their hold. But the plan was modified; he was at Nimār at the end of December and then went to Bundelkhand where Holkar and Sindhia too were assembled. He next marched from Datiā to Gwālior, but finding the whole country desolate and thankful to get only Rs. 50 from a village where he could, he fell back on Narwar, where we find him on 8th April 1734. Finally Pilāji returned to the Deccan marching with Chanderi on his left hand. The Bundi expedition was undertaken by Holkar and Sindhia. (S. P. D., xiv. 10, 11, 13.)

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Gujrāt and Mālwa were practically lost to the Empire, but hitherto no Marātha had entered Rājputāna. Now, however, the eternal domestic feuds of that unhappy land brought the Deccanis in, first as hired allies and finally as masters levying tribute and ravaging the country year after year. We shall here trace the steps that led up to this.

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§ 6. The dispute for the throne of Bundi.

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Sawāi Jai Singh, finding that his position and influence at the imperial Court were unrivalled by any other Hindu feudatory and daily witnessing the increasing weakness and incapacity of his suzerain, embarked on "a deeply cherished scheme" for imposing his supremacy over the minor Rājahs. He determined to seize upon all the districts on his frontiers within his grasp. (Tod, ii. Haravati, Ch. 3.) He occupied the fort of Bundi with his own troops during its ruler Budh Singh’s absence and secured from the Emperor an edict transferring that State to Dalil Singh (the second son of Sālim Singh Hādā of Karwar), on condition of his acknowledging the house of Jaipur as his overlord, (c. Sept. 1729.) Budh Singh survived his fall for ten years (dying on 26 April 1739), and though his excessive consumption of wine and opium, joined to the disappointments and hardships of his lot, soon deranged his never very sane mind, he for the rest of his life and his exceptionally gallant and able son Ummed Singh after him gave the usurper no rest till at last Ummed Singh entered the capital of his ancestors and was crowned king of Bundi (23rd October 1748); but his heritage continued even thereafter to be disturbed by internal enemies and fleeced by the Marāthas. [Vamsha Bh., 3542, 3285.]

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Jai Singh, the sole prop of the usurper of Bundi, having left his home for Mālwa at the end of 1729, Budh Singh advanced to recover his lost city. But Jaipur troops quickly arrived to the aid of Sālim, who was holding Bundi for his young son Dalil. This huge host scared away most of the supporters of Budh Singh, so that he counselled his followers not to fight. But some of his devoted tenants would not listen to him, they attacked the Jaipur force and were defeated, at Kusalath, 6th April 1730. (*Vamsha Bh.*, p. 3147.) Dalil Singh, thus freed from rivalry, was crowned on 19th May and married to a daughter of Jai Singh.

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§ 7. First Maratha invasion of Rajputana.

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The defeated Budh Singh took refuge in Udaipur and then at Begham, and sank deeper and deeper into wine and opium, finally turning mad. But he found an unexpected ally. Pratāp Singh Hādā, the eldest son of Sālim Singh, on seeing his younger brother Dalil raised to the throne of Bundi, came over to Budh Singh’s side out of wounded pride and fought against his own father and brother. He was now sent to the Deccan by Budh Singh’s queen with her money for hiring Marātha aid against Dalil Singh. The price was settled at six *lakhs* of Rupees. On 22nd April 1734, the day of a solar eclipse, Malhar Rāo Holkar and Rānoji Sindhia, guided by Pratāp Singh, attacked Bundi which was being held by Sālim Singh the regent. In the end the fort was captured and Sālim Singh was carried away as prisoner by the Marāthas. The queen of Budh Singh tied the rākhi thread round the wrist of Malhar, publicly declaring the goat-herd’s son the brother of a princess of the solar line that claimed descent from the god Rāmchandra. But as soon as Malhar had left, a Jaipur force, 20,000 strong, came and restored Dalil Singh at Bundi. [Vam. Bh., 3216-3220.]

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This first Marātha penetration into Rājputāna had opened the eyes of the more thoughtful among the princes to their perilous condition. The terror of it continued to be remembered for long afterwards.* In the second half of October 1734, Jai Singh called a conference of all the Rājahs of Rājasthān at Hurdā near Agaunch (a village in Mewār) to concert measures for keeping the Deccani spoliators out of their fatherland. That end could be reached only by a close co-operation with the imperial troops sent against the same enemies. But nothing came of the meeting. Indeed, the moral decay of the Mughal nobility made a vigorous and united policy of defence against the Marāthas impossible. [Vam. Bh. 3227.]

