Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c8.s5: § 17. Condition of the country under Maratha terror
Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c8.s5
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§ 17. Condition of the country under Maratha terror
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This second Bargi invasion (March to May, 1743) repeated the misery of the previous year's raid, though in a smaller theatre and for a shorter time. The English merchants of Calcutta write, “An entire stop was put to (our) business for some time at Calcutta, Qāsimbāzār and Patna.” The defensive measures at Calcutta are thus described: “On the Marāthas’ return we on 17th March (1743) ordered the batteries to be put in good order and entertained a hundred Baksaris. We raised a militia of the inhabitants on 4th April. The merchants proposed at their own expense to dig a ditch round the town to secure their houses. (The Council) agreed thereto on 29th March and lent them Rs. 25,000 on four persons’ security to repay it in three months; which is completed as far as the Great Road that leads from the Fort Gate towards the Lake and is begun to be carried on as far as the extent of the Company’s bounds at Govindpur.” This was the origin of the famous Marātha Ditch of Calcutta. [Bengal letter, 3rd February, 1744.] At Patna the nāib nāzim, Zainuddin Ahmad Haibat Jang, constructed a mud wall round the city.
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§ 18. Third Maratha incursion, March, 1744.
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The nine months from June 1743 to February 1744 passed in peace for these three provinces, and then at the beginning of March, 1744, Bhāskar renewed the invasion of Bengal by way of Orissā and Medinipur. He was now in a fierce mood by reason of his having lost all his booty and camp property in his hurried flight from Katwā (27 Sep. 1742) in his first year's campaign, and his having been expelled bag and baggage from Bengal by Bālāji in the second year (April, 1743). The Peshwā had easily secured 22 *lakhs* of Rupees from the province, while the Bhonslé had hitherto gained not a pice in return for his vast expenditure on the Bengal adventure. Therefore, Bhāskar began his third year's raid with brutal ferocity and the Nāgpur troops ranged through the country like mad dogs.
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As the contemporary Gangārām writes: "As soon as Bhaskar arrived again, he summoned all his captains and ordered them, "Draw your swords and kill every man and woman that you see." When the commander spoke thus, they plundered and slew on every side with shouts of *kill! kill!!* Brahmans, Vaishnavs, Sannyāsis, women and cows were slaughtered by hundreds." The universal outrage committed on women by the raiders as reported by this observer has been mentioned already.
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In their attempt to escape from such rape and slaughter, the fugitive population had to undergo unspeakable privations.
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§ 19. *Alivardi deceived by the Peshwa—his helplessness.*
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Alivardi was utterly bewildered by this revival of the Marātha menace. Only a year ago he had paid a huge subsidy to Bālāji on condition that the Peshwā would effect an enduring settlement with Raghuji and insure Bengal against all risk of *Bargi* raids in future. Bālāji had, no doubt, driven Raghuji out of the province for the occasion (April 1743), but next year these human locusts reappeared in their myriads as before.
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The reason was that in the meantime these two Marātha chiefs had met together at their king's Court and Shāhu had imposed upon them a compromise, dated 31 August, 1743, by which the four *subahs* of Malwa Agra Ajmir and Allahabad as well as the two estates of Tikāri and Bhojpur (inclusive of Dāudnagar) in *subah* Bihār, *i.e.*, the tract lying west of Patna and east of Allahabad and yielding 12 lakhs of Rupees a year, were assigned to the Peshwā, while Raghuji was to enjoy the two *subahs* of Bengal (including Orissā) and Oudh in their entirety and all Bihār except the *mahals* yielding 12 lakhs reserved for the Peshwā; and each was strictly forbidden to interfere with the other's share. [*Aitihāsik Patravyavahār*, ii. 35 and 36.]
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This meant in effect that the province was merely partitioned between these two Marātha leaders as their respective spheres of influence; each of them simply contracted not to encroach on the other's special hunting ground, but was left free to do what he liked in his own part of the subah, without any moral or legal responsibility to protect the payer of the blackmail in the other parts of his dominion.
