Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c40.s7: § 3. Fourth stage: Sindhia advances again, reaches Lalsot
Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c40.s7
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§ 3. Fourth stage: Sindhia advances again, reaches Lalsot
v3.c40.s7.1
Sindhia therefore determined to put a bold face on it. Giving up all ideas of retreat, he countermarched towards the enemy position, arriving a few miles south of Lālsot (probably at Bhaiā kā Bāgh) on 15th June. On the same day the Rajput force at Dāosa pushed a detachment southwards to occupy Ramgarh, which is only 6 miles north-west of Lalsot, thus threatening to oppose the Maratha advance through the latter pass and to pin the invaders down to the dry circuitous route south of it for their communication with Agra.
v3.c40.s7.2
But though Mahadji had boldly turned at bay, he was really not in a position to risk an action. There was constant and increasing desertion from his North Indian contingent owing to famine prices (wheat selling in his camp at six seers to the Rupee) and his long default in paying their salary. His own faithful Deccani troops cherished a rooted distrust of their North Indian allies and ever stood on the guard against any treacherous attack from that side of the camp. Every one said that on the day of action these Hindustanis would go over to the enemy and turn suddenly upon their professed comrades. Sindhia was therefore forced to put off an action and bide his time till he should be joined by the trusty detachments he had recalled to his aid. These were two: Khande Rao's division in Bundelkhand, consisting of 10,000 hard-bitten veterans and the two disciplined sepoy battalions of De Boigne with their excellent artillery,—and Ambaji Ingle's army, then posted in the Karnal district, nominally 15,000 strong with guns. The latter was also expected to bring with himself a strong force of hired Sikh cavalry. Ambaji started from Patiala on 7th June but was greatly delayed on the way by heavy rain and local hostility, so that it was as late as the 16th of the next month when he could ride into Mahadji’s camp, and that too after leaving his entire force straggling several days’ march behind, near Kot-Putli. [PRC. i. 117, 122, 124, 129.]
v3.c40.s7.3
Therefore, for a week after reaching Lalsot, Sindhia firmly held to his cautious resolve and kept his generals back from advancing to seek a conflict with the enemy. The Rajput army, in spite of the tall talk of their generals and the ignorant clamour of their rank and file, really dreaded a trial of strength with Sindhia. They had a salutary fear of his more modern and better served artillery and his fine sepoy battalions under French commandants. They therefore planned to neutralise these advantages of their enemy by delivering battle on a rainy day when gunpowder would be less effective against sword and lance. Or, as an alternative, five thousand Rathor horse, vowed to death, would deliver a wild onslaught on his guns, ride over their brethren mown down by the first discharge or two, and impetuously fall upon the gunners and cut them down before they could load again. The Marathas on their part were terrorised by the reports which their spies brought of the Rajput war-plan of keeping their main force in ambush in the deep ravines which scored that terrain, and sending a small body onwards to engage the Marathas and then by a pretended flight decoy them into the nālās. Hence, Mahadji abandoned his first idea of surprising the immobile Rajput camp at night. He trusted to time for the speedy dissolution of the ill-knit Rajput confederacy; he must fight a field action in which his superiority in artillery and disciplined musketeers would have full effect. [Akhbarat.]