Fall of the Mughal Empire v2.c27.s16.4

v2.c27.s16.4

Everything, therefore, seemed to point out that the Afghan invader would be glad to beat a hurried retreat to his home without venturing to attack the Marathas, or, if he chose to halt there, the longer he delayed the more would his Indian allies be scattered by privations, and his troops and horses reduced by famine, so that a crushing victory over him would be a mere walk over for the Marathas. The Bhāu’s plan was accordingly formed; on 4th November he decided to entrench his position and secure it by artillery against assault. At the same time he wrote to Govind Ballāl to harry the upper Doab, now entirely denuded of Durrāni and Indo-Afghan troops, to cut off the grain convoys that Najib’s agents were sending from that region to his camp in the desolate Pānipat district, to capture Najib’s posts in the Mirat division, and even to threaten to cross the Ganges and sack the homes of the Ruhelas and Shujā’s northern districts. Such hostile action on the east of the Jamuna would place Abdali between two fires, intensify the sufferings of his troops and impel all his Indian allies to hurry back from his banners to the defence of their Doāb and trans-Ganges homes. The Bhāu’s strategy was eminently sound in theory; it only needed able instruments to execute it and an adequate supply of food and munitions to outlast his opponent’s. The question, in its essence, was simply which of the two would starve the other out first. In both of these respects the Bhāu’s calculations went wrong, and the inevitable result was disaster.