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The Nawāb found that in return for all his expenditure he had now got not an assured protector, but only two blood-suckers instead of one. The Peshwā's breach of his promise and callous desertion of the Nawāb's cause threw Alivardi into an agony of despair and rage. Smarting under the 'Punic bad faith' of the Marātha race, he decided to use the same weapon to free his people from their intolerable tyranny. His own situation was well nigh desperate. The two successive years' invasions had more than half dried up his revenue, and at the same time his coffers had been exhausted by the heavy tribute that he had to pay to the Emperor on his accession,[*] the subsidy exacted by Bālājī in 1743, the pay and bounty of the vastly increased army that he had now to maintain for the defence of the province, and the cost of the munitions and equipment consumed in the war. His Government was bankrupt. His soldiers were worn out by the fatigue of campaigning every year. He himself was in poor health and unable to march out at their head. Therefore, a new campaign against the elusive Marāthas in the fierce summer just then commencing, had to be avoided by all means.
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∗ Alivardi had paid the Emperor 40 lakhs of Rupees on account of the property of the deceased Sarafraz Khan and 40 lakhs as his own peshkash, in addition to the annual surplus of the revenue of the three provinces (which was one kror of Rupees acc. to Siyar, 107). He also presented, at his accession, 3 lakhs to the imperial wazir and one lakh to the Nizam, besides smaller sums to other nobles (Riyaz, 325; Siyar, ii. 107).
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§ 20. Alivardi massacres the Maratha generals at an interview.
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The Nawāb took counsel with his leading Afghān general, Ghulām Mustafa Khān, who undertook to bring Bhāskar and his chief officers to a friendly interview and there massacre them, if he was promised the governorship of Bihar as his reward for the deed. Alivardi agreed, and the plan was matured in strict secrecy. Under Bhāskar there had come this year twenty Marātha generals and two Muhammadans, namely Shahāmat Khān and Alibhāi Qarāwwal. Alivardi sent Rājah Jānakirām (his *diwān*) and Mustafa Khān to Bhāskar’s camp at Dignagar. The two envoys declared that the Nawāb was anxious to end these disputes by paying an annual *chauth* that may be fixed by mutual agreement and that for such a settlement a personal discussion between the two chiefs was necessary. Jānakirām and Mustafa took the most solemn oaths possible for a Hindu and a Muslim respectively that no treachery would be done to Bhāskar’s party if they visited the Nawāb. Then Bhāskar agreed to come and an auspicious day (the second day of the Bengali new-year, 31st March, 1744) was fixed for the interview.
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The place selected for the meeting was the plain of Mankarā, four miles south of the modern Berhampur Cantonment station. By way of Katwā and Palāshi, Bhāskar reached Mankarā on 31st March. Portions of his army remained behind at Katwā and Palāshi (18 miles south of Mankarā.
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Bhāskar advanced on foot to the big tent of interview and was welcomed at its door by Jānakirām and Mustafa Khān. With him were 21 generals, the only absentee being Raghuji Gāikwād, who had always suspected Alivardi of treachery and on this day had stayed behind on the plea of illness. Besides these, there were some twenty other attendants of lower rank. The party began to walk up the carpeted floor of the tent towards the far end of it where the Nawāb was sitting on a dais with his officers. They had barely crossed one-fourth of the way, when the Nawāb, after satisfying himself that Bhāskar had really come, cried out, "Kill these wretched misbelievers." Then the Nawāb’s soldiers rushed out of their places of hiding in the wings, hemmed the Marātha visitors round and after some exchange of blows cut all of them down.
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As soon as the massacre began, the Nawāb got out of the tent by the back door, joined his men behind it, and ordered a charge on the Marātha general’s escort. These leaderless men fled without making a stand anywhere. Raghuji Gāikwād, the sole survivor of the massacre, had galloped away with his contingent at the first tumult, reached the camps at Palāshi and Katwā, and quickly set off for his home with the troops present there and as much property and baggage as could be loaded quickly. Their roving bands fled to Nāgpur from every part of these provinces. Bengal and Orissā were thus cleared of the enemy at one blow. The Nawāb distributed a bounty of ten lakhs of Rupees to his troops. The Emperor, at his recommendation, conferred promotions and titles on all the officers of the Bengal army.*
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∗ Siyar, ii. 134-136, Riyaz, 350-352. Letter from Chandarnagar to Pondichery, 12th May (N. S.), Calcutta letter to Company, 3rd August.
