Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c40.s7.2

v3.c40.s7.2

But though Mahadji had boldly turned at bay, he was really not in a position to risk an action. There was constant and increasing desertion from his North Indian contingent owing to famine prices (wheat selling in his camp at six seers to the Rupee) and his long default in paying their salary. His own faithful Deccani troops cherished a rooted distrust of their North Indian allies and ever stood on the guard against any treacherous attack from that side of the camp. Every one said that on the day of action these Hindustanis would go over to the enemy and turn suddenly upon their professed comrades. Sindhia was therefore forced to put off an action and bide his time till he should be joined by the trusty detachments he had recalled to his aid. These were two: Khande Rao's division in Bundelkhand, consisting of 10,000 hard-bitten veterans and the two disciplined sepoy battalions of De Boigne with their excellent artillery,—and Ambaji Ingle's army, then posted in the Karnal district, nominally 15,000 strong with guns. The latter was also expected to bring with himself a strong force of hired Sikh cavalry. Ambaji started from Patiala on 7th June but was greatly delayed on the way by heavy rain and local hostility, so that it was as late as the 16th of the next month when he could ride into Mahadji’s camp, and that too after leaving his entire force straggling several days’ march behind, near Kot-Putli. [PRC. i. 117, 122, 124, 129.]