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Early Chauhan Dynasties c51: Chapter XXVII: The Causes of the Downfall of the Early Chauhān Kingdoms

Early Chauhān Dynasties c51

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Chapter XXVII: The Causes of the Downfall of the Early Chauhān Kingdoms

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In the preceding pages we have tried to give some idea of the chief achievements of the Chauhāns, of their successes and failures and the way their people lived, thought and acted. Patriotic Hindus must have admired the Chauhāns for their long and brave stand against the Muslims. In the very beginning of their historical career, they helped the Pratīhāras in stemming the onrush of the Arabs. They fought against the Ghaznavites. From the twelfth to the fourteenth century Arṇorāja, Vigraharāja IV, Pṛthvīrāja III, Vāgbhaṭa, Hammīra, Sātaladeva and Kānhaḍadeva formed the vanguard of that noble and heroic band of warriors who fought for Hindu independence and Hindu culture. That ultimately even these sturdy fighters had to succumb to the Muslim invaders calls for some explanation.

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None who has gone through these pages would regard lack of valour as one of the causes of Chauhān failure. Muslim as well as Hindu historians bear incontestable testimony to the fact that the valiant Chauhāns knew well how to die and sell their lives dear. Many a time they fought on even when there was not the least chance of success,¹ because they considered it disgraceful to surrender or flee. To them nothing was more meritorious than to die fighting on the battlefield. Nor was the failure of the Chauhāns due to any lack of religious fervour. The Siwālik Pillar *praśasti* which praises Vigraharāja IV for having made Āryāvarta a real *Āryāvarta*, *i.e.*, an abode of the Āryas, by the repeated destruction of the *Mlechchhas*,² could not have been composed at the dictation of a ruler uninspired by the love of Hinduism and a relentless hatred of the Muslims; and the same anti-Muslim and pro-Hindu spirit pervades the drama, *Lalitavigraharāja*, wherein the hero, who is none else than Vigraharāja IV himself is represented as saying that he cared little for his life, if he could not protect the Brāhmaṇas, sacred places and the temples of Hindu gods from destruction at the hands of the *Hammīra*, *i.e.*, the Amīr of Ghaznā.³ According to the *Pṛthvīrājavijaya*, the first Chauhān was born to free Puṣkara from the ill-doings of the *Mātaṅgas*.⁴ Pṛthvīrāja II and Pṛthvīrāja III were regarded as incarnations of Rāma,⁵ because their mission was believed to have been the destruction of the *Asuras*, meaning by this term, of course, the Muslim invaders from the north-west. Jayānaka even goes so far as to call the Muslims "demons in human form whose destruction had been vowed by Pṛthvīrāja."⁶ Firishta's statement that in the second battle of Tarāin "the Rājpūt princes, to the number of 150, had assembled in the vast camp, having sworn by the water of the Ganges, that they would conquer their enemies or die martyrs to their faith"⁷ again tells the same story of the Chauhān's love of Hindu religion and determination, if necessary, to die for it. In fact, a careful perusal of the epigraphic and literary sources of the period, whether Hindu or Muslim, would belie the belief, popularly entertained, that the Muslims alone knew how to risk their lives and to make the heaviest sacrifices for their faith.

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¹ See for instance above, pp. 185-186, the last fight of Sātala.

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² आाविन्ध्याद्रि-हिमाद्रैर्विरचितजयस्तीर्थयात्राप्रसङ्गा- दुद्ग्रीवेषु प्रहर्ता नृपतिषु विनमत्कन्धरेषु प्रसन्नः । आर्यावर्तं यथार्थं पुनरपि कृतवान् म्लेच्छविच्छेदनाभि- र्देवः शाकम्भरीन्द्रो जगति विजयते वीसलक्षोणिपालः ॥

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³ अकीर्तिः काप्युच्चैः सुहृदभयदानव्रतहति- स्तथा ध्वंसस्तीर्थ-द्विज-सुमनसां वीर्यविगमः । ममैतेषु व्यस्तेष्वपि भृशमसह्येषु सकला- निमानङ्गीकर्तुः कथयत विधेयं किमसुभिः ॥

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⁴ See Brahmā's prayer to Viṣṇu, Canto I.

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⁵ पृथ्वीराजो महाराजो रामोसौ संशयं विना (Pṛthvīrāja II's Hānsī inscription) श्रीराम एव पृथ्वीराजरूपो जात इति वक्ष्यति । (Jonarāja's comment on *PV.*, I. 33)

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⁶ Canto X, 42.

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⁷ *TF.*, I, 175.