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The three eastern provinces enjoyed peace and happiness for fifteen months after the death of Bhāskar. The Rājah of Nāgpur was in no position to avenge the murder of his generals immediately. His money difficulties had grown worse by now, and his old friction with the Peshwā had recurred in many a quarter in violation of the compromise effected in 1743, because even after that agreement each was trying to encroach on the other's special sphere. As a financial speculation the three campaigns in Bengal from 1742 to 1744 had brought no gain to the Nāgpur Government. The result was a respite enjoyed by Bengal for more than a year after March 1744.
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§ 21. *Nawāb's money difficulties and exactions.*
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For the time being the Marātha menace had been dispelled, but the Nawāb's Government was at its wits' end for money. The three annual raids had caused an enormous loss of wealth and shrinkage of revenue. As the Peshwā's agent at the Court of the Nawāb told him in December 1746, "Raghuji, after coming to your country has plundered and destroyed ten times the value of the *chauth* of the province." At the same time, the Nawāb had to increase his defensive force to an immense extent; and his army bill alone amounted to one *kror* and eighty *lakhs* of Rupees a year. The result was that bankruptcy stared him in the face and he was driven to raise money by every means fair or foul.
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In 1743 he had levied a war tax of Rs. 2,000 from each of the three European nations trading in his dominions, but it was a mere drop in the ocean of his need. Early in July 1744 he made "a very extraordinary demand" on the English chief of the Qāsimbāzār factory, "setting forth that the English carried on the trade of the whole world; (they formerly) used to have but four or five ships, but now brought 40 or 50 sails, which belonged not to the Company; that for five years he had done them daily service, but they had him not in remembrance, (and now) that he was engaged in defending the country against the Marāthas, instead of assisting (him) they had supplied the enemy with powder and ball. He therefore ordered them to refrain (from) doing any business at any place, unless (they) supplied him with two months' pay for his troops, amounting to about three millions of Rupees." Three days afterwards (10th July) the Nawāb set peons on the European merchants at Murshidābād and issued orders to all parts of the country to stop trading by the Europeans.
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From the Bengal letter of 8th November 1744 we learn: "Horse and foot were gone to impede business at the *garā ārangs* (i.e., factories of coarse cotton cloth). The Nawāb went on seizing and whipping every person. Preet Cotmah was tortured till he agreed to pay Rs. 1,35,000, and (was then) delivered to another tormentor to make him agree to three *lakhs*. The (English Company's) *wakils* were kept two days at the *darbar* without eating.” . . . . After a time the Nawāb referred the affair (of the English Company) to Chain Rāi and Fathchand (Jagat Seth), who said, “The Nawāb does not expect this sum (namely, 30 *lakhs*) from the Company, but expects that they raise it among the merchants under their protection and from the number of rich persons (who have) fled to Calcutta during (these) troubles.” (They added) “that the Nawāb, to pay his troops, had spent the revenues of the province, his own wealth, and was forced to take money from his relations and servants, and therefore thought it highly reasonable (that) the inhabitants of Calcutta should pay a share. The military officers were impatient and daily importuned the Nawāb to give (them) orders to fall on the English and the *ārangs*.”
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The English Company, in order to reopen their business in Bengal, Bihār and Orissā, were at last (Oct. 1744) glad to beat the Nawāb down to Rs. three and a half *lakhs*, besides which they had to pay Rs. 30,500 to his generals and officers in Murshidābād, Rs. 8,000 at Patna, and Rs. 5,000 at Dāccā. [Bengal letter, 9 February, 1745.]
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The French at Chandarnagar suffered equally, considering the small value of their trade in comparison with that of the English. In December the Chandarnagar Council was faced with the Nawāb’s demand for one *lakh* of Rupees, and had ultimately to pay Rs. 45,000 under the name of a loan. So, the Superior Council of Pondichery issued absolute orders to levy from the inhabitants of the French villages in Bengal a tax which was estimated to yield Rs. 25,000. We thus see that the pressure in the last resort was passed on to the helpless Indian peasant, as is always the case.