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∗ Tod. i. Mewar, Ch. 15.

§ 8. Imperial campaigns in Malwa and Rajputana, 1734-35, fail

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In October 1734, the imperial Court planned a grand campaign under its two highest officers, the *wazir* Qamruddin and the *bakhshi* Khān-i-Daurān, to expel the Marāthas from Mālwa and Rājputāna. Next month the *wazir* started from Delhi, at the head of 25,000 men, *via* Agra for Bundelkhand where Pilāji Jādav was roving. Two or three light engagements took place between them in February 1735, as the result of which Pilāji retreated to Sipri and Kulāras, while the *wazir* stayed at Narwar, 24 miles north of the enemy's position. After a few more skirmishes, Pilāji withdrew his baggage from Bundelkhand and set out for the Deccan by the Chānda and Deogarh route (April.) The *wazir* returned to Delhi, arriving there on 9th May, 1735. [S. P. D., xiv. 22, 21.]

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The campaign in the western theatre had been entrusted to Khān-i-Daurān. He set out from Delhi at the same time as the *wazir* and on the way to Ajmir was joined by Jai Singh of Jaipur, Abhay Singh of Jodhpur, and Rao Durjan Sāl of Kotā with their contingents. In this way his force became a vast host (whose number was swelled by rumour to two hundred thousand men) with artillery and munition carts "beyond count."

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Crossing the Mukundarā pass, the imperial army reached Rampurā territory, where Holkar and Sindhia were sighted (early in February.) Its unwieldy size, composite character and slack organisation foredoomed it to failure against the Marātha light horse led by born cavalry generals like Malhar and Rānoji. For eight days the Marāthas circled round Khān-i-Daurān, absolutely immobilising his army, cutting off its provisions and fodder, and capturing horses and camels from it. Then the Marāthas made a lightning raid. Leaving the *bakhshi* and his allies there, they crossed the Mukundarā pass, went to Bundi-Kotā and thence into the now defenceless Jaipur and Jodhpur territories, the imperialists painfully toiling up far behind them. Finding the field clear, Malhar raided many places in this region. The loot of the rich city of Sambhar, then under the Emperor's direct administration, on 28th February, yielded him a rich harvest. The *faujdār* Fakhru was robbed of everything he possessed (worth three *lakhs* of Rupees, besides 3 or 4 elephants) and let off with only the clothes he stood in. The *qāzi* of the city, after slaying his women in the Hindu manner of *jauhar*, fought the invaders with frenzy, and fell down wounded. Early in March, the position of the two sides was this: Khān-i-Daurān had taken post at Kotā, Jai Singh near his capital, and Malhar and Rānoji some 20 miles from the latter.—(Siyar, ii. 83, S. P. D., xiv. 23, 21, Rustam Ali in Elliot, viii. 51.)

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Thus, in both the theatres of war, the armies of the empire failed to achieve any decisive result and were, indeed, hard put to it to defend and feed their unwieldy numbers. The smaller Marātha forces had completely rendered them immobile and powerless. At last, the wazir offered a bribe of five lakhs to Pilāji for vacating Mālwa. In Rājputāna, Khān-i-Daurān, after wasting many weeks at Bundi in utter inaction, listened to Jai Singh’s advice and induced the Marāthas to retire beyond the Narmadā by promising them on behalf of the Emperor 22 lakhs as the chauth of Mālwa. This understanding was effected on 22nd March at a meeting between Khān-i-Daurān and the two Marātha generals through the mediation of Jai Singh,—the camps of Khān-i-Daurān and Jai Singh being then at Kotā and that of the Marāthas at Bundi.* (S. P. D.,

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∗ The later negotiations on this point will be described afterwards. (S.P.D. xiv. 31, 47.)

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In April 1735 Holkar and Sindhia invaded Mārwār, under orders of Bāji Rāo in order to punish Abhay Singh for his recent hostile action. Their orders were to spare the territories of Jaipur and Mewār with scrupulous care. Indeed, the ravaging of Abhay xiv. 27, 23; xxii. 284.) From this inglorious campaign the two heads of the Mughal army returned to Delhi at the end of April, 1735. The Marātha generals retired, Rānoji to Ujjain, Malhar to Kālābāgh, and Pilāji to Sironj (June.) (S. P. D., xiv. 29, 30.)