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And equally difficult it is to agree with the dictum of those who ascribe the fall of the Chauhāns to the lack of generalship among their leaders. Arṇorāja, Vigraharāja IV and Kīrtipāla were all leaders of note, in no way inferior to their Muslim adversaries, the Yāminīs of Ghaznā and Muhammad of Ghor. Pṛthvīrāja III defeated the Muslims decisively in the first battle of Tarāīn. What his tactics might have been, if he had not been deceived by Muhammad Ghorī’s promise of truce is beyond any historian’s power to tell. To declare, as Sir Wolseley Haig has done, that Pṛthvīrāja III lost the battle of Tarāīn on account of being a slave to tradition is certainly going beyond the evidence at our disposal and ignoring the great advantage accruing to the Muslim forces as a result of their surprise attack, which forced the Hindus not to fight as they wished, but as well as they could, against a well-equipped army employing tactics already well-thought-out and discussed.⁸ Hammīra of Raṇthambhor drove back the Muslims more than once from before the walls of his fort, and his fall, ultimately, was due more to treachery in his own ranks than to any conspicuous military skill displayed by Alāuddīn Khaljī.⁹ Sātaladeva and Kānhuḍadeva resisted for years the might of Delhi. If the superior resources of a big empire, employed for years against them, along with perfidy, bribery and treachery, finally brought about their downfall, the credit for this should not go to Khaljī generalship.

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⁸ See above, pp. 93-95, for details.

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⁹ See above, pp. 123-125, for details.

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We have to look elsewhere than the lack of religious fervour, lack of military skill and lack of valour for the downfall of the Chauhāns. Partly, it was due to the caste system, which whatever its services might have been towards the preservation of Hinduism, had disastrous effects in the political field. It prevented not only the amount of fusion necessary for the creation of a strong people but also kept away a large number of people from the profession of fighting. Once the fighting class (which consisted largely of Rājpūts with a small sprinkling of Brāhmaṇas¹⁰ and now and then a Vaiśya¹¹) was defeated, the enemy had generally an easy walk-over. The priestly classes generally resisted only when it came to the destruction of the temples where they officiated. The traders perhaps resisted even less. All that they wanted was a settled government, and generally they were the first to come to terms with the alien government.¹² As to the depressed classes, which have always constituted a very large percentage of the Indian population, what interest could they have in the perpetuation of a political system in which they had plenty of duties but very few rights? When big kingdoms fall, one after the other, in their fight against a common enemy, obviously, it is not the political leaders alone, but the whole social system and its inadequate adjustment to changing conditions that is at fault.

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¹⁰ Pṛthvīrāja's general, Skanda, was a Brāhmaṇa. So was also the commander of the Chaulukya forces sent against Ballāla of Mālwā. The soldiers who killed Ballāla were according to the *Dvyāśraya-kāvya* of Hemachandra "bad Brāhmaṇas." Kumāra, the *purohita* of Gujarāt, is similarly said to have been a good general.

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¹¹ शस्त्राशस्त्रि युध्यमाना राजपुत्रा एव शोभन्ते न वणिजः (खरतरगच्छपट्टावलि, *Ms.*, p. 20.) Notable exceptions to this rule are Ambada and Vastupāla.

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¹² See for instance the Jaina inscriptions referring themselves to the "reign" of Alp Khān (*Prāchīna-Gurjara-kāvya-saṅgraha*, Appendices VII and VIII), the *Samararāso*, and the *Nābhinandana-jinoddhāra-grantha*). Read also the present writer's paper, "New light on Alāuddīn Khaljī's achievements," *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Seventeenth Session, pp. 240 ff.

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In some measure the downfall must have been due also to luxury and idleness fostered by many years of continued prosperity. A ruler like Pṛthvīrāja III who could indulge in riot and revelry with the enemy just encamped opposite¹³ deserved to fail against an adversary who had since his defeat in the second battle of Tarāīn "abstained from his wife's bed", "not changed the clothes of his body", and, having passed the year in grief, "sorrow and sadness", not permitted the *Amīrs* who had abandoned him in the battle to present themselves in his presence.¹⁴ Pṛthvīrāja's brother, Harirāja, was according to the *Hammīramahākāvya* overpowered easily by his Muslim enemies, because towards the end of his reign he began spending most of his time in the company of the dancing girls presented to him by the ruler of Gujarāt.¹⁵ Hammīra of Raṇthambhor allowed, to his cost, his policy to be influenced by the court-dancer, Dhārā¹⁶; and this general tendency towards voluptuousness and indolence finds expression in contemporary literature also,¹⁷ though in the Rājasthān of our period it perhaps never reached the lengths it did in the Madhyadeśa.

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¹³ See above, p. 94.

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¹⁴ Raverty, *Tabaqāt-i-Nāsirī*, p. 467, footnote 7.

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¹⁵ *HM*, IV, 2-16.

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¹⁶ See above.

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¹⁷ See for instance the *Karpūramañjarī*, the *Laṭakamelaka* and the *Rambhāmañjarī*. My paper, "Gleanings from Sanskrit Literature, Rājaśekhara's works," *JIH*, 1939, may also be read in this connection.