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§ 22. *Afghan general Mustafa Khān quarrels with Alivardi, 1745.*
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A year of peace followed the extermination of Bhāskar Rāo and other Marātha generals, and then in 1745 a domestic revolution turned Alivardi’s strongest allies into his bitterest enemies and the divided and weak condition of the province resulting from this internal dissension lured the Marāthas to renew their raids with a prospect of easy success which would have been otherwise impossible. Bengal has no indigenous race capable of the long continued exertion, the ready submission to discipline, the concerted action in large bodies, and the cool and steady fighting that are required in resisting the hardier races of invaders coming from the south or the west. War, as distinct from the mere guarding of palaces or convoys and the police protection of revenue-collectors and custom-officers, had not been the profession of any class of its people since the imposition of Mughal peace two centuries ago. Therefore, the army of the Nawābs of Bengal, Bihār and Orissā, after they had become independent of the central Government at Delhi, was filled entirely with Afghāns (both infantry and cavalry) and Hindu foot-musketeers of Baksar, with a sprinkling of Sayyids of Barha and other foreign settlers in Upper India and Bahelia musketeers from Oudh. Of these the Afghāns were by far the most numerous and efficient element. Their proud consciousness of superiority, inborn martial habits, and strong clannish cohesion made them quite irresistible if they could be only united under one great leader.
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Hitherto the Nawāb’s right-hand man had been Ghulām Mustafa Khān, the foremost of his Afghān officers. Mustafa’s personal achievement in defeating the first year’s Marātha raid and his successful *coup* in destroying Bhāskar in the third year, had raised him almost to a position of equality with Alivardi. His reputation as a brave man and veteran general was deservedly unrivalled, and he had gathered in his own command a compact body of 9,000 Afghān horsemen besides a force of infantry. His armed strength, capacity and ambition made him a formidable danger to the Nawāb's throne.
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Alivardi in his hour of sore need had lightly promised him the governorship of Bihār as his reward if he could murder Bhāskar; but he now shrank from the fulfilment of his promise and tried to placate Mustafa by deferring a decision and sending him only smooth messages. Mustafa was justly angry at this breach of faith. His tone became haughtier and more insistent as his heart grew sick with hope deferred, till an armed conflict between him and the Nawāb seemed imminent. He came to fear the fate of Bhāskar if he attended the Nawāb's Court, and therefore he kept to his own house surrounded by his retainers. Alivardi, on his part, called up the loyal troops from all sides and guarded his palace and the mansions of his relatives in full force against any sudden assault by Mustafa's army.
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But some other Afghān generals, like Shamshir Khān and Sardār Khān, and even a few of the lieutenants of Mustafa, were won over by Alivardi's gold and favours, and Mustafa on seeing the forces gathering under the Nawāb at Murshidābād, shrank from delivering an attack on him. He resigned the Nawāb’s service and demanded the due salary of his troops, amounting to 17 *lakhs* of Rupees, which the Nawāb paid at once without holding any muster or examination of accounts, and thus promptly got rid of the menace to his throne and capital (February, 1745). The discontented general set off for Patna, determined to wrest the throne of Bihār from Alivardi’s deputy Zain-ud-din Ahmad Haibat Jang. On the way he forcibly took away some guns and elephants of the Government from Rājmahal, stormed the fort of Mungir, and appeared before Patna (March 14, 1745) in open rebellion. If Alivardi could seize the throne of the three provinces from the lawful *subahdār*, Sarāfrāz Khān, why should not he (Mustafa) do the same from Alivardi? He too held a conquering sword in his hand, which was the best of imperial *sanads* in that age, as he openly said, in reply to a conciliatory message sent by Zain-ud-din. [*Siyar*, ii. 141.]
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§ 23. Mustafa Khān assaults Patna city.
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Zain-ud-din was warned by Alivardi of the coming danger and urged to save himself by fleeing to Murshidābād by the northern side of the Ganges, so as to avoid Mustafa’s route. He chose the manlier part of defending the province in his charge. Hurrying back to his capital from Tirhut, he rapidly organised a most efficient plan for guarding Patna. Calling up his detachments from the outposts and all local nobles and loyal zamindārs to his side, he soon assembled about 14,000 fighters round him. His armed camp in Jafar Khān’s garden, east of Patna City, was surrounded on the land side by a ring of wooden towers (*sangar*) for musketeers, and these were joined together by curtains and continued up to the embankment for keeping out the flood from the marsh south-west of the city (called *jallā*). A deep wet ditch was dug outside this line of defence and the earth thus excavated was thrown up in the form of a rampart outside the mud and water. On the bastions guns were mounted, and sections of the walls were distributed among the different captains.