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§ 9. North-Indian pilgrimage of Peshwa's mother, 1735.

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In the meantime, this armed clash with the empire had come at an inopportune moment for the Peshwā. He had arranged for a complete North Indian pilgrimage for his mother Rādhā Bāi. She crossed the Tāpti at Burhānpur on 9th March 1734, in charge of the astrologer, Bābuji Nāyak Joshi, who had lived long in Benares and was familiar with North Indian shrines. Everywhere she was supplied with escort by the officers of the imperial Government and the local chiefs, while the Rājput Rājahs whose capitals she visited treated her with the high respect due to a noble Brāhman widow and the mother of an all-conquering son. They personally welcomed her, introduced her to their queens, and gave her rich presents. Travelling in this way, Rādhā Bāi

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Singh's kingdom would only please Jai Singh, as Bāji Rāo wrote to his master. (S.P.D., xiii. 49.) xiv. 14 probably belongs to the March of this year.

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visited Udaipur (6th May), Nāthdwārā, Jaipur (c. 16 July), Mathurā, Kurukshetra, Allahabad, Benāres and Gayā (November), then back again to Benāres, whence she turned to Bundelkhand in January 1736, and finally reached Punā on 2 May. (S. P. D., ix. 12, 13, 14, xiv. 21, 31, 39, 51, xxii. 330; Vamsha Bh., p. 3223.)

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§ 10. How Jai Singh promoted Maratha interests in Hindustan.

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When the vast armament and heavy expenditure of the imperial campaign in the first quarter of 1735 not only failed to crush the Marāthas but ended only with the promise to pay a huge contribution of 22 *lakhs*, the Emperor was naturally angry at this disgraceful result. His Court threw the blame for it on Jai Singh as the officer most directly concerned from his office of *subahdār* of Agra and Mālwa, and on Khān-i-Daurān, his ally and constant supporter at Court. Sādat Khān, the governor of Oudh, told the Emperor, "Jai Singh has ruined the entire empire by his secret support of the Marāthas. Give me only the governorship of Agra and Mālwa, I do not ask for any money aid. Jai Singh has asked for a *kror* of Rupees to equip his army for this war, but I have enough treasure of my own. The Nizām is my friend; he will hinder the Marāthas from crossing the Narmadā.” Sarbuland Khān equally denounced Jai Singh.

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The Emperor censured Jai Singh and Khān-i-Daurān for having bought the Marathas off. The Khān pleaded, “I only promised the Marātha generals who had entered Mālwa that they would be given as *jāgir* those parganahs of the province which were in the hands of the refractory Ruhelas and other brigands, but that they should never trouble any district under the Emperor’s (rule.) Bāji Rāo is obedient to your Majesty in every way. See how he has brought his family to Northern India on the plea of bathing in the Ganges. His mother also has come here on pilgrimage. . . . The Marāthas cannot be effectually subdued by fighting. But by friendly negotiations I shall induce Bāji Rāo, or at least his brother Chimnāji, to come and meet the Emperor. If his desires are granted, the imperial dominions will be freed from disturbance in future. If, on the other hand, Sādat Khān and the Nizām unite, they will set up another Emperor.” (*S. P. D.*, xiv. 47, 39, 31.)

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This talk of removing him from his two viceroyalties reached Jai Singh’s ears and positively antagonised him towards the Emperor. A selfish opportunist, he never had much loyalty to the throne. Calling the Marātha agent at his Court to a secret council, he told him, “I have hitherto guarded the prestige and interests of Bāji Rāo because I cannot trust the Turks (i.e., the Mughal royal house.) If the latter triumph over the Deccani forces, they will disregard us. Therefore, in every matter I shall follow the Peshwā’s behest.” He then (August 1735) sent a proposal to Bāji Rāo to come to him at the head of 5,000 horse, taking care not to plunder any place on the way. Jai Singh would pay the daily expenses of this force (Rs. 5,000) in addition to the *chauth* of Mālwa and the rent of Pilāji Jadav’s *jāgir*,—a total of 20 *lakhs* in cash. After the Peshwā’s arrival in Jaipur, Jai Singh would take counsel with him on the situation, secure assurances and oaths of safe-conduct from the Emperor through Khān-i-Daurān and then take the Peshwā to interview the Emperor. Otherwise, the Peshwā would return home from Jai Singh’s country. (*S. P. D.*, xiv. 47.)

