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Fall of the Mughal Empire v2.c27.s11: § 10. Difficulties and distress of the Bhau after the conquest of Delhi

Fall of the Mughal Empire v2.c27.s11

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§ 10. Difficulties and distress of the Bhau after the conquest of Delhi

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But the Maratha acquisition of the Mughal capital was in truth a barren spectacular success. It actually aggravated the Bhāu’s difficulties in two ways. His residence in the dry sterile north-western suburbs of Delhi (the Shālimār gardens) far away from the friendly and fertile old base in the Jāt country, caused the draught-oxen of his guns and munition-tumbrils to die of famine and sickness. The stoppage of food supply from the Doāb by reason of Abdālī’s occupation of the tract immediately east of Delhi and the flood in the Jamunā, caused his soldiers and horses to starve. At the same time the occupation of the imperial city brought him no gain in money, but actually increased his expenses by one lakh a month. As the official guardian of the imperial family, he had now become responsible for the maintenance of the princes and the salaries of the palace guards and menial servants and the Court officials. [SPD. xxvii. 257.]

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On 16th September we have this astonishing report from the Bhāu’s camp in Delhi, “In our army even big men are fasting, the horses have forgotten what it is to eat gram. Our soldiers are ruined; nowhere is a loan obtainable. There is no life left in any man or horse; our men can procure rice with difficulty. The end of it all threatens to be very hard. None has seen such a year ever before.” Each trooper and his horse now required Rs. 200 a month for food, and yet for three months the Bhāu had not been able to pay any subsistence money to his soldiers.

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Even a fortnight before this the Bhāu had written to the Peshwā: “There is starvation in my camp; but no loan can be had; no revenue is being paid to me by any kamāvisdār (collector), in spite of my frequently writing to them. My troops are going through many a fast.” Up to 5th September, the Bhāu had received from two Maratha collectors in North India only Rs. 2,80,000 and “not a kauri from any one else.” The two lakhs that he had received at Sironj (6 May) from the Peshwā had been exhausted in a fortnight. And, as early as 26th June, when he had not yet reached Agra, he makes this piteous appeal to the Peshwā for financial assistance: “I am getting no money from any side,—neither from our mahals [in the Doāb] which are disturbed, nor from tribute which is being evaded [by our vassal chiefs.] If we are to overcome Abdāli we require 30,000 horsemen. Many of my troopers had lost their chargers in the war with Nizām Ali, or from disease, and they have to be supplied with remounts. The parting gift for last year is still unpaid to my troops. As I cannot give them their full subsistence even, whence can I pay their overdue parting gift and bounty for equipment (nālbandi)? The troubles around Delhi have dispersed the bankers of this region; hence no loan can be raised here.” [SPD. ii. 130, 131, xxi. 193, xxvii. 257, 255, 258.]

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§ 11. Sadashiv Bhau's financial resources during the Panipat campaign.

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The Peshwā had sent the Bhāu off with such small funds as he could immediately spare and had supplemented them with two lakhs after a month. He himself was overwhelmed with debt (a legacy from his father) and expected the Bhāu to support his troops with the revenue of the Maratha jāgirs in Hindustan and the tribute due from the Rajahs there, which would now be more promptly paid by reason of the Bhāu's presence there in overwhelming force. But both these calculations went wrong. The northern vassals sat on the fence, paying nothing unless the Bhāu attacked them (which was not expedient during Abdālī’s presence in India.) The Peshwā’s orders were that his local revenue officers should pay half their actual collection to the Bhāu and remit the other half to the Punā treasury. In consequence of it, the Bhāu received nothing beyond Rs. 2,80,000 (as against 25 lakhs due on paper from Govind Ballāl alone.) He wrote to the Peshwā complaining that the rascally collectors had taken advantage of the Peshwā’s order and “paid to neither, telling the Bhāu that they had transmitted their entire receipts to Punā, and reporting to the Peshwā that they had paid the whole amount to the Bhāu!” It is clear that the Bhāu entirely misjudged the situation from his ignorance of North India; he refused to accept Govind Ballāl’s very reasonable explanation that the Maratha districts in the Doāb had been too much ravaged by the late wars and were now too convulsed by Abdālī’s presence in force in Aligarh to yield their normal revenue.

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All that was remitted to the Bhāu by the Maratha collectors in Hindustan, besides the above Rs. 2,80,000, was 4.2 lakhs which reached Nāro Shankar at Delhi on 17th December, and out of which only Rs. 1,10,000 was safely conveyed to Panipat,—or a total of Rs. 3,90,000 actually received. Adding to this the 9 lakhs he made by coining the remnant of the silver ceiling of the Diwān-i-khās of Delhi and the 7 lakhs of booty secured at Kunjpurā, as also the Rs. 1,88,000 received at Sironj and the lakh or less of starting gift at Patdur,—his total receipts during this entire campaign of just under ten months was about 22½ lakhs. But his mothly expenditure ran to 5½ lakhs for the first four months and a half, seven lakhs for the next two months and a half, and about ten lakhs during the last three months,—or a total of over 72 lakhs, *i. e.*, more than three times his income. And this at a time and in a country where he had not a single ally nor a single banker willing to give him credit. [SPD. xxvii. 254-258. Raj. i. 281.]

Cites (1)