Fall of the Mughal Empire v4.c53.s2: § 2. Lakhwā Dādā is appointed Sindhia’s viceroy in Hindustan, (Nov. 1794), his difficulties
Fall of the Mughal Empire v4.c53.s2
- Language
- English
§ 2. Lakhwā Dādā is appointed Sindhia’s viceroy in Hindustan, (Nov. 1794), his difficulties
v4.c53.s2.1
Lakhwā Dādā in concert with Jagu Bāpu, took charge of his office as Sindhia’s viceroy in Northern India, on 1st November 1794. His dismissed predecessor Gopāl Bhāu accompanied by his family took refuge in De Boigne’s camp, seeking protection from the violence of his long unpaid soldiery.
v4.c53.s2.2
Lakshman Anant Lād, popularly called Lakhwā Dādā, was an officer of outstanding ability and character. During the eclipse of Mahādji Sindhiā after Lālsot, he had defended Agra fort against the combined forces of Ghulām Qādir and Ismail Beg for nine months, with matchless courage, tenacity and alertness. (Ch. 36 § 3.) Later he had distinguished himself in some other campaigns. His political sagacity equalled his generalship. Like his master Mahādji, he had the wisdom to treat the English Power with courtesy and friendliness. The British Resident, Colonel Palmer, “lamented the fall of Lakhwā Dādā (in November 1796) on account of his personal character, which for mildness and moderation exceeds that of any Maratha I know.” (*PRC.* viii. 42, 217.)
v4.c53.s2.3
It was to no bed of roses that Lakhwā Dādā succeeded when he became Sindhiā’s viceroy of North India. During the month before, De Boigne had realised some lakhs as tribute from Jaipur and Mācheri, but he had spent this money in paying the salaries of the regular corps (*paltan*) under himself only, while the indigenous Deccani cavalry and the North Indian irregulars (*fauj*) received no part of their long standing dues. A bitter quarrel broke out between the two sections of Sindhia’s army in the North, and it led to rioting, in the course of which the Regulars wounded eight men of the Silahdār cavalry. The indigenous troops vowed vengeance, but Bālobā Pāgnis’s agent pacified them by promising that Lakhwā Dādā would satisfy their claims on returning to his head quarters in Mathurā,—as if the new viceroy could coin money (*DY.* ii. 138, 139).
v4.c53.s2.4
The financial mismanagement of the Marātha administrators in the North and South alike, foredoomed their dream of *Hindupat Pādshāhi* (paramountcy over all India) to utter futility. As the British Resident, Colonel William Palmer, wrote during a visit to Lakhwā’s camp in Mathurā in April 1795,—
v4.c53.s2.5
"The officers who have lately succeeded to the administration of the Maratha affairs in Hindustan found them in a state of very alarming disorder; the revenues grossly mismanaged or embezzled and the collections so reduced as to be very inadequate to the expenses of Government. The Deccan troops and Hindustani Irregulars mutinous and disaffected for want of pay, and with difficulty restrained from the greatest outrages by the corps under Mons. De Boigne; the tributary Rajahs retaining their respective contributions and preparing to resist the future exaction of them; the Sikhs ready to invade and ravage the western provinces. . .
v4.c53.s2.6
"The Maratha State . . . is but ill-qualified for permanent conquest or civil government, however formidable may be the means which it possesses of ravage and devastation. The whole country under its subjection from the Chambal to the Ganges is in the most miserable state of neglect and disorder, the lands deserted and the cultivation so scanty as scarcely to supply subsistence to the remaining inhabitants, the roads infested with numerous bands of robbers, . . . particularly in the neighbourhood of Delhi, where they are so formidable as to set the forces of the Government at defiance.
v4.c53.s2.7
"In this disgraceful and ruinous condition of the country and Government, a large army is employed in seeking its own subsistence by exacting unjust contributions from the defenceless Rajahs of Hindustan, instead of repressing the violences and depredations committed in their own territories and protecting their own subjects and revenue." [PRC. viii. No. 11.]
v4.c53.s2.8
But administrative disorder and vanished revenue were not the only drag on Lakhwā Dādā's activity. During the months immediately following his coming to power, the thoughts of all Marātha leaders were absorbed by the problem of forcing the Nizām to fulfil his treaty obligations. The decision of arms took place at Khardā on 11th March 1795, but before the terms of the treaty forced on the Nizām there were executed, came the catastrophe of the young Peshwā's death (27th Oct.), followed by an interregnum of 13 months when Mahārāshtra became a scene of hopeless intrigue and party strife, till the recognition of Bāji Rao II as Peshwā (5 Dec. 1796.) During this interval the Central power of the Marātha State was entirely paralysed and its recently humbled enemies recovered their old position. No military help could be expected by the viceroy of Hindustan from his master in Punā, and therefore he could take no strong action.
v4.c53.s2.9
§ 3. Threatened invasion by the Abdāli Shāh—its reaction on Indian politics
v4.c53.s2.10
At the same time the death of Mahādji Sindhiā encouraged all the anti-Marātha elements in Northern India, and even the faithless Shah Alam to invite the Durrāni king Zamān Shāh to invade India and repeat his grand-father's feat by expelling the Marāthas and restoring Muslim domination in Hindustan. Every winter that the Shah crossed the Khyber and came to Peshāwar, a thrill of fear passed through the Panjab, Delhi and Oudh. In 1794 (January), 1795 (Nov.), 1796 (Nov.), 1797 (Oct.), and 1798 (Oct.) Zamān Shāh visited Peshāwar, and in 1797 and 1798 occupied Lāhor itself. The report of his movements sent the rich fleeing from Lāhor, Amritsar and even Delhi to safer places, and made the Marātha generals in the north "tremble like a cane branch under the wind" and cling helplessly to the English for armed support. From our fuller knowledge of the facts we can now see that the Afghan menace was really not so great as the men of the time feared. In fact, the Durrāni king's power was hopelessly weakened by his empty treasury and the incurable disputes in his family, while the Sikhs gradually set as a concrete wall guarding the land of the five rivers, and young Ranjit Singh made himself master of Lāhor.*
v4.c53.s2.11
∗ Zamān Shāh left Lāhor on 4th January 1799. "This was the last Muslim invasion of India. The Khālsa though disunited, had erected a wall of concrete against the north-western flood which had carried
v4.c53.s2.12
Therefore, the Marātha generals in Hindustan remained on the defensive every winter from 1795 to 1798-99, and no ambitious or long-extending project could be undertaken by Lakhwā Dādā or his successor during these years. The departure of De Boigne from India at the end of 1795 robbed the Marāthas of a strong and reliable defender, and henceforth they could only make pathetic appeals to the English for a defensive coalition. But the British Indian authorities more accurately gauged the Durrāni power for offence and gave only a lukewarm response to the Marātha proposals.
v4.c53.s2.13
We shall now briefly narrate what Lakhwā Dādā could do during his viceroyalty. In August 1795, he forced the fort of Sābalgarh, in the Karāuli State, south-east of the Chambal, to capitulate and then laid siege to Bijaypur (south of Sābalgarh). In October he stormed the city of Narwar from the Kachhwā Raja of Shivpuri, and next invested the fort which protected the city, but it held out till March next year. In June 1796, we find Lakhwā attacking Datiā, the Bundelā Raja of which defied the Marathas for many years. [PRC. viii. 24.]
v4.c53.s2.14
But Lakhwā Dādā had not enjoyed his high office for full two years when a revolution in his master's Court in Punā overthrew him.