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On the other side, at the end of September the Emperor formed his plan of operations against the Marāthas during the coming winter. He first reconciled Abhay Singh to the *wazir*. Agra, Mālwa, and even Gujrāt were proposed to be put in charge of the *wazir*, with orders not to molest Jai Singh’s territory if he loyally joined the Emperor’s cause with his own contingent; otherwise he was to be chastised as he deserved. It was decided that as soon as the river levels would fall sufficiently low in autumn the Emperor himself would march out of Delhi, while Jai Singh and Khān-i-Daurān would proceed to the Deccan via Jaipur, and the wazir with Abhay Singh and Sādat Khān would take the route via Gwālior. (S. P. D., xiv. 39.)

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§ 11. Bāji Rāo's visit to Rajputana, 1736.

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The agreement of 22nd March 1735 not having been ratified by the Emperor, Bāji Rāo planned a grand campaign in the north under his own command in the coming winter. He started from Punā on 9th October. The light forayers of Holkar in 1734 and 1735 had created terror throughout Rājputāna and given the people a close acquaintance with Marātha rapacity at their very doors. The failure of the entire force of the empire, led by the two highest officers of the State in the first quarter of 1735 had taught the Indian world to believe that the Marāthas were invincible and that no protection was to be looked for either from Delhi or from their own chiefs. The news of the coming of the dread master of the Marātha generals threw all Rājputāna into alarm and despair.* But Bāji Rāo's object was to visit the Rājput Courts personally and impose *chauth* by peaceful persuasion if possible.

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∗ Tod, i. Mewar, Ch. 15, Maharana's letter to Biharidas Pancholi.

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After taking a fort named Kukshi on the Gujrat frontier of Dhār, the Peshwā advanced north through Dongarpur and Loniwādā, arriving at the southern frontier of Mewār (c. 15 January, 1736.) The Mahārānā made every arrangement for giving him a worthy reception. The ceremonial of the meeting was thus settled : the Mahārānā was to make a bow (*praṇām*) to the Peshwā as a Brāhman, the holiest of all Hindu castes, while the latter as a priest was to bless the temporal ruler. Arrived near Udaipur, Bāji Rāo was lodged in the Champā-bāgh garden in the village of Ahar, and received a purse of Rs. 5,000, robes, horses and an elephant as welcome-gift to a guest. Next day a grand *darbār* was held by the Mahārānā, to which the Peshwā was called. Two cushions had been laid down side by side; the Mahārānā advanced to the door of the hall, welcomed the Peshwā, and led him to the cushion meant for him, but Bāji Rāo respectfully sat down below it on the floor, on a lower level than the Mahārānā. He waved the *chāmar* (fly whisker) over the Rājput’s head, who protested saying, “*You should be adored by us, being a Brāhman;*” but Bāji Rāo diplomatically replied, “I count you alone as king, for you have sixteen chiefs (*umārā*) under you."'*

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Then he proceeded to business. After long higgling, the Mahārānā had to sign a treaty promising to pay an annual tribute of Rs. 1,60,000, to cover which the Banhādā pargana was ceded to the Marāthas. This amount was divided into three equal shares, assigned to Holkar, Sindhia and Pawār. The management was at first entrusted to Holkar, but subsequently Sindhia acted as the receiver-general. This treaty remained in force for ten years, after which it became a nullity. (Tod, i. Mewar, Ch. 15.)

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There was a breach while these negotiations were pending. The Mahārānā invited Bāji Rāo to visit his Jagmandir palace in the midst of the Picholā lake. Bāji Rāo took this to be a trap for murdering him, flew into a rage, and could be pacified only by the Mewār ministers agreeing to pay a fine of seven *lakhs*! Three *lakhs* out of this sum was paid in cash to Bāji Rāo, under the name of "gift of gold to a Brāhman at a funeral", out of the property of the Mahārānā’s grandmother, who had recently died.

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∗ A friend advised Bāji Rāo not to be too grasping in his dealings with the Maharana, adding, "You need not go to an extreme in your demands on the Ranaji. Act so as to keep him satisfied. You cannot grasp the whole world in one day." (S.P.D. xiv. 54.) *Vamsha Bh.*, 3236-8, gives these details, as well as those in the next two paragraphs. In Sanskrit a *Chakravarti* or Sovereign is defined as a king ruling over a circle of twelve sub-kings. *S.P.D.* xiv. 50, 51.