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We have to remember also that virtue carried too far turns into vice. The Chauhāns' adherence to *śāstras*, when fighting against their own countrymen, was perhaps commendable. But it was suicidal in the fight against an alien race which recognised no such rules. Similarly, though it was good to be religious, it was bad to be superstitious. A society, which turned a *Mlechchha* victor into Rudra (*Kānhaḍadeprabandha*, II, 131-4) eager to cut the heads of Kṣatriyas, and ascribed all mishaps to its own past misdeeds (*Ibid.*, I, 158-174) was bound to suffer some day for its credulity.

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Equally or even more fatal to their political existence was their failure to evolve a political and military system strong enough to fight and unite India against invaders. Partly it was a fight of the elephant against the horse. The elephant was good enough under Indian conditions. It could help in breaking the gates of a fortress. It could trample under feet the slow moving force of the enemy. But it was no match for the swift Central Asian horse. The Muslim soldier shot arrows from its back-arrows which could easily pierce through the armours the Indian had. Further havoc was created by the use of naptha arrows, but this perhaps a little later. The Indians of the period 1200-1215 A.D., or so, because they could neither bring into existence a strong cavalry, with the weak horses they had nor create a mounted archer whose striking capacity equalled that of his Asian adversary. That the Indians fully realised their essential unity is demonstrated by the existence of their most important sacred places, Rāmeśvara, Badrīnātha, Dvārakā, Jagannāthapurī respectively in the extreme south, north, west and east of India; by the repetition of a formula containing the names of the sacred rivers of both the north and the south by devout Hindus at the time of their bath every day; and also by the aspiration of the Indian *digvijayin* to rule India from the Himālayas to the southern ocean and from the western to the eastern sea.¹⁸ But the methods that they employed to give this ambition a political and practical shape were in nine cases out of ten extremely unsatisfactory. The success of Alexander against the freedom-loving but weak republics of the Punjāb and the failure of Seleukos Nikator against Chandragupta Maurya should have shown the Indians that the interest of India could be best served by a strong central government which, while giving full freedom to municipal and rural bodies, kept severely in check fissiparous tendencies of the provinces by appointing its own governors, keeping a well-organized regular army paid direct from the State-treasury, and the use of news-writers and other agencies so well-known to us from Maurya and other records. But the Rājpūts preferred instead the traditional *digvijayin’s* ideal of merely exacting tribute and leaving the administration of the acquired territories almost wholly under the control of the beaten princes. They merely asked them to keep in readiness, a number of horse and foot for the service of the suzerain,¹⁹ and even in their own *deśa*, power largely lay with feudal lords enjoying definite rights and immunities and leading their own followers in a battle. This state of affairs, though highly extolled by some writers,²⁰ could hardly lead to the formation of a consolidated and strong state, powerful enough to throw back the vigorous races from the north-west, who in their fight with the Rājpūts were inspired by religious zeal as well as pecuniary greed. Raw levies, coming together on the spur of the moment and fighting under the leadership of their different leaders, could not be the best means of beating back a determined enemy. The Rājpūts did not lack courage. But they lacked discipline and the absolute unity of command so necessary for success in major operations²¹.

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¹⁸ For this topic Dr. R. K. Mookerji's *Fundamental Unity of India* may be read with profit.

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¹⁹ See the chapter on administration.

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²⁰ By Sri C. V. Vaidya in *History of Medieval India*, Vol. II and Dr. Ishwari Prasad who quotes Vaidya’s remarks approvingly in his *Medieval India*.

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²¹ See above the account of the Chauhān military machine for its weak points.

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Result as good as that of a strong centralised state might have been secured also, if the Rājpūts had learnt to cut down the powers of the feudal lords and feudatories, sunk their mutual differences and evolved somehow the idea of a federation. In the twelfth century this, in fact, would have been the best policy. With the Muslims knocking at the western door of India, and the three main powers of Northern India, the Chauhāns, the Chaulukyas and the Gāhaḍavālas so evenly balanced that none could secure more than a temporary advantage over the others, *digvijayas* of the old type described in the *Raghuvamśa*, or of any type in fact, meant not merely wastage of energy but the ruin of the country. The *digvijayins* turned these great kingdoms against one another, when a common front was needed, and allowed them to be destroyed piecemeal by the Muslims. Had the Chaulukyas and the Gāhaḍavālas come to the help of the Chauhāns immediately after the second battle of Tarāin, the fortunes of the kingdom of Sapādalakṣa could have been retrieved and the Hindus might have escaped many years of humiliation. It was the just hand of Nemesis which struck down Jayachandra in 1194 A.D. and humiliated the Chaulukyas two years later. Kelhaṇa, Hammīra and Kānhaḍadeva all fell before the relentless foe, because they forgot the axiomatic truth, “United we stand, divided we fall”.

Cites (11)