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Early Chauhan Dynasties c51.25

Early Chauhān Dynasties c51.25

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English

c51.25

Equally or even more fatal to their political existence was their failure to evolve a political and military system strong enough to fight and unite India against invaders. Partly it was a fight of the elephant against the horse. The elephant was good enough under Indian conditions. It could help in breaking the gates of a fortress. It could trample under feet the slow moving force of the enemy. But it was no match for the swift Central Asian horse. The Muslim soldier shot arrows from its back-arrows which could easily pierce through the armours the Indian had. Further havoc was created by the use of naptha arrows, but this perhaps a little later. The Indians of the period 1200-1215 A.D., or so, because they could neither bring into existence a strong cavalry, with the weak horses they had nor create a mounted archer whose striking capacity equalled that of his Asian adversary. That the Indians fully realised their essential unity is demonstrated by the existence of their most important sacred places, Rāmeśvara, Badrīnātha, Dvārakā, Jagannāthapurī respectively in the extreme south, north, west and east of India; by the repetition of a formula containing the names of the sacred rivers of both the north and the south by devout Hindus at the time of their bath every day; and also by the aspiration of the Indian *digvijayin* to rule India from the Himālayas to the southern ocean and from the western to the eastern sea.¹⁸ But the methods that they employed to give this ambition a political and practical shape were in nine cases out of ten extremely unsatisfactory. The success of Alexander against the freedom-loving but weak republics of the Punjāb and the failure of Seleukos Nikator against Chandragupta Maurya should have shown the Indians that the interest of India could be best served by a strong central government which, while giving full freedom to municipal and rural bodies, kept severely in check fissiparous tendencies of the provinces by appointing its own governors, keeping a well-organized regular army paid direct from the State-treasury, and the use of news-writers and other agencies so well-known to us from Maurya and other records. But the Rājpūts preferred instead the traditional *digvijayin’s* ideal of merely exacting tribute and leaving the administration of the acquired territories almost wholly under the control of the beaten princes. They merely asked them to keep in readiness, a number of horse and foot for the service of the suzerain,¹⁹ and even in their own *deśa*, power largely lay with feudal lords enjoying definite rights and immunities and leading their own followers in a battle. This state of affairs, though highly extolled by some writers,²⁰ could hardly lead to the formation of a consolidated and strong state, powerful enough to throw back the vigorous races from the north-west, who in their fight with the Rājpūts were inspired by religious zeal as well as pecuniary greed. Raw levies, coming together on the spur of the moment and fighting under the leadership of their different leaders, could not be the best means of beating back a determined enemy. The Rājpūts did not lack courage. But they lacked discipline and the absolute unity of command so necessary for success in major operations²¹.