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Matters having been thus settled in Mewār, Bāji Rāo advanced north towards Jaipur, making a pilgrimage to Nāthdwārā (25 miles north of Udaipur) on the way. Thence he marched to Jahājpur (25 miles north-west of Bundi.) Jai Singh had hastened southwards with all his forces to meet him on the way. Their interview took place at the village of Bhambholāo* near Kishangarh. Jai Singh had asked from the Peshwā equality of honour with the Mahārānā, but Bāji Rāo told him that the lord of Udaipur was equal in status with his own king Shāhu as he had never owned the Muslim Pādishāh as master, while Jai Singh was a mere imperial mansabdār. A pavilion was pitched in the middle for the meeting while the two armies stood fully armed on the two sides, (c. 15 February.) The two chiefs descended from their elephants, embraced, and sat down on the same cushion, the Peshwā on the right and Jai Singh on the left. Bāji Rāo, in spite of his being a priest by caste and the prime minister of the greatest Hindu Rājah in India, had the manners of a moss-trooper, which had been anything but improved by his infatuation for Mastānī, a Muslim girl with the morals of a *vivandière*. He enjoyed his pipe, blowing the smoke into the face of his host. Now, the Jaipur Rājah, though a Rājput, was a man of refined tastes, and had consorted with scholarly Europeans. He did not enjoy this rough horseplay of the Deccani, but was powerless to check it. The Marātha captains were presented to Jai Singh one by one; only Malhar Holkar sulked in his tent, as Bāji Rāo did not now ask Jai Singh to restore Bundi to Budh Singh, although they had promised to Rājah Shāhu to do so when Pratāp Singh Hādā was at Satārā begging Marātha aid for him.

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∗ The only name approaching this that I can find in the map near Kishangarh is Bonabhao, 7 m. due east of Pushkar and 13 m. s. w. of Kishangarh. (Ind. Atlas, 33 S. E.)

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Then Jai Singh went back to his capital, telling Bāji Rāo that it was better for him to return to the Deccan as the time was not favourable for his intended attack on Delhi; he might come next year with better preparations. In the meantime, Jai Singh promised to use his influence at the imperial Court to secure for Rājah Shāhu the grant of *chauth* and the cession of Mālwa from the Emperor. From this point, Bāji Rāo retraced his steps to the Deccan, halting on the way at Begham (25 miles n.e. of Chitor), where he paid a visit to the dispossessed Budh Singh, in the company of Malhar and Pratāp Hādā, and spoke a few kind words to soothe his feelings. (*Vamsha* Bh., 3238—3240; S. P. D., xiv. 52, 56, xxii. 331, 333.)

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§ 12. Imperialists open peace negotiations with Baji Rao, 1736.

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In the meantime, while Bāji Rāo was still in Mewār (January), his agent Mahādev Bhat Hingané went to Jaipur and was introduced by the minister Ayā Mal (Rājāmal) to Jai Singh, who agreed to present the Peshwā with five *lakhs*,—two *lakhs* in cash and the balance in costly robes, jewellery, five horses and one elephant. The Rājah sent a message to Bāji Rāo inviting him to his dominions and promising to introduce him to the Emperor and arrange a lasting peace between the Mughal Government and the Marātha, by securing for the latter the grant of 20 *lakhs* in cash and a *jāgir* worth 40 *lakhs* a year in Mālwa, the subsidy being assigned on Dost Muhammad Khān of Bhopāl. With this offer, Ayā Mal went to Bāji Rāo’s camp. Another Marātha wakil, Dādāji Pant, attended the camp of Khān-i-Daurān, negotiating through the medium of Rānoji Sindhia and Rāmchandra Bābā Shenvi. The Bakhshi sent Nejābat Ali Khān from his side with money to Bāji Rāo. (S. P. D., xiv. 50, 51.)

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In short, as Bāji Rāo wrote to his mother, the Emperor and his councillors were eager to make friends with him. He himself had no armed conflict anywhere. A state of war had existed between his generals and the imperial officers (especially Muhammad Khān Bangash) in the country south of Dholpur. But as soon as peace overtures were received from Delhi through Jai Singh, Bāji Rāo sent out orders (7th Feb.) to his officers to suspend hostilities. The Marātha detachment in Jodhpur territory* was recalled. Khān-i-Daurān at first proposed to come from Delhi and meet the Peshwā, but evidently he did not, and the negotiations were opened on behalf of the Emperor by Yādgār Kashmiri, Kripā Rām and Nejābat Ali Khān, who left Delhi on 8 March. Bāji Rāo next went into Ahirwādi (north-east of Sironj), sending his agent Bābu Rāo to Delhi, on whose return with a reply from the imperial Court the Peshwā set out for the Deccan (end of April, 1736.) (S. P. D., xiv. 51, 56, 58, 52; Siyar, ii. 84; Later Mughals, ii. 284.)

