Fall of the Mughal Empire v2.c27.s10.37

v2.c27.s10.37

The Bhāu had started from the Deccan with a wholesome respect for the Durrāni military power and a persistent belief that his own resources must be greatly increased by the addition of fresh musketeers, firearms, munitions, and North-Indian allies, before he could confront such an enemy with any hope of victory. His almost daily correspondence during this campaign effectively disproves the popular tradition that his head was turned by insolence and pride ; it could not have been so before his capture of Delhi ( 3 August ), when Suraj Mal had already been estranged. His letters [ SPD. xxvii. 255, 257 ] to the Peshwā show that even after the capture of Delhi he realized the gravity of his position and the difficulty of defeating Abdāli in pitched battle, so that he still preferred a waiting game and the policy of starving the enemy out as the best in the circumstances. A durable and honourable peace with Abdāli was possible by sharing Hindustan with him, vix., by ceding the Panjāb to Ahmad Shah and confirming Najib's possessions in the Doāb. But such a settlement he had rejected in June, long before his capture of Delhi, because the Peshwā's instructions were clearly against ceding the Panjāb to the Afghans. Therefore, a fight to the finish with the Durrānīs was the only course left to the Bhāu, and for this choice of an extreme policy the responsibility rests not on the Bhāu but on his master in Punā.