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By the middle of March, Mustafa Khan’s force had swollen to 14,000 troopers, partly his own retainers and partly adventurers who had gathered round him in search of employment. With him were about 50 pieces of artillery and 150 elephants; but his Afghāns made little use of cannon, though they carried firelocks to the field and used them on suitable occasions. Their horses were the best available in India, the cheapest of them having cost not less than four to five hundred Rupees. Their gorgeous saddle and accoutrement and gilded armour made a splendid show.
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Arriving before Patna about two hours after dawn on March 14, 1745, Mustafa Khān halted in the numerous mango-groves south of the city. Forming his men in two divisions, each six to seven thousand strong, he sent one of them under Buland Khān Ruhela to turn the rear of the defences, while he himself led the other against the last stockade which was held by the Rājāh of Tikāri and other zamindārs. The local levies broke and fled at the first charge of these compact bodies of seasoned warriors, and the Nawāb’s officers who made a stand found themselves unsupported except by a handful of personal friends. The field was quickly swept clear up to the position where Zainuddin himself stood thinly guarded.
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Mustafa now pushed close up to him, and the Afghān’s victory seemed certain, when a musket shot killed Mustafa’s elephant driver, which induced that general to jump down from its back lest the uncontrollable beast should stampede to his rear and his followers interpret the movement as their general’s flight. But his action in dismounting produced exactly the effect that he wanted to avoid; his men concluded that he had been shot off his elephant like his *māhut* a few minutes before; they broke and fled, and Patna was saved.
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For five days and nights after, the two armies stood facing each other in their respective positions, merely exchanging fruitless gunfire. At last Mustafa realised that he was powerless to storm the city and camp, and began his retreat on the 21st. Zainuddin could not at first credit the news that such a great threat had passed away so easily; hence, there was no effective pursuit of the enemy. By way of Mithāpur, Naubatpur, and Muhib-Alipur the baffled Afghān general retired south-westwards to the Son river. Soon afterwards Alivardi arrived at Patna and joined in the pursuit. Mustafa was now quickly expelled from Bihar and chased as far as Zamānia (opposite Ghazipur). The rebel took refuge in the village at the foot of Chunār fort, which belonged to the *subah* of Oudh, and Alivardi and Zainuddin returned to their respective capitals in April [Siyar, ii. 137—146.]
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§ 24. Fall of Mustafa Khan.
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Meantime, Raghuji Bhonslé, at the invitation of Mustafa, had invaded the province, which hastened the return of Alivardi to Bengal and detained him there. This news encouraged Mustafa to come out of Chunār, just before the arrival of the monsoon rains which would make campaigning impossible for the imperialists and give him time to enrich himself by plunder. He entered the Shāhābād district and reached the zamīndāri of Udwant Singh Ujjainiā, the owner of Jagadispur, who had long been hostile to the governor of Bihār.
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On hearing of this development, Zainuddin promptly issued from Patna at the head of 13,000 men, forded the Son river at Koilwar, and next day advanced 12 miles south-west by south to Karhani on the edge of the jungle of Jagadispur. Two miles beyond this village the enemy were sighted and the battle joined (June 20, 1745). Mustafa’s forces and equipment had been greatly depleted by his lack of money, as his Patna adventure had ended in failure and he had exhausted all his treasure. But he charged desperately. Nothing could stop him; the Nawāb’s vanguard was put to flight; but just then Mustafa was shot dead by a musket-ball. A servant of the Nawāb mounted the rebel’s elephant, cut off his head, and exposed it on the point of a spear. At the sight of it the Afghān army broke and fled to the village of Magror under the leadership of Mustafa’s son, Murtaza, and other surviving officers. Thus one great danger passed away from the Nawāb and he was free to deal effectively with another which had assailed him at the same time. This was the fourth incursion of the Bargis.* [Siyar, ii. 146—148.]