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∗ Malhar and Rānoji marched to Merta, guided by Pratāp S. Hādā. Pratap at first visited Ummed Singh Sisodia of Shāhpurā (acting as Abhay Singh's agent) and the bhāndāri (Marwar minister) within the city and discussed terms with them. But no ransom having been agreed upon, Pratap returned to the Maratha camp and hostilities were begun. On the first day the Marathas captured the town, which was totally deserted, the inhabitants having fled to the fort. Then siege was laid to the fort and trenches carried towards its walls. The garrison made repeated sorties on the trenches, each side losing some officers of note in the encounters. The Marathas were bombarded from the fort walls and driven out of the outermost trench of the defenders which they had occupied after the retirement of the Rajputs from it. Heavy exchange of fire went on from day to day. [S.P.D., xiv. 14. This letter was written by Malhar and Ranoji from their camp before Merta, to the Peshwa, and is dated by the editor, in a correction, 1st April 1736. But as Sambhar was sacked on 28 Feb. 1735, that year is more likely for this letter, and the date should be 12th April, 1735; but the day of the week given in the latter agrees only with 1734.]

§ 13. Campaign of early 1736; imperialists defeated

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We shall here briefly survey the campaigns in the three theatres, Mālwa, Bundelkhand and Eastern Rājputānā, which were ended early by these peace talks. At the close of 1735, the Peshwā’s brother Chimnāji advanced with a large army towards Gwālior by way of Sironj and Bundelkhand. Pilāji Jādav came from the south to support him and was left in charge of the operations. Muhammad Khān Bangash, the subahdār of Allahabad, was ordered to proceed to the defence of Mālwa. The fort of Gwālior successfully held out under a contingent of Pathāns sent by him. Leaving that fort untaken, a Maratha division under Bāji Bhimrāo proceeded to Nurābād, 15 miles north of it, and made it their base for some weeks, and advancing still further reached Syliā, 7 miles n.w. of Nurābād and only four or five miles from the Chambal river.

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In the meantime, Muhammad Khān Bangsh had reached Dholpur on 14th January 1736 and taken post in the ravines of the Chambal, guarding every ford against the invaders. The Marātha leaders halted at Syliā for about ten days, daily sending out cavalry patrols to the river to watch for Muhammad Khān. But in fear of the Marāthas, "he would not once come out of his hole in the sands of the river," and there could be no fight with him. Bāji Bhimrāo then surprised and sacked the village of Bāgohini (11 miles w. of Syliā), the stronghold of a robber chieftain (clan Sikarbār.) When this division fell back towards Gwālior, Muhammad Khān ventured out of the bed of the Chambal and entrenched in the ravines that intersect the narrow fork between that river and the Koāri (immediately south of the Chambal), throwing up mud walls and mounting guns. Behind these he sheltered himself, refusing to accept the challenge to sally forth and fight the Marāthas when they reappeared before him. Thus the whole month of January and the earlier part of February were passed in inaction on the Mughal side, after which envoys came from the Bangash for terms and finally hostilities were suspended by order of the Peshwā (received by Bhimrāo on 1st March) as the Delhi Court had inclined towards peace. Then the invaders withdrew from Mālwa (March 1736.) Before this a small Marātha force had crossed the Jamunā and made a dash into the Gangetic doāb, raiding some places in the Etāwa and Cawnpur districts, but it retired shortly afterwards; Bāji Rāo also wrote (end of February) forbidding these provocations. (S. P. D., xiv. 55, 56; xiii. 48; Later Mughals, ii. 281-282.)

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In Bundelkhand, the wazir's division advanced by way of Narwar to the Arjal lake, 12 miles east of Orchhā, where he entrenched and faced Pilāji Jādav during the month of fasting (January.) There were frequent skirmishes between the patrols. At last on 3rd February, Pilāji delivered an attack, but after an all-day battle he fell back at night and made a rapid retreat to the Deccan, the Mughals following in search of him, but at a great distance behind, up to Ujjain. (Lat. Mug. ii. 282-283.)

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In the western theatre, Khān-i-Daurān was sent to expel the Marāthas from Rājputānā. Joined by Jai Singh, he prepared a strongly entrenched position at Todā Tonk, facing Malhar and his ally Pratāp Hādā. The imperialists were here immobilised for many weeks, and one day a foraging party from their camp, 1,500 strong, was almost totally cut off. Then in February the peace negotiations put an end to the operations,* the Marāthas went away and the two Mughal generals were liberated. (*Later Mughals*, ii. 283-284.)

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§ 14. Baji Rao invades Northern India, 1737-38.

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Throughout the year 1737 a severe famine due to failure of rain and the exhaustion of last year’s harvest, raged in Bundelkhand and the north-eastern parts of Malwa, up to the Jamuna river. The water-sources on the way dried up and no food for man or horse could be had anywhere before the new crop ripened. (*S. P. D.*, xiv. 52, xv. 8.) Next year, 1738, the famine desolated the Aurangabad and Ahmadnagar region in the Deccan (xv. 63.) No real settlement could be effected through the peace-negotiations conducted by Jai Singh as mediator. He induced the Emperor to appoint Bāji Rāo as deputy governor of Malwa, with Jai Singh himself as the nominal *subahdār*. "This was, in effect, though not in form, a cession of the province. As to the other concessions the only one agreed to was the hereditary appointment (of Rājah Shāhu) as *sardesh-pāndya* in the six provinces of Mughal Deccan; . . . the rate of payment was five per cent. of the revenue." (*Lat. Mugh.*, ii. 284-285.) This did not satisfy the Marathas, and responding to Jai Singh's secret invitation Bāji Rāo issued from Punā on 12th November, 1736, to carry the war to the gates of Delhi. (*Vam. Bh.*, 240; *S. P. D.*, xxii. 341.)

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∗ Irvine’s statement. (ii. 284) that Jai Singh and Bāji Rāo met at Dholpur on 8th Rabi I 1149 (6 July 1736, O.S.) is impossible, as we know from the Peshwā’s records (S.P.D. xxii. 333) that he re-entered Puna on 24th June 1736. Here Irvine’s Persian authorities have made a confusion of years. A Peshwā did meet Jai Singh on 8th Rabi I, but it was in the year 1154 (=13 May 1741) and the Peshwā was Bālāji Rāo. (S.P.D. xxi. 2.)

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The campaign in Bhadāur, the ravage of the Gangetic doab in March 1737, Sādat Khan's defeat of Malhar and Satvoji Jādav at Jālesar on 13th March—which according to the Marāthā despatches was greatly exaggerated by the imperialists, Bāji Rao's cavalry dash upon the environs of Delhi and sack of Kālka-devi (30th March), the terror of the capital and Court, the rout of the imperialists at Tāl Katorā, the *wazir's* victory at Bādshāhpur (31st March), the sudden retreat of Bāji Rāo to Rājputānā, the coming of the Nizām to the Emperor's aid (2nd July), his fight with Bāji Rāo near Bhopāl (December), and the humiliating treaty made by him with the Marāthas at Dorāha,* have been described in detail in Irvine's *Later Mughals*, ii. 286-306, on the basis of the Persian authorities, with information from the Marāthi sources then available added by me in the form of notes to that work.

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∗ 6th January 1738, promising to grant to Bāji Rao (1) the whole of Malwa, (2) the complete sovereignty of the territory between the Narmada and the Chambal, (3) to obtain confirmation

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This expedition did not affect Rājputānā except that while Bāji Rāo was investing the Nizām at Bhopāl in December 1737, Safdar Jang and Mahārāo Durjan Sāl Hādā of Kotā, marching to the relief of the Nizām, were intercepted and defeated by Malhar Holkar and Jaswant Pawār. For his unfriendly act the Mahārāo now felt the heavy hand of the Marāthas. After the Nizām had made terms and retreated to Delhi, Bāji Rāo with Malhar Holkar and Jaswant Pawār marched from Bhopāl to Kotā, laid siege to the fort, and "utterly devastated that district by plunder", (January 1738.) Durjan Sāl fled to fort Gangroni and made peace by promising to pay a fine of ten *lakhs*. Eight *lakhs* were paid down (by 10 Feb.) and a bond was signed for the remaining two *lakhs*.*

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